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What and how should individuals resist in political situations? While this question, or 
versions of  it, recurs regularly within Western political philosophy, answers to it have often 
relied on dyads founded upon dogmatically held ideals. In particular, there is a strain of  
idealist political philosophy, inaugurated by Plato and Þnding contemporary expression in the 
work of  Alain Badiou, that employs dyads (such as the distinction between truth and doxa or 
the privilege of  thought over sense) that tend to reduce the complexities of  practices of  
resistance to concepts of  commitment. Although these dyads have been challenged by, 
amongst others, poststructuralist theorists, this has often been at the cost of  losing their 
structuralist heritage. This thesis develops an ontology proper to structuralism that engenders 
non-idealist and non-dogmatic, yet ethical, practices of  resistance against commitment 
orientated accounts of  resistance and the return of  classical ontological dyads. 
The thesis begins with an examination of  the extent to which a dogmatic use of  
idealism grounds the work of  a prominent contemporary theorist, Alain Badiou. In 
developing his neo-Maoist metapolitics, Badiou follows both Platonic ontology and the 
Marxist tradition of  dialectics by claiming that political practice can only be carried out in 
truth by paying Þdelity to an event that ruptures the presented order of  things. Chapter one 
opens with an exploration of  BadiouÕs mathematic meta-ontology to draw out its three 
foundational dyads (truth/doxa; sense/intelligibility; is/is not). It is argued that although 
Badiou makes important criticisms of  the preponderant trends of  political philosophy, he is 
unable to support his own account of  politics due to his dogmatic reliance on idealist 
principles. Chapter two begins by developing two accounts: Þrst, of  the relations between 
BadiouÕs work and that of  his former teacher Louis Althusser and, secondly, the relations 
between AlthusserÕs thought and that of  Gilles Deleuze, in particular his reading of  David 
Hume. Discussion centres around the importance of  the role that time plays within the works 
of  all three authors, particularly in regard to the idea of  the void. The chapter concludes with 
the argument that HumeÕs temporal idea of  human nature is the key to a symptomatic 
reading of  Althusser that accounts for the persistence of  ideas in the latterÕs social theory. In 
chapter three, DeleuzeÕs reading of  HumeÕs idea of  relations is developed to take into account 
chapter argues that DeleuzeÕs account of  temporal relations informs AlthusserÕs social theory 
to create the ontological grounds for non-dogmatic and non-idealist practices of  resistance.  
These practices are developed in chapter four with an unlikely turn to John Stuart MillÕs 
idea of  genius, the metaphysical property of  the individual that signiÞes the discovery of  new 
truth. The chapter begins with an argument that there is an under-developed account of  
ethics in DeleuzeÕs work. Distinguishing the idea of  genius from both MillÕs moral philosophy, 
as well as from utilitarian thought more generally, the idea of  genius is sutured onto DeleuzeÕs 
ontological account of  individuation. Read alongside AlthusserÕs social theory, which accounts 
for the non-idealist conceptualisation of  situations, this suture creates an ethically oriented 
structuralist ontology. The thesis concludes with the argument that the idea of  genius is the 
ethical imperative that motivates practices of  resistance. When individuals are understood as 
embodied within situations, practices of  resistance are conceptualised not against other 
components of  a situation, but contra them, taking them into account in order to amplify, 
multiply and transform the individualÕs potential within a situation. 
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ÔThese three dimensions Ð knowledge, power and self  Ð are irreducible, yet 
constantly imply one another. They are three ÔontologiesÕ. Why does Foucault 
add that they are historical? Because they do not set universal conditions. . . 
they do vary with history. What in fact they present is the way in which the 
problem appears in a particular historical formation: what can I know or see 
and articulate in such and such a condition for light and language? What can I 
do, what power can I claim and what resistances may I counter? What can I 
be, with what folds can I surround myself  or how can I produce myself  as a 
subject? On these three questions, the I does not designate a universal but a 
set of  particular positions occupied within a One speaks-One sees, One 
confronts, One lives. No single solution can be transposed from one age to 
another, but we can penetrate or encroach on certain problematic Þelds, 
which means that the ÔgivensÕ of  an old problem are reactivated in 
anotherÕ (Deleuze 1988a: 114-115) 
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What and how should individuals resist in political situations? Both the liberal and 
republican traditions of  political theory, as expressed in contemporary literature by inßuential 
names such as Dahl (1973, 1989), Pateman (1970) and Warren (2007), maintain that 
representative democracy channels citizensÕ voices into political institutions which exercise 
legitimate authority. As such, legitimate political resistance is targeted towards the state, and 
must be pre-authorised by the institutions that are often being resisted: a monstrous 
grandchild of  LockeÕs theory of  toleration, where Þdelity to the state is the precondition for 
resistance to it (Locke 1988 [1690]). Rejecting this Ôjuridical model of  sovereigntyÕ, Foucault 
(2003) reversed ClausewitzÕs dictum to claim that Ôpolitics is the continuation of  war by other 
meansÕ, and demonstrate both the superÞciality of  political elitesÕ claims to legitimacy and the 
contingency of  their authority. If  Foucault is correct, it is clear that any attempts to preÞgure 
the target and mode of  resistance must be examined for the preconditions that accompany 
them. 
These predominant schools of  political theory are accompanied by a mode of  analysis 
in Anglo/American political studies: comparative analysis. According to this analysis, 
individual actions are preÞgured by the type of  actor one happens to be within given 
situations; an empirical ÒgridÓ is placed over a situation that classiÞes the situation as a set of  
dominant political actors and analysis then attempts to predict the actions they may 
undertake (Althusser and Balibar 1970: 18). In assuming the stability of  political institutions, 
as codiÞed by the liberal and republican traditions, the best approach to resistance for 
comparativists can only be understood having ruled out all other available options.  De Vaus 1
demonstrates the commitment to naive realism in such analysis, claiming that Ôit is only 
through making comparisons that our observations take on much meaning and we are able to 
eliminate alternative explanationsÕ (De Vaus 2001: 40). However, whereas comparative 
analysis may well be able to offer up logical political choices, having subtracted all other 
apparent options, it is unable (and often unwilling) to take into account the politics of  that 
logic: Ôone may applaud diffrance [...] in the humanities, but not in the social 
sciencesÕ (Gerring 2008: 7). The idea that things may not be as they seem is an importance 
 For accounts of  the comparative method in political analysis, see Heywood (2007), Jones and Gray (2010) and 1
Pollock (2012).
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relegated from the study of  politics to areas (presumably) less consequential. Indeed, in 
contemporary political analysis, questions of  political ontology are often superseded by the 
discussion of  methodology (see Katznelson in Lichbach and Zuckerman 1997: 81-112). 
The various schools of  Marxism know very well however that things are not what they 
seem and, worse, things might be concealed by false images of  ideology. Although developed 
by Engels and not Marx (Engels 1893), the idea of  Òfalse class consciousnessÓ, has provided 
the Marxist tradition with a useful image by which to analyse situations and prescribe the 
relevant course of  action. Whether developed by the Frankfurt School of  critical theorists, 
humanist Marxists such as Gramsci and Benjamin, or Hegelian Marxists such as Lukcs, 
Sayers and McLellan, the dialectic between (either true or false) thought and matter provides 
the means by which to understand historical change and articulate practices of  resistance. 
MarxÕs third thesis of  Feuerbach proves foundational in this regard, arguing that the 
materialist doctrine must Ôdivide society into two parts, one of  which is superior to society. 
The coincidence of  the changing of  circumstances and of  human activity or self-changing 
can be conceived and rationally understood only as revolutionary practiceÕ (Marx 1969 [1845]: 
13). In support of  revolutionary practice, the various schools of  Marxist thought keep the 
current of  ontology ßowing, relying on the ontology of  the dialectic to conceptualise the 
structure of  practices of  resistance. Whether in the form of  contradictory ideas in HegelÕs 
Science of  Logic (1969, 1991 [1830]), consciousness and objects in his Phenomenology of  Spirit 
(1998) or MarxÕs dialectic of  history (Marx 1976 [1867]), the relation of  two into one as the 
motor of  change underpins much contemporary political theory and accounts of  political 
resistance.  And yet, rarefying the dialectic to such importance risks dogmatic idealism, 2
deÞned by Kant as the use of  an idea without prior understanding of  its function (Kant 1996 
[1787]: Bxxxv- 22 xxxvi, pg. 35). The idea of  what is false as opposed to either true or real, 
and the sublimation of  two into one, begs investigation into the ontological nature of  dualities 
and whether or not practices of  resistance necessitate idealism in one form or another. 
This thesis develops an ontology proper to structuralism that engenders non-idealist and 
non-dogmatic, yet ethical, practices of  resistance against commitment orientated accounts of  
resistance and the return of  classical ontological dyads. Chapter one discusses a prominent 
account of  a philosophy that does rely on both commitment and dyads for its theory of  
 Inßuential examples include FreudÕs Civilisation and its Discontents (2015 [1930]), LacanÕs conceptualisation of  the 2
mirror stage (1956, 1977 [1949]) AgambenÕs conceptualisation of  biopolitics in Homo Sacer (1998), and ŽižekÕs 
resurrection of  Hegel (2012a).
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political resistance. A prominent contemporary philosopher, an interlocutor with Althusser 
and Deleuze, and a Þgure of  admiration by writers such as Žižek, Hallward, Douzinas and 
contemporary Marxists, Badiou writes with a strong polemical style which has garnered the 
attention of  both authors and activists. The chapter will examine what is at stake in the three 
dyads (truth/doxa; intelligible/sensible; is/is not) that Badiou maintainsÐalongside that of  
being and eventÐin order to support his ÒmetapoliticalÓ criticism of  contemporary political 
philosophy. In developing his neo-Maoist metapolitics, Badiou follows both the Marxist 
tradition of  dialectics and Platonic ontology by claiming that political practice can only be 
carried out in truth by paying Þdelity to an event which ruptures with the presented order of  
things. It will be argued that BadiouÕs axiomatic decision to rarify mathematics to the height 
of  ontology furnishes him with the grounds upon which to clearly and powerfully criticise 
contemporary politics and political philosophy. However, his insistence that matter must be 
subtracted from thought for the purposes of  truthful resistance prohibits him from accounting 
for how his idea of  resistance might engage with events. In formally maintaining the 
distinction between ideas and matter, BadiouÕs metaontology maintains an idealist 
commitment to mathematics which cannot be explained on his metaontologyÕs own account. 
Unable to account for the relation which sublates his neo-Platonic dialectic, he cannot 
therefore adequately conceptualise a practice of  resistance. 
As a member of  AlthusserÕs reading group on Spinoza, and an attendee of  his 
ÒPhilosophy Course for ScientistsÓ, Badiou drew inspiration from AlthusserÕs appropriation 
and development of  SpinozaÕs ontology. Deleuze also drew heavily on Spinoza, both in his 
books Spinoza: Practical Philosophy (1988b) and Expressionism and Philosophy (1992a) and a lecture 
series on his concept of  affect (1980). Nevertheless, whilst all three authors share a 
commitment to anti-humanism in their work, DeleuzeÕs ontology differs signiÞcantly from 
BadiouÕs in that he accounts for the differential relations between dyads, as opposed to arguing 
that they are ruptural (Bowden 2011: 173-177). How can two ontologies, so apparently at odds 
with each other, nevertheless claim the same inspiration? Chapter two examines the 
relationship between AlthusserÕs thought and that of  Badiou and Deleuze. The chapter begins 
by outlining AlthusserÕs appropriation of  Epicurean atomism to inform his ontology, upon 
which he builds his social and political theory. When he reads AlthusserÕs ontology however, 
Badiou reads it through the grid of  his own ruptural metaontology and thus forces his strict 
ontological differentiation upon AlthusserÕs work. Having Þrst outlined AlthusserÕs ontology, 
the chapter substantiates BadiouÕs misreading of  Althusser before foregrounding the 
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differential relations that separate AlthusserÕs categories and put him in line with Deleuze. 
Nevertheless, AlthusserÕs aleatory materialism will be shown still to suffer from an idealism in 
the form of  the Epicurean void, which breaks the persistence of  ideas in philosophical 
practice. In order to overcome this idealism, the chapter proceeds to suture onto AlthusserÕs 
materialism HumeÕs idea of  human nature. Whilst bearing in mind the explicit anti-
humanism of  AlthusserÕs philosophy, the suture of  HumeÕs conception of  human nature to 
AlthusserÕs historical materialism furnishes the latter with a conceptualisation of  persistence 
and overcomes the otherwise eliminative effect of  a philosophical void. 
Nevertheless, there is still the danger of  replacing one dogma for another: the idealism 
of  BadiouÕs dyads for the dogma of  the relations that constitute HumeÕs idea of  human 
nature. Why should there be only one particular set of  relations, as Hume argues, as opposed 
to others? What seems to be at stake here is either an ontological or a socio-historically 
speciÞc account of  the relationship between ideas and matter. Extending the argumentation 
from chapter oneÕs criticism of  Badiou, chapter three argues that it is necessary for philosophy 
to be able to explain both. That is to say, philosophy must be able to explain the ontological 
account of  social forms, as well as the social formationÕs account of  ontology.  Comparing 
ChamberÕs reading of  Althusser and MeillassouxÕs criticism of  Hume, this chapter 
demonstrates that AlthusserÕs ontology with HumeÕs idea of  human nature can indeed 
account for both, but it is necessary to suture on DeleuzeÕs theory of  time (Deleuze 2011 
[1994]). The chapter argues that Deleuze appropriates and modiÞes BergsonÕs theory of  time 
to account for how ideas, time and matter are related in a synthesis that avoids the criticism 
of  idealism. AlthusserÕs emphasis on political practice is read through DeleuzeÕs synthetic 
conceptualisation of  the individual to form the foundations of  a non-dogmatic practice of  
resistance developed in the Þnal chapter. 
This practice is developed in chapter four with an unlikely turn to John Stuart MillÕs 
idea of  genius. Distinguishing the idea of  genius from both MillÕs moral philosophy, as well as 
utilitarian thought more generally, the chapter argues that the idea of  genius provides the 
ethical imperative that motivates practices of  resistance. As opposed to conceptualising 
political philosophy according to the juridical model of  sovereign institutions as per the liberal 
and republican traditions, or the formal axiomatics of  BadiouÕs militant politics, the political 
philosophy of  Deleuze is described as a Òstructural normativityÓ. Whilst critics of  post-
structural philosophy have charged it with an inability to adequately account for normative 
concepts (see Habermas 2015: esp. 282-284), chapter four argues that structural normativity 
"6
provides in fact the key to conceptualising the relationship of  the individual with (political) 
norms that are also accounted for as part of  a structure. The chapter expands upon the 
beneÞts of  conceptualising this relation as such: with DeleuzeÕs ontology accounting for the 
individualÕs structural relation within situations, the idea of  genius is the non-ideal function of  
practice that informs resistance both to and within situations. In sum, this thesis argues that 
the principle of  genius impels the individual towards cautious, yet creative, resistance 
practices with the emphasis on experimental learning to inform the best course of  action. In 
accordance with this principle, the individual must pragmatically experiment within 
presented situations, tactically choosing options that supplement and liberate the individual 
from that which attempts to homogenise and conÞne them. 
A note on methodology 
This thesis avoids, on the whole, sections that exhaustively deÞne ideas. Where exegesis 
and explanation is needed for clarity, primary and secondary sources have been given. 
Occasionally, technical ideas are explained when necessary for argumentsÕ sake. The 
secondary literatures on all of  the authors drawn upon in this thesis are developed enough 
that full discussions of  their ideas can be found in much more substantial form there than can 
be reproduced here. As Bryant avows, this methodology is wholly in line with DeleuzeÕs own 
reading of  the history of  ideas, and focuses on addressing philosophical problems rather than 
simply listing the ÔtoolsÕ with which one might address them (Bryant 2008: 4-5). This is to say 
that, in line with Deleuze and GuattariÕs argument that philosophy as the Ôart of  forming, 
inventing, and fabricating conceptsÕ (Deleuze and Guattari 1994 [1991]: 2), this thesis has 
been written with the aim of  fabricating a non-dogmatic and non-idealist practice of  
resistance. 
In this light, it is understood that the reading of  Badiou that comes across in chapter 
one may appear polemic, if  not harsh in its conclusions. Unfortunately, given the vigour and 
commitment which Badiou infuses into his political arguments, it is hard not to make similar 
gestures in response. However, as stated in the chapterÕs discussion, there is no desire to target 
BadiouÕs character or to undermine the brilliance of  his argumentation. Although the chapter 
is Þrm in its disagreement with BadiouÕs political statements, all attempts have been made to 
disagree on theoretical grounds and to fully elucidate the important conceptual differences. 
As Hughes clariÞes of  the critical methodology in Difference and Repetition (2011 [1994]), a 
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Ôradical critique demonstrates the genesis of  that which it has criticisedÕ (Hughes 2009: 3). 
Thus, the discussion of  Badiou in chapter one, on the one hand, reads his work in order to 
account for it as part of  DeleuzeÕs philosophy in chapter three. On the other hand, the 
reading introduces the key ideas which are thematised throughout the rest of  the thesis: 
resistance, ontology, thought, being, practice, ethics. These ideas run as guiding threads 
through the rest of  the thesis, structuring the discussion of  each authorÕs ontological 
commitments, towards the conclusion. 
With regards to writing conventions, terms (i.e. idea/Idea) are capitalised throughout 
the thesis according to the capitalisation found within authorsÕ works. All instances of  ÒzÓ in a 
word (i.e. standardize) have been standardised to an ÒsÓ, not out of  a desire for correctness, 
but uniformity. 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Chapter 1 - Badiou: Being and 
Failure 
A question of  dualities 
As Laruelle puts it, Ôthe spontaneous usage of  philosophy involves an exaltation of  force, 
of  combat and of  war that stems from certain of  its origins, its axioms evenÕ  (Laruelle 2013: 
xvii) and, from this, two things can therefore be said of  philosophy. Firstly, to the extent that 
philosophy is used, philosophy and the subject who engages with it exist within a milieu of  
signiÞcation, problematisation and power structures, which engender its application within a 
situation. Secondly, that which exists on paper, or in discussion, is actualised in accordance 
with a signiÞcant encounter between the subject and its target: a ÔwarÕ partly constituted 
within philosophy itself. For the biologist to develop philosophy might be to inscribe a vitalism 
within the conventions of  a philosophical debate in which he or she is situated, or, was a social 
theorist to feel themselves not Þtting in with a dominant psycho-sexual paradigm, they may 
then resist this trend with a method for the critique of  its constitutive social norms. If  then, as 
Laruelle puts it, philosophy presents an embodied Þght against a particular target, what has 
Badiou got in his sights? Constituting a principle target of  his oeuvre, according to Badiou, 
Ô[O]ne of  the core demands of  contemporary thought is to have done with Òpolitical 
philosophyÓÕ (Badiou 2005d: 10). Yet, if  philosophy is constituted in part by its placement 
within a particular milieu, what motivates BadiouÕs philosophical efforts to make such a 
demand? Are we to believe that his philosophy is not political? When Badiou declares that, 
Ômathematics, throughout the entirety of  its historical becoming, pronounces what is 
expressible of  being qua beingÕ (Badiou 2001: 25), or that there are fourÐand only fourÐtruth 
procedures which condition the development of  the subject (Badiou 2008 [1992], 2009: 9-33, 
2011: 16), it is necessary to uncover the presuppositions in BadiouÕs use of  these statements 
and assess the validity of  his criticism of  political philosophy. 
The guiding thread of  this chapter will therefore be to investigate how Badiou accounts 
for the veracity of  the theoretical presuppositions in his workÐnot with regard to the 
intricacies of  his materialist dialecticsÐbut with regard to his claim that mathematics consists 
the language of  being qua being, conditioning a political truth procedure that is only unveiled 
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through an impasse of  being (Badiou 2013 [1982]: 22-28). As mathematics plays a central 
part in BadiouÕs ontology, some of  his usage of  it (in particular his exposition of  HegelÕs 
dialectical method in Theory of  the Subject (2013 [1982]) and a brief  outline of  his use of  set 
theory) will be set out in what follows. However, this chapter will not analyse BadiouÕs 
understanding of  mathematics; this is to say that, given that this chapter investigates the 
relationships between mathematics, ontology and ethics, there will be no questioning BadiouÕs 
mathematics per se, where it has been applied. Furthermore, in line with FraserÕs argument 
that a Ôdisproportionate amount of  ink has already been spilledÕ over it, neither will this 
chapter dwell on the BadiouÕs concept of  the event (Badiou 2007 [1966]: xvi).  What will be 3
investigated are both the rationale conditioning BadiouÕs adoption of  mathematics as his 
meta-ontology, grounding his political philosophy, and its resultant implications.  In doing so, 4
this chapter will develop a symptomatic  reading of  BadiouÕs work in order to, Þrstly, advance 5
an understanding of  what Badiou is arguing when he develops a philosophy of  politics upon a 
meta-politics of  mathematics  and, secondly, explain what decisions it has been based upon, 6
without reducing his work to a philosophical autobiography. In this regard, the chapter will 
Ôdivulge[É] the undivulged event in the text it reads, and in the same movement relate it to a 
different text, present as a necessary absence in the ÞrstÕ (Althusser and Balibar 1970: 28). 
Unlike other works more polemically addressed at Badiou, the purpose of  this 
investigation is not intended as an ad hominem attack on BadiouÕs attempt to Ôre-educateÕ, 
ÔeviscerateÕ, or to ÔBadioliseÕ philosophy (see Gironi 2014: 5, Laruelle 2013: xviii-xxi). The 
temptation to place the decision to ground a philosophy within the rigorous conÞnes of  
mathematics (or, more accurately, to position philosophy as the capturing of  a political truth 
procedure illuminated by the expression of  mathematics) upon a penchant for technical 
obfuscation would be a grossly reductive misattribution and it would ignore the rigorous and 
innovative power of  his work. Yet there is nevertheless a necessity to elaborate on its 
positioning as such, in part, due to the speciÞc nature of  the politics that mathematics 
 For discussion of  BadiouÕs theory of  the event, see Hallward (2003: 107-130).3
 Rather than ÒgroundingÓ, ÒauthorisingÓ is technically the correct term to use in this context as it is developed 4
by Badiou. Its meaning is developed towards the end of  the chapter, but requires an amount of  exposition in 
order to make sense beforehand. See ff. 53 and the discussion it relates to below.
 According to Montag, a symptomatic reading Ôpresupposes the coexistence of  two texts, one of  which becomes 5
visible only when we note the lapses and gaps that normally function to make certain parts of  the text 
illegibleÕ (2003: 49).
 This is not of  course, for Badiou, a Òpolitical philosophyÓ.6
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authorises to be thought. As Livingston argues, there is a tension in formal systems (of  which 
the more mathematised expressions of  BadiouÕs meta-ontology are an example) between their 
coherence and their totality (Livingston 2011: 15-16). In order for a system to remain 
internally coherent (and its properties to make sense) it must be totalised to the extent that this 
totalisation generalises and legitimises the systemÕs rules according to all possible situations 
that might present themselves to the system. However, as Livingston argues, a systemÕs 
internal coherency cannot account for its totalisation by itself;  a systemÕs rules cannot 7
legitimise themselves and, rather, the rules of  a system have to be legitimised by a ÒhigherÓ 
power.  In order to avoid an inÞnite regress of  systems legitimising themselves with another, 8
Livingston invokes GdelÕs Þrst incompleteness theorem to argue that a formalist is obliged to 
settle for a system that is either internally consistent (i.e. containing meaning) or totalising, 
creating what he terms a Ômetalogical dualityÕ (Gdel 1931, Livingston 2008: 20, 34, 53). As 
will be shown, BadiouÕs entire meta-ontological construction amounts to nothing without the 
subjective intervention in a situation which co-constitutes the subject as such and authorises 
the coherency of  BadiouÕs meta-political schema. Well aware of  the problematic raised by 
RussellÕs paradox and the Gdel sentence (a later development along the same lines of  the 
Russell paradox, albeit with different implications (Livingston 2008: 21-25)),  Badiou 9
addresses LivingstonÕs problematic duality by positing the subject as the totalising element in 
his otherwise consistent theory.  It is the engagement of  a subject (a subject, in BadiouÕs 10
terms, of  ÔinÞnite thoughtÕ (Badiou 2005c), and not the not an anthropomorphised human) 
 As Wittgenstein put it, no Ôcourse of  action could be determined by a rule, because every course of  action can 7
be made out to accord with the ruleÕ (Wittgenstein 2001 [1953]: 201).
 Cantor, a leading architect in the development of  set theory, Ôshowed the strict excess of  the size of  the power set 8
of  any setÑthat is, the set of  all possible sets recombining its elementsÑover the original set itself. By means of  
this operation, the vast Cantorian hierarchy of  ÒtransÞniteÓ sets, each an inÞnity strictly larger than the last, is 
bornÕ (Livingston 2011: 21).
 Published by Bertrand Russell in a 1908 paper, RussellÕs paradox demonstrates that a formal system cannot be 9
both consistent and totalising at the same time and can be understood in terms of  the Cretan liar: Epimenides 
(himself  a Cretan) says that all Cretans are liars. This statement is paradoxical to the extent that it cannot be true 
whilst Epimenides himself  forms part of  the set of  Cretans to which the statement pertains. EpimenidesÕ 
statement is therefore logically consistent but non-totalising (in that it cannot include Epimenides himself  in the 
statement) and is thus an example of  the RussellÕs paradox. As Livingston puts it, in combination with the Gdel 
sentence, Ôboth results were often taken together as demonstrating the fundamental untenability of  the earlier 
formal projects of  logicism, which had sought to reduce mathematical truths and objects to truths and laws of  
pure logic, and formalism, which had sought to reduce mathematical reasoning and inference to purely 
mechanical proceduresÕ (Livingston 2008: 25).
 Hallward clariÞes the coherency of  BadiouÕs ontological system, arguing that, ÔBadiouÕs truth coheres, in the 10
sense that a generic procedure must group an internally consistent set of  investigations or conditions; it is 
expressly founded on the real of  the situation and implies the unrestricted application of  bivalence; and it is 
effectively self-verifying, composed over time in a laborious series of  incremental stepsÕ (Hallward 2003: 154).
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that totalises an otherwise internally coherent mathematical system, preventing an inÞnite 
regress of  sets, the rules of  which must be accounted for (Trott 2011: 87). The intervention of  
the subject therefore, seemingly, pulls the rug from under LivingstonÕs feet, yet: can Badiou 
have his cake and eat it? 
It is this claim, that the subject totalises an otherwise coherent system, that will be put 
under investigation whilst looking at the motivation for BadiouÕs system. Clearly, as a key part 
of  his mathematical, meta-ontological system, the subjectÕs relationship to the formalist 
aspects of  BadiouÕs system forms a determining part in its overall consistency as a generic (or 
axiomatic) system. Nevertheless, it must not be forgotten that Badiou is writing against the 
background of  a particular conception of  politics. He was a Ôcommitted Maoist in the 1970sÕ, 
currently Ôretains an assertive voice in radical politicsÕ and is Ôdirectly involved in a number of  
campaigns concerning immigration, labour issues, and political justice in the broadest 
senseÕ (Hallward 2003: xxii). Indeed, Badiou made his political pre-suppositions clear when he 
wrote in 1982 that, ÔtodayÕs political subject [is] that of  the Cultural Revolution, the 
MaoistsÕ (Badiou 2013 [1982]: 247). Even though his current involvement in the Organisation 
Politique does not echo the same explicitly militant tones of  his writing in Theory of  the Subject, 
Badiou nevertheless struggles with one particular question, asking Ô[h]ow we are to move from 
the aggressively fraternal ÒweÓ of  the warlike epic to the peaceful ÒweÓ of  the disparate 
collectivity, without compromising the principle that ÒweÓ must remain truly we?Õ (Hallward 
2003: 47). If  BadiouÕs subject is political in the Þrst instance, that is before its meta-ontological 
position has been fully worked out in his oeuvre, what role does it then Þll as part of  his meta-
ontology? The answer to this question is the Òsecond textÓ, Ôpresent as a necessary absence in 
the ÞrstÕ, that this chapter will suggest.  
Resistant being 
Alain BadiouÕs oeuvre provides a strong argument as to why liberal politics, 
representative politics and political philosophy based upon poetic sophistry are to be rejected 
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in favour of  a militant communism.  According to Badiou, commonplace understandings of  11
politics primarily conceive individuals as existing within, and interacting with, an external 
world that conditions the subject as a Ôworld spectatorÕ (Badiou 2005d: 12). World spectators 
exist as an audience in front of  a stage on which the political acts and with which they have 
no real interaction. A discussion of  politics, i.e. Òpolitical philosophyÓ is, in this case, Ônothing 
more than the erudite servant of  capito-parliamentarismÕ, which claims to ÔÒfoundÓ politics, 
or even Òthe politicalÓ, and to impose upon it norms that are, ultimately, moral norms: 
ÒgoodÓ power, the ÒgoodÓ state, ÒgoodÓ democracy and so onÕ (Badiou, Macey et al. 2010: 
38). A politics that is instantiated by philosophy, for Badiou, Ôconcerns, and only concerns, 
public opinionÕ (Badiou 2005d: 13), that is, the mere discussion of  current affairs that results 
from the bifurcation of  individuals into two separate groups: the political and the civil. 
Badiou crusades, as Sacilotto puts it, against the Ònew sophistsÓ who Ôpropose a relativisation 
of  Truth to the contingent historicity of  cultures, thereby deßating the universality of  the 
former in favour of  the transient plurality of  opinions circulating in the latterÕ (2013: 65). As a 
former student of  Badiou, Meillassoux expands his teacherÕs argument to claim that politics, 
following the post-modern stripping of  its metaphysical recourse to either theological or 
Enlightenment rationalist authority, now relies upon a purely nihilistic and personal belief  
system.  Highlighting the dogmatic faith towards what is, in fact, a lack of  any truthful 12
underpinning of  contemporary political thought, he argues that, Ôfaith is pitched against faith, 
since what determines our fundamental choices cannot be rationally provedÕ (Meillassoux 
2008: 46). According to both then, the political realm is constituted by the prevailing freedom 
 BadiouÕs portrayal of  sophistry comes from PlatoÕs portrayal of  doxo-sophia. In the Sophist, PlatoÕs Stranger 11
describes the sophist as having come Ôto light for us with a certain opinionative science (knowledge) about 
everything, but heÕs without truthÕ (Plato 2006: 233D). For Plato, the sophist is a rhetorician who, akin to a 
hunter preying on its target, targets wealthy young men with promises of  knowledge. Lacking a basis to question 
arguments from a position of  truth, Sophists Ôquestion thoroughly about whatever anyone believes heÕs saying 
something while saying nothing (sic.). And then, because those questioned wander, they examine their opinions 
with ease, and once they bring the opinions together into the same place by their speeches, they put them side by 
side one another, and in so putting them they show that the opinions are simultaneously contrary to themselves 
about the same things in regard to the same things in the same respectsÕ (Plato 2006: 230B). BadiouÕs position 
runs counter to this and, as Hallward neatly summarises, his philosophy Ôprovides some resources for thinking 
the ÒsituatedÓ character of  a universal truth, for instance its localisation in an Òevental siteÓ, or its incorporation 
in a ÒbodyÓ shaped by regional norms of  appearing or existenceÕ (2009: 114). Badiou intersperses his writing 
with reasons as to why sophistic philosophy should be rejected, but speciÞcally addresses the issue in two places: 
for arguments in favour of  why liberal and representative philosophies should be rejected, see ÔAgainst ÒPolitical 
PhilosophyÓÕ in Badiou (2005d) and for why poetic philosophy must be rejected more generally, see ÔConditionsÕ 
in Badiou (1992).
 Neither Badiou nor Meillassoux make any distinction between the organisation of  political institutions, 12
political philosophy and the discussion of  politics in terms of  their separation from capito-parliamentary dogma. 
All (anti-)philosophies that do not cement themselves on a foundation of  truth, as well as any discussion that a 
group of  people may have about politics in a pub are grouped together under the category of  sophistry.
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for individuals to think whatever they want to, given that there is no basis upon, or deÞnite 
recourse to, truth. The two writers agree that parliamentary politics is Ôsophistry in the 
modern sense of  the word, that is to say a sophistry dedicated to the promotion of  an entirely 
particular politicsÕ (Badiou 2005d: 14).  This, particular, parliamentary politics is that which 13
happens in the sphere of  the Other, and is effected and commentated upon by the individual; 
it is a separate realm in which the individual is afforded no meaningful engagement, but of  
which the individual is encouraged to develop opinions, in the belief  that this is all that has 
any real meaning. 
BadiouÕs critique of  what counts as meaningful political engagement in the worldÐand 
corresponding forms of  political resistanceÐcentres around liberal individualism, whereby 
individuals must have a say in the given parliamentary structure which then sets out what is 
legitimate in terms of  political activity. In turn, democratic theorists and parliamentary 
proceedings set out the conditions within which it is acceptable to resist. Both Hobbes and 
Locke can be seen as keystone Þgures within liberal and democratic theory, discussing the key 
notions of  natural rights and sovereignty which still underpin contemporary liberal thought 
today. Yet, either in the case of  wilful harm of  the individual by HobbesÕ Leviathan,  or 14
against the turn to tyranny or deÞciency of  LockeÕs republic to enforce contracts,  the 15
legitimate conditions for resistance against the state are preÞgured and conditioned by the 
political and moral arenas within which individuals are placed. In other words, the 
prescriptions of  Hobbes and Locke both place individuals within their positions in society and 
tell them how they are to resist. According to BadiouÕs argument, both of  these political 
philosophies preÞgure a manner by which to understand the individual and consequently 
construct an illegitimate political order upon a foundation constructed from their opinions. In 
 Deleuze also argues in similar fashion that, Ômany people have an interest in saying that everybody knows 13
ÒthisÓ, that everybody recognises this, or that nobody can deny it. (They triumph easily so long as no surly 
interlocutor appears to reply that he does not wish to be so represented, and that he denies or does not recognise 
those who speak in his name)Õ (Deleuze 2004b: 166-167). Deleuze does not recourse to the same formal, 
mathematised ontology for his conception of  politics as Badiou, but does interrogate political notions of  ÒgoodÓ 
and ÒcommonÓ sense that pervade political debate. See Deleuze (2004b: 164-70).
 Hobbes argues that, Ôif  the Soveraign command a man (though justly condemned,) to kill, wound, or mayme 14
himselfe; or not to resist those that assault him; or to abstain from the use of  food, ayre, medicine, or any other 
thing without which he cannot live; yet hath that man the Liberty to disobeyÕ (Hobbes 1996 [1651]: 268-269). 
For a full discussion of  HobbesÕ arguments with regard to resistance, see Steinberger (2002).
 Resistance against the sovereign, for Locke, becomes permissible because, Ò[w]herever law ends, tyranny 15
begins, if  the law be transgressed to another's harm; and whosoever in authority exceeds the power given him by 
the law, and makes use of  the force he has under his command, to compass that upon the subject which the law 
allows not, ceases in that to be a magistrate; and, acting without authority, may be opposed as any other man 
who by force invades the right of  anotherÕ (Locke 1988 [1690]: ¤202). Locke provides arguments for resistance 
against tyranny in ¤214-7 and against a sovereign unable or neglecting to carry out their charge in ¤219.
"14
contrast to this dogmatic mode of  institution-centred politics, Badiou argues that, ÔÒpoliticsÓ is 
the name of  what concerns, not determinant judgement, but reßexive judgementÕ (Badiou 
2005d: 16). Politics cannot constitute a preÞgurative framework for judgement because this 
would foreclose both the possibility for the individual to identify with other communities than 
that within which they are placed as well as, Ôthe place for debating genuinely alternative 
options, which at best are subject to disputeÕ (Badiou 2005d: 17). It is in this way that political 
philosophy, for Badiou, is inherently dogmatic.  With respect to the individual, Badiou argues 16
that, contemporary Ô[p]olitics is to be found in a public judgement which states whether this - 
which is not an object, but an appearing, a taking-place - pleases or displeases me, and is 
exercised in the debate of  such judgementsÕ (Badiou 2005d: 16). In other words, Badiou 
rejects any distinction between a public realm where politics applies and a private realm in 
which it doesnÕt, as well as any philosophy that conceives of  politics as the process of  pluralist 
debate.  Indeed he takes his criticism yet further, strongly criticising philosophers Ôsuch as 17
John Rawls who are persuaded by the central importance to thought of  human rights and 
individual libertiesÕ (Hewlett 2010: 24). For Badiou, even fundamental protections, such as 
laws prohibiting murder, would constitute the illegitimate pre-structuring of  politics by the 
state which forecloses the potential for genuine politics. 
It is as a result of  his analysis, that Badiou argues, Ô[o]ne of  the core demands of  
contemporary thought is to have done with Òpolitical philosophyÓÕ (Badiou 2005d: 10). If  
contemporary thought is to think the possibility of  genuine political change, for Badiou, it 
must not only provide arguments against political philosophy, it must completely ignore the 
possibility of  the latter setting the terms of  what constitutes legitimate politics. Political 
philosophy, being a form of  thought complicit with the state, must be revoked entirely, 
constraining as it does the possibility of  thinking the pure Òevent of  the multipleÓÑor the 
possibility of  the subject becoming other than what is predetermined in the possibilities that 
 As Kant deÞned it, dogmatism is the ÔprocedureÉ[of] reason, without prior critique of  its own abilityÕ (Kant 16
1996 [1787]: Bxxxv- 22 xxxvi pg. 35). In BadiouÕs eyes, political philosophy cannot condition a critique of  its 
own foundations, being based on sophistic judgement. The argument in this chapter however is that Badiou 
remains dogmatic because his condition for truth (i.e. his meta-ontology) likewise cannot condition a support for 
itself  within its own framework.
 In Metapolitics (2005b), Badiou develops his criticism of  political philosophy using the work of  Arendt, who 17
uses Kantian distinctions to justify parliamentarianism, and the work of  Revault dÕAllonnes. He summarises his 
disavowal of  political debate, arguing that, Ôdebate is only political when it crystallises in decisionÕ and that it 
turns ÔÒpoliticsÓ into mere passive commentary on current affairs, a kind of  collective extension of  reading 
newspapersÕ (Badiou 2005d: 15). A philosophy which underpins such a conceptualisation can therefore, for 
Badiou, Ôdo no more than oscillate between an intolerable mutism - that of  Heidegger faced with Paul Celan - 
and the almost desperate search for a prose of  thought that would prepare thoughtÕs leave for the poemÕ (Badiou 
2008 [1992]: 147).
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are laid out for him or her by a particular philosophy (Badiou 2010b: 7). A politics that is to 
enable activity which is not simply an extension of  anything condoned by the state, needs to 
escape the ÔsophistryÕ of  public debate and political philosophy (Badiou 2005d: 14-15). 
Indeed, although his earlier work in Theory of  the Subject tended to emphasise the destructive 
nature of  politics as an operation against the state (see Badiou 2013 [1982]: 146-147, Hallward 
2003: 37), in his latter work Badiou concentrates more on the creative potentiality imbued 
within revolutionary situations. He staunchly argues that it is impossible to form a truly 
revolutionary political movement from any position that is connected to forms of  knowledge 
that are themselves connected to the state; the task instead is to negate the placement of  the 
proletariat itself.  In order to explain this, Badiou invokes Hegelian dialectical movement in 18
order to show how a proletariat Þghting against the bourgeoisie will never end up doing 
anything but repeating the same structural formation it sets out with: Ôit is the bourgeoise 
world, imperialist society, of  which the proletariat, let this be noted, is a notorious element, as the 
principal productive force and as the antagonistic political poleÕ (2013 [1982]: 7 emphasis 
added). In other words, if  the proletariat allows itself  to be described, or ÒplacedÓ, by the 
bourgeoisie as a proletariat, it can never escape its relationship with the bourgeoisieÑeven in 
a negative form. The ÒplacingÓ of  the proletariat in its position within the bourgeois worldÑ
i.e. in a class relation to the bourgeoisieÑis an operation of  the bourgeoisie itself, and not an 
essential part of  the relationship between the two classes. An analysis that takes as its base 
Ô[t]he famous contradiction of  bourgeoisie/proletariat is a limited, structural scheme that 
loses track of  the torsion of  the Whole of  which the proletariat qua subject traces the 
forceÕ (Badiou 2013 [1982]: 7). In other words, there is an ontological nuance that is ignored 
when essentialising the identity of  the two groups in a pluralist (i.e. comparative, agonistic or 
liberal) conceptualisation of  politics, namely that of  their placing; the bourgeoisie quite 
literally puts the proletariat in their place. Revolutionary politics is, for Badiou, not the eternal 
struggle of  the proletariat over the bourgeoisie, because this would imply that the proletariat 
accepts its place vis a vis their bourgeois masters. Instead, Ôthe project of  the proletariat, its 
internal being, is not to contradict the bourgeoisie, or to cut its feet from under it. [ItÕs] 
project is communism, and nothing elseÕ (Badiou 2013 [1982]: 7). The objective of  
 Badiou uses the term ÔstateÕ meaning both the system of  political and economic institutions that comprise a 18
state and its government, as well as its meaning in the phrase, Òstate of  the situationÓ. He writes that the state is 
Ôthe system of  constraints that limit the possibility of  possibilitiesÕ and that Ôthe State is that which prescribes 
what, in a given situation, is the impossibility speciÞc to that situation, from the perspective of  the formal 
prescription of  what is possibleÕ (Badiou 2010b: 7). A small ÒsÓ is used to denote the state in a ÒglobalÓ sense, i.e. 
a formal designation of  the conÞnes of  a systemÐthat which is the case in set theoryÐand a capital ÒSÓ is used for 
a ÒlocalÓ state, such as a census or legislation created by a national government.
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proletarian politics is, as a result, Ôthe abolition of  any place in which something like a 
proletariat can be installed. The political project of  the proletariat is the disappearance of  the 
space of  the placement of  classes and an ignorance of  the preÞgurative structure that forms 
the legitimate sphere of  the political for the bourgeoisieÕ (2013 [1982]: 7). It is Ôthe loss, for 
this historical something, of  every index of  classÕ, where ÒsomethingÓ is the unnameable 
proletariat removed from its placement (2013 [1982]: 7). However, if  an understanding based 
upon philosophical sophistry and a reduction of  what constitutes politics to a Schmittian 
notion of  Ôthe politicalÕ is the problem for BadiouÕs idea of  politics, then how does he avoid a 
similar recourse in his argument?  His answer lies in foregrounding an understanding of  19
politics within an ontological schema, after which politics manifests as a series of  truth claims 
based upon this ontology. For Badiou, Ô[p]hilosophy is the general theory of  being and the 
event as tied together by truthÕ (Badiou 2005b: 26), and it is this claim to truth that legitimates 
the faithful militant in their actions. This meta-ontological position (i.e. that ontology can be 
formally presented to condition a philosophical prescription) will be developed, before 
showing how this affords Badiou the ability to claim that politics is routed in the truth of  the 
void of  non-being. 
Political ontology 
His Þrst major work in the realm of  philosophy, Badiou bases his ontological position in 
Theory of  the Subject upon the Parmenidean duality of  being and nothing (Badiou 2011: 23, 
Laruelle 2013: 70). In the poem On Nature, Parmenides argues that there are two states, that 
of  ÒbeingÓ and Ònot beingÓ, stating that, Ô[i]t needs must be that what can be spoken and 
thought is; for it is possible for it to be, and it is not possible for what is nothing to 
beÕ (Parmenides 1920: ¤6). Using the declarative ÒItÓÐas opposed to a named subject or Òthe 
somethingÓÐto signify the object of  being, ParmenidesÕ strict duality of  being and non-being 
involves a non-signifying unity of  being (Ôit isÕ) which is contrasted against that of  which 
 See SchmittÕs, The Concept of  the Political, where he calls for the support of  Ôthe all-embracing political unit, the 19
stateÕ (1996: 32).
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nothing possible is sayable (Ôit is notÕ).  Because, for Parmenides, it is only possible to talk of  20
what is, rather than what is not, we must presume that there is being to express:  ParmenidesÕ 
monist ontology of  being is therefore expressed in a language which Ôteaches us about what 
must be said concerning what is, not about what is permissible to say concerning what we think 
there isÕ (Badiou 2010c: 16 original emphasis). For Badiou, this is mathematics in its particular 
formation in ZFC set theory and is what he means by a language of  Ôbeing qua beingÕ. 
Because there can be nothing outside that which ÒisÓ to deÞne what is included in the subject 
and object of  being, in the terms used by Livingston, the whole of  BadiouÕs meta-ontology is 
non-totalisable and non-representative because epistemological concerns are immanently 
wrapped up in the initial ontological and axiomatic dual postulate of  being and non-being. In 
other words, being is not representable by anything that might be in excess of  it and is not the 
result of  an a priori state of  being, qua HeideggerÕs idea of  es gibt (Badiou 2011: 9-10, 123-129). 
For Badiou, it is mathematics that thinks being (and its negating inconsistent multiplicity of  
non-being) and which must be harnessed. As Sacilotto puts it, Ô[a]gainst the primacy and 
transparency of  experience avowed in AristotleÕs Òintuitive inductionÓ (epagoge), modern 
empiricisms, as well as all forms of  vitalism and phenomenology, Badiou avows the Platonic 
separation of  being from appearance, and identiÞes mathematics as the medium that accesses 
being intrinsically rather than representationally or hermeneuticallyÕ (2013: 64 original emphasis). Yet 
 ParmenidesÕ ontological position can be usefully contrasted against HeideggerÕs to establish where BadiouÕs 20
loyalties lie. Heidegger states that, ÔBeings are [É] interrogated with regard to their being. But if  they are to 
exhibit the characteristics of  their being without falsiÞcation, they must for their part have become accessible in 
advance as they are themselvesÕ (Heidegger 2010 [1953]: 5). In other words, Heidegger argues that Ôthe being of  
being ÒisÓ not a beingÕ and thereby distinguishes the ÒbeingnessÓ of  that which ÒisÓ with the fact that it is given 
as being. He argues this by stating that, ÔBeing [Sein] is found in thatness and whatness, reality. the objective 
presence of  things [Vorhandenheit], subsistence, validity, existence [Dasein], and in the Òthere isÓ [Òes 
gibtÓ]Õ (Heidegger 2010 [1953]: 10-11). For Heidegger then, it is a question of  exploring the relationship between 
that which is given as being and the process of  being given as an existence in itself. ParmenidesÕs position is 
different from HeideggerÕs in that, for him, there is only the existence of  that which ÒisÓ (i.e. Heidegger's 
ÒDaseinÓ), arguing that, Ôit is complete, immovable, and without end. Nor was it ever, nor will it be; for now it is, 
all at once, a continuous one [É]. I shall not let thee say nor think that it came from what is not; for it can 
neither be thought nor uttered that anything is not. And, if  it came from nothing, what need could have made it 
arise later rather than sooner? Therefore must it either be altogether or be not at allÕ (Parmenides 1920: 8). For 
Parmenides, HeideggerÕs position would be unfounded in the sense that it names two conditions of  being, one of  
which (es gibt) cannot be known within the formula Òthere isÓ. Badiou uses ZermeloÐFraenkel set theory to 
develop the Parmenidean orientation and show how, although things can only be said about constituted being, 
certain events within constituted being can highlight the (necessarily unsayable) non-being of  nothingness (or, 
Òno-thingnessÓ). As unstructured by an authoritative count (i.e. an authoritative operation that constitutes being), 
it is this no-thingness that is the site of  pure becoming and militant subjectivity (see ÔThe Void: Proper name of  
beingÕ in Badiou 2011: 52-60). In contrast to Parmenides, for Badiou, although he maintains the biunivocal 
relationship of  being and non-being (ÒnothingÓ in BadiouÕs lexicon) and appears to approach the Heideggerian 
duality (Sein/Dasein), nevertheless Ô[n]ature is not a region of  being, a register of  being-in-totality. It is the 
appearing, the bursting forth of  being itself, the coming-to of  its presence, or rather, the Òstance of  
beingÓÕ (Badiou 2011: 123). If  Parmenides remains with either a state of  ÒisÓ (a position similar to HeideggerÕs 
Dasein) and an unsayable Òis notÓ, and Heidegger invokes two modes of  ÒisÓ, Badiou modiÞes the Parmenidean 
duality into Òis beingÓ and Òis notÓ. BadiouÕs position will be further developed below.
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how can Badiou leverage mathematics as a language that does not fall foul to the same 
epistemological concerns as natural language does and, therefore, the same politics of  truth? 
In attempting to construct the idea of  a truthful political procedure according to what Badiou 
calls the Ôrational ontologyÕ of  numbers (Badiou 2004: 71), how can he prescribe the status of  
truth to an ontology without also having to validate precisely the truth of  this prescription?  21
BadiouÕs answer to this question would seem to determine whether or not the political 
prescriptions of  his oeuvre contain the kernel of  truthÐin its procedural formÐthat he wishes 
them to, or whether they remain tainted by the doxa he recoils from. BadiouÕs answer to this 
question will be developed following a necessary detour to show how he employs the two 
Platonic dyads of  truth & doxa and reality & appearance in his own schema. This is important 
for Badiou and the ability for his idea of  the subject to access the true reality of  a situation, 
yet it is also where he faces a problem when conjoining mathematics to his understanding of  
being in the world. 
In his 1981 lectures at the Catholic University of  Louvain, Foucault stated that, Ôif  
critical philosophy is the philosophy that starts not from wonderment that there is being, but 
from the surprise that there is truth, then we can clearly see that there are two forms of  
critical philosophy. On the one hand, there is that which asks under what conditionsÐformal 
or transcendentalÐthere can be true statements. And on the other, there is that which 
investigates the forms of  veridiction, the different forms of  truth-tellingÕ (Foucault 2014: 20). 
BadiouÕs conception of  truth clearly takes the Þrst form, as transcendental truth conditions 
would simply rely on the counting operation, which truth negates, for their legitimacy.  22
 In the same passage as he defends the use of  numbers as the multiple having been Ôgiven to thoughtÕ (Badiou 21
2004: 71), Badiou takes issue with Deleuze and GuattariÕs disagreement on this point in What is Philosophy? 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1994 [1991]: 151-153). Badiou accuses the two authors of  a dogmatic insistence to ÔÞlterÕ 
number theory through the duality of  the closed and the open, which are for him are non-ontological ideas due 
to their partiality (Badiou 2004: 71). For BadiouÕs rationalist ontology and as with the truth procedure, 
ontological ideas must be undecidable or, in other words, they must not be determined by the empirical and 
instead will determine what might be (2004: 49-58). Deleuze and GuattariÕs emphasis on openness and closure 
however is in service of  their argument that set theory attempts both consistency (the perfection of  axiomatic 
coherence) and totality (the Ôextrinsic determinationÕ of  multiples by thought) (Deleuze and Guattari 1994 
[1991]: 121). As this thesis argues, Badiou cannot adequately account for the consistency and totality of  his 
ontology because he subtracts both doxa and the sensible away from the world in attempts to explain it. The 
ÔdecisionÕ that accounts for ontologyÕs consistency and totality is, for Badiou, made from the realm of  doxa, 
undermining its ontological status by his own account (Badiou 2004: 51). 
 Although BadiouÕs subject does rely on the technique of  verifying a ÒforcedÓ truth within situations 22
subsequent to an event in order to guide his behaviour, this is not what Foucault had in mind for his 
classiÞcation. Foucault states that in the Ôcase of  a critical philosophy that investigates veridiction, the problem is 
that of  knowing not under what conditions a statement is true, but rather what are the different games of  truth 
and falsehood that are established, and according to what forms that are establishedÕ (2014: 20). Different games 
of  truth are precisely what Badiou criticises as all belonging to the realm of  opinion-trading and, consequently, 
he does not Þt within this model of  philosophy. 
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Indeed, BadiouÕs answer to the problematic of  truthÕs justiÞcation is to claim that truth is 
revealed, not as a process of  veriÞcation or veridiction, but as a subtraction from what is 
commonly presented as sensible. Whilst, for both Parmenides and Badiou, the only thing that 
can be said to exist is that which is presented (by itself) as being, Badiou deÞnes this as only 
the ÔstateÕ of  being which dominates and conÞnes the inÞnite potential of  being different. It is 
the fact that there is a dominant discourseÐthat which is afÞxed in a position of  authority 
within parliamentary government and which deÞnes all that is sayable about lifeÐthat is the 
political problem with contemporary thought for Badiou. In contrast to Parmenides, for 
whom that which Òis notÓ is entirely unimportant and merits no further discussion, that which 
Òis notÓ is, for Badiou, as important as that which can be said to be, because it (in-)consists the 
ground for the possibility of  becoming different than what is stipulated by the state.  23
Nothingness does not consist in any knowable way, yet its existence remains sayable in its non-
consistence purely through its opposition to consistent being. As Barker puts it, Ôthe event 
cannot be, its non-being is unthinkableÕ; Ô[b]etween the void and its mark, ¯, there is nothing, 
not even the void. But this ÒnothingÓ is still part of  the voidÕ (2002: 67-68). It remains, as 
Parmenides states, Ôunthinkable and nameless (for it is no true way)Õ (1920: ¤8). Badiou 
thereby places ontology in the seemingly paradoxical position whereby it must present being 
on Ôthe other path [which] is real and trueÕ (Parmenides 1920: ¤8), which is expressed through 
a mathematical rupture of  the presented, yet which points towards the being of  nothingness.  
What sense is to be made of  the being of  nothingness and, if  it Ôis notÕ, how can 
anything be said of  it at all? For Badiou, the other path of  Òreal truthÓ can only be what 
Badiou calls the Ôlanguage of  being qua beingÕ because, taking his inßuence again from 
Parmenides, Ôit is the same to think and to beÕ (Badiou 2010c: 49, Parmenides 1920: ¤5, 
Sacilotto 2013: 64). It is this call to thoughtÕs immanent existence with being that Badiou uses 
to ground his claim that we can think being as a form of  revealing the truth of  it. In other 
 The insigniÞcance of  that which is not is clear when Parmenides argues, Õ[f]or this shall never be proved, that 23
the things that are not are; and do thou restrain thy thought from this way of  inquiryÕ (Parmenides 1920: ¤7).
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words, (and in a strong connection to Spinozist Pantheism,)  being speaks to us through its 24
own language which is intelligible to us because we are also a part of  being.  Badiou states 25
that, Ôthe determination of  the One (this multiple, such that it can unequivocally receive a 
proper name) is strictly immanent, because a set is identiÞed by its elements, i.e. by the sets 
that belong to it. Such is the foundational character of  the sign of  belonging, ∈, which is the 
veritable index of  being qua beingÕ (Badiou 2014: 55). It is therefore the language of  being 
qua being that, because it expresses the being of  itself  (and therefore illuminates the site of  
the void in which being is not) and does not represent being in the mind of  the subject, 
provides Badiou with the ability to make claims about both what is, but also what is not 
(which still has an unnameable name in its non-being).  26
 The interpretation of  Spinoza was one of  the battlegrounds over which Badiou and Deleuze fought during 24
their, at Þrst, hesitant and, then later, tumultuous correspondence (see ÔDeleuzeÕs Vitalist OntologyÕ in Badiou 
1998: 63-71). In The Clamor of  Being, Badiou criticises Deleuze for his Ôfundamental problem [that] is most 
certainly not to liberate the multiple but to submit thinking to a renewed concept of  the OneÕ (2000: 10). Taking 
quotes such as one found in the Þnal paragraph of Difference and Repetition, where Deleuze hails a Ôsingle and same 
voice for the whole thousand-voiced multiple, a single and same Ocean for all the drops, a single clamour of  
Being for all beingsÕ (2004b: 378), he argues that Deleuze remains a theorist of  the One-All, or a single event 
from which all of  history has unfolded. Because, for Deleuze, Ôthe One is sovereignÕ, Badiou argues, the 
ontological work within Difference and Repetition can only be regarded as a ÔÒdogmaticÓ treatiseÕ, wholly in line with 
that of  Òclassical philosophyÓ, as can be seen in conjunction with DeleuzeÕs book on Spinoza, Expressionism in 
Philosophy  (Badiou 2000: 13, Deleuze 1992a). This problem, he argues, stems from their mutual reading of  
Spinoza, (yet a reading that, in DeleuzeÕs work, Badiou does not recognise (Badiou 2000: 1)). In both Spinoza 
and Deleuze, Badiou sees a Òcircular doctrineÓ, whereby the Ôlegibility [that] distinguishes individuals, whose 
multiple, supposed inconsistent, receives the seal of  consistency once the unity of  their effect is registered. The 
inconsistency, or disjunction of  individuals is then received as the consistency of  the singular thing, one and the 
sameÕ (Badiou 2011: 112). ÔMultiplesÕ (or, in common parlance, ÒobjectsÓ) are, for Spinoza and Deleuze, given 
their singular existence by the effect that they have as multiples, having emanated from an originary unknowable 
multiplicity. For Badiou, this is a tautological proposition, in that both the singular multiple and its effect are 
born from the same originary multiple but are only knowable in their mutual coexistence, one emanating from 
the other. As he writes, Ôinsofar as the operator of  the count which articulates them, causality, can only be 
vouched for, in turn, by the count of  the effectÕ (Badiou 2011: 113). In other words, the power that articulates 
being (and concordantly its consistency) is, in Spinoza, articulated only by that which it presents. Badiou 
addresses this tautology, arguing that a single state of  being can account for the adequacy of  its own presentation 
of  itself  only by signalling the existence of  an underlying void of  inconsistent non-being. This inexistent non-
being is not a One (in the sense that it is itself  totalisable), but rather it is a Ômultiple of  multiplesÕ which 
underpins ontogenesis and the consistency of  presented multiples (see Badiou 2011: 45). Because this multiple of  
multiples must necessarily not be presented, Badiou states that the Ôgreat lesson of  SpinozaÕ (and, by implication, 
that which Deleuze also did not learn), is that Ôyou will not be able to avoid the errancy of  the void; you will have 
to name its placeÕ (Badiou 2011: 120).
 In BadiouÕs work following Theory of  the Subject, the truth of  politics is thought through a subjective decision 25
and implication with the event (being itself  revealing its underpinning nothingness). The transition from the 
early Badiou, who conßated Ôthe subjective process of  becoming conÞdent in oneself  with the global process of  
historical struggle itself, as aspects of  a single logicÕ (Hallward 2003: 39) to his later thought, in which the subject 
is a pre-ontological supposition in the consistency of  his ontological model, will be developed below.
 For Livingston, it is the fact that Badiou can make a claim about what is not that causes him to reject Ôthe 26
legacy of  Parmenides and, indeed, [É] the entire ontological tradition he founded (Livingston 2008: 44). 
However, although Badiou does indeed reject the totalising operation of  Parmenides One-All (the state of  being 
that results from a properly singular form of  Ôto beÕ), Badiou nevertheless remains within the Parmenidean 
tradition in the sense that he maintains a radical duality between the presentation of  being (for Badiou, that 
which is accessible through set theory) and the no-thingness of  the void.
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Presuppositions 
In order to ground a philosophy of  politics (which, in BadiouÕs language, would 
certainly not be a political philosophy), on a soil cleansed of  doxa,  Badiou reverses the lexical 27
priority of  philosophy and politics and argues that politics forms the condition of  
philosophical thoughtÐnot the other way round. BadiouÕs topology, therefore, is one whereby 
ontology provides the logos of  philosophy, grounding thought on the basis of  the truth of  what 
being says about itself. Being, expressing itself  through a language that tells of  its own void, 
opens a ruptural door for a political subject to realise the possibility of  it becoming other than 
what has been speciÞed by a dominant order. As a modiÞcation of  the example Badiou 
himself  uses: a family might Þll out a census to the best of  their ability, tracing the family line 
back as far as they know. However, a knock at the door might reveal an adopted family 
member that, by blood, could be included within the family set, but had not been presented 
as such before. This Ôevental siteÕ would highlight an excess of  being (in this case, the existence 
of  a non-counted family member) through the inability of  the stateÕs census to capture the set 
of  the family. In turn, this allows a new understanding of  the family, in lieu of  a Þdelity to the 
initial event (Badiou 2011: 174). BadiouÕs system is therefore aptly capable of  dissecting a 
presented situation, highlighting the errancy of  the constricting and coercive dominant state 
(the Ôcount-as-oneÕ in BadiouÕs terms) in certain events that happen to highlight the stateÕs 
presentation of  the situation. It is for this reason, given an event, (whereby ÒtrueÓ being 
expresses itself  alongside a rupture of  the political orderÐwhich is itself  made sensible by the 
rupture) that Badiou turns to mathematics in place of  traditional political philosophy, or 
Ôbourgeois epistemologyÕ (Sacilotto 2013: 83).  28
How does Badiou show that the counting operation reveals itself  through an event? To 
clarify, BadiouÕs concept of  the event is a subtraction from ontological determination, or the 
revelation of  the possibility for inÞnite thought brought about, not as a miracle, but as 
extracted from a particular situation (Badiou 2004: 98). It is this process of  revelation that 
 Hallward claims that, ÔBadiou presents his enterprise as another step taken in the ancient struggle of  27
philosophy against dogmatic prejudice or doxaÕ (2003: 3). Badiou clariÞes the grounds of  his enterprise, stating 
that, Ômathematics is a condition for thinking or theorising in general because it constitutes a break with doxa or 
opinion. This much is familiar. But what needs to be emphasised is that mathematics is the only point of  rupture with 
doxa that is given as existing, or constitutedÕ (2010c: 30).
 Badiou accounts for three other Òtruth proceduresÓ: artistic, scientiÞc or amorous, although it is 28
predominantly that of  the political which will be examined in this chapter because it is most relevant for 
BadiouÕs idea of  resistance.
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highlights the errancy of  the void and reveals the operation of  the count-as-One.  As Badiou 29
informs the reader in the ÒdictionaryÓ at the end of  Being and Event, Ô[g]iven the non-being of  
the One, any one-effect is the result of  an operation, the count-as-one. Every situation (+) is 
structured by such a countÕ (Badiou 2011: 504). In other words, a census constitutes a Òone-
effectÓ, that is something which takes the form of  a totalising gesture or a claim to hegemonic 
classiÞcation, but does not in fact legitimately totalise it because Ô[t]he one [É] is notÕ (Badiou 
2011: 90 original emphasis). As Heidegger puts it, highlighting the illegitimacy of  an 
operation of  understanding, Ôit is not knowable because it simply cannot become a possible 
object of  knowing, i.e., the possession of  a knowledge of  beings. It can never become such 
because it is a NothingÕ (1997: 83). There is thus the potential for viewing the ÔexcessÕ of  the 
state over the situation albeit, due to the fact that Being is unknowable in itself, this is an 
indeterminate excess which is only borne out by the violence in the eventÕs rupture with what 
is presented.  It is this rupture, sensible yet not measurable by the subject, that constitutes the 30
evental site and, in which, the event can be located. In contrast to Badiou, Lacan, who 
became increasingly inßuential for Badiou as the editor of  the journal Cahiers pour lÕAnalyse 
(Hallward 2003: x), consistently argued that there is in fact Ôsuch a thing as (the) OneÕ (Lacan 
1999 [1973]: 5).  This ÒOneÓ was developed from SaussureÕs linguistics, itself  inßuenced by 31
ÔLvi-Strauss and BenvenisteÕ who, following Saussure, Ôboth insist upon a dimension of  total 
structure that is present in language as such and prior to any individual action or 
occurrenceÕ (Livingston 2011: 73). This linguistic structure of  signiÞers (which signiÞes the 
coherence of  being, or Òthat which is signiÞedÓ) led Lacan to argue that the ÔFreudian 
unconscious is Òstructured like a languageÓ and thus can be read and interpreted in the terms 
provided by SaussureÕs structuralist picture and its subsequent reÞnementsÕ (Livingston 2011: 
73). Lacanian psychoanalysis was therefore constituted as the project of  uncovering the 
 See (Badiou 1997) for BadiouÕs discussion of  Saint Paul and the revelation of  the event.29
 This excess over Being is not measurable because, in order for it to be so, the void of  Being would have to be 30
another constructible set. Were this the case, the excessive cardinality of  the state could then be measured 
against the constructed set of  Being. However, because Being is not constructedÐbut subtractedÐfrom 
presentation, it remains immeasurable, yet present. As Badiou puts it, Ô[i]t is because the void is the point of  
being that it is also the almost-being which haunts the situation in which being consistsÕ (2011: 77). In fact, 
constructionism (a position which Badiou is ardently apposed to) is described by Plato in the Sophist, where the 
Stranger portrays the sophist as Ôjust one of  the genus of  conjurorsÕ (2006: 235C). It is the imitative art of  
conjuring reality in opinions, which are then set against each other in an ongoing creation of  ever more doxa, 
that subtractive ontology attempts to eliminate. For a further discussion of  why excess is immeasurable from the 
perspective of  set theory, see Livingston (2011: 192-197).
 LacanÕs translator has since argued that the elusive French ÔY a dÕlÕUnÕ could also be translated as ÒThereÕs 31
such a thing as OneÓ; ÒThereÕs something like OneÓ; and ÒThe One happensÓ, giving some doubt as to the 
formalist consistency of  what is signiÞed by ÒOneÓ (Livingston 2008: 331).
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errancy and excess of  the subjectÕs being in the world through the unfolding of  formal 
signiÞers as the latent presentation of  being within the subject itself. Indeed, Lacanian desire 
is only meaningful when it is placed within the structure of  the signifying chain that 
constitutes the totality of  the subjectÕs understanding of  the signiÞed world, despite the fact 
that Ô[t]he subject is nothing other than what slides in a chain of  signiÞers, whether he knows 
which signiÞer he is the effect of  or notÕ (Lacan 1999 [1973]: 29).  Badiou modiÞes the 
Lacanian statement that, Ô[t]he real can only be inscribed on the basis of  an impasse of  
formalizationÕ (Lacan 1999 [1973]: 73), arguing that Ô[t]he real is the impasse of  
formalization; formalization is the place of  the forced pass of  the realÕ (Badiou 2013 [1982]: 
22). In declaring this, Badiou reverses LacanÕs reliance on formalism to present the 
constituted subject Òbeing towards deathÓ in favour of  the subject emerging from a rupture 
with what is presented formally. 
However, there is another component to BadiouÕs ontological schemaÐa meta-ontologyÐ
that imbues his system with the necessary consistency for him to ground a revolutionary 
political standpoint based on truth. This meta-ontology takes the form of  a decision by an 
individual who completes the ontological schema, as well as the justiÞcation for his use of  
mathematics. Because, for Badiou, non-being, or in his terminology Òinconsistent 
multiplicityÓ, is not actually presented as suchÐsince all that can be said of  being in its 
sensibility is done under the law of  the countÐinconsistency, as pure multiplicity, is solely the 
presupposition that, prior to the count of  a state, the one is not (Badiou 2011: 52). In other 
words, inconsistent multiplicity (the possibility that being can be radically different from what 
is presented) can never be properly within what is presented because, by virtue of  the 
Parmenidean duality of  is/is-not, it is nothing.  To lay out the stakes clearly then: Badiou 32
needs a way of  accessing being in itself  that both removes any contamination of  doxa or 
ideology from within the expression of  being and, perhaps more importantly for his project, 
does not do so from within the realm of  ideology itself. As Sacilotto puts it, Ôthe sophist begins 
by denying the philosophical use of  dialectical rationality in its power of  exclusion in refusing 
 The terminology here is important for Badiou. He states that, Ôonce the entirety of  a situation is subject to the 32
law of  the one and consistency,Õ (i.e. once a state has been imposed upon any particular situation), Ôit is necessary, 
from the standpoint of  immanence to the situation, that the pure multiple, absolutely unpresentable according to 
the count, be nothing. But being-nothing is as distinct from non-being as the Ôthere isÕ is distinct from 
beingÕ (Badiou 2011: 53 original emphasis). The distinction Badiou makes is that of  something that does not 
exist in any expressible manner, yet which still has a trace or a name associated with its place of  being, with that 
of  something that simply does not exist at all. The pure multiple is no-thing, yet ÒisÓ to the extent that it is there 
as an ontological excess of  the state of  being. It is for this reason that, elsewhere, Badiou names ÒbeingÓ consistent 
multiplicity and Ònon-beingÓ inconsistent multiplicity (see ÔThe Question of  Being TodayÕ in Badiou 2010c: 
39-48). 
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the primitive separation between Truth and doxa, what is and what is not, reality and 
appearanceÕ (2013: 65). Furthermore, 
Ô[a]gainst both the irrationalist hijacking of  the negative which pushes the 
Real too far from thought, and the afÞrmationist annihilation of  the negative 
which annuls the separation between Truth and Opinion in the name of  lifeÕs 
afÞrmative potency, the rationalist dialectician insists on thoughtÕs capacity 
to access being and on the difÞcult, but possible, participation in Truths. The 
implication is that philosophyÕs dialectical task is at once analytic and 
synoptic: it brings together the autonomous procedures than condition it at a 
given time by way of  the concept of  Truth, but to do so must render explicit 
the protocols of  discernment between the space of  mere opinions and the 
exceptional form of  Truth. To stave off  the sophist, the dialectical 
philosopher must distinguish reality from appearance, being qua being from 
mere semblances, and Þnally the exceptional character of  Truth from being 
itself. It must recognize order if  only to admit of  the possibility of  its 
disruptionÕ (Sacilotto 2013: 66). 
This is the crux of  BadiouÕs efforts to legitimise his ontological schema and avoid the 
charge of  dogmatism: in other words, BadiouÕs materialist dialectic must Ôrender explicitÕ that 
which determines truth as truth in terms that are not self-referential. Mere recourse to 
rationalism, i.e. upholding thought in order to separate truth from the pollution of  sensible 
doxa, would beg the question Òwhat, in comparison to sense, is non-ideological about 
thought?Ó. And yet it is within thought that Badiou locates the grounds of  the truth 
procedure.  What, then, is truthful about thought that distinguishes it from the realm of  sense 
perception? 
The Þrst characteristic of  thought that cements its role in capturing truth is precisely its 
ability to distinguish through the negative. In this sense, it is only within the realm of  thought 
that distinctions can be made between what is true and false, new and the same, and so on. 
Sacilotto deÞnes BadiouÕs philosophy as assuming an inherently revolutionary role 
Ôaccomplished by aligning the concept of  Truth with the production of  novelty across the 
different conditions of  its time in politics, art, love and scienceÕ (2013: 61). As has been shown, 
Badiou is not interested in the minor discussions governing day-to-day political manoeuvring. 
Rather, he is concerned with the development of  an immanent logic of  novelty which can be 
harnessed by political militants to guide their activities.  In this sense, logic is to be 33
Ôunderstood in the Hegelian sense in terms of  which one articulates a transparent discourse 
 See, in particular, ÔMeditation Thirty-Five: Theory of  the SubjectÕ in Badiou (2011: 391-409).33
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that adjudicates on rational grounds between what is and what is notÕ (Sacilotto 2013: 62). 
The crux of  BadiouÕs anti-sophistic argumentationÐhis ability to say what really is (or at least 
how this might be grasped)Ðis an adherence to the decision of  the negative, or to say what is 
not. BadiouÕs problem, or as he puts it, Ôour problem is the problem of  negativityÕ (2013a: 1).  34
Indeed, for Badiou and his followers, the negative is important as Ôit is the negative that 
empowers thought to differentiate itself, to bring itself  forth or to make itself  explicit in the 
rule-governed transparency of  a discourseÕ (Sacilotto 2013: 62). This is one of  BadiouÕs a priori 
conditions of  any possible ontology, arguing that, Ôwe Þnd ourselves on the brink of  a 
decision, a decision to break with the arcana of  the one and the multiple [É]. This decision 
can take no other form than the following: the one is notÕ (Badiou 2011: 23).  Where 35
Sacilotto identiÞes two dyads in BadiouÕs thought, the Þrst Platonic dyad of  truth/doxa or 
Philosophy/Sophistry and the second Platonic dyad of  the intelligible/sensible or reality/
appearance, there is, in fact, a third dyad which conditions the coherency of  the Þrst: the 
Parmenidean dyad of  is/is not.  This dyad can distinguish the Parmenidean/Platonic 36
 Badiou further declares that he thinks Ôthe problem today is to Þnd a way of  reversing the classical dialectical 34
logic inside itself  so that the afÞrmation, or the positive proposition, comes before the negation instead of  after 
itÕ. He claims that, Ô[i]n some sense, my attempt is to Þnd a dialectical framework where something of  the future 
comes before the negative present. IÕm not suggesting the suppression of  the relation between afÞrmation and 
negationÐcertainly revolt and class struggle remain essentialÐand IÕm not suggesting a paciÞstic direction or 
anything like that. The question is not whether we need to struggle or oppose, but concerns more precisely the 
relation between negation and afÞrmationÕ (2013a: 3). Whilst he is signiÞcantly less focussed on the priority of  
the negative than in earlier works, Badiou nevertheless relies on the negative, in dialectical relation to 
afÞrmation, in stipulation of  what is or is not as an unproblematic category.
 BadiouÕs decision to align himself  with the non-being of  the One reßects the axiom of  choice in his 35
appropriation of  ZFC set theory. According to CantorÕs ÒdiagonalÓ argument, when a set, T is the set of  an 
inÞnite sequence of  binary digits, a second set, s can be constructed where each of  its elements correspond to the 
digit n in the set T, i,e, s1, s2É , sn.É Set T therefore cannot be counted because the second set, s would always 
differ from the sequence of  T sn and thereby consist of  another set which would have to be included post hoc by 
sequence T. CantorÕs diagonal argument has led to several conclusions in mathematical encampments leading 
constructivists, for example, to conclude that there are an inÞnite series of  constructible sets (the set s must now 
be counted by a new set, and so on). More pertinent for Badiou however, given that constructivism is, for him, 
akin to sophistry, was the argument drawn up by Ernst Zermelo in 1908. Zermelo concluded that, because the 
set s is uncountable (it exists in excess of  all countable sets), yet itself  contains non-empty sets, there is an element 
common to all the non-empty sets within it. Given an inÞnite number of  different pairs of  shoes, one would be 
able to pick out an inÞnite number of  left shoes (this being a common property of  the inÞnite number of  pairs 
of  shoes according to the axiom of  choice). It is the axiom of  choice therefore that Badiou employs as his 
ÒdecisionÓ, subjectively denying the encapsulation of  presentation by a superior set (or, Òpower setÓ in his 
nomenclature), whilst enabling the subject to pay Þdelity to an evental rupture of  presentation, to ÒchooseÓ what 
to take from this new-found and non-totalisable revelation of  being. This is what Badiou refers to as Þdelity to a 
truth procedure.
 The claim that something is or is not is itself  grounded upon an a priori conditional idea that distinguishes 36
between the statuses Ôwhat isÕ and Ôwhat is notÕ. In one discussion of  this dyad, Meillassoux (2008) discusses this 
ÔfacticityÕ of  an object, arguing that the principle of  sufÞcient reason in its negative form (Ôx is not trueÕ) carries 
with it truth conditions that cannot be justiÞed. This results in a world of  inÞnitely possible situations that may 
or may not happen because we cannot know for certain that they will not. Whilst Meillassoux disparages 
Deleuze by, alongside Kant, putting him into the category of  ÔcorrelationistÕ, fruitful research could be carried 
out by combining the MeillassouxÕs work on facticity with the DeleuzeÕs concept of  signiÞcance in understanding 
the consistency of  becoming-new.
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intellectual heritage of  the one, the many and the multiple, as opposed to the Hericlatean 
passage of  becoming; as Sacilotto argues, it is precisely in opposition to the ÔafÞrmationist 
annihilation of  the negative which annuls the separation between Truth and Opinion in the 
name of  lifeÕs afÞrmative potency, [that] the rationalist dialectician insists on thoughtÕs 
capacity to access being and on the difÞcult, but possible, participation in TruthsÕ (2013: 66). 
In other wordsÐand in comparison to senseÐit is thoughtÕs capacity to think the negative that 
prioritises it over sense within the realm of  truth. Because sense cannot speak of  the negative 
and thereby either afÞrm or, in BadiouÕs case, productively negate that which is, it is left to the 
attribute of  thought to tell the truth of  being.  37
Thought having been identiÞed as the realm wherein truths can be known, Badiou 
makes a distinction between philosophies that he labels ÒpoeticÓÐthose that maintain the 
sophistic penchant for fudging important distinctions within thought, such as true and false or 
good and evilÐand those of  the Platonic line which do not (see for example Badiou 2011: 
9-10). As Norris puts it, that which sets poetic philosophers out (Ôthough some more than 
othersÕ) is, for Badiou, Ôa sheer dereliction of  philosophyÕs proper roleÕ and Ôtheir way of  
falling back on an appeal to language, discourse or representation as the ultimate horizon of  
intelligibility or the end point of  ontological enquiryÕ (2012: 21). If  it is thought which rids the 
individual of  the obfuscating haze of  the sensible that blurs the boundaries of  what is or isnÕt, 
then poetic philosophy, for Badiou, reinserts the sensible into thought through the back door. 
As it does not attempt a recourse to the authority of  being to express itself, poetic philosophy 
Ôdraws authority only from itself, abhors argument, and states what is, in the sensory form of  
what imposes itself  without having to share this impositionÕ (Badiou and Toscano 2006: 40). 
Resultantly, if  thought is to not reinstate the authority of  presentation back onto itself  or is, in 
other words, to escape ideology, then it must do so through the authority of  being presenting 
itself through thought and negating any mediation by representation or mimesis. It is therefore 
to mathematics that Badiou turns as the ÔguardianÕ or ÔlanguageÕ of  Ôbeing qua beingÕ, going 
so far as to say that Ômathematics is ontologyÕ (Badiou 2011: 15).  As Brassier puts it, reßecting 
BadiouÕs uptake of  the Althusserian quest to rid dialectical materialism of  ideology, Ôfor 
Badiou axiomatic set-theory is the science of  being as sheer multiplicity, the science of  the 
 BadiouÕs argument here stems from a contentious reading of  ParmenidesÕ poem On Nature. Cordero (2004) has 37
written a full and nuanced discussion on the poem which discusses, amongst other important issues, the 
sensibility of  nothing. BadiouÕs claim here is that, if  sense senses, there must be something to sense. Even if  one 
senses what they think is nothingness, that nothingness is nevertheless a thing they have simply termed 
ÒnothingnessÓ.
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presentation of  presentation (rather than of  what is presented); in other words, the science 
that guarantees access to presented realityÕ (2005: 135-136). Where science constitutes the 
puriÞcation of  representation from historical analysis for Althusser, BadiouÕs utilisation of  
mathematics, as the science of  being, is intended to rid analysis from the semantic and poetic 
illusions of  ideology.  38
Badiou here seems stuck at an impasse himself. Having stated that Ô[t]he real is the 
impasse of  formalisation; formalisation is the place of  the forced pass of  the realÕ, yet also 
that all hitherto presentation consists under a count as one operation, thereby afÞxing it 
within the realm of  statist ideology, does this not also put axiomatics within the same camp as 
ideology? If  mathematics (even in its formalist variants) consists of  statements that prescribe a 
structure onto being, then this would resemble precisely the same mode of  thought that 
operates within BadiouÕs understanding of  political philosophy. To the extent that this 
philosophy must be Ôdone withÕ, would this not also be entirely appropriate for the 
prescriptions of  mathematics? As Sacilotto asks then: Ôhow is this intrinsic access that 
formalisation achieves vis a vis the world to be conceived, if  not by a relation of  identity 
between the forms and the real, one which would however render the world inherently 
ÒmathematisedÓ, and thus preemptively idealise itÕ (2013: 72)? In having subtracted the 
sensible from the possible criteria by which to know being, Badiou risks idealising his meta-
ontological gesture that prescribes mathematics as that which adequately presents being. 
Moreover, following the revealing of  being through an event, would not the militant be forced 
to negate precisely the mathematical structure that expresses the evental rupture in the Þrst 
place? If  Badiou is to avoid the charge of  dogmatism, he must therefore also avoid both an 
essentialist recourse to the Platonic formation of  the real, and the reproduction of  an evental 
 Excellent portrayals of  BadiouÕs critical uptake of  AlthusserÕs Òepistemological breakÓ from ideology can be 38
found in FraserÕs introduction to Badiou (2007 [1966]: i-lxv) and in Bosteels (2001). AlthusserÕs distinction 
between scientiÞc knowledge and ideology will be developed in the next chapter as a point of  unity between 
Badiou and Deleuze.
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rupture alongside a truth procedure whilst, at the same time, maintaining a veracity to the 
truth of  it.  39
The truth of  mathematics 
In order to address this question, i.e. Ôis mathematics non-ideological under BadiouÕs 
own conception of  ideology?Õ, a brief  summation of  BadiouÕs position would be helpful. 
Refuting contemporary politics as a sophistic world external to the subject, Badiou upholds 
the necessity to reveal the truth of  politics and constitute the subject according to this 
revelatory truth procedure. This dyadÐopposing truth to opinion (synonymous with doxa in 
BadiouÕs usage)Ðconstitutes the Þrst of  two Platonic dyads that compose his thought, the 
second being that of  the distinction between the sensible and the intelligible. Because the 
sensible cannot provide the grounds for telling the truth of  what is, it is the intelligibleÐ
subtracted from the thought of  the sensibleÐwhich provides the only method for doing so. 
Both of  these dyads are premised upon the Parmenidean dyad of  is/is not which, for Badiou, 
conditions the ground upon which to make truthful decisions. This being the stage set, it is 
clear that any conception of  mathematics which bases its operative power within its 
propositions will not sufÞce for Badiou, who terms this ÔformalismÕ. Whilst semantic language 
is needed to mathematise in an active sense, the subject itself  remains in the ideal position of  
authoritatively setting out that which it will then organise and manipulate. In forming matter 
with mathematics, the subject would take on the role of  governing the state as did the 
philosopher kings of  Plato. 
Instead of  this reversion to blatant dogmatism, Badiou addresses the position of  
mathematics containing its own expressive authority in The Concept of  Model (2007 [1966]). 
Reformulating the dogmatism inherent within semantics, Badiou argues that, Ônothing is 
more indistinct, and more empiricist, than the notion of  a collection of  objects, to the point 
that if  it maintains this notion, semantics will have no chance of  articulating itself  
 Badiou recognises this problem early on in his writing, taking on the latter issue as the task left by Althusser. 39
He develops the problematic in Theory of  the Subject, where he discusses the placement (or ÔsplaceÕ), P of  pure 
being, A. As has been shown, for Badiou, the task of  the proletariat is to negate the placing operation of  the 
bourgeoisie to the extent that society becomes truly classless, otherwise it remains a set of  the proletariat 
counting operation. The reproduction of  the evental rupture throughout a social upheaval would be written, 
with the language of  the Hegelian dialectic, Ap(Ap) = P where Ap is being-placed. This algorithm represents a 
deviation ÔÒto the rightÓ, which leads back to the objective brutality of  the place P in order to deny the possibility 
of  the new inherent in the oldÕ (Badiou 2013 [1982]: 12). In other words, given a process of  determination, the 
placement of  being will not have disappeared, Ônothing will have taken place but the placeÕ and being will 
remain represented through the situation it intended to rupture (Badiou 2013 [1982]: 10).
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scientiÞcallyÕ (2007 [1966]: 29). Instead, Badiou attempts to demonstrate how Ôthe intra-
syntactic difference between logical and mathematical axioms is fully thinkable only with 
reference to the models in which such axioms are ÒtrueÓÕ (2007 [1966]: 28). It is not the case 
that mathematics exists in the empirical sense by which language formalises a model that 
captures a particular instance, but rather, as what Brassier calls Òscriptural 
materialityÓ (Brassier 2005), mathematics constitutes its own productive sense by virtue of  its 
inherent rules which are then inscribed by an individual. Badiou argues that mathematical 
models consist of  three elements: individual constants (a, b, c), predicates (P, Q, R) and 
variables (x, y, zÉ) and that, because not all sequences in mathematics will be correct, the 
governance of  Ôsyntactic senseÕ is performed by punctuation to achieve the Ôrules of  
formationÕ (2007 [1966]: 23-24 original emphasis). From this collection of  variables (Ôin respect 
of  which it is implicitly agreed that they denote pure multiplesÕ (Badiou 2011: 60)), it is 
possible to write well-formed expressions, which present particular operations, whereby Ôa rule 
of  formations authorises an inscription of  each markÕ (Badiou 2007 [1966]: 24). In this sense, 
Badiou can talk of  mathematics existing as a language of  Ôbeing qua beingÕ because he views 
mathematicsÕ rules of  formation as contained within the progressive development of  its own 
model, and not as the result of  a semantic discussion of  what may/may not, or should/should 
not, be.  For him, it is the axiomatic and syntactical operation of  mathematics itself, a priori 40
of  its inscription by a mark, that accords it productive capability and an independence from 
semantics. Yet the mark is important to BadiouÕs use of  mathematics because it differentiates 
the agency of  mathematics in its operation from the agency of  an active subject who 
ÔmathematisesÕ. In Theoretical Writings, Badiou distinguishes between the little and grand style 
of  mathematics, whereby little mathematics Ôstrives to dissolve the ontological sovereignty of  
mathematics, its aristocratic self-sufÞciency, its unrivalled mastery, by conÞning its dramatic, 
almost bafßing existence to a stale compartment of  academic specialisationÕ (2010c: 3). 
Accordingly, versions of  either empirical or formalist mathematics are subservient to 
philosophy and take their stage under the watchful eye of  a scholarly director who can correct 
them when they are wrong. As the proper alternative to the little style, Badiou prescribes the 
grand style: Ôarithmetic as an instance of  stellar and warlike inhumanity!Õ because Ôthere is no 
essential harmony between mathematics and the human intellectÕ (2010c: 12-13). The grand 
 Badiou provides a rigorous defence of  mathematics as the language of  being qua being, as opposed to 40
sophistry and superstition in ÔMathematics and PhilosophyÕ in Theoretical Writings (2004). He declares that 
mathematics Ôis Òolder than the sun,ÓÕ that it will remain intact Ôon the ruins of  timeÕ, and that mathematics Ôis 
the discipline and the severity, the immutability and the image of  Òthat supreme truthÓÕ (2004: 12).
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style of  mathematics is, for Badiou, a separate pre-constitutive part of  the world (ontology) 
that exceeds intellect, yet a part that can nevertheless be harnessed and expressed. It is 
because of  the a priori validity of  its axioms to itself  that mathematics constitutes the language 
of  being qua being before it is expressed by humans semantically. Badiou demonstrates that 
Ô[e]very measurement can therefore be expressed in a formal language (the system of  reals), 
where the rationals are effectively marked; and the forms of  calculation, the operations, would 
essentially be conserved, thanks to a certain invariance of  the Ôspecies of  structureÕ [lÕespce de 
structure]Õ (2007 [1966]: 21) and, correspondingly, this allows him to state that Ôit is impossible 
to be lazy in mathematicsÕ (2008 [1992]: 96).  41
As a way of  illustrating his argument (that science cannot incorporate semantic or 
empiricist arguments and is based upon those of  syntax) he states that, Ô[i]n these expressions 
the quantiÞed variable x cannot be replaced by a constant. This is clear enough: the statement 
(x)P(x) does not tell us which particular constant is marked by P, but only that some such 
constant existsÕ (2007 [1966]: 24-25). The truth of  the statement (x)P(x) is not predicated upon 
its deduction from the sensible, leading to an inÞnite series of  asking Ôare we sure?Õ (where 
truth would imply the semantic use of  either induction or inference), but from the conditions 
demarcated by the axioms of  mathematics itself.  Put generally: given BadiouÕs argument 42
that the sensible cannot be trusted to present being, that the attribute of  thought is the only 
realm in which being can truly be known, and that poetry roots thought in sophistry, it is only 
by holding onto the axiomatic integrity of  mathematics that the subject can know what is 
possible to exist. 
In a statement that sums up the later development between his two major works, Being 
and Event and Logics of  Worlds, BadiouÕs position from this point is telling. Having demonstrated 
that it is only via the syntactic operations of  mathematics that being can be thought, yet 
acknowledging that philosophy must also account for the sensible, Badiou states that Ô[i]t 
would indeed seem legitimate to found an epistemology of  models on the systematic study of  
correspondences between syntactic and semantic conceptsÕ (Badiou 2007 [1966]: 21). It is 
necessary for Badiou to account for the connection between mathematical and poetic 
 For further discussion of  the little and grand styles of  mathematics, see Badiou (2010b: 3-38).41
 Badiou preempts the criticism of  inference, arguing that, rather than inferential, Ôevery universalising 42
procedure is implicative. It veriÞes the consequences that follow from the evental statement to which the 
vanished event is indexedÕ (2004: 149). Badiou takes for granted the pre-subjective constituency of  mathematics 
and, in his formation of  his work at least (see below), does not rely on any synthesis (such as KantÕs synthetic 
unity of  the manifold) to reproduce and take active agency in applying its authoritative power. Mathematics acts 
through the subject it constitutes and is not constituted by an a priori subject.
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thoughtÐand yet two problems emerge as a result of  this necessity. On the one hand, why 
does Badiou assume that there is in fact a correspondence between syntactic and semantic 
concepts, having gone to such lengths to repudiate the latter? There is hitherto no reason to 
assume that there is any meaningful correspondence between the two to study (given BadiouÕs 
own reasons to rid ontology of  poetic thought). Furthermore, even supposing there were some 
correspondence, what would the truth of  this correspondence be grounded in given that, 
hitherto, it is only the mathematical logic of  models (also referred to as set theory in BadiouÕs 
other works) that contained access to truth? On the other hand, even if  there were a 
correspondence between the two, why should it be that either of  the two kinds of  statements 
make any meaningful contribution to understanding the sensible. Whilst the axiomatic 
integrity of  mathematics enables the subject to know what is possible to exist, this has been 
accomplished through the subtraction of  the sensible from thought to the extent that it is 
assumed that the translation of  thought back into the sensible makes sense. There are 
philosophical grounds to presume a connection between thought and the sensible, for 
example either in SpinozaÕs parallelism or HumeÕs positivist associationism. Yet, whilst he 
does not subscribe to either philosophy, and having argued that the presentation of  being 
itself  cannot be trusted to show what truly is (hence the resort to an axiomatic model in its 
place), Badiou must account for why the prescriptions of  mathematics should be taken as 
structuring political activity. Does he simply rely on a negative argument akin to saying that, 
Ôit canÕt be anything else other than mathematics that creates the rupture of  political truthÕ? 
This would seem too weak an argument upon which to ground his otherwise tightly presented 
system, and so Badiou must provide the imperative to condition politics upon the logic of  set 
theory in a more substantial manner. It is not sufÞcient to simply claim that mathematics, in 
its axiomatic purity, should condition Òsome-oneÕsÓ (Badiou 2001: 40-57) politics without 
accounting for the legitimacy or authority of  the claim itself. 
Both problems place Badiou into the position of  what Meillassoux terms a Ôweak 
correlationistÕ, whose argument proscribes Ôany knowledge of  the thing-in-itself  (any 
application of  the categories to the supersensible), but maintains the thinkability of  the in-
itself Õ (Meillassoux 2008: 35).  Given that, for Badiou, the Ôone is notÕ and that beingÕs very 43
existence is only knowable by its mark, he precludes the knowledge of  the thing-in-itself  other 
 MeillassouxÕs conception of  correlationism will be developed further in chapter four.43
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than through mediation of  mathematics.  As Meillassoux invites, Ôlet us call ÒspeculativeÓ 44
every type of  thinking that claims to be able to access some form of  the absoluteÕ (i.e. 
BadiouÕs being), Ôand let us call ÒmetaphysicsÓ every type of  thinking that claims to be able to 
access some form of  absolute beingÕ (BadiouÕs truth procedure, albeit in a negative/
subtractive form) (Meillassoux 2008: 34). This being the case, and if  Ôall metaphysics is 
ÒspeculativeÓ by deÞnitionÕ, it must be demonstrated that Ôit is possible to envisage an 
absolutising thought that would not be absolutistÕ (2008: 34). Put in the terminology of  
Livingston, the correlationist faces the problem of  accounting for the authority of  a totalising 
element in a system that does not gain its authority from itself, lest it succumb to dogmatism. 
Both Meillassoux and Livingston constitute a challenge for Badiou: account for why 
mathematics should be held up as that which presents the in-itself, as opposed to anything 
else.  Put directly: what does Badiou say of  the activist, or the refugee; why should they take 45
heed of  the bafßingly complex political rallying call of  set theory to put them in the place of  
a militant? Do they not already know that they are resisting and do they need mathematics to 
tell them how? Indeed, knowledge of  the in-itself, evacuated by sense, seems to lead to what 
Ryder calls an Ôimpersonal subjectÕ, constituted only by the fact that it is part of  an axiomatic 
system that prescribes its places as part of  it (2013: 38). The resistance of  activists only 
becomes authorised if  it conforms to the mathematical prescriptions of  the void set, whilst the 
individual is mere ÔÒgeneric human stuff Ó that is ontologically indistinguishable from pure 
mathematical multiplicityÕ (Hallward in Badiou 2001: xxxii). As part of  the axiomatic 
mechanics of  set theory, and following the originary Parmenidean postulate of  is/is not, it 
could very well be that this is the role of  the subject that Badiou has in mind. Yet the lack of  
connection between the syntactic and semantic, as well as the axiomatic and sensible, hint at 
the fact that Badiou offers, as Osborne puts it, Ôa full-blown idealism struggling with the 
limitations of  its grasp on actuality, which redeÞnes reality in terms of  the gap that structures the 
limitation (Osborne 2013: 22 original emphasis). Ryder demonstrates BadiouÕs attempt to 
 It is unclear whether or not the mark as discussed in The Concept of  Model and within Being and Event are the 44
same for Badiou. In The Concept of  Model, Badiou uses the term to refer to the inscriptions of  mathematical 
terminology in a much more general sense than in Being and Event; in the latter book, the mark represents only 
the being-as-nothing prior to the count-as-one.
 Laruelle puts this forcefully; of  BadiouÕs ontological position, he claims that Ô[e]ither it is an ÒintricatedÓ unity, 45
philosophically self-intricated, that claims to found itself  and to operate the act of  subtractionÐan act that 
conceals another, more pure, philosophical-style auto-foundation, but which does not know itself  as such or is 
not announced explicitly; or else it requires a relatively detached meta-ontological act of  being-posited, an 
explicit intervention of  positing. Badiou as materialist tries to ßatten one onto the other the object posited and 
the idealist act of  positing. The difference in the two cases is the difference between the implicit and the explicit, 
but that makes no difference to the decisionist or arbitrary structure at work hereÕ (Laruelle 2013: 82).
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avoid this criticism by collapsing the distinction between sense and the transcendental logic of  
mathematics; this demonstration will be presented below, showing that Badiou does not 
escape this criticism and that BadiouÕs subject can only be seen as a supplement to an 
originary decision-making individual. 
Who Resists? Just Some-One 
Although KantÕs project may seem far removed from BadiouÕs, Kant being a 
Ôphilosopher of  relation, of  the linkages between phenomena, and [as] this constitutive 
primacy of  relation forbids all access to the being of  the thing as suchÕ (Badiou 2010c: 135), 
Badiou relies on ÒKantÕs subtractive ontologyÓ for his conception of  the subject. Indeed a 
chapter, dedicated to Kant, is named as such in Theoretical Writings (2004) and is dedicated to 
drawing out the distinction between the synthesis of  the manifold of  phenomena (binding) and 
the originary basis for this (unity). For BadiouÕs reading of  Kant, the synthesis of  the manifold 
is the transcendental aesthetic which is experienced by intuition. Unity is then that which 
conditions the possibility of  the transcendent being held as such, giving it the ability to be 
intuited. This unity is precisely what Badiou uses himself  in order to answer Ôthe problem of  
how the inconsistent manifold comes to be counted-as-oneÕ, a unity which Ômust have been 
decided in advance in order for relational synthesis to be possibleÕ (2004: 135). Badiou agrees 
with KantÕs claim that Ôthe consistency of  multiple-presentation is originary, and that the 
relations whereby phenomena arise out of  that multiple-presentation are merely derivative 
realities of  experienceÕ (2004: 135). In other words, for both Kant and Badiou, the 
mechanism by which phenomena appear and combine within the realm of  the sensible must 
be governed by a realm that originates before the phenomena themselves: this is the role of  
KantÕs unity and BadiouÕs real/undifferentiated multiplicity (Badiou 2011: 283-284, 298).  46
Badiou points out another similarity in his conception of  the subject with KantÕs showing 
that, Ô[i]f  we set aside the subjective connotation in the notion of  originary apperception, 
which is conceived of  by Kant as the Òtranscendental unity of  self-consciousnessÓ, and focus 
strictly on its functioning, we should have no difÞculty recognising in it what I call the 
 Kant states that Ô[t]his unityÐspeaking generallyÐis called pure concept of  understanding. Hence the same 46
understandingÐand indeed through the same acts whereby it brought about, in concepts, the logical form of  a 
judgment by means of  analytic unityÐalso brings into its presentations a transcendental content, by means of  the 
synthetic unity of  the manifold in intuition as suchÕ. The Ôpure concept of  understandingÕ crucially is not 
understanding itself, it is that which allows understanding as such. Kant uses this Ôpure conceptÕ of  
understanding in his argument against Hume to demonstrate how, despite the lack of  our ability to access the 
thing-in-itself  directly, there must be an in-itself  in order to allows us the possibility of  knowing.
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counting-as-one, which Kant applies to representation in general, conceived as a universal 
abstract situationÕ (2010c: 136 original emphasis). Kant therefore has in place both a non-
presentational conception of  the real (in the correlationist sense that the subject cannot grasp 
the thing-in-itself), as well as the claim that what is sensible by the subject is in fact a 
representation of  Òmultiple-presentationÓ (or the ability of  being to express itself). Both of  
these claims are shared by Badiou, with Badiou using the Kantian terminology of  the 
Òfunction of  synthetic bindingÓ and his own nomenclature Òsystems of  categoriesÓ 
synonymously, to express the transcendental category of  logic that structures the appearance 
of  phenomena.  Nevertheless, Badiou claims that KantÕs problematic was not the radicality 47
of  his conclusions, but that the necessity to think a unitary subject that was induced upon his 
work to the extent that his conclusions Ôdo not always clearly deliver the full extent of  their 
signiÞcanceÕ (2010c: 137). Badiou claims that, unlike Kant, his subject does not maintain a 
relation of  understanding  in order to weakly separate the potential of  it developing 
separately to the hypothesised object = x (Ryder 2013: 47).  So, if  Badiou conßates the 
emergence of  the subject with the uniÞed presentation of  the multiple under the political 
form authorised by set theory, what is it that makes the decision to claim Þdelity to the event 
in the Þrst instance? 
Badiou shows that, for Kant, both the subject and object are split into empirical and 
transcendental forms. Whereas the empirical subject Ôexists according to the determinations 
of  our state in inner senseÕ, is changeable and Ôhas as its correlate represented 
phenomenaÕ (Badiou 2010c: 138-139), the transcendental subject, Ôas given in originary 
apperceptionÕ is Ôthe supreme guarantor of  objective unityÕ relative to which Ôrepresentations 
of  objects is alone possibleÕ (Badiou 2003: 139). As a correlate to the transcendental subject 
there is an Ôobject which cannot itself  be intuited by us because it is the form of  objectivity in 
generalÕ, i.e. the transcendental object = x (Badiou 2010c: 139). In other words, KantÕs 
transcendental logic provides both the grounding to condition the existence of  the sensible 
subject (Ògiven the synthesis of  the manifold to experience, the subject exists to make 
judgements upon itÓ) and the existence of  the transcendental subject (Òthe transcendental 
subject exists in order to be able to make determinations of  x in the Þrst placeÓ). It is only on 
 The inner workings of  BadiouÕs theory of  categories, most fully developed in Logics of  Worlds (2009), will not be 47
discussed here because the purpose of  this chapter is not to see how well Badiou accounts for the presentation of  
the transcendental. Instead, it is more important to account for whether or not BadiouÕs ontology can be 
connected back to the semantic, having previously extradited it, and the status of  the political actor within the 
Badiouian system.
"35
the basis of  having a transcendental subject as a placeholder in his system that Kant can 
make statements about the cohesion of  the rest of  his system (including those pertaining to 
the empirical subject).  As Badiou argues, this is because, without the transcendental subject 48
existing in a separate ontological category to the object, the subjectÕs empirical side would 
have no consistent ontological grounding on which to make epistemological claims.  In this 
sense, the minimal form of  the subject for Kant acts as the same prerequisite for systemic 
cohesion as it does within BadiouÕs ontological conÞguration. Like KantÕs transcendental 
subject, for Badiou, a Ôsubject is not a substanceÕ and, rather, the Ôintrinsic indiscernability in 
which a generic procedure is resolved rules out any substantiality of  the subjectÕ (Badiou 
2011: 391). As has been shown however, the axiomatic prescriptions of  mathematics for 
Badiou exists a priori of  their inscription within a mark; mathematics, as the language of  being 
qua being, does not necessitate a subjectÐtranscendental or notÐfor the ontological to be 
sensed. Because Kant Ôposits that his originary and empty Òtranscendental object = XÓ 
guarantees that any given content will enter into a realm governed by relational, logical, and 
categorial limitationsÕ, as Ryder explains, Ôan ontological question is glimpsed through eyes 
open wide just enough to admit a guarantee for the certainty of  logical judgmentsÕ (Ryder 
2013: 44). For Badiou, however, the subject cannot be understood as Ôthe empty centre of  a 
transcendental realm but rather as the operational unity of  a multiplicity of  effectuations of  
identityÕ (Badiou 2010c: 142). Accordingly, the subject is not Ôa resultÕ of  any operation 
(including that of  mathematics), but is the Ôlocal status of  a procedure, a conÞguration in 
excess of  the situationÕ (Badiou 2011: 392). BadiouÕs subject is a subject within the structure 
of  a truth procedure (not given as a product of  it, but as an intrinsic component of  it), and is 
only revealed as part of  a given situation. Were there no situation to contain an evental site, 
through which the subject is made knowable, then the subject would act as an empty category 
within BadiouÕs ontology.  
The crucial difference, for Badiou, with regard to KantÕs subject, is that there is no 
necessity for a form of  subjective consistency (even in the sense of  KantÕs originary 
apperception) to condition the consistency of  BadiouÕs ontology as a separate ÒkindÓ of  
ontology to the subject itself. The subject is simply another part of  the ontological framework 
 A full examination of  KantÕs philosophy is beyond the purview of  this thesis. It is worth noting however that 48
Deleuze complicates the this preliminary exposition of  Kant through his reading of  the Critique of  Judgement in 
(Deleuze 2008 [1963]). According to Hughes, what fascinated Deleuze about KantÕs project was that the third 
Critique examined the Kantian concepts of  synthesis and schematism from the point of  view of  each other, in 
order to uncover the Ôtranscendental genesisÕ of  each faculty (Hughes 2009: 5). In this way, for Deleuze, Kant 
goes some way to avoiding the dogmatic idealism of  the Þrst two Critiques.
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structured and described by mathematical set theory. Kant provides (in BadiouÕs reading of  
him at least) an ontological basis for the epistemological category of  originary apperception 
and, therefore, can argue that, Ôthe conditions of  the possibility of  experience in general are 
likewise conditions of  the possibility of  the objects of  experienceÕ (Kant 1996 [1787]: A157/B197, 
p. 228). Badiou stops short of  claiming that Kant places the transcendental subject within the 
count as one (and thereby within the realm of  ideology), yet does argue that ÔKantÕs powerful 
ontological intuitions remain tethered to a starting point restricted to the form of  judgement 
[É], while in the order of  localisation, they remain tied to a conception of  the subject which 
makes of  the latter a protocol of  constitution, whereas it can, at best, only be a resultÕ (Badiou 
2004: 141). The necessity that Kant felt to account for judgement in the Þrst place 
conditioned his theory to separate the subjective form of  originary apperception from the 
transcendental object = x. Yet the dual nature of  KantÕs subject (as both transcendental pre-
supposition and empirical) can therefore account for the problematic laid out above, i.e. that 
Badiou must account for the connection between synthetic and analytic statements. The 
Kantian subject exists transcendentally because it conditions the uniÞcation of  the manifold 
of  phenomena vis. itself, and empirically because it judges concepts based on these 
phenomena. Badiou, on the other hand, does not see the need to account for judgement 
because any form of  semantic discussionÐthe use of  concepts involving analytic and synthetic 
propositionsÐis rooted within the epistemological realm of  the sensible. His subject is purely 
one of  ontology, within the truth-procedure (Badiou) or multiple-presentation of  unity (Kant), 
and, as a result, Badiou does not specify either the transcendental conditions of  a subject or 
its empirical features. 
Instead of  constituting either a transcendental prerequisite of  consistency, or a purely 
empirical phenomenon for analysis, the subject for Badiou is therefore neither more nor less 
than a part of  his ontological framework: it is constituent of  the prescriptive axiomatisation of  
mathematics. The ideological covers of  a political situation are thrown off  to reveal the 
subject of  the event as an operant and essential element of  the mathematical structureÐbut 
only within its mathematical construction. BadiouÕs Ethics is the most revealing in this regard, 
demonstrating BadiouÕs claim that, ÔMan thinks, Man is a tissue of  truthsÕ (2001: 12). If  there 
is a subject in any way connected to the human animal, it is due only to the ability of  humans 
to effect the truthful logic of  mathematics. Indeed, appropriating the Aristotelian distinction 
between man and animal as delineated by the capacity of  the former to think politically, 
Badiou argues that it is the Ôenormous effortÕ on the part of  human beings, who have been 
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subjected to torture or imprisonment, to stubbornly Ôremain what he is Ñ that is to say, 
precisely something other than a victim, other than a being-for-death, and thus: something other 
than a moral beingÕ (Badiou 2001: 11-12). Furthermore, Badiou claims that, when the individual 
is not political, i.e. Ôthe status of  victim, of  suffering beast, of  emaciated, dying body, equates 
man with his animal substructure, it reduces him to the level of  a living organism pure and 
simpleÕ (2001: 11). Furthermore, he claims that, Ôhumanity is an animal species. It is mortal 
and predatory. But neither of  these attributes can distinguish humanity within the world of  
the livingÕ (2001: 11). The distinction between man as an animal and something to be rariÞed 
as more than simply one species amongst others is that humans have the ability to re-afÞrm 
what they are, or were, before that which attempted to reduce them to animality: thought.  49
This thought must, of  course, be puriÞed of  doxa which, for Badiou, is only the realm of  
sophistry and statist communication (see Badiou 2001: 50-52). How does mankind relate then 
to the truth procedure itself ? Ryder is not entirely correct when he argues that, ÔBadiouÕs 
conception of  a political subject relies on a chance encounter with a truth-processÕ (Ryder 
2013: 55), because this implies a Kantian distinction between the transcendental subject of  
unity and the empirical subject of  the truth procedure-become-sensible. The chance that the 
subject relies upon is actually the chance that an event emerges from an evental site, making it 
possible for the subject to be thought by its human tissue. If  Ôtrue (rare) politics [É] is the 
coming to light of  an indiscernible of  the timesÕ (Badiou 2011: 17) or, in other words, is the 
revelation of  undifferentiated being within a particular situation, then the subject does not 
rely on an encounter with a truth-process so much as is uncovered by it.  50
Yet what does this say about the human animal, the animal engaged in political 
situations, amorous encounters, scientiÞc exploration and artistic creativity? If  man (and 
 Badiou offers no evidence that non-humans do not have a sense of  self-identiÞcation and always uses the 49
masculine pronoun (in both Ethics or his book on love (2012). This leaves his anthropological reliability open to 
question, as well as the gendered and hetero-centric logic of  his philosophy.
 Barker neatly summarises BadiouÕs concept of  the situations as Ôthe set of  circumstances, inÞnitely multiple, 50
which is interrupted and named Òafter the eventÓÕ (2002: 134). To explain the evental site, Badiou turns to a 
strangely banal example of  family composition. A family who have have all registered with the registry ofÞce and 
possess French nationality, yet who harbour a secret member of  the family at home who has not been registered 
is a ÒsingularÓ multiplicity. This is because the presentation of  the family itself  has not been represented by the 
state. A family who has been entirely counted by the state is a ÒnormalÓ multiplicity in the sense that the count 
as one of  the state functions here normally. This family has been presented (by itself) and represented (by the 
state). For Badiou, an evental site would be a family Ôall of  whose members were clandestine or non-declared, 
and which presents itself  (manifests itself  publicly) uniquely in the group form of  family outingsÕ (Badiou 2011: 
175). Because none of  the terms of  the family are counted as one and only the multiple ÒfamilyÓ forms a one, 
this family is Ôon the edge of  the voidÕ, to the extent that it borders singular presentation and the count as one of  
the state. The evental site belongs to the situation, although its contents do not. It is from here that there is a 
chance, under certain circumstances particular to each situation, for being to spring from the conÞnes of  
representation and rupture into an event. See Badiou (2011: 173-177).
"38
woman?) thinks, though it is only through man that the truth procedure can construct a real 
political sequence, does Badiou value anything else that constitutes the activist? It cannot be, 
of  course, that the activist ÒisÓ in any way, because anything that is remains within the realm 
of  representative ideology. Yet does that mean that everything else that constitutes the human, 
bar thought, is to be discounted alongside ideology? What then of  MarxÕs valorisation of  the 
struggle he argued was at the heart of  human life? Badiou argues that every truth Ôdeposes 
constituted knowledges, and thus opposes opinions. For what we call opinions are 
representations without truth, the anarchic debris of  circulating knowledgeÕ Badiou (2001: 50 
original emphasis). However, despite his praise of  the truth, Badiou argues that, Ôopinions are 
the cement of  sociality. They are what sustain all human animals, without exception, and we 
cannot function otherwiseÕ (2001: 50). So, on the one hand, Badiou upholds the purity of  
truth as opposed to mere opinion yet, on the other, claims that opinions provide vital 
sustenance for the individual: BadiouÕs attitude to the human condition itself  must be called 
into question. With his earlier work in Metapolitics (2005d) lamenting the march forward of  
political philosophy, as well as what he calls the Ôanarchic debrisÕ of  opinions Ethics (2001: 50), 
BadiouÕs revocation of  everything that opposes the truth procedure can also be seen to 
include the animality of  the human itself. Badiou disavows everything that enables the human 
to think mathematics, praising only that they happen to do so. HumanityÕs ability to think 
mathematics is entirely contingent however, because there is nothing within BadiouÕs 
ontological schema (as being presenting itself) that separates the individual human from any 
other presented being whatsoever. For Badiou, everything that constitutes human 
individuality that has not yet reached the status of  being synonymous with the ontological 
prescription of  the truthful subjectÐactivists, the subaltern, the polyamorous, refugees, indeed 
anyone at allÐis no more worthy of  consideration than the parliamentary politics he derides. 
What a shame, it seems for Badiou, that humans have so much human baggage to carry with 
them. If  only they could see what truly is, rather than toil away at their erstwhile naive needs 
and desires. 
The condescension of  BadiouÕs reference to those who have not been ordained by the 
aleatory encounter with a truth procedure is shown in his reference to them as Ôsome-
oneÕ (Badiou 2001: 44). Although the neologism neatly captures BadiouÕs portrayal of  the 
individual as only existing within the count-as-one operation of  a state, as well as the non-
speciÞc nature of  their existence in the realm of  doxa, it nevertheless entirely discounts the 
effort of  every human that does not live up to BadiouÕs prescription of  success. As he says, the 
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subject Ôin no way pre-exists the process. He is absolutely nonexistent in the situation ÒbeforeÓ 
the event. We might say that the process of  truth induces a subjectÕ (2001: 43 original 
emphasis). The subjectiÞcation of  some-one is therefore the process by which he (or she) 
makes a decision to relate Ôhenceforth to the situation from the perspective of  its evental 
supplementÕ (Badiou 2001: 41 original emphasis). The subject exists as the supplement to some-
one, sutured onto the biological excess of  the truth that is inferior to purity of  truth, but a 
contingent pre-requisite for its revelation. Indeed, Badiou is very clear about the insufÞciency 
of  the individual to reach the status of  a subject: stating that, Ôthe subject of  a revolutionary 
politics is not the individual militantÕ, for him, it is a Ôsingular production, which has taken 
different names (sometimes ÔPartyÕ, sometimes not)Õ.  Badiou gives three examples of  the 51
subject whereby the individual is insufÞcient to reach the adequate status of  subject. Firstly, 
and almost at pains to acknowledge the individualÕs efforts in a political process, he accepts 
that, Ô[T]o be sure, the militant enters into the composition of  this subjectÕ. However, because 
both the sensible and doxa must be purged from the truth of  the political truth procedure, the 
truth procedure Ôexceeds himÕ (Badiou 2001: 43). For his second and third examples, those of  
two lovers and the artist (what is wrong with polygamy and why not multiple artists?), the 
individuals again occupy an entirely separate ontological register to that of  truth. This is the 
result of  BadiouÕs prescription that the sensible needs to be subtracted from mathematical 
thought yet, again, a result that negates the lover and the artist who is not faithful to an event. 
According to Badiou, some-one then is the passive recipient of  a truth procedure who Ôenters 
into compositionÕ of  an assumed Ôpoint of  truthÕ (2001: 44) and any endeavour on the part of  
the individual to affect political, amorous, scientiÞc or artistic changeÐthat does not involve an 
aleatory eventÐis cast aside as unworthy of  being named under one of  the categories.  
Yet what is it that makes the decision to act in either a political, amorous, scientiÞc or 
artistic manner? Against KantÕs presupposition of  the transcendental subject, that which 
allowed for the consistency needed to think in time and space separately from the manifold of  
phenomena, Badiou argued that the subject was Ôthe operational unity of  a multiplicity of  
effectuations of  identityÕ (2004: 142). BadiouÕs subject is not the decision-making actor to 
initiate Þdelity to a truth procedure because it is not a separate ontological component from 
the structure itself; it was shown above that BadiouÕs most signiÞcant criticism of  Kant was 
 Badiou furthers his argument, clarifying that, for him, it is Ôimportant to understand that the ÒsubjectÓ, thus 51
conceived, does not overlap with the psychological subject, nor even with the reßexive subject (in DescartesÕ 
sense) or the transcendental subject (in KantÕs sense)Õ (Badiou 2001: 43).
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precisely the rareÞcation of  the transcendental category of  the subject due to the perceived 
necessity to account for judgement in the Þrst place. As such, and existing only as it does 
within the matheme, it cannot be the subject that decides to pay Þdelity to the truth 
procedure, for the subject is always/already part of  it. Instead of  the subject, it is the Ôsome-
oneÕ that makes the decision, for Badiou, to put in motion their Þdelity to a truth procedure. 
It is Ôthis body, and everything that it is capable of, which enters into the composition of  a 
Òpoint of  truthÓ - always assuming that an event has occurred, along with an immanent break 
taking the sustained form of  a faithful processÕ (Badiou 2001: 44-45 original emphasis). Taking 
for granted that an event has taken placeÐfor there is no possibility to pay Þdelity to a truth 
procedure if  there has not been an eventÐit is the animality of  the individual, complete with 
doxa, weakness and its lack of  rareÞcation with regard to animals, that submits to the truth 
procedure. Badiou appropriates SpinozaÕs concept of  Ôperseverance in beingÕ as the term for 
ordinary human behaviour, or Ôthe law that governs some-one in so far as he knows himself Õ. 
HoweverÐand crucially for BadiouÕs conception of  the subjectÐhe argues that this law does 
not constitute the Ôtest of  truthÕ (given that the void cannot be known) (2001: 46). BadiouÕs 
perseverance is therefore the knowledge that some-one has of  them-self  but, as knowledge is 
opposed to truth for Badiou, perseverance is without the subtracted realm of  truth. Following 
a truth-event, the individualÕs perseverance leads to ÔconsistencyÕ, or the Ômanner in which our 
devotee of  mathematics will engage his perseverance in that which breaks or opposes this 
perseverance, which is his belonging to a truth-processÕ (2001: 46-47). Consistency then 
describes the combination of  the individualÕs perseverance through life (characterised by 
knowledge, sense and doxa), the subject of  truth and the two things combined. Consistency is a 
new ÒthingÓ, a politicised individual (within a ÔPartyÕ for example) or the loving couple, but 
only in the knowledge that the some-one must constantly re-afÞrm their animality by their 
attempts at Þdelity to the truth prescriptions of  mathematical ontology, whilst always knowing 
that they arenÕt themselves sufÞcient to the task of  being political or amorous. However, 
BadiouÕs use of  perseverance is not the same as SpinozaÕs, leading to a misappropriated 
understanding of  consistency. 
In Ethics (1992 [1677]), Spinoza describes the being of  the conatus, or the inherent 
tendency in a thing towards its self-preservation. According to Spinoza, Ô[e]ach thing, in so far 
as it is in itself, endeavours to persist in its own beingÕ (1992 [1677]: IIIP6). Given SpinozaÕs 
univocal world with its parallel attributes, perseverance is not delimited from any ontological 
truth that might exist as a supplement to the thing in itself. As Nadler puts it, Ô[b]ecause 
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ultimately everything is an expression of  the power of  one and the same substance, a 
substance from which Òthere must follow inÞnitely many things in inÞnitely many modes,Ó 
there is, [Spinoza] is saying, really only one order of  things. This order of  things that has its 
source in substance must express itself  within each of  the substanceÕs attributesÕ (2006: 128). 
In other words, the single Ôorder of  thingsÕ is expressed by each of  the attributes in a method 
particular to that attribute. It is not the case that, qua MeillassouxÕs portrayal of  KantÕs and 
BadiouÕs epistemologies, there is only a correlation between the thought and the existence of  
being in Spinoza. Instead, ÔSpinoza is making the stronger claim that there are ordered series 
of  ideas in Thought each of  which corresponds in its order to the ordering of  modes in one of  
the other attributes. More particularly, the order and connection of  the modes in Thought 
that are ideas of  extended bodies is the same as the order and connection of  the modes in 
Extension that are those bodiesÕ (Nadler 2006: 127 emphasis added). To couch this in 
BadiouÕs terminology, it is not the case, for Spinoza, that the truth of  mathematics has any 
greater ontological priority over the sense of  the phenomenal because they correspond as 
different expressions of  the same substance. As a result of  this correspondence, Spinoza 
metaphysically conßates the radical distinction between the (non-)being of  truth and the 
realm of  the sensible found in Badiou, stating Þrst that, Ô[e]very substance is necessarily 
inÞniteÕ (Spinoza 1992 [1677]: IP8) and then that, Ô[t]he more reality or being a thing has, the 
more attributes it hasÕ (1992 [1677]: IP9). Because substance contains an inÞnite number of  
attributes, substance is necessarily the only real that there is and mathematics cannot 
constitute a subtracted real that takes any greater priority than substance. 
Given the lack of  ontological hierarchy between SpinozaÕs conception of  thought and 
extension, BadiouÕs use of  perseverance without the realm of  truth is a partial misuse of  the 
concept. According to Spinoza, an individual can persevere in life without recourse to any 
underlying authoritative truth claim because no attribute has any greater authority to truth 
than any other. The lack of  a mathematical language of  truth in SpinozaÕs ontology therefore 
highlights a corresponding lack of  any imperative in BadiouÕs work for Þdelity to the truth: 
why is it that some-one should pay Þdelity to a particular (in this case, mathematic) truth 
procedure, rather than not? Recalling the challenge posed above, and given BadiouÕs 
conception of  some-one persevering (without truth), why should some-one pay Þdelity to an 
event in accordance with BadiouÕs highly complex and schematic prescriptions? What might 
constitute the individual to become a militant: is there an imperative for them to do so? More 
importantly, were such an imperative to exist, whilst Badiou maintains his revocation of  
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opinion, what is the ontological status of  this imperative? Given BadiouÕs dismissal of  
opinions and in order to substantiate his ethical framework, he stands at his own impasse, 
whereby he must account for why some-one should pay Þdelity to the truth as prescribed by 
his mathematics. Indeed, the lack of  an imperative underpinning Þdelity highlights OsborneÕs 
charge that Badiou has set up a Ôfull-blown idealismÕ, unable to justify some-oneÕs adherence 
to an event aside from BadiouÕs own prescription that they should. Unless he provides such an 
imperative, BadiouÕs Ôsubject to truthÕ will remain forever an abstract dialectic category, 
unreachable by anyone not worthy of  BadiouÕs naming. 
As Žižek explains it, BadiouÕs ÔTruth is contingent; it hinges on a concrete historical 
situation; it is the truth of  this situation, but in every concrete and contingent historical 
situation there is one and only one Truth which, once articulated, spoken out, functions as the 
index of  itself  and of  the falsity of  the Þeld subverted by itÕ (2000: 131). Žižek recognises the 
contingent nature of  the truth of  a situation and the fact that, for Badiou, there is only a 
singular ÔethicsÕ of  each particular situation (Badiou 2001: 40-41). Yet he also identiÞes the 
necessity for Badiou to be able to identify the event from what is not an event, i.e. the 
standard operation of  life from within the count as one. Despite the necessity to account for a 
militantÕs decision to pay Þdelity to a truth procedure however, Žižek points out that, in order 
for this decision to bear any ontological weight, it has to be part of  ontology itself. He argues 
that, Ôthere is no neutral gaze of  knowledge that could discern the Event in its effects: a 
Decision is always-already here - that is, one can discern the signs of  an Event in the Situation 
only from a previous Decision for Truth, just as in Jansenist theology, in which divine miracles 
are legible as such only to those who have already decided for FaithÕ (2000: 136). Why should 
a subject decide to pay Þdelity to a truth procedure? Because it has already discerned the 
emergence of  a truth from a situation, as a result of  having previously belonged to a truth 
procedure. Žižek shows an entirely circular argument in BadiouÕs concept of  Þdelity, going so 
far as to say that an ÔEvent is thus circular in the sense that its identiÞcation is possible only 
from the standpoint of  what Badiou calls Òan interpreting interventionÓ - if, that is, one 
speaks from a subjectively engaged position, or - to put it more formally - if  one includes in 
the designated situation the act of  naming itself Õ (2000: 135). Badiou does not object to the 
argument that his concept of  the subject is circular, given that (as has been shown) it is a 
necessary and prerequisite part of  his ontological system.  Yet Žižek clariÞes the fact that the 52
 For an excellent discussion of  why this is so from the formalist perspective, see LivingstonÕs chapter on 52
BadiouÕs paradoxico-criticism in The Politics of  Logic (2011: 107-208).
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decision to become a militant does not exist in the language of  the sensible and doxa and, 
therefore, not within the world of  some-one. It is precisely because the potential consistency 
of  the subject is subtracted from the sensible that the subject can only be induced as a 
supplement onto the human animal by the subject itself. Given that this happens only as part 
of  a situation, the Ôintuitive power of  BadiouÕs notion of  the subject [É] effectively describes 
the experience each of  us has when he or she is subjectively fully engaged in some Cause 
which is Òhis or her ownÓ: in those precious moments, am I not Òfully a subjectÓ?Õ (Žižek 
2000: 141). In accordance with a truth-event, some-one might ask themselves whether they 
are or are not a subject. Of  course, this individual will already know BadiouÕs answer that 
they are notÐand that they can only ever attempt subjectiÞcationÐyet the individual can 
nevertheless know whether they have achieved the status of  militant correspondent, or not. 
Bearing in mind that this question is motivated by the event itself, rupturing at the order of  
things at the evental site, as Žižek then asks, Ôdoes not this very feature [of  the event] make it 
ideological?Õ. It seems in fact that the ÔTruth-Event is uncannily close to AlthusserÕs notion of  
ideological interpellationÕ (2000: 141). 
In Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses (1971a), Althusser clariÞes MarxÕs revision of  
the social topology in his early work, arguing that the legal and ideological superstructure 
does not merely derive from the economic infrastructure (or ÔbaseÕ), but in fact reproduces it 
(1971a: 136). For Althusser, a plurality of  Ôdistinct and specialised institutionsÕ exist within the 
private realm (as opposed to state apparatuses which exist within the public realm), which seek 
to symbolically educate, discipline and censor the individual (1971a: 144). DeÞning ideology 
as Ôthe imaginary relationship of  individuals to their real conditions of  existenceÕ (1971a: 
162), Althusser argues that it is not Ôtheir real conditions of  existence, their real world, that 
ÒmenÓ Òrepresent to themselvesÓ in ideology, but above all it is their relation to those 
conditions of  existence which is represented to them thereÕ (1971a: 164). As a result of  this 
representation of  their existence to themselves, and because Ôan ideology always exists in an 
apparatus, and its practice, or practicesÕ, Althusser argues that the distinct institutions that 
make up private life impress upon individuals the ideas that constitute them (1971a: 166).  53
Badiou agrees with Althusser that Ôideology is characterised by the notion of  subject, whose 
 For Althusser, ideology is not a positivist set of  purely imagined dreams that has no bearing on reality, but it 53
Ôrepresents the imaginary relationship of  individuals to their real conditions of  existenceÕ (1971a: 162). As such, 
Ideological State Apparatuses constitute an image of  the individualÕs relationship with themselves which is 
understood by the individual as reality. Althusser argues that this conceptualisation of  ideology gives it a material 
basis, in the sense that it ideology is routed in the performative practices that make up the individualÕs 
engagement with social institutions.
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matrix is legal and which subjects the individual to ideological State apparatusesÕ (ISAs), and 
clariÞes that this process is what Althusser called Ôsubjective interpellationÕ (Badiou 2004: 63). 
A subject, for Althusser, is thus an individual who has been infused by an identity created by 
their interaction with both the repressive apparatuses of  the state and the ideological 
apparatuses of  the private sphere.  As, for Althusser, all Ôideological State apparatuses, 
whatever they are, contribute to the same result: the reproduction of  the relations of  
production, i.e. of  capitalist relations of  exploitationÕ, BadiouÕs individual occupies the same 
ideological position as AlthusserÕs subject. As shown above, BadiouÕs proletariat is conditioned 
by its placement within its dialectic with the bourgeois class; the proletariat identity is 
conditioned not by the bourgeoisie itself, but by the relationship it has with it, in the same 
manner as AlthusserÕs subject is interpellated by its relationship to ISAs (Althusser 1971a: 
165). Yet AlthusserÕs subject always becomes subjectiÞed by a greater subject (which he 
capitalises, ÔSubjectÕ), in what set theory describes simply as a larger set that counts the subject 
within it. The structure of  all ideology interpellates subjects as part of  a greater Subject 
(Althusser uses the example here of  God) who then, in reference to FreudÕs mirror stage, 
recognise themselves as subjects (Althusser 1971a: 181). Importantly, because, for Althusser, 
Ôindividuals are always-already subjectsÕ, this is an immanent and non-historicist process of  
constitution that the individual can never escape from (Althusser 1971a: 176 original 
emphasis); although Althusser proposes a form of  scientiÞc method to analyse society from 
outside of  bourgeois class relations, he does not hold BadiouÕs position that the subject exists 
separately from any development of  ideology.  54
Žižek describes the process of  ideological interpellation, which he ascribes to Badiou as 
well as Althusser, as a circular relationship. He asks, is not Ôthe circular relationship between 
the Event and the subject (the subject serves the Event in his Þdelity, but the Event itself  is 
visible as such only to an already engaged subject) the very circle of  ideology?Õ (2000: 145). If, 
as has been shown, the individual (some-one) must already be implicated within a truth 
procedure, even as the excess of  its subjective capacity for truth, then the individual has been 
interpellated to understand the evental site as what it is: the capacity for the production of  
truth. As Žižek summarises, 
Ôwhen Badiou dismisses the topic of  human Þnitude, from Heideggerian 
Òbeing-towards deathÓ to Freudian Òdeath driveÓ, as the morbid obsession 
 AlthusserÕs claim that this is possible and the difference between scientiÞc and ideological knowledge will be 54
developed in the next chapter.
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with what makes man equal to and thus reduced to a mere animal [É] his 
theoretical gesture involves a ÒregressionÓ to Ònon thoughtÓ, to a naive 
traditional (pre-critical, pre-Kantian) opposition of  two orders (the Þnitude of  
positive Being; the immortality of  the Truth Event) that remains blind to how 
the very space for the speciÞc ÒimmortalityÓ in which human beings can 
participate in the Truth-Event is opened up by man's unique relationship to 
his Þnitude and the possibility of  deathÕ (2000: 163).  55
These two orders and, more importantly, the gap between the two, are then the same 
two ordersÐand the same gapÐthat Badiou criticised Kant for instantiating in his 
transcendental and empirical subject. Indeed it is only from within the ÔÞnitude of  positive 
BeingÕ that some-one can align themselves with the truth procedure, yet only ever as an 
alignment, or a correlation, never as the Spinozist correspondence that Badiou strives to 
reach. Whilst the subject consistently remains within the three-part attachment to the 
individual (some-one, subject and consistency), the would-be activistÕs constant afÞrmation of  
their status as a militant (and correction of  their activities if  they are not one), keeps 
consistency within the ideological (and Kantian) realm of  recognition.  To put it simply: a 56
militant knows that something was an event because it appeared to be so, as consistent with 
their interpellated understanding of  what an event is. Yet this understanding is based upon 
the knowledge, indeed an homage, to a prior Subject who deÞnes the characteristics of  the 
event. Even if  it cannot point out an event were it to happen (because it can only determine 
what its characteristics and name might be), ÔBadiou elevates the Þgure of  the Master: the 
Master is the one who names  the Event - who, by producing a new point de capiton, Master-
SigniÞer,Õ reconÞgures the symbolic Þeld via the reference to the new Event (Žižek 2000: 164). 
Yet, again, if  Badiou is to maintain his correlationist position against the sensible world, then 
the fact that this naming can only be justiÞed from within the sensible prevents it from being a 
truthful ethical imperative. Indeed, BadiouÕs ethical imperative is tautological in his 
formation: in order for the subject to maintain a Þdelity to the truth, BadiouÕs consistent 
individual must already have been interpellated by the ideological knowledge that there is an 
event, and that it has certain characteristics to look out for, and it will then look for another 
event with the same characteristics. Following interpellation, the truth that the event brings 
forth a truth procedure is only the truth for the subject (as always-already a component of  the 
truth procedure itself). For the animal-individual, it can never be true that an event is a pure 
 Badiou makes several references to his desire for immortality. For examples, see the title of  InÞnite Thought and 55
Ethics (2001: 10-13). 
 For BadiouÕs account of  how the subject relates to a situation, see Badiou (2011: 406-409).56
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Òtruth-eventÓ, dwelling as the animal does within sense and doxa, devoid of  the thought of  
truth, and always-already ideologically interpellated. When asked: ÔWhy is that name the name of  
the Event?Õ (Žižek 2000: 164), BadiouÕs individual can only answer, ÒBecause my Master told 
me soÓ. 
Whose truth? 
BadiouÕs conception of  truth must be able to explain the truth of  its own position in 
order to avoid the charge of  dogmatic idealism, and, as has been demonstrated (and, indeed, 
as Badiou himself  admits), it cannot.  A result of  its own auto-authorisation and, as Žižek 57
has demonstrated, because BadiouÕs account of  truth in fact actualises a particular form of  
ideological interpellation, it is not as devoid of  epistemic conditions as Badiou might like his 
readers to believe. Instead, because BadiouÕs truth is conditioned on a priori assumptions, a 
question to be asked is, Òwhat is the truth of  the truth that Badiou describes?Ó.  However, to 58
ask Òwhat is?Ó idealises a presupposition that there is something to be revealed and, as has 
been shown, BadiouÕs truth condition (the matheme) axiomatically authorises itself, creating 
precisely this presupposition. To ask Òwhat is?Ó would therefore play BadiouÕs own game and 
take his conception of  truth as is, without any criticism of  its formation. This empirical 
question can only be answered by comparison with the requirements of  an alternative model 
 Badiou often claims that mathematics is beholden to no justiÞcation and carries its own authority within its 57
own presentation. His discussion in Conditions makes this argument particularly clearly, drawing his argument 
from Book VI of  PlatoÕs Republic, and stating that, in the Ôform of  the already-there, mathematics and it alone 
constitutes the only point of  external support for breaking with doxaÕ (2008 [1992]: 102). One upshot of  
removing any necessity for mathematics to legitimise itself  with external support is that, as Gironi (2014) argues, 
BadiouÕs conception of  science becomes aleatory. As matter comes immediately after Being, rather than as a part 
of  it, and because it is only through an event that scientiÞc truth becomes knowable through its mathematical 
inscription, BadiouÕs scientiÞc progress is constituted by a series of  revelatory moments. However, in his attempt 
to naturalise BadiouÕs ontology within an account of  structural realism, Gironi demonstrates that the progression 
from Galilean mathematisation (starting with observation and measurement of  phenomena) towards DiracÕs 
Ômethodological revolutionÕ (where mathematics itself  became an inductive tool for new phenomenic aspects) 
could only come about via NewtonÕs initial success at conceptualising general mathematical laws (such as the law 
of  universal gravitation). As he concludes, Ôit is simply not true that the mathematised concepts employed by 
contemporary physics retain Òa relation to the world which means that they cannot be deduced from any 
mathematical corpus whatsoeverÓÕ (Gironi 2014: 40). Not to mention the mystic/theological undertones of  his 
revelatory conceptualisation of  science, discussions of  which can be found in Phelps (2013) and Frederiek (2009), 
BadiouÕs inability to account for the connection between the ontological and the sensible removes any possibility 
for understanding scientiÞc continuity.
 ÒAuthorisationÓ is the term Badiou uses to describe the statist process (i.e., the count-as-one) that formalises 58
inconsistent Being into consistent multiplicities. It is because authorisation is a formalism that brings together 
that which is otherwise inconsistent into something that can be engaged with in practice that it is also 
appropriate to attribute it to BadiouÕs mathematics. Yet, BadiouÕs mathematics carries with it its own 
authorisation in the form of  the axiomatic, hence the preÞx attached here. For BadiouÕs discussion of  
authorisation, see Badiou (2011: 24-25).
"47
of  truth, a comparison which would rely on an (ultimately inÞnite) recourse to ever-deeper 
justiÞcations for truth. In order to rescue BadiouÕs ontology from OsborneÕs charge of  
idealism thenÐi.e. to understand under what conditions BadiouÕs idea of  truth is trueÐit must 
be placed back within its own relations of  production. At the risk of  removing the 
transcendental authority of  BadiouÕs ontology, and therefore negating the categorical 
structuring of  the sensible in Logics of  Worlds (2009), the question to be asked is: Òwhat is 
truthful about BadiouÕs ontology?Ó. Whilst a similar question was asked above regarding 
BadiouÕs conception of  thought, positing this question of  ontology allows BadiouÕs four truth 
procedures to be seen as concepts constructed by, and bound within, a very particular set of  
propositions. In removing the presumption that there is a truth to be investigated, its 
differentiated contours left to be determined, any conception of  truth that has been built up 
can be seen as a result of  its constitution and nothing more. This chapter will conclude by 
arguing that BadiouÕs truth procedures (and his resultant ethical position) can only ensue from 
the failure of  revolutionary moments, resulting from the three dyads of  thought presented 
above, as well as an always-already interpellated subject who looks for an answer to the 
question, Òwhy didnÕt this revolution work?Ó. 
The Þrst of  the three dyads that were discussed above was, as identiÞed by Sacilotto, the 
Platonic dyad of  truth/doxa. Although this distinction has been used uncritically throughout 
this chapter, BadiouÕs use of  it is nevertheless not without its baggage and does not conform to 
the standard conceptions of  truth. Hallward outlines three conventional conceptions of  truth 
that deÞne the conception Ôin terms of  coherence, correspondence, or conÞrmationÕ (2003: 
153) and yet, he states, ÔBadiouÕs conception of  truth is not only not reducible to any one of  
these three alternatives; it undercuts the basis for their distinction tout courtÕ (2003: 154). As has 
been shown, for Badiou, an axiomatic truth procedure does not need any form of  external 
condition in order to legitimise its claims and, indeed, anything that is legitimised as such is 
under the illegitimate authority of  the count-as-one. Hallward clariÞes BadiouÕs truth 
procedure as that which Ôlinks its assertion with the method of  its veriÞcationÕ (2003: 154), 
and this is due to the now familiar reason that any form of  veriÞcation not contained within 
BadiouÕs axiomatic system exists in the realm of  doxa, from which truth must be subtracted. 
Put simply, for Badiou, the truth procedure is true because it determines itself  as true and it 
cannot be otherwise because this would make the procedureÕs truth conditional. Yet BadiouÕs 
conception of  truth does have a precondition that is belied by his statement that it cannot be 
what is doxa, because the negative distinction of  the truth as Ònot being doxaÓ is not obvious; 
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why is a statement about the world that is not routed in BadiouÕs particular conceptualisation 
of  the expression of  being not truthful in itself ? If, as Hallward argues, veriÞcation in 
BadiouÕs system of  truth is linked with its own assertion, how is this any different with any 
other truth condition, all of  which anchor the conditions for their veracity in their own 
systems? In distinguishing between truth and opinion, yet declaring that truth is true purely 
by virtue of  it being so according to its own prescription, Badiou does not account for why his 
particular conceptualisation of  truth should be taken as any more truthful than any other 
conceptualisation.  
BadiouÕs rejoinder to this criticism is that ontologyÕs role is that which understands what 
is (not), hence the association of  the event with a truth procedure as an expression of  the void. 
Yet this association artiÞcially limits the scope of  truthÕs remit, given that it involves an a priori 
procedure of  subtraction and a concomitant isolation of  what it is (not) that the truth 
procedure pertains to (i.e., non-being). Hallward argues that, Ôthe subtractive approach 
understands that the operations that consolidate ÒrealityÓÐrepresentation, appearing, 
semblance: the state of  the situationÐare not simply external to the real as a cover that might 
be removed, but are organized as its ontologically irreducible repressionÕ (2003: 163). And yet, 
if  the state of  the situation (and therefore also doxa) plays such an active part in repressing 
ÒrealityÓ, how can the state not also be part of  reality and, consequently, also fall within the 
realm of  truth? 
The second dyad employed by Badiou is the second Platonic dyad, that of  the 
intelligible/sensible. This is based upon a precondition, namely that the argument as to why 
truth cannot be borne out of  the ontic realm is not immediately obvious. Badiou announces 
his starting point for a conceptualisation of  truth in InÞnite Thought as the Heideggerian 
passage, Ô[i]n becoming a property of  the proposition, not only does truth displace its locus; it 
transforms its essenceÕ, clarifying that this Ômust be understood as stating that the entire effect 
of  the decline of  thought, which is also the decline of  being, is manifested in the fact that 
truth is presented, after Plato, as localizable in the propositionÕ (Badiou 2005c: 59). 
Continuing, Badiou argues that this Ôlocalization is also a de-naturing. Nothing of  the truth, in 
its authentic sense, remains accessible if  we allow that the phenomenon of  truth occurs in the 
propositionÕ. (2005c: 59). The virtue of  the axiomatic for Badiou is that it does not contain its 
truth localised in a proposition, but rather takes the form of  a procedure whose ramiÞcations 
are veriÞed by the militant. Invoking the axiomatic allows Badiou to avoid a number of  
metaphysical issues that plague other non-immanent systems of  truth (such as those that 
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Hallward outlines).  However, in negating the truth of  propositions, Badiou replaces this with 59
mathematical thought which reductively takes on the role of  another vehicle for truth. 
Although he justiÞes thought as the proper vehicle for truth and the only way of  
distinguishing between that which is and that which isnÕt, this only maintains HeideggerÕs 
propositional character of  truth in its inverse form: as opposed to propositions containing 
truth, mathematics expresses truth in a particularly anthropomorphic manner. Yet Badiou 
does not account for why it is thought that has the glorious position of  presenting being in the 
Þrst place; why does dance not present the being of  the world as truthfully as any 
mathematical articulation, or the struggle of  refugees against arbitrary immigration targets? 
As with the Þrst dyad, BadiouÕs conception of  truth sets out its own declarations of  what it 
will tell of  (i.e. the four truth procedures) and does not attempt to address the truth of  the 
sensible at all (for reasons he is, of  course, very clear about). If  the Þrst dyad stipulates an 
inability to account for the truth of  doxa, then the second dyad likewise stipulates a condition 
of  truth which can only tell of  the noetic and not the sensible. Yet what is a truth that 
denegates an entire attribute of  the world as a way of  expressing this same world? As Bergson 
argues, preempting the matheme, Ô[i]t is of  no use to hold up before our eyes the dazzling 
prospect of  a universal mathematic; we cannot sacriÞce experience to the requirements of  a 
system. That is why we reject radical mechanismÕ (Bergson 1911: 39). 
The third dyad at work in BadiouÕs ontology is the Parmenidean dyad of  is/is not. The 
biunivocal distinction elaborated in On Nature governs, for Parmenides, the presentation of  
reality as that which is, and which is necessarily thought by the subject.  BadiouÕs 60
modiÞcation of  the dyad, as is set out in the Þrst meditation of  Being and Event, reverses the 
priority of  what is in favour of  what is not in order to escape an inÞnitely unfolding, yet pre-
conditioned, universe. Although interpretations of  Parmenides differ with regard to his status 
as an idealist or not, in his introduction to the Dialogues of  Plato, Benjamin Jowett credits 
Parmenides as Ôthe founder of  idealism, and also of  dialectics, or, in modern phraseology, of  
metaphysics and logicÕ (Plato 1892: 13). For Jowett, the distinction between being and non-
being is itself  a dialectic operation of  thought which, as a similar operation to the Kantian 
position discussed above, relies on a transcendental judgement of  thought. It is from this 
 For a discussion of  BadiouÕs mathematical ontology and how Badiou avoids these issues, see ÔThe Ontological 59
and the Empirical: Naturalist ObjectionsÕ in Gironi (2014: 34-62).
 Of  being, Parmenides states that, Ôit is impossible for it not to be, [it] is the way of  belief, for truth is its 60
companionÕ (Parmenides 1920: ¤4-5).
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Parmenidean duality that Plato, and then later Aristotle, developed the three laws of  thought: 
the law of  identity, the law of  contradiction (or non-contradiction), and the law of  excluded 
middle (see Hamilton 1860: lec. 5). However, BadiouÕs distinction between is/is notÐeven after 
BadiouÕs reversal of  their prioritiesÐremains an idealist differentiation, necessitating thought 
to distinguish one from the other. BadiouÕs reliance on this grand distinction is never discussed 
in any greater depth than discussions of  the one, multiple and the void (which all presuppose 
this distinction) and so this third dyad remains an idealist presupposition on which BadiouÕs 
truth procedures are conditioned.  61
 BadiouÕs conceptualisation of  truth is therefore tautological: employing a procedure 
that allows the identiÞcation of  Òis notÓ from ÒisÓ, Badiou creates the very conditions of  his 
ontological system of  truth (the three dyads) which can only tell the truth of  his own 
presuppositions. What is truthful about BadiouÕs ontology? Any subjective (and therefore 
purely logical) position that emerges as the prescription of  an unsayable event (again, a purely 
logical category), and that can be veriÞed as having similitude with an empirical situation. 
This truthfulness casts aside any ongoing struggle for resistance, as well as any material 
political, artistic, scientiÞc, or amorous practice, in favour of  a logical analysis from someone 
already interpellated with the schema of  what to look for. So why does Badiou, given 
signiÞcant involvement in theatre and literature, his lifetime record of  active political 
resistance, and previous Maoist identiÞcation hold onto such a limited account of  truth? The 
answer to this question lies in The Communist Hypothesis (2010), a small collection of  previously 
 For Parmenides, doxa is not simply the appearance of  being, as it is for Badiou, because, in a similar position to 61
BadiouÕs stance on the non-truthfulness of  doxa, Parmenides Ôknows that on that subject it would be possible to 
say something and also say the oppositeÕ (Cordero 2004: 153). For Cordero, the important distinction in On 
Nature is between ÒappearancesÓ and ÒpresentationsÓ: whereby philosophers truthfully understand that being 
appears before a classiÞcation into an ontic object (Òt ntaÓ), mortals believe that they must name certain 
presentations of  being in order to recognise them, though Ôthis has nothing to do with ÒappearancesÓÕ (Cordero 
2004: 153). Although ParmenidesÕ description of  presentations is similar to BadiouÕs description of  a counting 
operation, to the extent that sets are named by a power set which represents them to the state, ParmenidesÕ 
solution is not simply that knowledge of  that which is not presentation must be truthful. As Cordero puts it, 
challenging BadiouÕs conception of  the evental site, Ôif  nothing existed, there would be nothing to think 
aboutÕ (Cordero 2004: 83). Rather, Parmenides rejects the ability of  humans to know the truth as they are only 
able to Ôcreate opinionsÕ, i.e. to name and consequently understand presentations of  being (Cordero 2004: 154). 
For Cordero, in a contrasting reading to Jowett, being in Parmenides is lexically prior to thought (which is a 
necessary result of  being being all that there is). As a result of  his position that Ôthere is not and there will not be 
anything apart from that which is beingÕ (Parmenides 1920: ¤8.36-7), and the lexical priority of  being over 
thought, thought in Parmenides prohibits the positing of  any negative ontological void that contains a truth that 
presentation does not, although human thought of  appearances is nevertheless insufÞcient to bear the truth of  
being. It is this problematic that Badiou attempts to unravel in the Þrst meditation of  Being and Event, suggesting 
that it can only be the void that unfolds in a truth procedure. Yet, BadiouÕs answer, that ontology can only 
present the void is immediately undermined by the Parmenidean stipulation that all that is, is. On the other 
hand, ParmenidesÕ position seems to offer no way of  articulating a truth of  the world at all, given that thought 
does exist within being, yet only presides over presentation. This is the problematic that Althusser attempts to 
solve with his structuralist account of  a science of  being, and this will be discussed in the next chapter.
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written essays, bound in red, with a cover written in the gold leaf  of  a hotel bible. As David 
Morgan writes in his review of  it, Ôthe great strength of  this book, and of  BadiouÕs work in 
general, is in its commitment to defending and carrying forward the achievements and lessons 
of  the last two centuries of  revolutionÕ (2011: unpaginated). Although Badiou declares that 
The Communist Hypothesis is not a book of  politics or political philosophy (2010a: 37),  he 62
nevertheless discusses series of  signiÞcant political failures which he then expands on 
throughout the work. The three failures (May Õ68, the Cultural Revolution and the Paris 
Commune) all constitute political events which have (according to Badiou) failed in their 
goals, although BadiouÕs purpose is to explain that ÔÒfailingÓ is always very close to ÒwinningÓÕ 
(2010a: 31). In BadiouÕs terms, each event failed because a moment within each truth 
procedure was badly handled or, in other words, because a Ôtactical decisionÕ correlated with a 
Ôstrategic impasseÕ (2010a: 39). Because BadiouÕs truth procedure is veridical (i.e., it relies on 
the militant to ensure that their actions conform to the prescriptions of  the truth procedure), 
there is always the possibility that the militant fails in their Þdelity to the event and strays off  
course. Yet this does not mean that each event was an entire failure, because lessons from 
each event, for Badiou, can continue to be learned even after the event has come off  its 
tracks. Badiou writes that, Ôwe must accept that there was an element of  universality in the 
terrible failure of  the Cultural Revolution. And let us remember in this context that the fact 
that something ends in bloody failure is not the only thing that can be said of  it. Once again, 
you use the failure of  the Cultural Revolution as a facile argument in order to deny its 
importance and contemporary relevanceÕ (2010a: 273). As Morgan puts it, the Ôcore of  
[BadiouÕs] philosophical project (and of  his activism) has been an attempt to understand what 
it means to be faithful to the great revolutionary events of  the previous two 
centuriesÕ (Morgan 2011). Indeed, this is BadiouÕs conception of  subjectivity: Þdelity to an 
event and consistency brought about by acting in accordance with its prescriptions. So Badiou 
can count on himself  to be a militant of  each event because it is his ontology that deÞnes the 
event, interpellated as he is by knowledge of  each historical situation. 
Yet BadiouÕs project is plagued by one signiÞcant impasse that is highlighted by Žižek: 
each event is called an event a posteriori of  its occurrence, only within the knowledge of  the 
fact that it is not a part of  the state. In other words, BadiouÕs post-evental philosophy will 
forever be condemned to tell the truth only of  failed events, for the militant must verify his 
 Instead, it is Ôan attempt to deÞne the generic form taken by all truth processes when they come up against 62
obstacles that are inherent in the world in which they operateÕ (Badiou 2010a).
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actions as true or not against those of  the state. Whilst being cannot be accessed by a mortal 
some-one in any way other than through a rupture in presentation, the mortal must rely on 
this rupture failing in order to tell its truth as a consistent militant. As Žižek argues,  
Ôagainst Badiou, one should insist that only to a Þnite/mortal being does the 
act (or Event) appear as a traumatic intrusion of  the Real, as something that 
cannot be named directly: it is the very fact that man is split between 
mortality (a Þnite being destined to perish) and the capacity to participate in 
the Eternity of  the Truth-Event which bears witness to the fact that we are 
dealing with a Þnite/mortal being. To a truly inÞnite/ immortal being, the act 
would be transparent, directly symbolized, the Real would coincide with the 
SymbolicÕ (Žižek 2000: 164). 
It is therefore BadiouÕs speciÞcity in determining the event according to the three dyads 
(truth/doxa; sense/intelligibility; is/is not), and a mathematical modelling of  ontology as that 
which is not, that means he can only bring to bear truths of  the failure of  being. The success 
of  being, i.e. an entirely militant population alongside the dissolution of  the state with all its 
capito-parliamentary representatives, would be unsayable given the lack of  internal elements 
within the event with which to specify truthful actions. Just as when God made Saul blind 
before entering Damascus and he was helped into the city by those accompanying him (Acts 
9:8-16), the militant, guided by BadiouÕs idea of  the event, still needs the state in order to 
guarantee that their faith is to the event and that they havenÕt slipped into the heresy of  
obedience to the state (in BadiouÕs terms: a Ôslip to the rightÕ). BadiouÕs political truth 
procedure can therefore only remain a hypothesis and lacks any possibility to manifest itself  
outside of  a dialectic relationship with the realm of  sensible doxa. When Badiou asks of  a 
historical sequence that had Ôexperimented with one or another form of  the communist 
hypothesisÕ if  it was Ôa failure that simply proves that it was not the right way to resolve the 
initial problemÕ (2010a: 6), his question is undermined by the impossibility of  there being any 
way to know the correct way of  resolving the initial problem, this knowledge only being 
knowable in relation to the state. 
What then is the second text that this symptomatic reading of  Badiou can relate to? 
When Kropotkin (1989) laments the situation in Russia that he saw under Alexander II, his 
Þnger is pointed not at the serfs and peasant population as the source of  their own misery, but 
at the rule of  the emperor. Kropotkin writes that when the people of  Chit sent estimates to 
St. Petersburg for permission to build a new watchtower for their Þre brigade, it took the 
government two years to sign off  on the plans. By this stage however, prices for raw materials 
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had gone up and the estimates were now out of  date. This happened for 25 years, until the 
population of  Chit sent requests for twice what was necessary to build the watchtower, an 
amount which was enough to Þnally build it once the standard delay in replying had passed. 
This, for Kropotkin was the situation of  all throughout Russia under Alexander II, who, 
[y]ielding for a moment to the current of  public opinion around him, [É] 
induced men all over Russia to set to work, to issue from the domain of  mere 
hopes and dreams, and to touch with the Þnger the reforms that were 
required. He made them realize what could be done immediately, and how 
easy it was to do it; he induced them to sacriÞce whatever of  their ideals 
could not be immediately realized, and to demand only what was practically 
possible at the time. And when they had framed their ideas, and had shaped 
them into laws which merely required his signature to become realities, then 
he refused that signature. No reactionist could raise, or ever has raised, his 
voice to assert that what was left Ñ the unreformed tribunals, the absence of  
municipal self-government, or the system of  exile Ñ was good and was worth 
maintaining: no one has dared to say that. And yet, owing to the fear of  doing 
anything, all was left as it was; for thirty-Þve years those who ventured to 
mention the necessity of  a change were treated as suspects; and institutions 
unanimously recognized as bad were permitted to continue in existence only 
t h a t n o t h i n g m o r e m i g h t b e h e a rd o f  t h a t ab h o r r e d wo rd 
ÒreformÓ (Kropotkin 1989: 183). 
Kropotkin celebrates the will, ingenuity and energy of  the Russian people, whilst 
highlighting the stultifying effects of  the state governance which dampened the peopleÕs 
development and fulÞlment. It is this lamentation, and the work of  other revolutionaries who 
write of  the failure of  popular movements, that must be read into BadiouÕs work, as he 
attempts to Þnd answers to why political resistance so often fails, despite the energy of  the 
struggling people. A reading of  BadiouÕs work that focusses solely on its mathematical/
ontological components will fail to understand the important efforts that Badiou has gone to 
in attempting to understand the failure of  radical leftist politics.  On the other hand, read 63
separately, BadiouÕs polemics (for example, Manifesto for Philosophy (1992), The Communist 
Hypothesis (2010a) and The Idea of  Communism (2010b)) are overly triumphant in their 
assumption that communism will ultimately emerge victorious against the oppressing forces 
of  neocapitalism and parliament. His work can only be fully appreciated if  seen as a 
programmatic understanding of  the failure of  revolutionary politics, supported by a rigorous 
onto-mathematical base. However, it is ultimately the speciÞcity of  what Badiou is indeed 
 See Gironi (2014) for one example of  an exceptionally detailed discussion of  BadiouÕs mathematical ontology 63
which is left wanting for an appreciation of  his contribution to politics.
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attempting to explainÐa select number of  eruptions in the every-day mundanity of  
governmental politicsÐwhich undermines his ability to account for an ethical practice of  
resistance, limited as he is by the idealised contours of  the event. 
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Chapter 2 - Contra axiomatics: 
the persistence of  Althusser, 
Badiou and Deleuze 
An Althusserian conjuncture 
As Hallward says, the Ôevolution of  [BadiouÕs] relations to both Althusser and Deleuze 
certainly gives a colourful measurement of  how far his position has shifted from the days 
when he labeled the former Òarrogant, idealist, irresponsible, hypocritical and metaphysicalÓ 
and the latter a Òpetit professeur de lÕembuscade dsiranteÓ (Barker 2002: 2, Hallward 2003: 29). 
Following on from the discussion of  BadiouÕs ontology in the previous chapter, it is to the 
relation of  his work to that of  Althusser and Deleuze that this chapter will turn in the attempt 
to identify certain continuities and divergences between the three authorsÕ ontologies. 
Discussion will centre around the particular importance of  the role that time plays within 
their works in regard to the concept of  the void. BadiouÕs subtractive ontology features an 
emergent void from the realm of  the sensible. This is the void of  the radically new, and 
creates ruptural times consistent with each eventÕs rupture with representation. Deleuze (both 
by himself  and in his writing with Guattari) emphatically rejected any reliance on the void at 
all (Deleuze 2004 [1969]: 137), and his conception of  time is not ruptural, but (akin to his 
appropriation of  Bergson) immanent. Importantly however, with respect to both DeleuzeÕs 
and BadiouÕs inheritance from him, AlthusserÕs stance on the void is not as clear as theirsÕ and 
his conceptualisation of  time is underdeveloped in that it lacks an account of  persistence. 
Whilst MorÞnoÕs An Althusserian Lexicon (2005: ¤8-23) demonstrates several instances across 
AlthusserÕs texts that do indeed discuss the void, this chapter will stray from a purely 
comparative reading of  the three authors in order to evince a reading of  Althusser that differs 
signiÞcantly from that which BadiouÕs and MorÞnoÕs neo-classical inferences develop. True to 
AlthusserÕs own method of  Òsymptomatic readingÓ, this chapter will show that his workÐand 
particularly his seminal texts Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses (1971a) and Essays in Self-
Criticism (1976)Ðindicate a void which is Þlled, not with ÔnothingÕ as MorÞno and Althusser 
argue (MorÞno 2005), but a multiplicity that can be understood in relation to BergsonÕs 
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concept of  duration. In this context, BadiouÕs allegiance to AlthusserÕs ontology seems 
misplaced, as AlthusserÕs concept of  the void more closely resembles the concept of  the 
virtual in Bergson and Deleuze. 
AlthusserÕs thought is not in a spurious relationship to that of  BadiouÕs or DeleuzeÕs and 
the connections made in this chapter are not drawn of  fancy. BadiouÕs references to Althusser 
are many (Badiou 1998: 58, 2005a, 2005c: 10, 70, 2005d: xix, xxxvi, 44-66, 2006 [1997], 
2008: 647, 2013b, 2013 [1982]: 23, 187, 224), he was taught by Althusser at the cole 
Normale Suprieure, attended a research group on Spinoza organised by Althusser in 1967 
and the same year was invited to join AlthusserÕs ÒPhilosophy Course for ScientistsÓ (Barker 
2002: 1-2). AlthusserÕs initial inßuence over Badiou brought the two in line in the latterÕs 
earlier work with their conception of  science as a Ôpurely formal logic whose self-regulating 
rigour is maintained in the absence of  any reference to an external objectÕ (Hallward 2003: 
32).  Yet AlthusserÕs continued ßirting with the French Communist Party (PCF) drew the ire 64
of  Badiou, who scorned its Ôlegal, reformist institutionsÕ and its Ôtrade unions, along with the 
Òfalse working-class left, the inheritor of  anarchosyndicalismÓÕ (Hallward 2003: 35-37).  65
Alongside Rancire, who accused Althusser of  advocating a petty bourgeoisie of  professors 
and scientists in place of  party leaders (Rancire 2011 [1974]), Badiou dismissed AlthusserÕs 
revisionist pretensions (Bosteels 2005: 597, 602). AlthusserÕs position was intolerable for any 
Maoist - and indeed it was Ôexactly the oppositeÕ of  those taken by a number of  prominent 
Marxist thinkers (for example Kautsky, Plekhanov, Lenin, Labriola, Gramsci, Luckcs and 
Sartre) (Balibar 1993: 8). Althusser rejected Ôany ÒdialecticÓ of  Being and Consciousness, 
whether in its mechanistic or its speculative forms, and, instead of  adding a theory of  the 
ÒsuperstructureÓ to the existing theory of  the Òstructure,Ó he [aimed] at transforming the 
concept of  the structure itself  by showing that its process of  ÒproductionÓ and ÒreproductionÓ 
originally [depended] on unconscious ideological conditionsÕ (Balibar 1993: 8 original italics). 
As was shown in the previous chapter, Badiou staunchly rejects any determination of  being by 
consciousness under the Þrst Platonic dyad of  truth/doxa and, given that ideology and the 
production of  the unconscious occur within the realm of  doxa for Althusser, Badiou rejects 
 In the previous chapter, this Ôpurely formal logicÕ was shown in Badiou to be the matheme, or the scriptural 64
materiality of  BadiouÕs mathematical, subtractive ontology.
 In 1978, Althusser published an essay entitled ÔWhat Must Change in the PartyÕ (1978), which Ôdenounced the 65
weakness of  democracy and the entrenched bureaucracy within the partyÕ (Hewlett 2010: 22). AlthusserÕs wife, 
Hlne, had been a Marxist activist for most of  her life and had encouraged Althusser to remain within the PCF, 
leading Althusser to avoid the sort of  strong criticism afforded the party by Badiou (Althusser, Corpet et al. 
1993).
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Althusserianism as (mathematically) subjectless (Badiou 2005d: 58-67).  How then can 66
Badiou be the Althusserian (as well as Satrean and Lacanian) that both he and others 
characterise himself  as (Bosteels 2011: 612). Put differently: what is Althusserian in BadiouÕs 
writing? Although Badiou praises his former teacher as the one who obliged philosophers to 
Ôreject the humanist vision of  the bond, or the being-together, which binds an abstract and 
ultimately enslaved vision of  politics to the theological ethics of  rightsÕ (2005d: 66), BadiouÕs 
work is in direct contrast given its reliance on a theory of  the subject. Other than a revulsion 
from humanist politics and their placement within the post-Marxist cannon, is there really 
much that unites teacher and student? The status of  this unity will be explored in this chapter. 
In comparison to the primary and secondary literature on Badiou in connection to 
Althusser, there is very little to connect Althusser with Deleuze.  StolzeÕs revealing article on 67
Deleuze, Althusser and structuralism notes but two passing references to ÒLouis AlthusserÓ in 
over seventeen hundred pages of  anthology dedicated to Deleuze (Stolze 1998: 52). The only 
other substantive and speciÞc engagement with their work is DiefenbachÕs chapter ÔAlthusser 
with Deleuze: how to think SpinozaÕs immanent causeÕ (Diefenbach, Farris et al. 2013: 
165-180). Yet what elucidation there is shows a signiÞcant compatibility between their work 
(for brief  references to the two authors, see also Montag 2013b: 152, Rancire 2011 [1974]). 
As Stolze points out, Althusser Ôand his circle seem to have been quite favourably disposed 
toward certain of  DeleuzeÕs early works (such as a 1961 essay on Lucretius and the already 
 Badiou is correct in his assertion that AlthusserÕs aleatory materialism is without an active subject, however 66
underplays the importance of  AlthusserÕs formulation of  the unconscious which provides the synthesis of  
thought and matter.
 I have often been accused in presentations of  trying to argue that Deleuze was a Marxist (as if  that would be 67
such a terrible thing). Indeed, inserting the work of  Deleuze into a discussion with that of  Althusser and Badiou 
might seem as if  I was attempting to place Deleuze within the Marxist cannon. I am not interested however in 
what Chambers calls Ôpetty intellectual squabblesÕ with regards to Althusser (Chambers 2014: 93) and I am not 
trying to place Deleuze anywhere. This is not because Deleuze was not a Marxist, but because it doesnÕt matter 
if  he was or not (here I disagree with ReschÕs argument that it does matter and, furthermore, that Deleuze had a 
Ôhostility to MarxismÕ (Resch 1992: 2-10). The coherency of  any cannonÐMarxist or otherwiseÐis maintained 
either out of  reductive simplicity (i.e. a pragmatic necessity to stick to certain terms and assumptions in order to 
carry out productive research) or the defence of  key territories, Þgures or both. Whereas E.P. ThompsonÕs 
critique of  Althusser in The Poverty of  Theory is a defence of  both the territory of  Marxism and the Þgure of  
Marx when he argues that ÔAlthusser and his acolytes challenge, centrally, historical materialism itself Õ and that 
ÔAlthusserÕs structuralism is a structuralism of  status, departing from MarxÕs own historical methodÕ (Thompson 
1978: 196-197 original italics), Badiou goes so far as to argue that, following a radical rupture between Marx and 
Lenin as identiÞed by Lazarus, ÔMarxism doesnÕt existÕ (2005c: 58). A portrayal of  the Ôconjunctures in the 
international Communist movementÕ and the competing claims to an authoritative Marxism can be found in 
ElliotÕs Althusser: The Detour of  Theory (2006: 1-54) and a discussion of  his status as a Marxist in a conference 
paper presented by Elliot, AlthusserÕs Solitude (1993). I argue that, whilst a certain practical focus on central 
concepts is a central part of  academic research, the paternalist defence of  cannon belies either an unwillingness 
or inability to do the intellectual labour of  philosophy, relying on the authority of  names to do the work instead. 
As such, no claims are made by this chapter regarding whether or not either Althusser or Deleuze were Marxists 
(or even Spinozists), aside from the authorsÕ own claims to their intellectual inheritance.
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classic book on Nietzsche published in 1962)Õ (Stolze 1998: 51). In an attempt to rectify what 
Stolze terms an Ôastonishing silenceÕ (Stolze 1998: 52), his article outlines the contributions 
that Althusser and Pierre Macherey made to the Þrst draft of  what would become DeleuzeÕs 
essay ÔHow do we Recognise Structuralism?Õ (Deleuze 2004a: 170-192) and these 
contributions will be discussed below. This chapter will continue StolzeÕs efforts to Þll the 
silence, or rather to amplify its deadened whisper, with the voice of  Hume. 
Despite DeleuzeÕs inclusion of  Althusser within the band of  structuralists, and ChoatÕs 
characterisation of  ÔAlthusserÕs later workÕ as offering Ôevidence that he was [É] inßuenced by 
post-structuralismÕ (Choat 2010: 5), Althusser refused this classiÞcation, declaring in fact that 
Ô[w]e were guilty of  an equally powerful and uncompromising passion: we were 
SpinozistsÕ (Althusser 1976: 132). DeleuzeÕs own oeuvre is full of  references to Spinoza, as is 
BadiouÕs; there is therefore something of  a spectre of  Spinoza haunting a conjuncture of  all 
three philosophersÕ works.  Yet, whilst there is already a signiÞcant body of  work that relates 68
Badiou, Althusser and Deleuze to Spinoza, the inßuence of  Hume on both Badiou and 
Althusser is relatively understudied.  This chapter will therefore explore HumeÕs attempt to 69
reconcile the affective qualities of  materialism with mental impressions in order to account for 
the ideational. This is, as was mentioned in the previous chapter, an important challenge for 
Badiou (in particular) to account for in his own work. Hume raises the question for both 
Althusser and Badiou: Òhow is it that our ideas about ontology are constituted from our 
impressions of  the world?Ó, and this question also motivates DeleuzeÕs development of  
HumeÕs work in The Logic of  Sense. As will be shown, it is HumeÕs idea of  human nature which 
constitutes the framework within which time is understood as part of  the creation of  ideas in 
the mind. Thus, it will be argued that HumeÕs idea of  human nature is the key idea within a 
symptomatic reading of  Althusser that constitutes the idea of  persistence of  objecticity within 
AlthusserÕs aleatory void. 
Before developing any work on Althusser, it seems necessary within his secondary 
literature to nod towards the events of  his life as a generic preamble. In fact, much of  the 
 DeleuzeÕs two main works on Spinoza are Expressionism and Philosophy: Spinoza (1992a) and Spinoza: Practical 68
Philosophy (1988b) with a chapter entitled ÒSpinoza and the Three ÔEthicsÕÓ in Montage and Stolze (1997: 21-32). 
However, Spinoza is also to be found mentioned in every book he authored written since Difference and Repetition 
(2004b). BadiouÕs work also regularly features references to Spinoza and discusses his use by Deleuze in The 
Clamour of  Being (2000).
 There are a small number of  works on Badiou and Hume which include Johnston (2011) and Bell (2006). 69
Those on Althusser and Hume include (Peden 2008) and (Reed 2005). The literature on Deleuze and Hume is 
more substantive, although Jeffery Bell provides the most comprehensive study of  DeleuzeÕs reading of  Hume. 
See Bell (2006, 2008, 2009).
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literature on Althusser (both in support or criticism of  it) starts off  with autobiographical 
details which the author will then determine either did or did not condition AlthusserÕs 
theoretical work (MorÞno 2005: ¤1). This chapter however will not dwell on any of  
AlthusserÕs biographical details with the exception of  those pertaining to his relationship to 
the PCF and, thus, to Badiou. In line with DeleuzeÕs statements in the Abecedaire regarding 
biography being the worst kind of  philosophical literature (Boutang 1988), and MontagÕs 
bitter disappointment at AlthusserÕs theoretical contradiction in having written an 
autobiography (2003: 126), this chapter will focus solely on the philosophy (deÞned in Deleuze 
and GuattariÕs terms as the Ôcreation of  conceptsÕ  (Deleuze and Guattari 1994 [1991])) 
within his work.  
So, whilst the previous chapter demonstrated BadiouÕs mathematical ontology that 
sidelined the Òanimal humanÓ, this chapter will develop AlthusserÕs theoretical anti-
humanism, and the following two chapters will develop DeleuzeÕs focus upon immanent 
haeccity. This chapter will argue that all three philosophers have at least one thing in 
common: an anti-humanism/anti-rationalism that criticises humanism as a myopic ideology. 
Indeed, Althusser himself  put it well when he wrote that the Ôgolden rule of  materialism is do 
not judge being by its self-consciousness, for every being is other than its self-consciousnessÕ (1996: 
115). In particular, and in agreement with ProteviÕs characterisation of  a rationalist 
explanation of  behaviour Ôas abstracting from its concrete practical ground and breaking free 
to posit itself  as self-sufÞcient so that it pretends to ground that which in fact grounds it,Õ this 
chapter will not therefore re-inject the personal back into the sterile discussion of  its 
contribution to AlthusserÕs thought, but will trace the contribution his thought made to both 
Badiou and Deleuze (Protevi 2010: 419).  70
Which Althusser? 
At a conference in 1988 on the work of  Althusser, Balibar commented that Ô[f]or almost 
twenty years, Althusser was the controversial Marxist in France [É] controversial among 
ÒMarxistsÓ (who would discuss his formulations and react to his positions in a passionate 
manner), but also one who forced other intellectuals to take Marxism seriouslyÕ (Balibar 1993: 
 MontagÕs discussion of  AlthusserÕs autobiography is indeed excellent in highlighting its rupture with the 70
latterÕs oeuvre. See Montag (2003: 117-131).
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1 original italics).  Balibar then noted that ÔItaly is the one country where Althusser is still 71
publicly discussed in militant and intellectual circles on the LeftÕ, and thatÐparadoxicallyÐthe 
Ôremarkable persistence of  some expressions that have been either coined by Althusser or 
transferred by him out of  their specialised initial Þeld into common culture: Òepistemological 
break,Ó Òoverdetermination,Ó Òideological state apparatuses,Ó ÒProcess without a 
SubjectÓÕ (Balibar 1993: 1-2). Montag has also noted that both Rancire and Foucault used 
parts of  AlthusserÕs work without acknowledging their inßuence and AlthusserÕs inßuence thus 
stretches far into critical theory and post-structuralist thought (2013b: 151). If, as Jameson 
puts it, Ôthe current post-structural celebration of  discontinuity and heterogeneity is [É] only 
a moment in Althusserian exegesisÕ (1981: 51), then Althusserian philosophy offers much 
more to contemporary thought than his near-disappearance from discussion seems to 
demonstrate. And yet, as Montag argues, to Ôpose the question, ÒWhy read Althusser today?Ó 
is to admit at the outset that his status as a philosopher remains unclear in a way that is not 
true of  his contemporaries and friends, Foucault and DerridaÕ (Montag 2013a: 1). AlthusserÕs 
detractors might indeed have wished his excommunication from the ranks of  Marxists and 
ÔrealÕ philosophers, however his contribution towards Badiou and DeleuzeÕs work provides 
defence enough against this denigration.  72
One particular issue that prohibits an easy discussion of  AlthusserÕs work is that Ôthere is 
more than one identiÞable AlthusserianismÕ and, further, that Ôthese divergent readings vary 
according to disciplineÕ (Montag 2003: 3). Whereas Balibar identiÞes two kinds of  
Althusserianism, ÔÒAlthusserians of  the Conjuncture and Althusserians of  the Structure,Ó 
precisely because this antagonism traverses his entire corpusÕ (Balibar 1993: 94), Williams and 
Montag show a third Ômaterialism of  the encounterÕ at work in AlthusserÕs later work (Montag 
2010: 157, Williams 2002: 39). Such diversity in the work of  Althusser was explained by 
Althusser himself  however when he argued the history of  philosophy is not a Ôsuccession of  
closed systems, each of  which could be identiÞed with an author who would serve as its centre 
and principle of  unity, of  which Marxism or materialism would be one among 
 In personal communication, Richard Sakwa went so far as to say that everyone has, at one time or another, 71
been an Althusserian - if  only to repent later. Williams echoes this comment, writing that Ô[e]very theory of  
ideology which takes its genealogy through Marx has also to pass by way of  AlthusserÕ (Williams 2002: 29).
 In a particularly vitriolic polemic, directed as much against AlthusserÕs persona as against his philosophy, E.P. 72
Thompson labeled Althusser Ôa freak of  intellectual fashion, which, if  [historical materialists] close their eyes, 
will in time go awayÕ (1978: 195). Freaks, according to Thompson, Ôif  tolerated - and even ßattered and fed - can 
show astonishing inßuence and longevityÕ (1978: 195). This longevity, demonstrated by the continued interest in 
Althusser, evidenced by the repudiation of  his biographical history and internal to the work of  Althusser itself, 
says perhaps as much about AlthusserÕs anti-humanism than his theory.
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othersÕ (Montag 2013a: 5). Instead, and in a manner not dissimilar to DeleuzeÕs interpretive 
methodology of  ÒbuggeryÓ, AlthusserÕs Òsymptomatic readingÓ involved inserting oneself  into 
a literary text and its Òtheoretical conjunctureÓ in order to take up a position which will then 
be transformed by the process of  philosophy.  It is for this reasonÐAlthusserÕs refusal to 73
dialectically oppose philosophers ad hominemÐ that he Ôwould appear to embody the opposition 
between postmodernism and modernism, between rationalism and irrationalism, and can be 
summoned in defence of  either of  the opposing sidesÕ (Montag 2003: 133). AlthusserÕs 
signiÞcant contribution to Marxism however lay in his ability to criticise in spite of  (or even 
because of) his lack of  opposition; despite refuting the dialectic method completely in his later 
work in favour of  Òaleatory materialismÓ, AlthusserÕs philosophy was far from quietist 
(contrary to ChoatÕs accusation (see Choat 2010: 27-29)). In fact, Althusser accordingly 
adopted both NapoleonÕs maxim ÔÒon sÕengage et puis on voit,Ó (meaning, Þrst we engage the 
enemy and then see what does and doesnÕt work)Õ to characterise the strategy with which he 
approached philosophy (Montag 2013a: 4) and MarxÕs Ôfamous Òlittle phrase,Ó [É] [m]en 
make their own history, but they do not make it out of  freely chosen elements (aus freien 
Stcken), under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances (Umstnde) 
directly encountered (vorgefundene), given by and transmitted from the pastÕ (Althusser 1976: 
98-99). Wholly in line with his theoretical anti-humanism (but not, as discussed above, in line 
with his autobiography), history, for Althusser, Ôdoes not have a Subject, in the philosophical 
sense of  the term, but a motor: that very class struggleÕ (Althusser 1976: 99, see also Althusser 
and Matheron 2003: 232-236). AlthusserÕs concept of  the motor, separately formulated as the 
unconscious, will be returned to at the end of  the chapter in his account of  how thought is 
synthesised in order to think the new. 
Three ÒdifferentÓ Althussers contributing to one oeuvre and Ôa network of  mutually 
supporting argumentsÕ means that Ôit is difÞcult to assess his work except in its entirety and 
after taking at least one turn around itÕ (Resch 1992: 41). Balibar acknowledged this difÞculty, 
pointing out that Ôthere is nothing in fact like a systematic work of  Althusser, with a 
beginning, an end, a structural unityÕ (1993: 2). However, as stated at the beginning of  For 
Marx, one of  AlthusserÕs tasks was Ôto draw a line of  demarcation between Marxist theory and 
the forms of  philosophical (and political) subjectivism which have compromised or threatened 
 In Negotiations, Deleuze addresses his distaste for the prominence of  the history of  philosophy, stating that Ôthe 73
main way I coped with it at the time was to see the history of  philosophy as a sort of  buggery or (it comes to the 
same thing) immaculate conception. I saw myself  as taking an author from behind and giving him a child that 
would be his own off-spring, yet monstrousÕ (1995: 6).
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itÕ (Althusser 2005 [1965]: 12) and AlthusserÕs works can be seen as a developing effort to 
delineate this Marxist theory. One of  the reasons that AlthusserÕs work became the target of  
such personalised contempt, was his crusade to purify Marxism involved the dismissal of  all 
elements that aimed to ground analysis upon a sedimented layer of  ideology.  Althusser did 74
not dismiss ideology entirely, sharing as he did BadiouÕs position that human thought could 
not exist outside of  terms constituted by ideology. As Ricoeur puts it, although Althusser 
succeeds in calling out ideology as theoretically non-existent, that Ôis not to abolish itÕ (1994: 
50). AlthusserÕs task was thus to develop a scientiÞc theory which could account for the 
production of  ideology itself, despite the inability of  the subject to ever escape from 
ideological thought. This theory was thus Ôconcerned not with an investigation of  what 
particular subjects may think, or even how, by what means, they carry out the act of  thinking, 
rather he is concerned with the ideological mechanism according to which thought, perception 
and subjectivity are producedÕ (Williams 2002: 35-36 original italics). In order to carry out his 
task, AlthusserÕs Òtheory of  theoretical practiceÓ rejected the distinction between object and 
subject (due to the transcendentalism involved with a subject ÒinvestigatingÓ an object), and 
thus removed the distinction between ideology and traditional science. For Althusser, 
traditional science, (which Althusser termed Òempiricism,Ó) produced an imaginary, 
ideological Ôform of  knowledge because it takes the subjectÕs experience and perception of  
objects as the basis for knowledgeÕ (Williams 2002: 32). As Bryant puts it, Deleuze would later 
make a similar criticism of  this form of  knowledge, calling it one of  the forms of  the 
Òdogmatic of  thoughtÓ (Bryant 2008: 80-81, Deleuze 2011 [1994]: 164-214). Empirical 
science thus cannot form the basis of  a theory of  theoretical practice because the abstraction 
of  essence from a real object came from the operation of  a presupposed subject. For 
Althusser, the division between ÔÞction and truth, between ideology and the real [and, thus, 
subject and object], are wholly internal to ideologyÕ (Williams 2002: 34) and any a priori 
speciÞcation of  the two would constitute the same abstract differentiation of  subject from the 
empirical world that Badiou was shown to criticise in the previous chapter. Whereas Badiou 
 According to Williams, AlthusserÕs conception of  ideology was one of  Ôan imaginary, albeit wholly necessary, 74
relation to realityÕ (2002: 30). Williams lists various incarnations of  ideology that Althusser took aim at as Ôall 
forms of  Hegelian Marxism, notably that of  Lukacs with its attendant historicism and humanism as well as its 
residual idealismÕ and Ôother forms of  humanism, particularly the existential variety that remains tied to a 
conception of  the subject as cogitoÕ (2002: 31). The task of  replacing ideology with a science was one that 
Althusser saw begun by Marx: ÔHe replaced postulates (empiricism/idealism of  the subject, empiricism/idealism 
of  the essence) which were the basis not only for idealism but also for pre-Marxist materialism, by a historic-
dialectical materialism of  praxis: that is, by a theory of  the different speciÞc levels of  human practice (economic 
practice, political practice, ideological practice, scientiÞc practice) in their characteristic articulations, based upon 
the speciÞc articulations of  the unity of  human societyÕ (Althusser 2005 [1965]: 229 original italics).
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looked to mathematics in order to formally differentiate a subject from the empirical world of  
presentation and ideology, Althusser sought to remove the subject/object distinction entirely, 
looking instead to develop a theory which understood their production. 
The difÞculty of  reading Althusser is, for some readers, compounded by a theoretical 
problem that undermines the coherence of  his work. When Althusser disregarded the subject 
of  philosophy, assuming Ôthat philosophical texts presented the dissimulation of  coherence 
and consistency,Õ he argued that ideas had Ôa material existence,Õ that Ôconsciousness was 
nothing other than actionÕ (Montag and Stolze 1997: 157). Philosophical knowledge does not 
emanate from the subject, as it does for idealists, positivists and rationalists, but is rather 
ÒstoredÓ or ÒtransmittedÓ by texts. Accordingly, Althusser Ôhas not only separated mind and 
body, but has inserted between them the inÞnite space of  the void through which they are 
destined to fall in parallel for all eternityÕ (Montag 2010: 157, 160). By rejecting humanist, 
rationalist and vulgar determinist accounts of  history (or, in other words, a distinction 
between the subject or object of  history in whatever conÞguration they may appear), 
ÔAlthusser endows the history of  philosophy, with an object external to it: the nothingness that 
is the origin (or rather originary non-origin, a theoretical compromise which in no way 
escapes the implications of  the concept of  origins) and destiny of  all thingsÕ (Montag 2010: 
161).  In other words, because neither subject or object can be taken as the starting point, 75
analysis must begin with that which is not either of  those: a new object which contains the 
conditions for both theoretical procedure and result, yet a position which is un-sayable in its a 
priori non-existence. This starting point is, for Althusser, what he would call ÒaleatoryÓ 
materialism following a series of  interviews in 1984 with Spanish philosopher Fernanda 
Navarro, in which Althusser derives ÒaleatoryÓ Ôfrom the Latin alea, for the dice or games of  
chanceÕ (Montag 2003: 12). As Williams puts it, it is through the Ôparadox of  incessant rupture 
that philosophy is able to occupy a position, develop a strategy, a thought of  practice, to Ôthink 
practice via that thoughtÕ, and through this process to create political (that is, ideological and 
material) effects (2013a: 154). Locating it as indeed the ÔÒsole materialist tradition,Ó a lineage 
that embraces Epicurus, Lucretius, Machiavelli, Spinoza, Hobbes, Rousseau, Marx and 
HeideggerÕ (Althusser 1997, 2006: 167, Montag 2003: 12), aleatory materialism was 
AlthusserÕs answer to criticisms (and indeed his own self-criticism) that accused his earlier 
 This criticism of  Althusser is very similar to that made of  Badiou, i.e. that he is unable to account for the split 75
between the rational and empirical in his ontology.
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work of  lacking a justiÞcation for his structuralist alternative to traditional Marxist dialectical 
frameworks.  
A Ô[m]aterialism of  the encounter, and therefore of  the aleatory and of  contingencyÕ 
relies, for Althusser on what he calls Ôthe rain of  parallelismÕ. The rain of  which Althusser 
writes refers to EpicurusÕ philosophical atomism, which Althusser expands upon with the 
work of  Spinoza. According to Epicurus, an inÞnite number of  atoms exist in an inÞnite void 
of  space around them within which they exist in constant motion, forming an inÞnite number 
of  different bodies (Epicurus 1925: ¤40-41). For Althusser, Ô[T]hey still are,Õ and this implies 
both that matter (in its undifferentiated form) constitutes a being without any consistency (in 
the same sense of  BadiouÕs undifferentiated multiplicity), and that before the formation of  the 
world, Ôthere was no Meaning, neither Cause nor End, nor Reason nor UnreasonÕ (2006: 
168-169).  Interrupting the atomsÕ free-fall is the clinamen: an ÔinÞnitesimal swerveÕ which, 76
Ôbreaking the parallelism in an almost negligible way at one point, [induces] an encounter with 
the atom next to it, and, from encounter to encounter, a pile-up and the birth of  a 
worldÕ (Althusser 2006: 169 original italics). EpicurusÕ clinamen thus functions for Althusser as 
the structure that confers meaning upon matter. The clinamen does not contain bodies (or 
meaning, or reason) and is merely a structure of  void; bodies are the resultant encounter 
between different atoms which takes place within structure. The structure, as the possibility 
for an encounter to take place, facilitates encounters between atoms, encounters which confer 
Ôtheir reality upon the atoms themselves, which, without swerve and encounter, would be nothing but 
abstract elements, lacking all consistency and existenceÕ (Althusser 2006: 169 original italics). 
AlthusserÕs criticism of  ideology is clear (and similar to BadiouÕs): any form of  thought that 
bases itself  upon one (or several) encounters, which function as the transcendental basis of  
analysis, do not take into account that Ôthe accomplishment of  the fact is just a pure effect of  
contingency, since it depends on the aleatory encounter of  the atoms due to the swerve of  the 
clinamenÕ  (Althusser 2006: 169-170). Because ideas of  what are created by encounters 
appear after the fact, any presupposition of  encounters results in the dominance of  the man 
 Badiou also incorporates a latent atomism in his ontology and explains that Ôif  a property is attested for at 76
least one natural multiple, then there will always exist an ultimate natural element with this propertyÕ (Badiou 
2011: 135). This natural element, for Badiou, is the minimal property of  belonging ∈, or the ÔÒsmallestÓ element 
for which the [natural] property is appropriateÕ (Badiou 2011: 139). However because, for Badiou, a totalised 
nature does not exist, it is not the case that everything belongs to nature. Instead, as he argues, Ôeverything 
(which is natural) is (belongs) in everything, save that there is no everythingÕ, thus conÞrming the undifferentiated 
and unnameable status of  the void.
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who has the ability somehow to actively make history. It is worth here quoting Althusser at 
length from his ÔReply to John LewisÕ: 
ÔDo you know of  any being under the sun endowed with such a power? Yes -- 
there does exist such a being in the tradition of  human culture: God. Only God 
ÒmakesÓ the raw material with which he ÒmakesÓ the world. But there is a 
very important difference. John LewisÕs God is not outside of  the world: the 
man-god who creates history is not outside of  history -- he is inside. This is 
something inÞnitely more complicated! And it is just because John LewisÕs 
little human god -- man -- is inside history (Òen situationÓ, as Jean-Paul Sartre 
used to say) that Lewis does not endow him with a power of  absolute creation 
(when one creates everything, it is relatively easy: there are no limitations!) 
but with something even more stupefying -- the power of  ÒtranscendenceÓ, of  
being able to progress by indeÞnitely negating-superseding the constraints of  
the history in which he lives, the power to transcend history by human liberty. 
John LewisÕs man is a little lay god. Like every living being he is Òup to his 
neckÓ in reality, but endowed with the prodigious power of  being able at any 
moment to step outside of  that reality, of  being able to change its 
characterÕ (Althusser 1976: 43-44). 
The lay god is thus the man who, even having revoked the idea of  a theological God, 
nevertheless presumes to be able to shape the form of  the world by his or her own will, their 
action constituting the determining encounter in the course of  history. Instead, AlthusserÕs 
world is constituted by the contingent swerve of  the atom which forms objects, the thought of  
objects (which are different in kind to the objects themselves), and man itself. It is from here, 
and through discussion of  AlthusserÕs conception of  relative autonomy, that MontagÕs 
problem with the split between body and mind in Althusser can be understood, alongside 
AlthusserÕs claim that everything starts with the void. 
Relative autonomy within unity 
The concepts of  historical development and social determination are commonly 
thought to have been introduced by Hegel but were, according to Althusser, in fact introduced 
by Montesquieu. As a humanist, Montesquieu Ômust also be credited with originating the 
materialist conception of  history as Òthe concrete behaviour of  men in their relations with 
nature and with their pastÓÕ (Resch 1992: 59). MontesquieuÕs thought was then developed by 
Hegel, who was to rediscover Ôthe Spinozist perspective of  the absolute (God/nature) and 
[imbue] it with the social totality derived from MontesquieuÕ (Resch 1992: 59). Thus, for 
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Hegel, every historical event or phenomenon is always in dialectic and contradictory relation 
to the Idea of  it, which is the Ôconcrete historical process itself, in its totalityÕ (Gordy 1983: 3). 
Change occurs as every Ôhistorical entity demonstrates its Þnitude by passing away, by 
transcending itself  into a new and higher phase of  the Idea, its positive contribution to the 
historical process both preserved and transformedÕ (Gordy 1983: 3). This is, in Hegel, what 
Althusser terms an Ôexpressive totalityÕ (Althusser and Balibar 1970: 94). Yet the Hegelian 
synthesis pushes the materialist tradition of  both Spinoza and Montesquieu into the lofty 
clouds of  idealism, an ideology par excellence for Althusser, and one which consists of  a Ôsecret 
alliance between Subject and Goal which ÒmystiÞesÓ the Hegelian dialecticÕ (Althusser 1976: 
137-138, Diefenbach, Farris et al. 2013: 172).  AlthusserÕs problem with HegelÕs synthesis is 77
two-fold: Þrst it maintains a subject/object distinction (which, for Althusser can only be 
maintained whilst already in the realm of  ideology (Williams 2001: 63)) and then, secondly, it 
confuses the distinction between the two, creating a denegated, empirical form of  historical 
unfolding. As Chambers puts it, ÔHegelÕs philosophy cannot account for the socio formation as 
formed by contradictions that are not necessarily resolved in the march of  history award its 
inevitable telosÕ (Chambers 2014: 67-68).  
As Gordy puts it, unlike Ôthe simple unity of  the Hegelian totality, the Marxist whole is 
essentially complex. Effectivity does not take place from the centre outward but displays a 
mutuality through which any structure might have a determining inßuence on any 
otherÕ (1983: 9). What is particular about AlthusserÕs philosophy is that, due to the aleatory 
nature of  each encounter happening prior to any unity within a body, each of  the traditional 
Marxist histories (economic, ideological, political), that together form an essential unity in 
Hegel, function in AlthusserÕs work in Ôrelative autonomyÕ (Althusser and Balibar 1970: 100). 
Indeed, referring to the a posteriori nature of  the knowledge of  encounters, Althusser argued 
that each of  these Ôpeculiar histories is punctuated with peculiar rhythms and can only be 
known on condition that we have deÞned the concept of  the speciÞcity of  its historical 
temporality and its punctuations (continuous development, revolutions, breaks, etc.)Õ (1970: 
 In Logic of  Sense, Deleuze argues that the importance of  structuralism in philosophy was to displace frontiers 77
that had traditionally been set up, on the one hand by humanists and rationalists, and on the other by idealists 
who, primarily referring to Heidegger, he describes as the Ô[n]ew theologians of  a misty sky (the sky of  
Koenigsberg) [É] who sprang upon the stage in the name of  the God-man or the Man-god as the secret of  
senseÕ (Deleuze 2004 [1969]: 83). DeleuzeÕs frustration both is evident as he wonders Ôwhether it is the ass which 
loads man or man who loads the ass and himself Õ (2004 [1969]: 83). Deleuze argues that the sense of  whether 
one loads the other or not is an argument to create, rather than to discover, predating by seven years the 
argument made by Althusser in ÔReply to John LewisÕ. Other than StolzeÕs article speciÞcally connecting Deleuze 
and Althusser, there is no literature to show whether Deleuze also inßuenced Althusser in this regard, yet the 
similarity of  the argumentation used is certainly uncanny.
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100). The relative autonomy of  each particular structure is to be known only through the 
creation of  concepts, and the non-anteriority of  meanings (a position derived from Epicurus) 
stands Althusser in opposition to Plato and Aristotle. For Althusser, the world happens and is 
only then established in the Ôreign of  Reason, Meaning, Necessity and End [Fin]Õ (Althusser 
2006: 169).  
It is with the concept of  relative autonomy that Althusser can tie his ontology to his 
political claims. As Gordy points out, ÔMarx had a holistic conception of  society. Indeed, it is 
by emphasising that holism exclusively that many have concluded that the Marxist conception 
is simply the Hegelian one inverted, the rational kernel of  HegelÕs thought without its mystical 
shellÕ (1983: 9). However, Althusser is clear that the holism is only that which he calls the 
ÒÞnal analysisÓ of  the relative autonomy of  each particular history (economic, scientiÞc, 
ideological, et cetera). As he clariÞes, the Ôhistory of  philosophy, for example, is not an 
independent history by divine right: the right of  this history to exist as a speciÞc history is 
determined by the articulating relations, i.e., relations of  relative effectivity, which exist within 
the wholeÕ (Althusser and Balibar 1970: 100).  So it is not, as with Heidegger, that each 78
history opens up as a ÔgiftÕ from a given totality that already is (Dasein), but rather that the 
social totality is constructed after the Ôaccomplished factÕ of  various relatively autonomous 
histories unifying immanently in one identiÞable event (Althusser 2006: 169-170, Heidegger 
1977: 235). Althusser is thus at pains to point out that the emergence of  history is still 
contingent and may never happen at all; the fact that things have happened are not 
guaranteed (because they have not been determined by an a priori given). With a line of  
reasoning that Meillassoux extends to its fullest in After Finitude (2008), Althusser argues that 
Ôthe encounter may not take place, just as it may take place. Nothing determines, no principle 
of  decision determines this alternative in advance; it is of  the order of  a game of  
diceÕ (Althusser 2006: 174). Whereas, for Meillassoux, it is precisely this foundational lack of  
determination that questions the facticity of  the world (the fact that what is given in the world 
is given at all), Althusser argues that the world is given by virtue of  its existence in the Þnal 
 Diefenbach et. al put this clearly when they state that by Ôassuming that the social instances mutually condition 78
one another in their existence, Althusser infers that they internalise the position that they occupy in the 
structureÕ. Relations are Ônot thoughtÕ, they argue, Ôas in Spinoza, through the intervals that they articulate, but 
through their [own] termsÕ (Diefenbach, Farris et al. 2013: 174).
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analysis.  MeillassouxÕs position will be examined more fully in the next chapter, but provides 79
a useful contrast here. For Meillassoux, the conclusion that the encounter may not have 
happened (i.e. it is contingent) has to be enforced throughout all subsequent claims. What 
Meillassoux terms the Ônecessity of  contingencyÕ (Meillassoux 2008: 67) means that even the 
claim about the necessity of  contingency is itself contingent. Althusser does not go so farÐhe 
does not absolutise contingencyÐbecause, for him, the world is in the Þnal analysis and this 
claim is not open to scepticism.  
Philosophical dualisms 
In 1991, Deleuze and Guattari stated in their last collaborative book that Ôphilosophy is 
the art of  forming, inventing, and fabricating conceptsÕ (1994 [1991]: 2). Furthermore, they 
agree that Ô[s]ubject and object give a poor approximation of  thought. Thinking is neither a 
line drawn between subject and object nor a revolving of  one around the otherÕ (1994 [1991]: 
85). In this regard, Althusser seems to anticipate Deleuze and Guattari in understanding 
philosophy as the creation of  concepts. However, AlthusserÕs use of  philosophy is inconsistent 
in his work, at times emphasising the political nature of  philosophy and at times reducing it to 
the level of  the ideology he is tasked to criticise. For example, in a 1968 lecture to the Socit 
Franaise de Philosophie entitled ÔLenin and Philosophy,Õ Althusser maintained that 
Ô[p]hilosophy represents the peopleÕs class struggle in theoryÕ (Althusser 1971b: 21), and yet he 
also quoted Lenin calling professors of  philosophy Ôgraduated ßunkeysÕ (Althusser 1971b: 30). 
What is to be made of  this seeming irregularity? Following an outraged expression from the 
president of  the society and facilitator of  the event Jean Wahl, Althusser clariÞed that, by 
Ôphilosophy,Õ he means Ôthe idealism of  philosophies of  historyÕ that are to be replaced by a 
Marxist ÔscientiÞcity with respect to historyÕ (1971b: 40). This new scientiÞcity, Althusser 
 The importance of  unveiling new wordsÐor theoretical conceptsÐhas large implications for AlthusserÕs 79
ÒsymptomaticÓ reading of  texts, as developed in Reading Capital. Althusser reveals that, ÔMarx criticised Smith 
and Ricardo for constantly confusing surplus-value with its forms of  existence: proÞt, rent and interest. The great 
EconomistsÕ analyses are therefore lacking a wordÕ (Althusser and Balibar 1970: 146). It is by introducing a new 
term into analysis (Ôsurplus-valueÕ) that, for Althusser, Marx allows for the correct theoretical analysis of  
capitalism, corrected against the myopia suffered by both Smith and Ricardo (1970: 19). Althusser is clear that 
not every word can function as a theoretical concept but, rather, if  Ôthe word surplus-value has such importance 
it is because it directly affects the structure of  the object whose future is at stake in the simple act of  
namingÕ (1970: 146).  Thus, new terminology both unveils and stipulates the affective extents of  encounters that 
have been arrogated under previously myopic classiÞcations. Whilst this could, at Þrst, appear as if  Althusser is 
setting up a simple positivismÐwhereby matter takes the form of  the concept that is applied to itÐto claim that 
this were so would be to ignore the a posteriori nature of  concepts vis. the encounter. As in the work of  Hume, for 
Althusser, relations are external to (and in excess of  their terms). The encounter forms the basis upon which 
concepts can be constructed, not the other way around, and there is not necessarily any assumption that the new 
concept, once constructed, is entirely adequate to the task of  capturing the affective capability of  the encounter.
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declared, is to be the Marxist philosophy of  science: Òdialectical materialismÓ. However, is 
Althusser entirely justiÞed in conßating every mode of  philosophy other than materialism 
under the banner of  idealism, only in order to sweep them under the carpet? 
In order to answer this, it is useful to see in more detail what Althusser suggested in the 
place of  philosophy. Already, two deÞnitions of  Althusserian philosophy have been presented 
above: the Þrst is Ôtheory of  theoretical practiceÕ and the second is Ôrepresentation of  the class 
struggle with the sciences,Õ both of  which are conÞrmed by Badiou (Badiou 2005d: 61). These 
articulations are possible, for BadiouÕs Althusser, because the Ôfundamental condition for 
philosophical activity is its dependence on politics, on political clariÞcationÕ (Badiou 2005d: 
61). Accordingly, the purpose of  Althusserian philosophy, for Badiou, is to harness politics: a 
certain set of  relations that make up the Marxist whole in relative autonomy to the other 
relations (of  science and ideology). This allows philosophy to Ôrecord, in the unfolding of  
previously unseen philosophical possibilities, the sign of  a renewed ÒthinkabilityÓ [É] of  
politics conceived on the basis of  its own exerciseÕ (Badiou 2005d: 62 original italics). Bearing in 
mind the revelatory character of  being through four truth procedures that Badiou develops 
within his own project, it is clear that BadiouÕs reading of  Althusser here is glossed with his 
own terminology and yet, unlike Badiou, Althusser has no mathematical ontology 
conditioning the revelation of  any (non) being in the particular conÞguration of  politics. 
Badiou is wrong therefore to characterise Althusser as rarifying politics to a greater degree 
than any other set of  relations. BadiouÕs mischaracterisation is found within his statement 
that, because ÔAlthusser posits that only the Òmilitants of  the revolutionary class struggleÓ 
really grasp the thought of  the process in relations,Õ [É] Ô[t]herefore, genuine thought of  
process is possessed by those engaged in political practiceÕ (2005d: 60). BadiouÕs strict 
delineation between politics and philosophyÐand his prioritisation of  the formerÐleads him to 
read into Althusser a concomitant distinction between those who both grasp the thought of  a 
process of  relations and act upon it (i.e. militants), and those who do not. Nevertheless, the 
previous chapter concluded that there was no imperative for BadiouÕs militant to pay Þdelity 
to the political outside of  ideology (because Þdelity to the event is constituted in the realm of  
ideology) and the same is true for Althusser - yet Althusser never makes claims to the 
contrary! Indeed, Althusser anticipates a reading of  him in this manner and says, following a 
passage on MachiavelliÕs Prince, that: 
ÔThe reader may object that this is merely political philosophy, over-looking 
the fact that a philosophy is simultaneously at work here too. A curious 
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philosophy which is a Ômaterialism of the encounterÕ thought by way of politics, 
and which, as such, does not take anything for granted. It is in the political 
void that the encounter must come about, and that [the] national unity [of  
Italy] must Òtake holdÓ. But this political void is Þrst a philosophical 
voidÕ (Althusser 2006: 173) 
BadiouÕs reading of  Althusser is founded upon his own strong (axiomatic) distinction 
between the militants of  the revolutionary class struggle and those who are not militants that 
is based upon the primacy of  the political event. As an ontological truth procedure, politics 
occurs prior to philosophy and axiomatically distinguishes between the militant and 
everything else. Politics, for Althusser, is a mode of  thought that occurs after philosophy or, to 
rephrase in Badiouian terminology: politics constitutes a language with which philosophy (in 
its Þrst conÞguration of  a Òtheory of  theoretical practiceÓ) speaks. Politics is a second-order 
mode of  thought that conditions the political activism of  the revolutionary militant and is 
encapsulated by philosophy, which itself  constitutes the terms and possibilities of  politics. 
Unlike BadiouÕs strong, axiomatic distinction, there is thus a weak (empirical) distinction for 
Althusser between a militant and a non-militant which is deÞned by the extent to which an 
individual participates in the revolutionary class struggle or not. Rather than politics 
axiomatically determining the subject, for Althusser, theory is Ôa weapon in the class struggle, 
and whether it serves progressive or conservative forces, whether it arms or disarms the 
exploited classes, is determined by the problematic that shapes its categoriesÕ (Gordy 1983: 
19). So, AlthusserÕs Þrst deÞnition of  historical materialism is a philosophy that both avoids 
the Ôdangers of  bourgeois ideologyÕ (i.e. idealism) and constitutes the ground for a political 
struggle againstÐor potentially in favour ofÐbourgeois politics (Althusser 1976: 105). 
What of  the second deÞnition of  philosophy, the Òrepresentation of  the class struggle 
with the sciencesÓ? As Althusser wrote in ÔElements of  Self-CriticismÕ, science is not, as he 
had deÞned it in his early work, the contrast between truth and error, or to be speculatively 
deÞned against ideology (1976: 106). His previous distinction between science and ideology, 
Althusser explained, was a ÔrationalistÕ explanation of  the break that was necessary to ÔÒproveÓ 
that there is an antagonism between Marxism and bourgeois ideologyÕ (1976: 105-106). Yet 
this led to a Ôtheoreticist deviationÕ (1976: 105) which, as has already been argued, Althusser 
could not justify. Instead, Althusser deÞnes science as a methodology whereby it is Ôpossible to 
produce (as Marx does in Capital ) proven theoretical results, that is, results which can be 
veriÞed by scientiÞc and political practice, and are open to methodical rectiÞcationÕ (1976: 110 
original italics). Conscious of  being mistaken for an idealist himself, Althusser clariÞes in an 
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important footnote that Ô[w]hat follows should not be understood as a relapse into a theory of  
science (in the singular), which would be quite speculative, but as the minimum of  generality 
necessary to be able to grasp a concrete object. Science (in the singular) does not exist. But nor 
does Òproduction in generalÓ: and yet Marx talks about Òproduction in generalÓ, and 
deliberately, consciously, in order to be able to analyse concrete modes of  productionÕ (1976: 
112). Put simply, AlthusserÕs conception of  science is the set of  minimum possible conditions 
for understanding an object (what is also referred to as a body), yet a set of  conditions that are 
modiÞed alongside change in the relatively autonomous totality to which it belongs. In line 
with AlthusserÕs aleatory philosophy more generallyÐand in disagreement with rationalist 
conceptions of  science such as PopperÕsÐscience does not come with any prerequisites for 
designating its practices a priori of  its operation, aside from its immanent distinction from 
politics, ideology and other modes of  thought.  Existing as it does within the umbrella of  the 80
Þrst deÞnition of  philosophy, the terms of  science are determined by theoretical practice - a 
practice with the world that is informed by the theory that it concomitantly generates. 
Williams puts it simply: for Althusser, scientiÞc knowledge (although this counts for all 
knowledge) is produced Ôaccording to conditions internal to its own productionÕ (Williams 
2002: 34) and these conditions also include practical activity.  The second deÞnition of  81
philosophy is therefore the class struggle (or Òtheoretical practiceÓ) represented as objective 
objects, whereby the conditions for the understanding of  objecticity are determined by 
theoretical practice itself.  It is a result of  this deÞnition that Althusser could argue that 82
 Although more commonly known as an empiricist, and following the distinction between the work of  Hume 80
and Popper developed within MeillassouxÕs Science Fiction and Extro-Science Fiction (2013), PopperÕs account of  
scientiÞc methodology places him better within the rationalist camp. As Meillassoux convincingly argues, 
PopperÕs description of  veriÞcation as the criteria that judges the truthfulness of  scientiÞc claims is an 
epistemological claim regarding the ability of  science to prove its own results and says nothing of  the ontological 
(Meillassoux 2013: 14). The upshot of  Popperian methodology is that science is unable to guarantee whether or 
not previously unforeseen material behaviours or scientiÞc laws might emerge. According to Meillassoux 
however, empiricism itself  is not necessarily guilty of  this inability (indeed Hume examined precisely this 
problem in his work), thus the distinction between rationalism and empiricism here is useful.
 That knowledge is produced according to conditions of  its own production was important for Althusser. He 81
wrote frequently of  analysis Ôin the last instanceÕ and this last instance is the point at which all relatively 
autonomous forms of  analysis (scientiÞc/ideological/economic) have concentrated into one moment that can be 
articulated (Althusser 1976: 50-51). As Gordy puts it,  the Ôconcept of  class struggle thus emerges as the 
fundamental category of  historical materialism, for to say that the economy is determinant in the last instance is 
precisely to say that class struggle is the motor of  history (Gordy 1983: 11). The mode of  production is a 
signiÞcant evaluative concept for Marx and Althusser and determines the nature of  class struggle, in the form of  
its social hierarchies and different property claims. Yet it should not be assumed that Althusser ignores ideology 
when he discusses economics, as all knowledge in AlthusserÕs work is in fact interpellated by ideology. Instead, 
analysis in the last instance should be taken to mean Òanalysis taking into account all modes of  analysis, but from 
the perspective of  (the most signiÞcant) oneÓ.
 Objecticity is used here in the Deleuzian sense to denote the understanding of  what an object is, as opposed to 82
objectivity which would be the study of  these objects once deÞned. See Deleuze (2004b: 164).
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Ôphilosophy, like theatre, cannot be suppressed; it is the perennial element in which scientiÞc 
discoveries are attached and defended, exploited for apologetic purposes or protected from 
exploitationÕ (Montag 2003: 35). Furthermore, Althusser can talk about a political void Þrst of  
all being philosophical, as philosophy constitutes the Þrst order method for constituting and 
understanding being, as presented by science which is political action described in objective 
terms.  83
Can Althusser get away with distinguishing his materialist philosophy from all other 
forms of  philosophy that are then placed under the banner of  idealism? AlthusserÕs 
philosophy can be distinguished from philosophies that either premise an explanation of  the 
world purely based on epistemology (Kant), or an epistemology that is in some manner 
ÒcorrectedÓ by ontology (Popper/Badiou) - both of  which constitute, for Althusser, idealist 
positions. First, AlthusserÕs concept of  relative autonomy prevents an idealisation of  
philosophy, through its constitution by theoretical practiceÐa practice which informs and, in 
turn, is delineated and differentiated by philosophy. The mutual co-constitution of  the two 
attributes of  theory (theoretical practice and the various modes of  thought, such as ideology 
and science et cetera) means that AlthusserÕs work avoids both understanding the form of  
being through pure epistemology and a scepticism that the real can only be understood in the 
form of  a mind-independent world.  Secondly, the relative autonomy of  science within the 84
overall social structure, like that of  ideology and economics, cements its materiality and 
further highlights its distance from idealist accounts of  science; removed from rationalist/
idealist/computationalist theories of  analysis that foreground the subject as the active centre 
of  epistemological explanation, modes of  analysis are unhampered by the limitation of  
simply being able to work on the level of  epistemology. As Williams puts it, ideology (and, by 
extension, science) Ôis not to be associated solely with the realm of  ideas; it is material and 
relational precisely because of  its structural existence. Ideology is an element of  the social totality 
and functions in a complex relation to the other elements or levels of  the structureÕ (Williams 
 Althusser clariÞes that Ô[p]hilosophy is not Absolute Knowledge; it is neither the Science of  Sciences, nor the 83
Science of  Practices. Which means: it does not possess the Absolute Truth, either about any science or about any 
practiceÕ (Althusser 1976: 58). Although philosophy does take lexical priority over science, philosophy has no 
claim to objecticity or, concomitantly, objectivity; this remains within the realm of  science. Philosophy, existing as 
it does in the void and remaining devoid of  transcendental truth conditions, is the space within which the terms 
of  science (and its outcomes) are hashed out by the relatively autonomous collection of  other theoretical modes. 
As Matheron and Post put it, philosophy is Ôthe full Þeld in which nothing occurs but the repetition of  a voidÕ - 
this void being the aleatory and inconsistent foundation of  all thought (Matheron and Post 1998: 28-29).
 Markus Gabriel provides an excellent argument as to why such worlds (mind-independent or not) do not exist 84
in his books Fields of  Sense (2015), Why the world does not exist (2015) and his TED talk of  the same name (2013).
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2002: 36). To this extent therefore, AlthusserÕs philosophy does avoid the trappings of  
idealising either thought or matter as lexically priorÐand thus conditioningÐof  the other. 
However there is a problem with AlthusserÕs philosophy that must be addressed before he can 
truly be said to have avoided idealism: how can AlthusserÕs relatively autonomous totality also 
be a void from which thought emerges? In order words, does Althusser not simply replace an 
idealisation of  either thought or matter with an originary, inexplicable moment which itself  
constitutes both? 
A very full void 
To sum up AlthusserÕs position so far: encounters between atoms occur due to shifts in 
their vectors within the clinamen constituting an event. Knowledge of  this event becomes 
intelligible through philosophy and then thinkable through politics, science, ideology etc. All 
of  these modes of  thought are determined in relative autonomy to each otherÐand to 
objecticity itselfÐby atoms encountering each other. In LivingstonÕs terms, philosophy is the 
language which provides the consistency of  each mode of  thought, yet it is non-totalising in 
its openness to the aleatory encounter. This means that, as Althusser puts it, Marxist 
philosophy is Ôrequired to think the openness of  the world towards the event, the as-yet-
unimaginable, and also all living practice, politics includedÕ (Althusser 2006: 264, Choat 2010: 
28).  Whilst Althusser never discussed his philosophy in formalist terms, AlthusserÕs structure 85
can never both totalise and fully consist in itself  because aleatory materialism is prefaced 
upon an encounter that itself  constitutes thought. As a result, his philosophy is consistent but 
non-totalising; knowledge is constantly re-conÞgured following the encounter or, as Althusser 
put it, history Ôis the permanent revocation of  the accomplished fact by another 
undecipherable fact to be accomplished, without our knowing in advance whether, or when, 
or how the event that revokes it will come aboutÕ (Althusser 2006: 174). However, this reliance 
on the encounter is where AlthusserÕs later philosophy faces the problem of  origins previously 
highlighted by Montag and Þnally falls to the charge of  idealism.  
AlthusserÕs Ôoriginary non-origin [and] theoretical compromise which in no way escapes 
the implications of  the concept of  originsÕ (drawn attention to above) is, for Montag, a 
 Althusser conceptualises history in two types. The Þrst is that of  historical laws, which are developed by 85
Ôvulgar historians and sociologistsÕ who Ôconsider only the accomplished fact of  past historyÕ (Althusser 2006: 
263-264). The second type is what Althusser calls history Ôin the presentÕ, the study of  tendential laws whose future 
paths cannot be seen because they are aleatory (2006: 264). The latter is the aleatory materialism, open to the 
event, that Althusser attributes to Marx.
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problem to do with persistence, or Ôa fear of  that which, in AlthusserÕs words, dure longtemps, 
lasts a long time, that which fails to end on time, as expected and predictedÕ (Montag 2010: 
181). Montag highlights the possibility that, for Althusser, atoms might not just encounter one 
another, but become interlocked (ÒaccrocherÓ), forming an order from whence there was 
originally none. A possible result of  this order is the Ôprimacy of  the structure over its 
elementsÕ (Althusser in Montag 2010: 181) whereby future encounters are limited in their 
ability to create new knowledge by the dominance of  their precursors which extend further 
into the future than they should. In suggesting that Althusser introduces the concept of  
interlocking that incorporates objects in the structure and prevents radical change, Montag 
nods towards AlthusserÕs essay ÒIdeology and Ideological State ApparatusesÓ (ISAs), where 
Althusser describes the interpellative effects of  ideology that serve to reproduce the 
Ôconditions of  productionÕ (Althusser 1971a: 127). Indeed, the ISA essay provides a sobering 
read as Althusser sets out how Ôchildren at school also learn the ÒrulesÓ of  good behaviour, i.e. 
the attitude that should be observed by every agent in the division of  labour, according to the 
job he is ÒdestinedÓ for: rules of  morality, civic and professional conscience, which actually 
means rules of  respect for the socio-technical division of  labour and ultimately the rules of  
the order established by class dominationÕ (Althusser 1971a: 132). However this description is 
sociological, not philosophical, and taking it for philosophy would be to mistake it for the 
materialist philosophy underpinning AlthusserÕs social theory - the philosophical content of  
the essay comes later in describing ISAs. In his social commentary, Althusser does not, of  
course, advocate for the reproduction of  the relations of  capitalist production so much as 
highlight their existence and set out in the essay their philosophical conditions. Therefore, 
placing the ISA essay into AlthusserÕs (oftentimes contradictory) oeuvre as Ôconstitutive and 
necessary to its very unfoldingÕ (Montag 2010: 173), ISAsÐas interlocking encounters with 
individualsÐdo not necessarily extend further into the future than they should. Rather, any 
presupposition that social forms should die out earlier than they do must give an account of  
why this is so and, in doing so, will explain itself  into a position of  idealism with an anterior 
account of  death. Montag misplaces the problem with AlthusserÕs concept of  origin as being 
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with his account of  persistence, when in fact it lies in his over-reliance on death; the problem 
with AlthusserÕs concept of  origin is precisely the lack of  an account of  persistence at all.  86
Choat puts the problem clearly: Althusser succumbs Ôto the seduction of  a theory that 
prioritizes the aleatory but which thence can discern no patterns in the chaos and offer no 
explanations for what become apparently random eventsÕ (Choat 2010: 28). The void in 
Althusser, which as Montag has pointed out is an originary nothingness, is posited by 
Althusser in order to escape the transcendence implicated in idealism, and yet also 
necessitates a new transcendental plane at every moment of  analysis. The difference between 
AlthusserÕs transcendental plane and the idealistsÕ that he criticises is that his plane is 
inconsistent to the extent that nothing can be said of  it (in the same manner as the void in 
BadiouÕs ontology). However the very objecticity of  the voidÐthe fact that it is named at all by 
AlthusserÐis a conceptualisation that cannot exist lexically prior to philosophy because, for 
Althusser, all knowledge is always/already philosophical and ideological. The void is a 
concept that must be posited by philosophy in the very act of  theoretical practice and, thus, if  
Althusser cannot account for its existence within knowledge (i.e. philosophy), it constitutes an 
idealism akin to the accounts of  philosophy that Althusser takes aim at. In this sense, 
AlthusserÕs void is as idealist as BadiouÕs void was shown to be in the previous chapter.  
The challenge of  idealism is not strange to either Althusser or Montag, who attempt to 
account for it by stating that Ôphilosophy must constantly pose to itself  the question of  its 
orientation, of  the place it occupies and that which the conjuncture demands it accomplish; it 
must constantly ask: Òwhat is to be done?ÓÕ (Montag 2010: 161). Philosophical practice, for 
Althusser, is an attempt to avoid idealism by constant engagement with matter. However, can 
Althusser really argue that philosophy Ôbegins by evacuating all philosophical problemsÕ whilst both 
keeping a coherency between philosophy, objects, social forms, or modes of  thoughtÐwhilst 
continuously instituting a transcendental empty voidÐand avoid the charge of  idealism 
 For Lampert, the problem of  origins in AlthusserÕs concept of  interpellation appears in ButlerÕs appropriation 86
of  it for her own work. According to Lampert, ButlerÕs commits Althusser to a theological understanding of  
ideology, whereby the act of  ÒhailingÓ an individual interpelates an individual by virtue of  the hailÕs assumed 
authority. This reading of  Althusser however forgets that the task of  the ISA essay Ôto undo the idealist schema 
of  ideology-as-belief  and words-as-actionsÕ (2015: 129). Instead, Ôit is notÕ as Lampert puts it, Ôthat the words 
spoken in a [É] ritual compel belief; rather, it is that a ritual is followed as if  those words were true, whether we 
believe them or not. The words themselvesÑÒI now pronounce you man and wife,Ó etc.Ñmay in fact be a 
necessary part of  the ritual (utterances can in this way be one ÒmodalityÓ of  material practice, as Althusser puts 
it). But the utterances themselves are not interpellations in some performative senseÕ (2015: 129). As such, whilst 
Lampert is wrong to claim that the words are true by necessity, he is correct to emphasise the importance of  the 
event within which the always-already there Þeld of  ideology relates to the individual. This event, which 
encompasses ideology and the individual, also accounts for the reproduction of  ideology following act of  the 
individualÕs interpellation.
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(Althusser 2006: 174)? To reformulate this question: if  Althusser is to be taken at his word, 
that the void is indeed devoid of  all content whatsoever, how are series to be understood? It 
seems that, rather than an empty void, AlthusserÕs must in fact be a very full void. In fact, true 
to AlthusserÕs own methodology of  symptomatic reading, a different kind of  void can be read 
into AlthusserÕs philosophy that addresses its non-foundational transcendency. This void must 
contain the conditions for the constitution of  knowledge, yet also avoid the unity that 
Althusser took Hegel to task over. Furthermore, it must also be able to account for the 
persistence of  past objects, and the non-immediate effects of  ideological, scientiÞc and 
political practices into future encounters.  87
Time and persistence 
In order to understand series, i.e. to conceptualise the new within the context of  what 
was (even on the condition that the new might have changed), a conceptualisation of  
persistence is necessary. As has been argued, positing a void in the assumption that this will 
then constitute knowledge equates to an idealism. Positing an empty void at each moment of  
philosophy breaks thoughtÕs consistency: the explanation of  events is prohibited because, 
following the void, knowledge could never be more than the result of  raw sensory outputÐa 
series of  impressions. It is necessary to make sense of  this raw output. What is missing in 
AlthusserÕs philosophy is a conceptualisation of  persistence, or the state of  objectsÕ protraction 
into the new.  
This is not to say that Althusser did not conceptualise time, for Althusser was careful to 
remove time from the reign of  idealism to the same extent as philosophy and the modes of  
thought: 
	 ÔThe coexistence of  the different structured levels, the economic, the 
political, the ideological, etc., and therefore of  the economic infrastructure, of  
the legal and political superstructure, of  ideologies and theoretical 
formations philosophy, sciences) can no longer be thought in the co-existence 
of  the Hegelian present, of  the ideological present in which temporal presence 
coincides with the presence of  the essence with its phenomena. And in 
consequence, the model of  a continuous and homogenous time which takes the 
 Deleuze and Guattari conceptualise philosophy in a manner which accounts for these factors in What is 87
Philosophy? (1994 [1991]). According to the authors, concepts are created by a conceptual persona from an 
immanent pre-conceptual plane of  immanence, which synthesises a conceptÕs conditions. This text is not drawn 
from in this chapter however as it says little of  either time or persistence, two ideas which are necessary for the 
discussion of  ethics to come.
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place of  immediate existence, which is the place of  the immediate existence 
of  the continuing presence, can no longer be regarded as the time of  
historyÕ (Althusser and Balibar 1970: 99). 
Just as Althusser distinguished between ideology, science and politics, arguing that each 
mode exists in relative autonomy to the others, so does he argue the same with regards to 
time.  Althusser does not however posit a single, continuous time, essentialised in opposition 88
to thought, which would unify AlthusserÕs relatively autonomous totality and result in an 
empirical time against which philosophy and the modes of  thought would be measured. 
Althusser shows that as each mode of  thought Ôdoes not have the same type of  historical 
existenceÕ, i.e. they are in relative autonomy with each other, Ôwe have to assign to each level a 
peculiar time, relatively autonomous and hence relatively independent, even in its dependence, 
of  the ÒtimesÓ of  the other levelsÕ (1970: 99). Furthermore, in contradiction to what the Ôbest 
historiansÕ are satisÞed with (this being one of  the criticisms that E. P. Thompson reacted so 
strongly to), Ôwe cannot be satisÞed [É] by observing the existence of  different times and 
rhythms, without relating them to the concept of  their differenceÕ (1970: 100). Time, for 
Althusser, is an attribute of  being that exists in as many different modes of  thought as it 
reciprocally constitutes. Differentially articulated as part of  the relatively autonomous totality, 
time exists for Althusser in rhythms and punctuations which must be thought Ôin the type of  
articulation, displacement and torsion which harmonises these different times with one 
anotherÕ (Althusser and Balibar 1970: 100, see also Chambers 2010: 207-208). 
Importantly for AlthusserÕs structural temporality was his insistence, Þrst, that time is 
made up of  both visible and invisible times and that, secondly, time is identiÞed in the last 
instance in its concept, a concept which must be Ôproduced, constructedÕ (Althusser and Balibar 
1970: 101). Althusser was clear that time had Ônothing to do with the obviousness of  everyday 
practiceÕs ideological timeÕ and that Ôin no sense is it a time that can be read immediately in the 
ßow of  any given processÕ (1970: 101). Both of  these accounts of  time, for Althusser, are 
empirical and rely upon the Hegelian process of  uncovering essence that, according to 
Althusser, Marx corrected in his latter work.  Empiricism, for Althusser, is the act of  89
extracting the essential kernel of  knowledge from its shell in a process which denegates its 
 As such, Chambers calls Althusser the Ôuntimely discoverer of  the untimelyÕ (Chambers 2014: 143).88
 Althusser explained that any attempt to account for obvious chronological passages constitutes an ÔÒempirical 89
historyÓ [that] is merely the bare face of  the empiricist ideology of  historyÕ (Althusser and Balibar 1970: 105, 
Chambers 2010: 208-209).
"78
own methodology.  Althusser pointed out that the extraction of  knowledge from a given 90
object relies on it Þrst being understood in enough detail to know from what to abstract, and 
only from that point is an appropriate method of  extraction able to be selected. By this point, 
however, the object has been abstracted from so much that the object of  knowledge created 
by the process of  empiricism has very little to do with the real object and more to do with the 
choice of  the process of  extraction. Empirical time, for Althusser, is thus a concession to 
timeÕs subordination under ideology, for only within ideology can an object be framed in such 
detail as to constitute the basis for knowledge extraction. As per his criticism of  idealist 
philosophy, the a priori speciÞcation of  empirical time places it within the realm of  ideology, 
that which must be put back within relative autonomy. Following its placement within the 
relative autonomy of  the structure, time must therefore be constructed as a concept in 
accordance with the self-reciprocating construction of  each mode of  thought. 
Althusser develops this much in Reading Capital but refuses to go further, despite his 
acceptance that the theory has Ôhardly been elaborated at allÕ (1970: 107). What is left 
therefore is a conceptualisation of  time that has been stripped of  its object (time itself  as a 
continuity), with the assumption remaining that time will re-constitute itself  in the structure, 
as part of  encounters and with the same objecticity as previous times. As a result, his aleatory 
conception of  time thus falls at the same hurdle as his aleatory philosophical void, i.e. there is 
no guarantee that knowledgeÐin any of  its formsÐcan cross over the eliminative anti-
foundationalism that AlthusserÕs aleatory moment institutes. AlthusserÕs ontological atomism 
removes the epistemic conditions for each individual time to be constructed in the void; why 
would there necessarily be time as a constitutive part of  an event, given that every encounter 
instantiates a new void?  It is not as necessary as Althusser thought to throw the baby out 91
with the bathwater, as what is needed in order to bring consistency to AlthusserÕs conception 
of  time is a foundation upon which to ground it. The conceptualisation of  series as found 
within Hume, sutured to AlthusserÕs temporality can account for the objecticity of  time and 
the potential for duration within events in the form of  duration developed by Bergson.  
 Althusser develops this criticism, directed predominantly against Hegel, in the introduction to Reading Capital 90
(Althusser and Balibar 1970: 1-78). The criticism will not be fully expanded here, only to note that it is similar to 
the critique of  ideology found in his later work.  
 In After Finitude (2008), Meillassoux argues precisely that there is no necessity for this at all as, indeed, there is 91
no necessity for the coming into existence (or ÒfacticityÓ) of  anything at all. A more substantive engagement with 
Meillassoux is reserved for chapter three yet, leaving to one side the probability or contingency of  an object 
existing, the issue at stake for Althusser and Deleuze is not whether or not an object exists but, to the extent that 
it does, what its affective characteristics are and what the object does. To this extent, the chapter concentrates on 
the construction of  series before their facticity.
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A turn to Hume might seem like one in the wrong direction, given AlthusserÕs 
repudiation of  empiricism in Reading Capital. As Reed puts it, Althusser Ôurges us to work our 
way out of  the ideological circle which encloses idealism and empiricism alike through a 
particular combination of  theory and practice in which the truth of  the theory precedes the 
reality it analyses, though the results of  analysis are fed back into the theory itself Õ (Reed 
2005: 210). Explaining the problematic at stake, Reed shows that ÔHumeÕs analysis of  the 
origins of  mental impressions is not fundamentally materialist, since he fails to prove that 
physical changes in the brain produce thoughts and perceptions, but he argues such a 
conclusion cannot be disproven, either, and that the reason for drawing a causal connection 
between physiological motion and mental effect is as sound as that for making any other 
causal link between action and reactionÕ (2005: 211). To put this in the terms used in the 
previous chapter: for Reed, Hume cannot demonstrate that thought is constituted by the 
empirical (or matter) whilst, at the same time, he uses negative argumentation to show that 
thought is as causally connected to matter as in any other explanation. Thus, HumeÕs thought 
lies half  way between a failed materialist dogmatism and an assumed correlationism for lack 
of  a better account of  causality. AlthusserÕs criticism (that empiricism lacks a sufÞcient 
authority to justify its own theoretical practices) would seem to strike Hume out of  contention 
as an empiricist par excellence. Yet the fact that one question pervades Hume studiesÐwas Hume 
a materialist or an idealist?Ðsheds light on a complexity in HumeÕs philosophy that 
nevertheless explains why he can provide a crucial addition to AlthusserÕs philosophy (see 
Buckle 2007). Indeed, Althusser himself  invited his readers to Ôrecover a Òmaterialism of  the 
encounterÓ from within a series of  denegations, condemnations, and forgettings; from within 
philosophy this form of  materialism rejects the presence that Reason, Origin, and End have 
maintained throughout philosophy, including, he suggests, throughout the history of  
materialismÕ (Reed 2005: 214). 
In his essay on Hume, Deleuze undercuts the unresolved tension regarding HumeÕs 
materialism and idealism, declaring this to be precisely the strength found in HumeÕs work 
(Deleuze 2001: 35-52). For DeleuzeÕs Hume, echoing AlthusserÕs account of  philosophy, 
theory is Ôan enquiry, which is to say, a practice: a practice of  the seemingly Þctive world that 
empiricism describes; a study of  the conditions of  legitimacy of  practices in this empirical 
world that is in fact our ownÕ (2001: 36). Again, as with AlthusserÕs own historical materialism, 
Deleuze argues that HumeÕs philosophy necessitates a constant practical engagement by the 
individual as part of  the world, in what various commentators have termed naturalism (see, 
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for example, Ansell-Pearson 2014a). HumeÕs Ôtheory of  association Þnds its direction and its 
truth in a casuistry of  relations, the practice of  law, of  politics, economics, that completely 
changes the law philosophical reßectionÕ (Deleuze 2001: 36). If  this is the case, then the 
legitimation of  theory in the work of  Hume seems to anticipate the relative autonomy of  
AlthusserÕs dialectical materialism - a theory of  theoretical practice. However the issue facing 
AlthusserÕs materialism was that of  an initiatory void which subordinated each mode of  
thought to and, thus, eliminated the coherency of  each passing moment in an (always/
already impossible) series - how did Hume avoid this pitfall? 
AlthusserÕs problem can be reframed as a Ôproblem of  the origin of  knowledge or of  
ideas, according to which everything Þnds its origin in the sensible and in the operations of  
the mind upon the sensibleÕ (Deleuze 2001: 37). Althusserian philosophy, as Deleuze frames it, 
is a Þght for the exteriority of  relations (a Þght which is also taken on in empiricism), by either 
ÔÞnding a way of  making relations internal to their own terms or by Þnding a deeper and 
more comprehensive term to which the relation would itself  be internalÕ (2001: 37). In other 
words, the object of  knowledge in AlthusserÕs Reading Capital would either have to be idealised 
to the extent that it exists externally to the materialism of  the world (i.e. ÒbeingÓ in Badiou), 
or subject to an inÞnitely repeating hermeneutic circle (and thus never actually arriving at a 
ÒtrueÓ object at all). Either way, Althusserian philosophyÐthrough its insistence on both the 
aleatory void and the existence of  the modes of  thoughtÐnecessitates a constant search for the 
relations that determine its modes of  thought within the a priori speciÞcation of  the modes. 
The void requires questions such as Òwhat is time and how is it generated with every new 
instance?Ó and yet even this question presupposes the existence of  time which, according to 
the void, might not be. As Deleuze writes of  Hume however, Ôgenesis is always understood in 
terms of  principles, and itself  as a principleÕ (Deleuze 1991: 66) and, furthermore, Ôrelations are 
external to their termsÕ (Deleuze 2001: 37 original italics). Accordingly, genesis is misunderstood 
as a principle that determines a relation between knowledge and an object. For DeleuzeÕs 
Hume, it is instead a term used to govern a relation that exists in excess of  it; rather than 
terms (or objects of  knowledge in Althusserian parlance) existing unto themselves, as kernels 
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of  essential knowledge that determine relations, terms are created as effects of  relations 
themselves.  92
What then is a relation, and how can it be used to conjoin philosophy with materiality 
without idealising the conjunction? For DeleuzeÕs Hume, a Ôrelation is itself  the fact of  so-
called principles of  association, contiguity, resemblance, and causality, all of  which constitute, 
precisely, a human natureÕ (Deleuze 1991: 39, Hume 1967 [1888]: 368). A relation in Hume is 
that which conjoins ideas with other ideas in order to make up the mind. The mind of  the 
human for Hume is never one idea Þxed as a term, but Ôonly the ways of  passing from one 
particular idea to anotherÕ (Deleuze 1991: 39). As Bell puts it, it is a subjective synthesis which 
transcends itself  in order to creatively engage with the world (Bell 2006: 412). Thus, contra 
DescartesÕs rationalism, whereby the subject is a principle by which to assert incontrovertible 
proofs (ideas of  objects), HumeÕs subject Ôbreaks with the constraining form of  predicative 
judgementÕ and is, instead, based upon Ôan autonomous logic of  relationsÕ (Deleuze 1991: 38).  
Two sets of  relations, the principles of  association (the Ôaffective circumstances [which] 
guide the association of  ideasÕ (Deleuze 2001: 45)) are combined with the principles of  
passion (those principles which Ôhave the effect of  restricting the range of  the mind, Þxating it 
on privileged ideas and objectsÕ (2001: 46)) to form human nature, or the characteristics of  
the mind (see Hume 1967 [1888]: 234-239). Why does Hume introduce associationism over 
the Cartesian rationalist unity? As Deleuze explains, there are two problems with Cartesian 
thought. First, Descartes advocates a Ôspontaneity of  relationsÕ (Deleuze 1991: 96) according to 
which, if  ideas are to be found within the mind Ôwhich are tied to the one that the mind 
wanted to see, it is, Þrst, necessary that the ideas themselves be associated in the mindÕ (1991: 
96). This originary ÒapperceptionÓ however would necessarily resemble an impossibly all-
knowing Þgure who could think all ideas (including all ideas of  the relations of  ideas) a priori 
of  their manifestation in the world. The criticism of  originary apperception is thus the same 
that Badiou leverages against Plato to justify his ontological reversal, prioritising the void over 
the One (Badiou 2011: 23-25). Secondly, Descartes argues in favour of  the Ôspontaneity of  
disposition (1991: 97), according to which the distinction between two kinds of  impressions (and 
thus the unity of  the differentiated objects) must exist in the world a priori of  the mindÕs ability 
 In Reading Capital, Althusser criticises empiricism with the Hegelian imagery of  a nut waiting to be cracked. 92
The kernel of  the nut is the analogous to the idea which must be attained by an empirical process of  extraction, 
the use of  which is then denied. Althusser describes this denial as ÔdenegationÕ or, Ôan unconscious denial masked 
by a conscious acceptanceÕ (Althusser and Balibar 1970: 312). In other words, denegation occurs when a process 
is used to understand an object, the knowledge of  which is thus an addition to the object, but the speciÞcities of  
the process are ignored in the assumption that the process used is the same as all other empirical processes.
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to sense them. This is also found in AlthusserÕs materialism, whereby the clinamen structures 
the world in a radically new manner with every passing present. The problem with this 
scenario is that there is no epistemic foundation upon which to comprehend difference; any 
change in the world would come as random to the mind, also randomly changing the 
constitution of  the mind as the basis for thought. As an answer to philosophies of  spontaneity, 
as Deleuze writes, Hume suggests that ideas are inferentially created from impressions, which 
are themselves the raw product of  sense (Deleuze 1991: 96, Hume 1967 [1888]: 92-93). 
How does Hume then overcome the aleatory void between each passing present? Or, 
put differently, how are ideas created from impressions? Hume introduces the concepts of  
inference and habit to account for how the subject pushes beyond itself  in the present and 
part-constitutes the present-to-come. Deleuze gives the following example: ÔWhen I see the 
sun rise, I say that it will rise tomorrow; having seen water boil at 100 degrees, I say that it 
necessarily boils at 100 degrees. Yet expressions such as Òtomorrow,Ó Òalways,Ó Ònecessarily,Ó 
convey something that cannot be given in experience: tomorrow isnÕt given in experience 
without becoming today, without ceasing to be tomorrow, and all experience is experience of  
a contingent particularÕ (Deleuze 2001: 40). For both Hume and Deleuze, memory Ôis the 
reappearance of  an impression in the form of  an idea that is still vividÕ (Deleuze 1991: 94). 
This concept is similar to the object of  knowledge in Althusser, yet with the process of  
ÒextractionÓ which is denegated by Althusser and accounted for by Hume with his conception 
of  human nature. However the idea in the present (in the form of  memory) cannot account 
for change because it does not contain within it that which it is not; the new situation in the 
next present will present a new set of  impressions, upon which ideas are then to be formed by 
the mind. Thus, the subject in the immediate present is required to infer, or believe, that a 
situation will change in a particular way, according to the habit that they have previously 
developed. This inference is characterised by certain principles: Ô[w]hen the mind, therefore, 
passes from the idea of  impression of  one object to the idea or belief  of  another, it is not 
determinÕd by reason, but by certain principles which associate together the ideas of  these 
objects, and unite them in the imaginationÕ (Hume 1967 [1888]: 92). The imagination is thus 
the faculty of  the subject which extends past the present, allowing the ideas in memory to 
persist into the future and forming the basis for HumeÕs originary apperception. In the next 
present, the mind forms new ideas from new impressions in relation to the principles of  
association and passion. However, as Deleuze warns, Ômemory alone does not bring abut a 
synthesis of  time; it does not transcend the structure, its essential role becomes the 
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reproduction of  the different structures of  the given. It is rather habit which presents itself  as 
a synthesis, and habit belongs to the subjectÕ (Deleuze 1991: 94). Habit is therefore the 
transcendental synthesis that Ôgives the subject its real origin and sourceÕ (Deleuze 1991: 95) 
and it is upon this source that the subject pushes itself  into the future in imagination and 
forms the conditions for future understanding.  
The problem for Hume is not to demonstrate that the past and present are synthesised 
because, in understanding the past and present, the subject has already shown itself  as that 
which synthesises them; this is what Ansell-Pearson means when he claims that the repetition 
of  a sequence produces an Ôoriginary subjectivityÕ in the mind (Ansell-Pearson 1999: 100). 
Instead, the problem is how to demonstrate the persistence of  the present into the future. For 
DeleuzeÕs Hume, the past and present are Ôconstituted within time, under the inßuence of  
certain principles, and [É] the synthesis of  time itself  is nothing but this constitution, 
organisation, and double affectionÕ (Deleuze 1991: 96).  In contrast to Althusser, for whom 93
each individual time was to be constructed as part of  the encounter, for Hume, the subject 
synthesises within time and, in doing so, provides the consistency of  thought necessary to make 
inferential predictions about the future. Whilst HumeÕs scepticismÐwhich denies the possibility 
of  knowing the world in-itself  and foregrounds only the belief  and potential delirium of  
knowledgeÐmight seem to leave him open to the same randomly-changing world and, 
therefore, randomly-changing modes of  thought that are present in Althusser, this is not so. 
For Hume, Ôaffective circumstancesÕ (i.e. the material conditions in the world) Ôguide the 
association of  ideasÕ (Deleuze 2001: 45) and thus, the subjectÕs principles of  association are 
developed on the back of  the individualÕs embodiment within the world. HumeÕs scepticismÐ
the argument that a static and unchanging world of  either being or presentation (Plato or 
Badiou) is not the starting point for knowledgeÐconditioned his argument that the 
understanding of  the world is based precisely on a synthesis of  change and the struggle to 
understand and adapt to an essentially different world. When imagination is found wanting by 
the subject-synthesis of  the future present, habit is modiÞed to take account of  the new 
situation and the subjectÕs lack of  ability to account for it in its projection of  the future. Thus, 
Hume remained a materialist to the extent that there exists a realm of  affective materiality 
separate to thought, but also an idealist to the extent that ideas are the subjectÕs 
understanding of  the world. Rather than idealising either of  the two realms as existing 
 Deleuze discusses this only brießy with regard to Hume, instead developing his theory of  time more fully in 93
Bergsonism (1991 [1988]), Cinema 1 & 2 (2005a, 2005b) and then Difference and Repetition (2004b). His development 
of  Hume is expanded on here due to its importance in DeleuzeÕs conceptualisation of  series and the individual.
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separately to each other however, (this would itself  fall foul of  the Humean criticism of  the 
spontaneity of  relations, preÞguring the world in a manner which must then be understood,) 
HumeÕs signiÞcant contribution to empiricism is, as was highlighted above, his emphasis on 
practice. An understanding of  the world, for Hume, is an inquiry into Ôthis empirical world 
that is in fact our ownÕ (Deleuze 2001: 36); not our own because our pre-constituted sovereign 
individuality claims property over parts of  it (qua Locke), but because subject, according to 
Hume, exhibits a constant fascination withÐand a deep-seated need to make its way throughÐ
the world that constitutes its understanding. 
The subject as practice 
The suture of  HumeÕs conception of  human nature to AlthusserÕs historical materialism 
furnishes the latter with a conceptualisation of  persistence and overcomes the otherwise 
eliminative effect of  a philosophical void. Without this addition, AlthusserÕs void undermined 
the contiguity and consistency of  series, breaking each idea with every passing present in 
instantiating itself  as the a priori condition of  historical materialism. Instead, and despite 
AlthusserÕs theoretical anti-humanism insisting that the subject could only exist within the 
realm of  ideology (Althusser 1984: 84, Williams 2013a: 158-159), Deleuze shows that, for 
Hume, it is precisely human nature that is needed in order to synthesise ideas and 
impressions. It is only the human mind mind that can synthesise ideas and impressions 
according to the two types of  principles (association and passion), and these principles 
constitute the subjectÕs habit. Whilst AlthusserÕs anti-humanism avoids an  idealism present on 
both rationalism (the reduction of  being to either a thinking subject qua Descartes) and vulgar 
materialism (an empiricism qua Smith or Ricardo), it fails to account for the contiguity of  
series as it is incapable of  thinking that which pushes itself  beyond itself  or, in other words, 
transcendence. For DeleuzeÕs Hume, it is the relations of  belief  and invention which allow the 
subject to transcend itself, pushing itself  into the future whilst conditioning series. Bell argues 
that this is the answer to DeleuzeÕs problem of  Ôtransforming a multiplicity into a system 
[that] is related to the problem of  accounting for the constitution of  a subject within the given 
that nonetheless transcends the given, or is irreducible to the givenÕ (Bell 2006: 411) and, 
furthermore, highlighting the importance of  practice, he says that Ôit is precisely through the 
creativity of  invention and belief  that the multiplicity of  ideas is transformed into a systemÕ 
which is both part of, yet goes beyond, the given (2006: 412).  
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This practical creativity is important for both the social and political: as Deleuze puts it, 
the Ôprinciples of  association Þnd their true sense in a casuistry of  relations that works out the 
details of  the worlds of  culture and of  law. And this is the true object of  HumeÕs philosophy: 
relations as the means of  an activity and a practice Ð juridical, economic and 
politicalÕ (Deleuze 2001: 51). HumeÕs philosophy can be characterised therefore as way of  
thinking the individuation of  life by way of  the individuated life, whereby Hume replaces the 
grounds of  subjectivity from either epistemology or ontology with practice. Avoiding an 
idealisation of  either, subjectivity emerges as the practically creative locus of  epistemology 
and ontology. In this way, does Hume not anticipate AlthusserÕs relative autonomy, yet imbue 
it with a practical relationality that conditions the creation of  the new? 
HumeÕs emphasis on the practical can be favourably compared to both BadiouÕs and 
AlthusserÕs. Unlike BadiouÕs and AlthusserÕs goals of  understanding the emergence of  the new 
from aleatory events whereby, on the one hand, the ontologically prescribed militant grasps 
an event and actualises it within his immediate milieu or, on the other, one must understand 
the event as Ôthe principle in relation to which all things are resolved into the identity of  pure 
nothingness, the origin and destiny of  all thingsÕ (Montag 2010: 168), Hume offers a practical, 
affective philosophy. Deleuze goes further, suggesting that Hume offers a Ôradical change in 
the practical way the problem of  society is posedÕ (Deleuze 2001: 46). Rather than framing 
the social in the manner of  the sovereign social contract theories of  the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries, HumeÕs institutions are premised upon artiÞce and the question Ôhow 
can we create institutions that force passions to go beyond their partialities and form moral, 
judicial, political sentiments (for example, the feeling of  justice)?Õ (Deleuze 2001: 47). For 
Hume, as developed in book II of  the Treatise (1967 [1888]) and the essay A Dissertation on the 
Passions (Hume 1777 [1757]), the passionsÐeither indirect (pride, humility, love and hatred) or 
direct (joy, grief, fear and hope)Ðare psychological states that are created by the individual 
when they carry out either good or bad acts (Hume 1777 [1757]: Bea 3, P 1.3).  Humean 94
institutions then are social arrangements that structure passions through principles of  
association that themselves structure the institutions and, as such, these institutions are an 
 A discussion of  HumeÕs passions that does them justice is too much for this thesis. Put simply, they are HumeÕs 94
account of  the motivations according to which individuals act in relation to others, and the second book of  the 
Treatise (Hume 1967 [1888]), in which they are discussed in their fullest, gives an account of  the underlying cause 
of  the different passions (McIntyre 2000: 78). For a full discussion, see ArdalÕs Passion and Value in HumeÕs Treatise 
(1966), which Immerwahr references as the most important book-length discussion of  HumeÕs idea of  passions 
(Immerwahr 1994: 225, ff. 2). With regard to DeleuzeÕs relation to the passions, an edited book, Deleuze and the 
Passions, is forthcoming with Punctum Books (Meiborg and Tuinen 2016).
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extension of  human artiÞce.  Bell describes two processes that transform the multiplicity of  95
ideas in the Humean social. On the one hand, ideas are transformed within the mind Ôinto 
impressions of  reßection that create beliefs, habits, and tendencies which constitutes within 
the given, that which transcends itÕ (Bell 2006: 413). On the other hand, this process happens 
within the social, Ôthough this time the multiplicity that comes to be transformed into a system 
or unity are partialities, passions, and interests of  individualsÕ (2006: 413). Thus, argues Bell, 
for Deleuze, Hume understands society not as a necessary stage in human history that is 
predicated upon our a priori conception of  human nature (i.e. for Hobbes), but rather Ôas 
invented institutions, inventions that are themselves indistinguishable from human nature in 
that they follow from the principles of  human natureÕ (2006: 413); Humean institutions are 
transcendent not from law, or a formal epistemology from which their moral norms can be 
discerned, but from practice itself. 
It is here that comparisons can be made to BadiouÕs mathematico-ontological 
philosophy. To summarise BadiouÕs position: Being is obfuscated by the representation of  
itself  in the world of  appearance (doxa) and that only a radical rupture in the state of  nature 
will determine the emergence of  the subject as the local phenomena of  a truth procedure.  96
 When sutured to AlthusserÕs aleatory philosophy and as part of  the Althusserian encounter, HumeÕs 95
institutions are examples of  persistence. Like HumeÕs concept of  habit (the transcendental source of  the subject 
for DeleuzeÕs Hume), institutions affect the constitution of  ideas in the mind in accordance with their temporal 
speciÞcity and contingency. As Deleuze says of  the mind, although it applies to both the mind and institutions, it 
ÔÒadvises certain ideas rather than others.Ó ÒTo transcendÓ means exactly thisÕ (Deleuze 1991: 127). In this sense, 
both institutions and habit can be viewed as what Stiegler terms Ôtechnical objectsÕ. Stiegler argues that the 
history of  western philosophy has systematically underplayed the role of  technics as the organisation of  
inorganic matter. In Technics and Time 1 (1998) and For a New Critique of  Political Economy (2010), Stiegler argues 
that technical objects are constituted by primary retention (the act of  remembering in itself) and secondary 
retention (memories), and are known as tertiary retention (memories that are extended into technical objects 
external to the subject) (Roberts 2016: 93, Stiegler 1998). Whilst it is is not within the scope of  the current thesis 
to develop it, research into the relationship between StieglerÕs and HumeÕs conceptions of  artiÞce could produce 
important conclusions regarding the temporal and pharmacological and ethical nature of  social institutions.
 Badiou aligns himself  more to Rousseau than any other social contract theorist and draws from him this 96
concept of  political subjectivity (Power 2006: 318).  Indeed, Badiou goes so far as to argue that if  ÔRousseau for 
ever establishes the modern concept of  politics, it is because he posits, in the most radical fashion, that politics is 
a procedure which originates in an event, and not in a structure supported within beingÕ (Badiou 2011: 345). 
Badiou cannot name the event in Rousseau (as the event, according to Badiou, is unnameable in itself), but 
where the Òevental formÓ is the social pact, what Badiou terms ÔeventnessÕ (where in the event Ôany political 
procedure Þnds its truthÕ is in the form of  the pact (2011: 345). It is in this sense that both Badiou and BadiouÕs 
Rousseau can claim to break from the state of  nature, as each citizen within the general will claims a pure form 
of  Þdelity. Badiou cannot completely support RousseauÕs position however because, as Power explains, when 
Rousseau considers the practicality of  the general will in singular situations, he Ôsubmits the general will to the 
Òlaw of  numberÓ and thus turns a generic, egalitarian political programme into a majoritarian oneÕ (Power 
2006: 319). The turn to numbersÐcounting each individual within the general willÐis simply, for Badiou, a case 
of  torsion (see chapter one above) or the Ôfetishism of  universal suffrageÕ (Badiou 2011: 350). Instead of  relying 
on RousseauÕs return to a theory of  individual subjects within the general will, Badiou relies on axiomatic 
subjectiÞcation and forcing to account for the subjectÕs actions within singular situations. For an illuminating 
discussion of  BadiouÕs relationship to Rousseau, and a criticism of  the generic approach to singular situations, 
see Critchley (2012).
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Put in the terms Deleuze uses to discuss Hume, BadiouÕs reliance on ontology to condition the 
thought of  itself  in the subject creates a dislocation between the relations that constitute ideas 
in the truthful subject and the animal human. Whereas, as was shown in the previous chapter, 
BadiouÕs militant is a suture to the animal human by the virtue of  mathematicsÕs scriptural 
productivity, the truth-eventÕs negation of  the presented world eliminates any relations of  
association or passion in the mind of  the subject. So, given the radical break from the 
presented and the lack of  a foundation for epistemology in ontology, where would the 
subjectÕs ideas come from? Badiou denegates the importance of  institutions (either ideational 
or socio-political) in the constitution of  truthful thought and replaces them with the event. As 
Žižek has shown however, the event is only knowable to those already interpellated within an 
ontological truth procedure and so, whilst denegating the thought of  the animal human and 
its relation to institutions in favour of  the ontological, BadiouÕs consistent individual (the 
animal human and its truthful supplement) represses its schizophrenia. A consistent 
individual, on the one hand, continues to live its life in relation to its natural world yet, on the 
other hand, hemorrhages the emergence of  Being.  Due both to the individualÕs inability to 97
incorporate the event into its understanding (BadiouÕs ontological event actively rejects any 
incorporation of  itself  into knowledge (Badiou 2011: 189-190)) and the eventÕs originary lack 
of  relation to the individualÕs thought, the consistent individual can only but involuntarily 
contain the subject in its lack of  knowledge of  it. 
Thus, if  Althusser idealises the aleatory event, Badiou idealises not the event, but the 
ontology of  mathematics and, particularly, the distinctions contained within mathematical 
logic that formalise the differentiation of  the event from the representation of  being.  Whilst 98
BadiouÕs event distinctly apes Christian imagery in its revelatory nature (Badiou 1997, Phelps 
2013, Žižek 2000: 137-138), the evental site (within which the event occurs) is in fact 
formulated by the scriptural materiality of  mathematics. It is thus not that the event is 
idealised in BadiouÕs work, but mathematical ontology from which the event is made known. 
Indeed, as Badiou makes clear, the Ôgrand styleÕ of  mathematics is the only form of  thought 
that thinks ÔÞrst principlesÕ and Ôhas paradigmatic value because it cannot submit anything to 
 As Badiou argues, Ô[n]ature has no sayable being. There are only some natural beingsÕ (Badiou 2011: 140). This 97
declaration, a result of  the illegitimacy of  the count-as-one operation, allows Badiou to then describe the 
Ôunlimited opening of  a chain of  name-numbers, such that each is composed of  all those which precede 
itÕ (2011: 141). In other words, there are natural multiples that structure the world in which the individual 
perseveres, yet these multiples are not totalising and condition the possibility of  the truth-event.
 See the previous chapterÕs discussion of  the two Platonic and the one Parmenidean axiom.98
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the regime of  opinionÕ (Badiou 2008 [1992]: 93-105, original italics). Discussion of  BadiouÕs 
idealism is found in the previous chapter and the intention is not to elaborate further on it 
here; instead, it is clear that both Althusser and Badiou foreground their philosophies with a 
dogmatic use of  an ideal form: the aleatory event itself  on the one hand, mathematical 
ontology on the other. It is only after positing the existence of  one of  these forms that either 
philosopher can set about understanding the creation of  the new. Deleuze expresses his 
dissatisfaction with this way of  thinking, stating that Ôa literature is disappointing if  it 
interprets signs by referring them to objects that can be designated (observation and 
description), if  it surrounds itself  with pseudo-objective guarantees of  evidence and 
communication (causerie, investigation), and if  it confuses meaning with intelligible, explicit, 
and formulated signiÞcation (major subjects)Õ  (Deleuze 2008 [1964]: 22).  99
In contrast, Hume does not idealise either ontology or epistemology, nor does he 
idealise an originary event that mystically produces consistent thought and being. Instead, 
Hume foregrounds the practical and affective engagement of  the mind in its world that both 
individuates the subject as part of  the world (contra Badiou), and as the naturalised locus of  the 
worldÕs consistency (contra Althusser). As Deleuze puts it clearly, Ôthe natural constitution of  
the mind under the inßuence of  the principles of  the passions does not only involve the 
movement of  an affection seeking out its object, it also involves the reaction of  a mind 
responding to the supposedly known totality of  circumstances and relationsÕ (Deleuze 1991: 
130). Of  course, Deleuze is not arguing that Hume conceives of  circumstances and relations 
as actually totalised. Rather, he is saying that the subject has ideas (or Ôgeneral viewsÕ (1991: 
130)) that have been both engendered and constituted in part by circumstances and relations 
and, in part, by the passions. These passions, themselves also having been subject to the same 
constitution, are thus not a component of  an essential subject (qua Descartes or Kant), but a 
 Although Deleuze does not expand on his distaste for major subjects after this passage, his preference for 99
minoritarian practices run throughout his works, including those with Guattari. For a discussion of  his 
appropriation of  minor mathematics, see Evans (2006) and chapter Þve of  Difference and Repetition (Deleuze 2011 
[1994]). For Deleuze and GuattariÕs conceptualisation of  a Òminor literatureÓ in his work with Guattari, see 
Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature (Deleuze and Guattari 1986) and for their idea of  Òbecoming minoritarianÓ see 
the fourth plateau ÒNovember 20, 1923: Postulates of  LinguisticsÓ in A Thousand Plateaus (Deleuze and Guattari 
2004b).
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localised and immanent production of  it.  In other words, Hume does not rely dogmatically 100
on essentialised forms to ground his philosophy and, instead, his is a non-dogmatic 
philosophy of  humanity as practical invention. 
Nevertheless, despite the criticism that Althusser has received in this chapter so far, his 
understanding of  the relationship between modes of  thought in relation to matter is a 
signiÞcant departure fromÐand, more importantly, an attempt to explainÐthe idealism in 
philosophies of  essence. For example, AlthusserÕs method of  symptomatic readingÐ
illuminating the invisible presence of  concepts in discourses as a result of  their interaction 
with other discoursesÐis a method of  reading which avoids transcendental claims of  authority 
(such as the Kantian intellect), remainingÐin this senseÐcritical and non-dogmatic. Whilst 
undermined by his reliance on the aleatory void in order to justify his anti-idealism, Althusser 
provides an important obstacle to structuralism, formalism, humanist and idealist Marxists 
(Lukcs 1966, Sayers 2003) and idealism more generally, in his insistence that these accounts 
must answer for the constitution of  their concepts. Furthermore, whilst Althusser does not 
rely on the concept of  practice in the same way as HumeÐin the sense that practice co-
constitutes the subject and itÕs world in differential relationshipÐtwo forms of  practice do 
nevertheless feature in his work. 
The Þrst conceptualisation of  practice in AlthusserÕs work is the practice of  Ôphilosophy 
which creates the philosophical void in order to endow itself  with existenceÕ (Althusser 2006: 174). 
Historical materialism requires an initial void that clears the way of  a priori (essential) concepts 
in order to allow the encounter of  two atoms or, in AlthusserÕs terms, philosophy Ôbegins by 
evacuating all philosophical problemsÕ (2006: 174). As has been argued however, wiping the 
philosophical slate clean in order to re-instantiate philosophy at every moment removes the 
objecticity of  thought in itself, rupturing the coherence of  ideas. Philosophical practice, in this 
conÞguration, has its legs pulled from under it and, in the act of  removing ideas from 
philosophy, Althusser resultantly prevents the very act of  philosophy. Under Althusser, 
philosophy becomes arbitrary as the meaning of  ideas is evacuated from it by the very act of  
 Deleuze insists that principles of  both association and passion are Ônot entities; they are functionsÕ and Ôare 100
deÞned by their effectsÕ (Deleuze 1991). To present a deÞnition of  the principles by deÞning their effects, i.e. to 
ask Òwhat they areÓ, would be to foreclose the possibility of  the passions becoming other than what is speciÞed 
by the a priori description. In other words, this would be to instantiate a dogmatism into HumeÕs conception of  
the subject. The virtue of  transcendental empiricism for Deleuze is precisely the understanding that the what is 
given as real can transcend itself to become radically new, regardless of  the predictable possibilities contained 
within the given. For this reason, the principles in Hume are to be understood as pure production and deÞned a 
posteriori in their effects, only in the understanding that they may still become other.
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doing philosophy. As will be developed in the next chapter, the practice of  philosophy needs 
ideas.  
The second of  AlthusserÕs concepts of  practice is that which occurs within the 
unconscious and, here, AlthusserÕs work takes aim at both the Lacanian school of  
psychoanalysis and the ethnographical work of  Lvi-Strauss. On 28 October 1966, four years 
after publishing his Þrst major work of  philosophy For Marx, yet two years before its 
development into a manual for philosophical practice in Reading Capital, Althusser sent the Þrst 
of  three Notes to his colleagues (Alain Badiou, tienne Balibar, Yves Duroux and Pierre 
Macherey) in the Theoretical Working Group on Spinoza that he convened, outlining his idea 
of  the work to be carried out by the group (Althusser and Matheron 2003: 34-35). Although 
this collective project never emerged, it points to an almost entirely understudied aspect of  his 
thought that sheds light on the role of  practice in constituting an otherwise federated, and 
therefore non-totalising philosophy (Ôhistorical materialismÕ). As Corpet and Matheron put it 
in their introduction to The Humanist Controversy, rather than the often presumed Althusserian 
hegemonic system, Ôwhat we Þnd in these texts is quite the opposite: a mode of  thought that 
attends to the singularity of  the sciences and carefully eschews, at a time when ÒstructuralismÓ 
was at its apogee, any uniÞcation of  the Òhuman sciencesÓ under the hegemony of  one of  
them, Òhistorical materialismÓ and Òdialectical materialismÓ not excepted - even while 
attempting a differential deÞnition of  the states of  each one of  them (in the present instance, 
psychoanalysis)Õ (2003: 36-37). 
In the Þrst Note, AlthusserÕs criticism of  Lacan and Lvi-Strauss centres on the 
statement that psychoanalytic theory, Ôtakes the form, in the best of  cases, of  a regional theory 
which lacks a general theory, although it is, in principle, the realisation of  this general 
theoryÕ (2003: 38 original italics). Psychoanalytic theory is, for Althusser, a regional theory of  
the unconscious that accounts for its structure and function within the terms that are 
generated within a therapeutic practice upon the unconscious itself. An empirical theory, 
psychoanalytic theory Ôgoes beyondÕ its Ôpoint of  departureÕ to produce its own theoretical 
object (i.e. it conceptualises a phenomena), but the theory of  conceptual production is 
denegated to the extent that psychoanalytic theory assumes that it speaks directly to the 
empirical object (2003: 39). Anticipating LivingstonÕs description of  thought as either 
consistent or totalising, Althusser claims that, 
Ôwe can observe, within the regional theory itself, the absence of  the general 
theory (the effects of  this absence) at the theoretical level: for as long as the 
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general theory is lacking, the regional theory strives to Òachieve closureÓ, but 
fails to; or, to put it in other terms, it tries to deÞne its own object 
differentially (in contradistinction to other theoretical objects: in the present 
case, the of  biology, psychology, sociology, etc.), but fails to. This attempt and 
failure are the presence of  this de facto absence of  a general theory, the 
existence of  which is nevertheless called for, de jure, in order to found these 
attemptsÕ (2003: 40) 
Accordingly, psychoanalytic theory, in presuming that its general theory is in fact a 
regional theory, cannot account for the conceptualisation of  its terms outside of  its own 
discourse and therefore falls to the criticism of  idealism. There are three possible upshots of  a 
lack of  a general theory to inform psychoanalytic thoughtÕs regional theory for Althusser: 
practitioners practice regional theory and, by chance, practice it correctly; practitioners 
practice false theory; or psychoanalysts master the regional theory in terms of  a general 
theory, yet practice it badly. Althusser does not elaborate on how he understands either 
ÒcorrectÓ or ÒbadÓ practice, inferring instead that practice would be correct if  it were 
corroborated by the support of  the general theory, yet Althusser does however claim 
provisionally that support of  regional theory by a general theory would have two beneÞts for 
practitioners. The Þrst would be to prevent the conßation of  psychoanalytic theory with other 
regional theories, such as biology and psychology, the second being the removal of  
conservative and limiting hesitation that often prevent the change of  terms that are created 
internally to a theory. 
What then is a general theory, and how does it effect a regional theory? A general 
theory is both the foundation and product of  all the differential regional theories, or that 
which provides and forms the differentiating reference points, which are deployed and 
modiÞed by regional theories.  For Althusser, and in accordance with SpinozaÕs claim that 101
substance is not a unity to be explained by its effects but rather Ôexists in its effectsÕ, a general 
theory can only be explained in the terms of  regional theories (Althusser and Matheron 2003: 
47 original italics). Using the example of  the psychoanalytic regional theory of  the 
unconscious, in the Þrst Note, Althusser argues that Ôthe unconscious is a structure whose 
elements are signiÞersÕ (of  the unconscious and not those of  other systems such as Ôideology, 
 Althusser is unclear as to whether there are one or a plurality of  general theories. In the Þrst Note, he 101
criticises Lacan for confusing the regional theory of  psychoanalysis as the general theory of  linguistics and vice 
versa. This leads, according to Althusser, to a conceptualisation of  discourses as ÔconfrontationÕ (or, in other 
words, dialectics) and the various ideological problems associated with such idealism (Althusser and Matheron 
2003: 45). What is needed, for Althusser, instead is a third elementÐthe general theoryÐwhich forms the 
transcendental synthesis for the two regional theories of  psychoanalysis and linguistics.
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art, science, etc.Õ) and that the general theory Ôallows us to think [the] speciÞc differenceÕ 
between the structures (2003: 48). Cautious of  the trappings of  formalist structuralism, 
Althusser warns that Ôit does not seem as if  a general theory of  the signiÞer can by itself  
produce (by deduction) the speciÞc difference that distinguishes the discourse of  science from 
the discourses of  ideology, art, and the unconsciousÕ, and instead goes on to argue that the 
general theory Ôshould make this difference possible through the play of  the possible 
variations inscribed in the theory of  discourseÕ (2003: 48). To the extent that a discourse is a 
structure of  epistemological indicators that, in expressing an object of  knowledge, signify a 
material object, a general theory therefore constitutes the discourse of  discourse.  And yet it 102
is not turtles all the way down, for the general structure is comprised (in a clear tautology), for 
Althusser, only of  regional theories and the differential relations that deÞne the regional 
theories against themselves (2003: 49). The relative autonomy of  each regional theory 
constitutes the consistency of  the general theory, a position from which the further 
development of  regional discourses is able to take place. For Althusser, a general theory 
cannot be reduced to an empirical operation on one or two regional theories (such as the 
regional theory of  linguistics and the regional theory of  psychoanalysis) but instead, Ôit must 
be developed in a very different perspective, by means of  very different confrontations, 
through the intervention of  very different regional theories and their differential 
relationsÕ (Althusser and Matheron 2003: 46). Indeed, Althusser clariÞes the relationship 
between general and regional theories, describing the effect of  general theory: Ôwhenever it 
clariÞes a given regional theory about itself, helping it to formulate and rectify its concepts, it 
necessarily has the same effect of  rectiÞcation-reclassiÞcation on the concepts of  the other 
regional theory brought into play in this operation of  differential deÞnitionÕ (2003: 44). In 
LivingstonÕs terms, the reformulation of  terms in one regional theory alters the consistency of  
the general theory which, in turn, has a determinate effect on the totality of  each of  the other 
regional theories. 
It is clear that Althusser is laying the groundwork for the different modes of  thought 
that are set out in Essays in Self-Criticism, where he explains that a science of  history (i.e. 
 In his 1971 debate with Chomsky, Foucault coins the term Òepistemological indicatorÓ to mean a concept 102
that has a Ôclassifying, delimiting and other [function]Õ to deÞne one discourse against another (Chomsky and 
Foucault 1971: 2). Foucault says of  the concept Òhuman natureÓ that it Ôplayed the role of  an epistemological 
indicator to designate certain types of  discourse in relation to or in opposition to theology or biology or historyÕ 
and was not, as Chomsky would have it, a scientiÞc concept (1971: 2). Epistemological indicators are thus used 
here as contingent reference points to certain discourses that have a problematic relationship to their designation 
with other, relatively autonomous discourses.
"93
dialectical materialism) Ôis born out of  the unpredictable, incredibly complex and paradoxical 
-- but, in its contingency, necessary -- conjunction of  ideological, political, scientiÞc (related to 
other sciences), philosophical and other ÒelementsÓ, which at some moment ÒdiscoverÓ, but after 
the event, that they needed each otherÕ (Althusser 1976: 112 original italics).  Despite AlthusserÕs 103
admission to a Ôtheoreticist deviationÕ in his early work which rationalised the epistemological 
break between the early and late work of  Marx (Althusser 1976: 105), there is a signiÞcant 
continuity that runs through AlthusserÕs work that involves understanding the performative 
effectivity of  discourses and practices in accordance with their differential relationships. A 104
general theory, then, is a realm of  expressive difference, totalised by regional theories, that 
constitutes the foundation for regional theories to deÞne themselves and, in doing so, specify 
their relation to other regional theories. In other words, a general theory provides the non-
totalised consistency that is totalised by regional theories, which themselves are inconsistent 
without their transcendental basis in the general theory.  105
How then does practice relate to the two levels of  theory for Althusser? For Althusser, 
practice does not relate to theory, but in fact practice relates theories; it is the passage from 
one local theory to another, using the signiÞcation of  one discourse as a transcendental basis 
for another.  Deleuze refers to AlthusserÕs Ôstructural causality in order to account for the 106
very particular presence of  a structure in its effects, and for the way in which it differentiates 
these effects, at the same time as these latter assimilate and integrate itÕ (Deleuze 2004c: 181); 
it is from the immanent, affective differentiation of  the different theories that practice moves 
 The differential relationship between modes of  thought that unify within a non-totalising whole is 103
reminiscent of  SpinozaÕs concept of  substance and its expression in attributes and modes. Much of  the recent 
secondary literature on Spinoza concentrates on AlthusserÕs relationship with Spinoza (see Diefenbach, Farris et 
al. 2013, Fourtounis 2005, Kaplan and Sprinker 1993, Montag and Stolze 1997, Williams 2013a) and this 
chapter defers discussion of  this relationship to these studies.
 Chambers makes a similar argument, pointing out that it is not necessary to highlight AlthusserÕs Ôso-called 104
aleatory materialismÕ in the Ôlater AlthusserÕ, particularly given that Althusser himself  Ôtook drafts of  early 
manuscripts and went through in later years crossing out ÒhistoricalÓ in the phrase Òhistorical materialismÓ and 
writing in ÒaleatoryÓÕ (Chambers 2014: 148).  For Chambers, AlthusserÕs conceptualisation of  social formations 
always was aleatory to the extent that he recognised that Ôtemporality is not a variable distinct or separate from the social 
order; any (theory of  the) social formation contains its own temporalityÕ (2014: 149).
 Deleuze credits Althusser by saying that no one has better thought the status of  the structure in terms of  105
Theory, conÞrming that the object of  knowledge is the production of  a regional theory by stating that Ôthe 
symbolic must be understood as the production of  the original and speciÞc theoretical objectÕ (Deleuze 2004c: 
173). 
 As previously noted, Althusser himself  recognises his early worksÕ Ôtheoreticist deviationÕ in Essays in Self-106
Criticism (Althusser 1976: 105-106). He clariÞes his position to remove its rationalist foundations and counter-
actualise it as a historical (and therefore practical) argument. Whilst, as has been argued, this counter-
actualisation may serve to immunise Althusser against claims to rationalism (and therefore idealism) with regards 
to a priori claims in this regard, his argument is ultimately founded upon the aleatory event which opens him up 
once more to criticism.
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one theory to the other as a singular point of  conjuncture. Whereas Deleuze refers to Reading 
Capital and how ÔAlthusser can present the economic structure of  a society as the Þeld of  
problems that the society poses for itself  [É] and that it resolves according to its own meansÕ, 
Althusser himself  explains his position most clearly within the Þrst Note with regard to 
psychoanalytic theory:  again within the context of  a discourse of  the unconscious, 107
Althusser describes the effect common to all the discourses (unconscious, scientiÞc, ideological 
and aesthetic) of  the subject. According to Althusser, every discourse has a Ôlieu-tenantÕ, a 
Ônecessary correlate, a subject, which is one of  the effects, if  not the major effect, of  its 
functioningÕ (Althusser and Matheron 2003: 48). The subject itself remains a formation and 
function only of  the ideological discourse which then ÔÒproducesÓ or ÒinducesÓ a subject-
effectÕ (2003: 48) within the other discourses and this subject-effect is a composition which 
presents the ideological subject in terms local to each of  the other discourses. Given that the 
relatively autonomous relationship between the regional theories implies differences in kind 
between their discourses, Althusser argues that Ô[if] we compare the various subject-effects 
produced by the different forms of  discourse, we observe that (i) the relationship these subjects 
bear to the discourses in question is not the same; (ii) in other words, the subject position 
ÒproducedÓ or induced by the discourse vis--vis that discourse variesÕ (2003: 48-49).  108
The consequence of  induced subject effects in each of  the relatively autonomous 
discourses is that, as a result of  subjective interpellation in the ideological discourse, each of  
the other discourses constitute a knowledge object in the unconscious (in this case the subject 
 For Deleuze, a society resolves problems according to its own means because the society itself  has formulated 107
the problems in its own terms, these being terms that society is able to understand and work with. Anticipating 
work on Bergson that he would publish sixteen years laterÐitself  a development of  an argument in MarxÕs work 
(Deleuze 1991 [1988]: 16)ÐDeleuze argues that Ôa problem always gains the solution that it deserves based on the 
manner in which it is posed, and on the symbolic Þeld used to pose itÕ (Deleuze 2004c: 181). The economic 
structure of  society is, for Althusser and Deleuze, not pre-given as an object that empirical problems can ÒÞnd 
outÓ about but, rather, it is only what is expressed as expression. In other words, solutions are veridical to their 
problems only on the terms of  the latter and, as such, the whole of  society is constituted by either well-formed, 
non-existent, or badly-formed problems (where non-existent problems contain a Ôconfusion of  the ÒmoreÓ and 
the ÒlessÓÕ; and ÔÒbadly statedÓ questions, [are] so deÞned because their terms represent badly analysed 
compositesÕ (1991 [1988]: 16-17)). Importantly for politicsÐand echoing HumeÕs conceptualisation of  social 
institutionsÐAlthusser and Deleuze highlight that the freedom, as well as Ôthe history of  man, from the 
theoretical as much as from the practical point of  view is that of  the construction of  problemsÕ (Deleuze 1991 
[1988]: 16).
 Caroline Williams objects to AlthusserÕs account of  subjectiÞcation arguing that ÔAlthusser offered no account 108
of  the link between the materiality of  ideological state apparatuses and the constitution of  the subject, that is, 
how ideology is internalised and how it produces the effects of  subjectiÞcationÕ (Williams 2001: 106). This 
objection however misses the emphasis that Althusser places on regional theories or, in other words, the socio-
historically speciÞc nature of  the subjectifying events. Althusser could not have given speciÞc accounts of  
subjectiÞcation because each process of  subjectiÞcation is singularly unique to the individual. Furthermore, the 
effects of  subjectiÞcation are, for Althusser, not articulable by ideology and must be expressed by one of  the 
other discourses.
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effect) that is both speciÞc to, and constructed within, the speciÞc terms of  each discourse. 
Thus, when Althusser speculates that the function of  the four different discourses might be 
knowledge (science), recognition-misrecognition (ideology), recognition-perception (art) and 
the circulation of  signiÞers (language), and that the subject effect in each discourse acts as a 
particular object of  knowledge to be worked on, he paves the way for an inquiry (that he 
never fully completed) into how practice within each discourse might create new objects of  
knowledge in other discourses. These new objects of  knowledge are important for AlthusserÕs 
theory of  structural causality insofar as the Ôstructural unconscious is at once differential, 
problematising and questioningÕ, enabling Althusser to Ôshow how contradictions are thus 
born in the structureÕ (Deleuze 2004c: 183, 191). Unlike a Hegelian conception of  
contradiction, whereby each phenomena has as its essential correlate both a place and an 
antithesis, Althusserian structural causality determines contradiction of  the knowledge object 
as a necessary, productive feature of  relative autonomy. This necessity is not a strong, 
metaphysical necessity, bounded as it is within the terms of  the structural determination of  
AlthusserÕs philosophy (and its reliance upon the void); rather, an object of  knowledge, by 
creating an effect in the other discourses that acts as the objectÕs Ôlieu-tenant (sic)Õ (Althusser 
and Matheron 2003: 49), thus creates a new foundationÐimmanent with the structure of  
which it is part ofÐthat acts as the imperative for theoretical practice.  109
The differential relations that determine the place of  each regional theory (existing 
externally to the terms of  each discourse in the Humean sense) concomitantly determine the 
Althusserian unconscious as the foundation for practice itself. However AlthusserÕs ambition 
for a theory of  structural causality, and an associated anti-humanist conception of  practice is 
undermined by the reliance on the aleatory void. As has been argued, each passing present in 
AlthusserÕs historical materialism implies the instantiation of  the philosophical void and, 
therefore, the clearing of  the objecticity of  thought. In the terms of  the Þrst Note therefore, 
although a subject effect might create a new object of  knowledge within the relatively 
autonomous regional theories that neighbour ideology, this object is eradicated as soon as it is 
constituted. It is therefore impossible for series to be formed. As Deleuze puts it, a Ôstructure 
only starts to move, and become animated, if  we restore its other half Õ, and this other half  is 
 The foundational status of  necessity within practice will be discussed more fully in the next chapter. Within 109
AlthusserÕs work, the concept is necessity is subordinated to the contingency of  the originary void, this being the 
basis for the prior criticism against his evacuation of  ideas from philosophy (MorÞno 2005: ¤37). As MorÞno 
highlights, ÔAlthusser uses the notion of  the ÒfactÓ in an anti-metaphysical senseÕ in the sense that he must submit 
Ôthe fact to the most radical contingencyÕ, i.e. the void (2005: ¤43). The construction of  the subject effect is an 
example of  what Deleuze calls a ÔsignÕ. See Deleuze (2008 [1964]: 3-17).
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the relation to another series that Ôderives from the terms and relations of  the Þrst, but are not 
limited simply to reproducing or reßecting themÕ ema. The construction of  the terms and 
relations of  a second series, used as the imperative for movement in a structure, is impossible 
if, at every new present, philosophy necessitates the superimposition of  the void in order to 
render neutral any previous thought. Thus, without the suture of  HumeÕs conceptualisation 
of  persistence, AlthusserÕs philosophy of  general and regional theories remains an inconsistent 
and non-foundational collection of  structures. Without a foundation for persistence and thus 
noetic coherency AlthusserÕs philosophy has no basis to establish the objecticity of  any of  the 
discourses. It is only when HumeÕs human nature is sutured onto AlthusserÕs structural 
determination, adding the possibility for the persistency of  both the objecticity and 
consistency of  ideas, that the ground is paved for a practical philosophy that avoids 
entrapment within either epistemology or ontology. In other words, when the persistence of  
ideas through time is accounted for within a differential structure of  relatively autonomous 
discourse, philosophy can be deÞned as the singular practice of  constituting epistemology and 
ontology as it itself  is constituted. 
Non-dogmatic philosophy? 
If  chapter one was an effort to identify the idealist principles that underpin BadiouÕs 
philosophy, whilst attempting to hold onto two important facets of  his work (the concept of  
truth and a way to think ethics), then the path this chapter has taken may seem divergent. So 
far, little has been mentioned of  AlthusserÕs politics, his conception of  ethics, or of  truth. 
Indeed, this chapter will not discuss these concepts, as what is at stake here is the contribution 
AlthusserÕs thought makes to a non-dogmatic philosophy as an alternative to Badiou and a 
contribution to the work of  Deleuze. As discussed, the task Althusser set himself  (becoming 
explicit in ÔThe Only Materialist TraditionÕ and ÔLenin and PhilosophyÕ) was similar to that 
undertaken hitherto in this thesis, i.e. to develop an account of  philosophy that does not 
premise itself  upon idealism and, as such, AlthusserÕs historical materialism is important (but 
not sufÞcient) in developing a non-dogmatic ethics. This non-dogmatic ethics will be properly 
advanced in the Þnal chapter. Thus, whilst exposition of  AlthusserÕs work centred in this 
chapter predominantly on his appropriation of  Epicurean atomism, the conjuncture within 
the clinamen and the associated problem of  the evental rupture, this was necessary only in 
order to examine the status of  idealism within his own thought. It was concluded that 
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Althusser did indeed manage to avoid the various trappings of  idealism (such as those of  
subject, object, epistemology and practice) in his later work only by idealising an initiatory 
void from which thoughtÕs consistency emerged. It is strange then that, whilst the coherence 
of  AlthusserÕs oeuvre lies in the attempt to subtract idealism from philosophy, he nevertheless 
injects it back in with his concept of  the event which, like BadiouÕs, remains obstinately 
aleatory. Both BadiouÕs and AlthusserÕs event present a rupture within being that, by design, 
cannot be explained and therefore remains an idealism par excellence. This is particularly 
strange, given the Þrst NoteÕs insistence that an object of  knowledge (in this case the concept 
of  an event itself) cannot be explained by the axiomatic postulates of  a regional theory and 
must be placed within the differential context of  the general theory. In this respect, and not 
forgetting the important correction of  his ÒtheoreticismÓ within the book, AlthusserÕs 
progression in Essays in Self-Criticism is a retrograde movement in his philosophy. The reasons 
for this (which may be more personal and sociological than philosophical) would make 
important contributions to both the study of  Althusser and of  continental philosophy more 
generally. 
To reiterate the argument so far: the conjunction of  Hume (or, more precisely, DeleuzeÕs 
reading of  Hume) to Althusser is an attempt to supplement this retrogression with an account 
of  persistence in order to overcome, or subvert, a charge of  idealism. The persistence of  
AlthusserÕs event as an idea, constituted by relations that exist externally to the terms of  the 
idea (and which are, in turn, artifactual in the Humean sense), immunises the event against 
charges of  idealism. This immunisation is achieved by accounting for AlthusserÕs concept of  
structural causality; the structure is causal because of  the (dialectical) differential relationships 
between the relatively autonomous modes of  thought (or regional theories) producing a new 
object of  thought and concomitant knowledge effects.  HumeÕs encounter, forcing thought 110
into action and the creation of  ideas from relations external to their terms, thus impels the 
persistence of  past thought into each passing present, within the structure of  the 
 The use of  the term ÒcausalÓ here is not to be read in the strict Hegelian sense by which a dialectic 110
relationship is synthesised by way of  logical progression which formally determines its outcome. Instead, it is 
used here to designate the functional relationship of  relatively autonomous modes of  thought, whereby the 
casual outcome of  the dialectic is determined by the differential relationship itself.
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subconscious.  The persistence of  thought into the intellect, as well as avoiding the charge 111
of  idealism present in AlthusserÕs aleatory materialism, puts thought into practical 
relationship with itself. In other words, politics can be thought in practical relationship with 
other modes of  thought, paving the way to the think politics of  art and science, or the 
aesthetics of  politics, et cetera. 
In contrast to BadiouÕs position, for whom politics was a prescription that could only be 
deployed by the militant a posteriori of  the aleatory event (Hallward 2005: 772), HumeÕs and 
AlthusserÕs relocation of  politics from the start to a part of  the differential structure has the 
effect of  turning politics from a prescription into a practical interrogation. Without 
ontologising thought to either the prescription of  a Badiouian event, or to the telos of  a polis 
(qua, for example, Aristotle)Ðboth operations hypostasise a particular form of  thought which 
remains transcendent to the form of  the polisÐAlthusser and Hume suggest that politics is 
essential within epistemology itself. Thus, removing the formal distinction that Badiou 
instantiates between (ontological) truth and doxa, practice alternates epistemology and the 
ontology of  the encounter in a practical relay, located within the human (Hume) and the 
unconscious (Althusser).  It is in the foregrounding of  practice that philosophy can undo the 112
Þrst Platonic dyad of  truth/doxa.  Furthermore, in addition to avoiding the charge of  
idealising either ontology or epistemology, the conjunction of  Hume to Althusser supplements 
Althusser with a conception of  time which circumvents the breaks in temporal continuity that 
were necessitated by the aleatory event. For Althusser, each mode of  thought has an inherent 
temporality, with both visible and invisible times that could be brought into visibility by the 
practice of  philosophy. For Hume, time is not local to the modes of  thought, but to the event, 
and time is constituted by the relations that make up human nature. For both thinkers, there 
is no single, continuous time along which human nature, or the unconscious travels, but it is 
only HumeÕs idea of  the subject which accounts for duration. As Boundas explains in his 
 With regards to the relations conjoining the encounter Reed demonstrates that this Ônotion of  a spontaneous 111
disposition is paradoxical, or even oxymoronic: it might be termed an Òunconstrained constraint.Ó Yet, with this 
oxymoron Hume is pointing to the ways a particular association erupts from the Þeld of  the possibleÕ (Reed 
2005: 218). Yet it is not purely the passive objecticity of  an association which impels the intellect, but rather that 
there are different ÒwaysÓ to associate which both call on and motivate the intellect to form new ideas. Reed goes 
on to argue that the Ôquality of  one thing to cause another is a power, as Hume points out, but by his system of  
analysis, that power exists only in associations we draw between the two things, not as an inherent quality of  the 
thingÕ (Reed 2005: 219). Things therefore condition associations between them (through what Deleuze calls 
elsewhere the ÒsignÓ (see Deleuze 2008 [1964])) which nevertheless then need associating, and it is this practice 
of  association which Hume calls human nature, and Althusser calls practice in its second form.
 This does not necessarily mean that rejecting the distinction between truth and doxa also necessitates giving 112
up on the concept of  truth. Instead, Deleuze contrasts truth not with doxa but with delirium. This will be the 
focus of  the Þnal chapter.
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introduction to Empiricism and Subjectivity, HumeÕs Ôanticipating and inventing subject 
constitutes the past which weighs on the present, making it pass, while positing the past as the 
rule for the future. Take as the constitutive force of  subjectivity, responsible for the bending 
and folding of  the given and the formation of  interiority, is indeed intensiveÕ (Boundas in 
Deleuze 1991: 16). HumeÕs account of  time, as opposed to AlthusserÕs, exists separately to the 
ideas that form the intellect and condition the intellectÕs formation, although the synthesis of  
the subjective intellect understands time only as it shapes times, as time shapes it. In this 
sense, the conjunction of  Hume to AlthusserÕs aleatory materialism, suturing the aleatory 
event with the persistence of  the past, allows for the continuity of  the objects of  knowledge 
and their relative effects within the series of  practical philosophy. In the creation of  the new, 
the past is preserved within time, but the object of  knowledge is created anew with each 
passing present. Contra Badiou, for whom the new could only be thought on the impossible 
condition that some-one had already been interpellated as a subject of  the ontological event, 
a relational Althusserianism allows for the thinking of  the new as part of the event, without any 
formal delineation between the event and its subject. 
As has been argued, Althusser is not entirely successful in ridding philosophy of  idealism 
and, in addition to a reliance on the event, AlthusserÕs focus upon the unconscious remains a 
dogmatic concept in his work that is never fully accounted for. Althusser was aware that the 
concept of  the unconscious has latent Freudian connotations that would eventually necessitate 
its replacement (Althusser and Matheron 2003: 53). Observing in the Notes that, even within 
FreudÕs work, the unconscious had acquired enough considerable negative connotations to 
suggest a surrogate, Althusser does not offer a suggestion as to what concept should take its 
place. Whilst Althusser does move away from explicitly psychoanalytic terminology in his 
later work, a central synthesis of  thought nevertheless pervades throughout his oeuvre. For 
example, in Essays in Self-Criticism, Althusser develops MarxÕs comment in the Eighteenth 
Brumaire that ÔMen make their own historyÕ to argue that Ôindividuals as historical subjects, 
active in history, has nothing in principle to do with the question of  the ÒSubject of  historyÓ, or 
even with that of  the Òsubjects of  historyÓÕ (Althusser 1976: 95). For Althusser, associating men 
as the agent that constructs history is an example of  the classical humanism of  the 
Enlightenment, an ideological distortion that constructs a abstract understanding of  history 
(1976: 97). Instead, history must be understood through Marxist philosophy: dialectical 
materialism, which explains the constitution of  the subject as an ideological object which has 
scientiÞc, artistic and philosophical effects. It is worth quoting Althusser at length: 
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ÔIt is precisely the Thesis of  the Communist Manifesto -- Òthe class struggle is 
the motor of  historyÓ -- that displaces the question, that brings the problem 
into the open, that shows us how to pose it properly and therefore how to 
solve it. It is the masses which ÒmakeÓ history, but Òit is the class struggle 
which is the motor of  historyÓ. To John LewisÕ question: Òhow does man 
make history?Ó, Marxism- Leninism replies by replacing his idealist 
philosophical categories with categories of  a quite different kindÕ (Althusser 
1976: 48). 
The philosophical categories that Althusser highlights are the relatively autonomous 
modes of  thought which, in the above passage, form the Marxist-Leninist understanding of  
history. Indeed, in the ÔReply to John LewisÕ, Althusser argues that even the concept of  
ÔmakingÕ must be done away with as it connotes too much importance to a centralised artiÞce. 
And yet, Althusser never addresses the relationship of  the unconscious (the singular, practical 
locus of  the four forms of  thought) that is set out programmatically in the Note and 
dialectical materialism more generally. Is dialectical materialism to be understood as 
ÒpopulatedÓ by unconsciousnesses, and how would this new objecticity (the being-in-the-
world of  unconsciousness) be explained? In identifying a unifying locus within which the four 
forms of  thought locate themselves in synthesis, does Althusser not institute a Kantian/
Badiouian subject: a transcendental unity that provides the minimum criteria for further 
epistemological practice? As well as the hypostatisation of  an aleatory event, Althusser 
speciÞes a subconscious that understands the world in fourÐand only fourÐmodes of  thought 
(or regional practices). Again, the problem of  origins that Montag highlights raises its head: a 
synthesis of  the modes of  thought is necessary in AlthusserÕs later work in order to account for 
the new, however Althusser does not develop this in any more detail within his later work to 
draw a connection between his initial psychoanalytic inßuence and his later materialism. 
Furthermore, in the Þrst Note, although Althusser tentatively suggests the four functions of  
the regional theories that make up the unconscious, there is no given reason as to why these 
are to be the particular theories that make up AlthusserÕs epistemology and, concomitantly, 
the minimum criteria of  the subconscious. Whilst he acknowledges the danger of  relying on 
deÞnitions based upon their function, the fact that he does not proffer any further explanation 
for differentiation within the rest of  his work leaves him open to the charge of  deÞning the 
modes of  thought upon the phenomenology of  established discourse - precisely what his 
conception of  relative autonomy was established to undermine. Whilst the distinctions 
employed are of  use to Marxist sociology and activism, in philosophy, the concept of  the 
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unconscious, as the pre-deÞned locus of  epistemological practice, falls to the criticism of  
idealist dogmatism to the same extent as AlthusserÕs aleatory void. 
  Similarly, does Hume not also commit a similar act when he posits a particular unity, 
with particular relations (i.e. association, contiguity, resemblance, and causality), that happen to 
constitute ideas? Boundas puts it clearly when he differentiates the subject as Ôthe product of  
the principles of  human nature; but then the mind, or the given, is the product of  the powers 
of  natureÕ (Boundas in Deleuze 1991: 17). Here, Boundas highlights the lack of  explanation 
for why some particular relations condition the mind, as opposed to others. Indeed Kant also 
recognised in Hume a metaphysical dogmatism on which, he claims, all indifferentists 
(philosophers who rely on common sense to ground a metaphysics of  skepticism) Ôinevitably 
fall back, in so far as they think at all, into those very metaphysical assertions which they 
profess so greatly to despiseÕ (Kant 1996 [1787]: Ax, Kuehn 1983: 182). For Kant, causality is 
an a priori concept that, as a concept, exists prior to the constitution of  the subject which only 
then attributes it to certain phenomena. The realisation of  this in HumeÕs work began a 
process of  realisation in Kant who found Ôthat the concept of  causality was only one among 
many a priori concepts of  the understanding and that all of  metaphysics consisted of  
themÕ (Kuehn 1983: 182). Whilst, as has been shown, KantÕs project does not successfully 
avoid the criticism of  dogmatism itself, both Boundas and Kant nevertheless highlight the a 
priori condition whereby certain relations constitute the mind which themselves require 
explanation. In other words, not everyone has the same cognitive apparatus because of  the 
differential relations superior to the subject that nonetheless constitutes it. Although, for 
Hume, the subject is indeed only a product of  relations which are superior to it, nevertheless 
the speciÞcation of  certain relations idealises them to a transcendent position above the 
subject. Hume and Althusser then rely upon certain dogmatic claims, constituted by ideal 
terms that, despite their foregrounding practice, nevertheless undermine their positions as 
non-dogmatic. 
The pragmatist John Dewey characterises best the underlying condition of  Badiou, 
Althusser and Hume as prescribing  Ômodes of  thought [that assume and foreground] the 
intelligibility of  the world, assuming that this is the only way in which the world can be 
ÒmanagedÓÕ (Dewey 1958: 128). Tracing this lineage back to its Platonic inspiration and an 
appropriation of  artisanship by ancient philosophy, Dewey argues that the Ôvery conception 
of  cognitive meaning, intellectual signiÞcance, is that things in their immediacy are 
subordinated to what they portend and give evidence of. An intellectual sign denotes that a 
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thing is not taken immediately but is referred to something that may come in consequence of  
itÕ (1958: 128). Dewey argues that in both the Platonic ideal form and AristotleÕs efÞcient and 
Þnal causes things are appropriated by philosophy in a problematic and unjustiÞed attempt to 
instrumentalise the world in a process that rids the thing of  its other intrinsic qualities, 
whatever they may be. The intellectual instrumentalisation of  things serves management, for 
Dewey, because the mode of  management conspires with the mode of  instrumentalisation of  
the world itself.  In service of  this appropriation, Ô[s]elf-evidence ceases to be a characteristic 113
trait of  the fundamental objects of  either sensory or noetic objects. Primary propositions are 
statements of  objects in terms which procure the simplest and completest forming and 
checking of  other propositionsÕ, meaning that Ô[m]any systems of  axioms and postulates are 
possible, the more the merrier, since new propositions as consequences are brought to 
lightÕ (1958: 130). DeweyÕs description rings true of  BadiouÕs explicitly axiomatic philosophy 
in terms of  the latterÕs ontological axiomatic structure and its claims to ÒunderstandÓ the new 
according to the category theory developed in Logics of  Worlds (Badiou 2009). His description 
also applies to HumeÕs and AlthusserÕs philosophies, which both seek to theorise an 
understanding of  the world by a propositional intellect. Yet, as Dewey argues, according to 
this understanding, Ô[o]bjects are possessed and appreciated, but they are not knownÕ (1958: 
131); for Dewey, to know Ômeans that men have become willing to turn away from precious 
possessions; willing to let drop what they own, however precious, in behalf  of  a grasp of  
objects which they do not as yet ownÕ (1958: 131). 
What does it mean to be willing to drop what is owned on behalf  of  what is not as yet 
owned? In Proust and Signs, Deleuze develops the concepts of  seriesÕ and groups with regard to 
love and it is necessary to quote him at length in order to understand the progression from 
one to the other. 
ÔThe image or the theme [of  love] contains the particular character of  our 
loves. But we repeat this image only all the more, and all the better, in that it 
escapes us in fact and remains unconscious. Far from expressing the ideaÕs 
immediate power, repetition testiÞes to a discrepancy here, an inadequation 
of  consciousness and idea. Experience is no help to us because we deny that 
 Dewey argues that, Ô[i]ntellectual meanings may themselves be appropriated, enjoyed and appreciated; but 113
the character of  intellectual meaning is instrumentalÕ, sardonically adding that Ô[f]ortunate for us is it that tools 
and their using can be directly enjoyed; otherwise all work would be drudgeryÕ (Dewey 1958: 128). Dewey here 
points out the complicity between the intellectual appropriation of  the world and the forms of  work that found 
themselves upon, and reinforce, this appropriation, forms of  work which also interpellate the individual into 
enjoying them for lack of  a fuller knowledge of  the world. This argument is expanded on by, amongst others, the 
situationists (for example, see Debord (2002)) and Bernard Stiegler (especially Stiegler (2010)).
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we repeat and still believe in something new, but also because we are 
unaware of  the difference that makes our loves intelligible and refers them to 
a law that is in a sense their living source. The unconscious, in love, is the 
separation of  the two aspects of  essence: difference and repetitionÕ (Deleuze 
2008 [1964]: 44). 
According to Deleuze, love exists as an idea, but this idea is not ÒplacedÓ upon a 
particular experience that attributes sense to the idea but, rather, it is an idea that unites 
different experiences in what then becomes a repeating series. In other words, a series of  
relationships only becomes a series in retrospect, once each relationship has begun and 
reached the stage which can then be called love. Yet the love of  one individual at one moment 
will not be identical to its antecedent love for everything involved is differentÐeven if  the 
partners are the sameÐand it is in this sense that love repeats differently with every 
experience.  As Deleuze reveals, Ôthe beloved belongs initially to a group, in which she is not 114
yet individualisedÕ. ÔWho will be the girlÕ, he asks, Ôthe hero loves in the homogenous 
group?Õ (2008 [1964]: 49). Thus, people must be willing to let things drop in order to place 
them into the condition where they may form series with that which is yet to come; one enjoys 
a thing in itself  whilst being open to its placement within a series. In this sense, the experience 
is a sign of  enjoyment for Deleuze, but it is only fully enjoyed when it is part of  a series which 
only occurs in retrospect of  its becoming (2008 [1964]: 47). It is not sufÞcient to allow things 
to remain appropriated within an intellectual system of  management, or an Ôabstract truth 
that a thinker might discover by the effort of  a method or of  a free reßectionÕ (2008 [1964]: 
47) because this would limit the potential to understand the thing as part of  a series that is 
itself  constituted with the thing.  Accordingly, for both Dewey and Deleuze, it is important 115
to let things dropÐor dieÐwhich is not itself  an enjoyable experience, but is the only possibility 
for joy; whilst Ôthe phenomena are always unhappy and particularÕ in their ßeeting singularity, 
Ôthe idea extracted from them is general and joyousÕ (2008 [1964]: 47). Indeed, Deleuze 
argues that we Ôextract from our particular despairs a general Idea; this is because the Idea 
 Contra Deleuze, for whom singular difference must be conceptualised in and for itself, Badiou argues that 114
one is able to say Òthis is the same thing as thatÓ because this Ôonly differs from that by the statement of  the 
difference, by the literal placementÕ (Badiou 2013 [1982]: 12). Borrowing from Hegelian dialectics, for Badiou, 
the difference between the thing (A) and the thing placed (Ap) is the difference between what Heidegger calls the 
ontological and the ontic being. This means that the thing never exists in itself  and relies upon a placing 
operation which results from the operation of  theory (2013 [1982]: 12). BadiouÕs reliance on theory in order to 
place the object however is another example of  the management strategy that Dewey locates as reverberating 
throughout Western philosophy from Plato. How fortunate it is for Badiou that the theory he advocates happens 
to result in the proto-Maoist political prescription that he holds dear.
 It is here that the foundations for an ethics of  the new can be seen to emerge in Deleuze, and this will be 115
further developed in the chapter four.
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was primary, was already thereÕ as part of  the things, and joy is the uniÞcation of  a series 
under the remit of  the Idea (2008 [1964]: 47). If  Badiou, Hume and Althusser all instantiate 
an idealism in their philosophies, it is because they all attempt to make intelligible a world 
which they, in turn, idealise as intelligible. For Deleuze, all three are sad thinkers as they deny 
the creative potential of  life in their attempts to subordinate it under the thinkable (Deleuze 
2001: 68-74). In order to bring joy to philosophyÐi.e. to afÞrm it and the novelty it createsÐ
and to construct an ethics of  this joyful philosophy, it is necessary to understand the thing as a 
singularity, within its place in a series.  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Chapter 3 - A time for practice 
Speculative or problematic? 
Chapter one demonstrated the inheritance of  Platonic and Parmenidean dogmatism in 
BadiouÕs philosophy and chapter two showed AlthusserÕs efforts to overcome such dogmas 
and develop a non-idealist philosophy. It concluded that Althusser did indeed avoid the 
idealist position of  either epistemology or ontology grounding the other, and that he 
accomplished this with his concept of  an aleatory void to dispel any latent dogmas that might 
pre-condition thought. This, it was argued, constituted a new dogmatic idealism as a 
replacement for the transcendent idealism that determined thought at each moment in the 
practice of  philosophy. Simply put, Althusser replaces idealism in philosophical practice with 
the idea of  a philosophical void which is, of  course, another idealism. In order to overcome 
the reliance upon chance that AlthusserÕs void forces upon thought, HumeÕs concept of  the 
subject was sutured to the latterÕs thought in order to account for the persistence of  ideas 
through the aleatory void. It is because, for Hume, the subject invents and anticipatesÐin 
other words practicesÐthought that ideas persist through time. HumeÕs concept of  human 
nature is that of  a synthetic product of  relations which, it was argued, can connect each 
otherwise-aleatory moment as the result of  (in AlthusserÕs terms) its theoretical practice. 
Nevertheless, the suture of  Hume to Althusser leaves some scar tissue: whereas HumeÕs 
relational subject was shown to provide persistence and coherence in thought, it is not clear 
why it is the subject per se that accomplishes this.  The lack of  an account of  what constitutes 116
the subject leads to two immediate questions. First, what is it that speciÞes the precise 
relations that constitute human nature for Hume, as opposed to others? Secondly, why are 
there three principles of  association (resemblance, contiguity in time and place, and 
causation) rather than otherwise? Having previously identiÞed the problem of  idealism in 
BadiouÕs thought and attempted to address it with Althusser and HumeÐonly to Þnd the 
problem relocated into HumeÕs human natureÐthis chapter will show that it is DeleuzeÕs three 
 It would be more accurate to argue that HumeÕs subject is the persistence of  thought through time. The word 116
provide is however used to account for a function in HumeÕs philosophy that is otherwise lacking in AlthusserÕs 
philosophy.
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syntheses of  time that are needed to overcome idealism (or, what Deleuze refers to as 
postulates of  the dogmatic Ôimage of  thoughtÕ (Deleuze 2011 [1994]: 167)). 
Before turning to Deleuze however, MeillassouxÕs account in After Finitude (2008) of  the 
relation between ideas and matter will be examined as an important, contemporary rendition 
of  materialism. In this, his Þrst monograph, MeillassouxÕs ambitious task is to rid 
contemporary philosophy of  what he calls ÒcorrelationismÓ. DeÞning correlationism as the 
position whereby Ôwe only ever have access to the correlation between thinking and being, 
and never to either term considered apart from the otherÕ (2008: 5), Meillassoux takes aim not 
only at all philosophical positions that fall within KantÕs distinctions of  ÔÒdogmatismÓ, 
ÒscepticismÓ, and ÒcritiqueÓÕ (Badiou in Meillassoux 2008: vii), but also metaphysics and 
many post-metaphysical positions (2008: 33-42). In trying to account for how we can make 
ÔancestralÕ statements about Ôany reality anterior to the emergence of  the human 
speciesÕ (2008: 10), Meillassoux attempts to show how a world of  absolute contingence can 
still be thought by Ôgrafting the Humean thesis onto that of  Cantorian intotalityÕ (Meillassoux 
2007: 232). In doing this he can be aligned with authors such as Ray Brassier, Ian Hamilton 
Grant and Graham Harman who argue in favour of  varieties of  Ônon-metaphysical 
speculationÕ (Meillassoux 2008: 111). Meillassoux has been particularly inßuential in recent 
debates on ontology (particularly with regards to speculative realism) and presents a novel 
articulation of  set theory in contrast to its appropriation by MeillassouxÕs one-time mentor 
Badiou.  The pertinent difference between Badiou and Meillassoux, in terms of  their 117
studies of  ontology, is that, whereas the former argues that politics, science, art and love are 
the four categories that ontology presents itself  in, Meillassoux makes no such foundational 
claim. Whilst Meillassoux couches both After Finitude and Science Fiction and Extro-Science Fiction 
in terms of  the factual claims about natural laws, and therefore seems to gesture in the 
direction of  BadiouÕs category of  science, there is nothing in his work which indicates a strong 
differentiation between different discourses. Therefore, it is the speculative nature of  
MeillassouxÕs ancestral question which makes him of  interest here, rather than the fact that he 
(again, speculatively) posits a mathematical answer to it. 
MeillassouxÕs argument will be rejected, not because his criticism of  a large set of  
correlationist philosophers is necessarily wrong, but because his solution, in avoiding the 
 Meillassoux has been discussed predominantly (although not exclusively) in blogs by authors interested in 117
Òobject orientated ontologyÓ. See Brassier (2016), Bryant (2016), Harman (2016), and Morton (2016), as well as 
a new journal ÒO-ZoneÓ dedicated to object orientated ontology. See also Zalloua (2015: esp. 393-394).
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correlationist position, currently relies (as Badiou does) on the Ôontological pertinence of  
CantorÕs theoremÕ (Meillassoux 2007: 103). Despite MeillassouxÕs convincing argument that 
post-Kantian correlationism cannot account for claims about the in-itself, his solution falls to 
the same criticism that chapter one brought against BadiouÕs reliance on the matheme. 
However, MeillassouxÕs reliance that upon mathematics is a symptom of  a different issue in 
his work from that of  Badiou and, so, although they share the same criticism (that they rely 
upon a naked rationalism), this criticism takes different forms. MeillassouxÕs efforts to address 
what he calls ÒHumeÕs ProblemÓ demonstrates the emphasis that Meillassoux places on 
constancy (in his case, the constancy of  natural laws). By maintaining the Parmenidean 
hypothesis that Ôbeing and thinking are the sameÕ (Meillassoux 2008: 44), reductively thinking 
ontology as mathematics, and maintaining the importance of  the sensible as the veriÞcation 
of  mathematicsÕ veracity with the world, Meillassoux argues that, as far as we can currently 
think, only mathematics can move from the question of  Ôwhat can I know?Õ towards two other 
problems: Ôwhat must I do?Õ and Ôwhat can I hope?Õ (Badiou in Meillassoux 2008: vii). 
However, as will be argued, Meillassoux nevertheless relies upon both the sensible and non-
mathematic thought in order to measure and verify the claims of  mathematics. As such, in 
contrast to DeleuzeÕs appropriation of  Hume, MeillassouxÕs speculative realism highlights the 
problem of  denigrating the sensible in favour of  mathematics. A turn (back) towards Marx 
will show that it is necessary to account for the constitution of  knowledge as a process of  
social production that takes into account the affectivity of  matter. Furthermore, it is 
important to not go from the concrete (MeillassouxÕs idea of  mathematics) to the abstract as 
Meillassoux advocates, but from the abstract to the concrete.  118
This turn will be carried out with ChambersÕ (2014) work on Marx and Althusser and a 
return to the three Notes of  the previous chapter. Chambers argues that when, in the 
Introduction to the Contribution to the Critique of  Political Economy (henceforth the Ò1857 
IntroductionÓ), Marx collapses epistemology into ontology, he places thought back into a 
social mode of  production (Chambers 2014: 106). There are several important ramiÞcations 
of  knowledge being part of  social production, but this chapter will emphasise the political and 
ethical territories which knowledge must traverse as it is being socially produced. To be 
preciseÐand counter to the claims of  Badiou and Meillassoux (as well as Object Oriented 
 An extended discussion of  abstraction in DeleuzeÕs philosophy is not possible here, but it is worthwhile 118
mentioning that both May and Patton have noted how Deleuze and GuattariÕs concepts such as Òwar machineÓ 
and ÒStateÓ Ôare not speciÞc historical entities but abstractions that are realised to a greater or lesser degree, 
and always in mixture, in concrete situationsÕ (May 1991: 27, Patton 1984).
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Ontologists more generally)Ðthis chapter makes the argument that there is no such thing as 
neutral, universal or true knowledge; all knowledge is subject to political and ethical 
constraints that condition itÕs constitution. Concomitantly, as part of  its social construction, 
knowledge is politically and ethically problematic. The openness of  knowledge to its 
problematisation as a condition of  its production forms part of  the conditions for further 
learning and ethical action, conditions which Deleuze terms the ÔencounterÕ (Deleuze 2008 
[1964]: 12). In particular then, this chapter will demonstrate that AlthusserÕs anti-humanist 
philosophy was not, as it has been accused, anti-subjective and this is because the concept of  
the subject is a productive component of  one of  AlthusserÕs four modes of  thought (the 
ideological). 
By showing that knowledge develops as part of  social production, this chapter will 
therefore serve as the foundation for chapter four, which will develop a latent, yet undeÞned 
ethical component to DeleuzeÕs metaphysics. In contradistinction to MeillassouxÕs speculative 
replacement for correlationismÕs inability to make metaphysical statements, this chapter will 
argue for the necessity of  metaphysics in the Þrst place. However, this will not be a 
metaphysics in the sense Meillassoux describes as Ôdemonstrating the existence of  a supreme 
principle governing our worldÕ, such as God (Meillassoux 2008: 87). Rather, DeleuzeÕs 
temporal metaphysics shall be read, not as a foundational principle which governs the world, 
but as a constitutive part of  it, itself  constituted by its practical, synthetic function. Taking 
heed of  LivingstonÕs warning that a philosophy can be coherent, totalising or paradoxical, this 
chapter shall conclude in favour of  the former. Indeed it is this non-totalised coherenceÐ
distinct from MeillassouxÕs mathematically founded speculative position in its lack of  any 
foundation whatsoeverÐthat constitutes the foundations for future ethical decisions, the topic 
to be developed in the next chapter. Ultimately then, this chapter will demonstrate how 
DeleuzeÕs synthetic metaphysics of  time can inform AlthusserÕs conclusion that the individual 
does not think, but that thought thinks (in its different modes), to create a socially embodied 
theory of  individuation. 
MeillassouxÕs problem with Hume 
Ancestral statementsÐstatements about the world anterior to the emergence of  human 
lifeÐconstitute the problem that Meillassoux addresses in After Finitude. How, he asks, is Ôscience 
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able to think such statements, and in what sense can we eventually ascribe truth to 
themÕ (Meillassoux 2008: 10)? In posing such a problem, Meillassoux follows in the footsteps 
of  Badiou, for whom it is necessary to tell the truth of  a situation before any philosophy is 
possible, to the extent that there is no explicit normative philosophy in MeillassouxÕs text at all 
(Johnston 2011: 103). Instead, the political implications of  MeillassouxÕs project are made 
clear in his criticism of  the ramiÞcations of  correlationism: the absolutisation of  Þdeism, 
which Meillassoux claims was announced by Montaigne, the Òfounding fatherÓ of  the 
Counter-Reformation. As Zalloua puts it, in his essay ÒOf  CripplesÓ, ÔMontaigne ridiculed 
philosophers who incessantly discourse about causes (he called them Òplaisants causeurs,Ó 
punning on the double meaning of  ÒcauserÓÑÒto talk about something/to someoneÓ and Òto 
cause somethingÓ)Õ (Zalloua 2015: 397). The renunciation of  causal thinking in contemporary 
philosophy has, through a generalised scepticism and the Ôdestruction of  the metaphysical 
absolute, [É] resulted in a generalised becoming-religious of  thought, viz., in a Þdeism of  any 
belief  whatsoeverÕ (Meillassoux 2008: 46). MeillassouxÕs political argument thenÐand it is an 
argument that this thesis is very much aligned toÐis summed up by his claim that, because 
contemporary philosophy has capitulated to faith, Ôthere is no reason why the worst forms of  
violence could not claim to have been sanctioned by a transcendence that is only accessible to 
the elect fewÕ (Meillassoux 2008: 47). 
Instead of  offering up a competing set of  normative statements, Meillassoux 
demonstrates the grounds upon which it is possible to make statements about the world, given 
that any absolutist statement made about it is usually couched in terms of  its truth, as Hegel 
put it, Ôfor usÕ (2008: 4, 13). For Brassier, MeillassouxÕs portrayal of  ÒcorrelationistÓ thought 
ÔafÞrms the indissoluble primacy of  the relation between thought and its correlate over the 
metaphysical hypostatisation or representationalist reiÞcation of  either term of  the 
relationÕ (Brassier 2007: 51). In other words, Meillassoux successfully demonstrates that there 
is a relation between thought and being, but also that contemporary philosophy jumps 
straight to representing this relationship in favour of  baldly stating it. Brassier insists that 
correlationism Ônever denies that our thoughts or utterances aim at or intend mind-independent 
or language-independent realities; it merely stipulates that this apparently independent 
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dimension remains internally related to thought and languageÕ (2007: 51).  To make his way 119
out of  this Ôcorrelationist two-stepÕ, Meillassoux thus needs a way to make non-metaphysical, 
absolutist claims about the in-itself. These claims must not be grounded upon, on the one 
hand, the presumption of  a past transcendental event that theorises an in-itself  of  which we 
can only know its appearance (this would be ÒweakÓ correlationism) (see Brassier 2007: 52, 
Kant 1996 [1787]: A 495, B 523) or, on the other hand, the assumption that the in-itself  is 
entirely unthinkable, except for the fact that we can think about it (ÒstrongÓ correlationism) 
(Meillassoux 2008: 39). Indeed, for Meillassoux, the only absolutist claim that can be made 
about the world is that it is absolutely contingent, and that this contingency is itself  absolutely 
necessary, i.e. not contingent (Zalloua 2015: 396).  
It is upon this understanding that Meillassoux takes up ÒHumeÕs ProblemÓ. Is it possible, 
he asks, Ôto demonstrate that the same effects will always follow from the same causes ceteris 
paribus, i.e. all other things being equal?Õ (Meillassoux 2008: 85).  In asking this, Meillassoux 120
attempts to account for the stability of  what is, for him, an absolutely contingent world, 
despite its manifestly stable appearance, given his thesis that correlationism is unable to think 
the in-itself.  Only by accounting for this stability, Meillassoux argues, can one say anything 121
determinate about ancestral objects. Putting this in terms already familiar to this discussion, 
 It is this clariÞcation that casts doubt over both BrassierÕs and MeillassouxÕs all-encompassing charge that 119
most philosophers both during and after the Enlightenment constitute either weak or strong correlationists 
(Brassier 2007: 50, Meillassoux 2008: 35-42, 46). Brassier equates the Ôthe reigning doxa of  post-metaphysical 
philosophyÕ with the Ôidea of  a world-in-itself, of  a realm of  phenomena subsisting independently of  our relation 
to itÕ, which is termed ÔdifferenceÕ (Brassier 2007: 50). Deleuze however (to mention only one example) never 
argued that Ôreality must be transcendentally guaranteed, whether by pure consciousness, intersubjective 
consensus, or a community of  rational agentsÕ (2007: 50). Moreover, as he develops in Bergsonism (put in terms 
that he may not have been comfortable with), his transcendental ÒguaranteeÓ is the world-in-itself, or pure 
difference. ÔWe perceive things where they areÕ he argues; Ôperception puts us at once into matter, is impersonal, 
and coincides with the perceived objectÕ (Deleuze 1991 [1988]: 25 emphasis added). The charge of  correlationism is no 
doubt an effective polemic tool, but is undermined by a lack of  detailed, referenced reading in both their works. 
Golumbia makes a similar criticism, although his claim that Meillassoux Ôfails to respect most of  the methods of  
that practice: to state clearly its contentions, to deÞne its terms, to distinguish between philosophical issues 
(particularly epistemology and metaphysics), or to demonstrate textually its historical-philosophical assessmentsÕ 
appreciates neither the scientiÞc or political claims in MeillassouxÕs sights, nor his criticism of  philosophy as a 
practice (see Golumbia 2016: 3, 12, Johnston 2011: 109, Meillassoux 2008: 45-48).
 A historical contextualisation of  After Finitude with regards to LeninÕs disagreement with Kant and Hume can 120
be found in Johnston (2011: 93-96). See also Brassier (2007: 246).
 Golumbia pulls Meillassoux up on his reading of  Kant by showing that ÔKant goes out of  his way to account 121
for and even to embrace human thinking about the noumena even as he is careful to restrict knowledge to that of  
which we humans have experienceÕ (Golumbia 2016: 9). As Golumbia explains, Meillassoux conßates the act of  
thinking the in-itself  for Kant with having knowledge of  it, and still argues that humans cannot think the in-
itself. This leads to the position where Meillassoux needs Ôto insist that human beings can know with certainty 
objects of  experience [É] of  which they have no experience whatever [É], and that this knowledge is somehow more 
scientiÞc than what current philosophy allowsÕ (2016: 9). This conßation is indeed not made by Kant and it is 
easy to see why Golumbia plainly says that Ôthe idea that Kant would write so often about the thing-in-itself  
while denying that he or his readers could think about it is plainly non-sensicalÕ (2016: 10).
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Meillassoux distrusts the doxa of  empirical discussion in the same manner as Badiou, but 
nevertheless wants to gain knowledge of  what, borrowing from Descartes and Locke, he calls 
the ÔprimaryÕ qualities of  things.  This involves addressing what Johnston, following David 122
Chalmers, calls the Òhard problemÓ of  philosophy: Ôan account of  the relationship between 
mind and matter not just in terms of  the formerÕs epistemological access to the absolute being 
of  the latter in itself, but in terms of  whether or not mind can be explained as emergent from 
and/or immanent to matter (and, if  so, what such an explanation requires epistemologically, 
ontologically, and scientiÞcally)Õ (Johnston 2011: 96). In avoiding the standard gesture of  
correlationism which, according to Meillassoux, would simply posit a relationship between 
mind and matter in order to then denegate it in favour of  an explanation of  how the world 
appears to the mind, it is necessary for him to come up with an ontological answer to the hard 
problem, albeit a speculative one that avoids any absolute other than that of  contingency. To 
do this, Meillassoux ontologises HumeÕs epistemological theory of  induction (Johnston 2011: 
95).  
Johnston summarises HumeÕs position well and it is worth quoting him at length: 
Ôas Hume insists, the mind is (naturally and instinctively) attuned to the 
worldÐalbeit attuned in modes such that an attenuated skepticism equivalent 
to a non-dogmatic openness to the perpetual possibility of  needing to revise 
oneÕs ideationally mediated knowledge of  extra-ideational reality (in the form 
of  conceptual structures of  cause-and-effect patterns) ought to be embraced 
as eminently reasonable and realisticÕ (Johnston 2011: 99).  123
In MeillassouxÕs terms, Hume is not satisÞed with statements about universalist laws and 
simply claims that Ôit would be perfectly compatible with the requirements of  logic and 
experience for everything to become other than it isÕ (Meillassoux 2008: 88). The only reason 
that it does not do so randomly is because individualsÕ habit has been constructed in 
attunement to the (now only potentially) random nature of  existence. Indeed, because causality 
lies within habit and not within the Òextra-ideational relationÓ, for Hume, the individualÕs 
 Drawing on the distinction made by Locke, for Meillassoux, the sensation of  pain is not a property of  a ßame 122
but a result of  a subjective relation with it. As such, pain is a secondary quality of  the ßame. A primary property 
would be a property of  ßame irrespective of  the subjectÕs (non-)relation to it. See Meillassoux (2008: 1-2).
 See (Hume 1993 [1748]: 35-37, 70-72). HumeÕs advocation of  a Ônon-dogmatic opennessÕ in individualsÕ 123
understanding of  reality that inßuenced the pragmatic theorists of  truth. For Misak, pragmatism Ôabandons the 
kind of  metaphysics which is currently in so much disrepute Ð it abandons concepts which pretend to transcend 
experience. Truth and objectivity are matters of  what is best for the community of  inquirers to believe, ÒbestÓ 
here amounting to that which best Þts with the evidence and argumentÕ (2002: 1). Thus Pierce takes up HumeÕs 
mantle when he states that Ôthe whole function of  thought is to produce habits of  actionÕ (Pierce 2004: 47).
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notion of  causality will come to expect causality in whatever form it has learned. Hume 
nevertheless remains a correlationist for Meillassoux precisely because his Ôcausal necessity is a 
necessary condition for the existence of  consciousness and the world it experiencesÕ (2008: 
89), despite the fact that, by HumeÕs own admission, it is a contingent practice. Thus, in line 
with BadiouÕs criticism of  Kant, namely that the latter posits an originary subject in order to 
guarantee the synthesis of  percepts and concepts, Meillassoux criticises Hume for positing a 
priori Ôthe truth of  the causal necessityÕ (2008: 90). Despite MeillassouxÕs admission that our senses 
say that the world is not entirely random (2008: 91), he problematises (what he sees is) HumeÕs 
dogmatic use of  causal necessity precisely because of  its reduction to an epistemological 
property of  the subject. It is because HumeÕs is not an ontological argument that Meillassoux 
takes issue with him in the Þrst place. Meillassoux thus lays out his speculative argument: 
Ôinstead of  asking how we might demonstrate the supposedly genuine necessity of  physical 
laws, we must ask how we are to explain the manifest stability of  physical laws given that we take these to be 
contingentÕ (2008: 91-92). 
The way the world really works 
For individuals who wish to grapple with Ôthe way things areÕ, MeillassouxÕs speculative 
approach is a seductive path towards political action, even if  he does not expand his approach 
beyond its theoretical discussion (Hallward 2011: 131). The speculative approach will be 
developed more below, but here it is sufÞce to say that, in offering a non-correlationist 
explanation for the stability of  natural laws, Meillassoux offers the individual what seems to 
be a solid ground upon which to make convincing political claims. By developing plans 
founded upon MeillassouxÕs speculative ontology, the activist can boast of  talking directly 
about the world, without any representative distortion. Nevertheless, this chapter will 
demonstrate how MeillassouxÕs insistence that natural laws do remain constant, despite his 
acknowledgement that they are fundamentally contingently, illuminates the idealism in how 
he measures this constancy. In other words, Meillassoux assumes the stability of  the world 
through the sensible and Þts his ontology to match it; is it any doubt then that there is a 
compatibility between the sensible and the ontological? Ultimately, this chapter will argue that 
grounding the knowledge of  a situation in one particular structure is not a problemÐindeed 
the next chapter will show that it is a signiÞcant part of  thinking ethically. The problem with 
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the speculative account however is the assumption that mathematics isÐand should beÐthe only 
structure to use. 
In order to show this, it is necessary to develop ChambersÕ work on Marx and Althusser. 
Chambers shows, in Bearing Society in Mind (2014), that the epistemology/ontology distinction 
that underpins much of  the problematic motivating the work of  both Meillassoux and Badiou 
is misconceived. In fact, Chambers denies that ontology or epistemology can ever ground 
each other, maintaining that thought is itself  ontological: Ôthinking always remains in a 
relation to the real because the thinker is always rooted in a social formationÕ (2014: 119).  124
Put negatively, thought can only be in relation to the real lest either thought or the real 
assume a foundation for the other. This foundation would then be subject to the same 
conditions that were highlighted by Livingston earlier in chapter one, namely that a 
philosophy can either be totalising or coherent, but not both. However, by making the 
connection between thought and the real relationalÐrather than foundationalÐChambers 
attempts to avoid this problem. Whilst Chambers is not saying that there is no such thing as 
epistemology per se, he collapses the distinction between thought of  the real and formal 
epistemology, where signiÞcation is reserved solely for either linguistic acts or properties.  In 
terms of  BadiouÕs distinction between politics and philosophy, for Chambers, philosophy 
would not be the discourse that actualises a (political) truth procedure, but rather a discourse 
in differential relation with politics.  
Chambers identiÞes a problem within the works of  Hegel, Butler and Hall that he 
draws on to unfold his relational ontology. Ultimately, for Chambers, the three authors are 
related by the assumption that one can not think the way the world really works without at the 
same time also thinking the social constitution of  knowledge. Taking his criticism of  Butler as 
an example, Chambers argues that she Ôapproaches Althusser as if  he, like Hegel, were 
describing relations among abstract philosophical subjectsÕ (2014: 60). Butler reads Althusser 
through her distinction between abstract subjects and the language through which they come 
into being as a consequence (Butler 1997: 107, Chambers 2014: 61). A theory whereby 
language ÒpopulatesÓ an otherwise empty subject has the advantage for Butler of  being able 
to create, as the subtitle of  her book ÔTheories in SubjectionÕ demonstrates, a number of  different 
 ChamberÕs use of  the term ÔrealÕ is not without its problems, although it should not be understood as in 124
opposition to something illusory or fake. As developed in ff. 27, the real is understood as matter in relation to 
thought, the relations of  which are understood, for Althusser, by the Marxist discourse of  science and the 
ÔimaginaryÕ discourse of  ideology (Williams 2002).
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theories of  subjection and, further, create moral distinctions between them. AlthusserÕs 
famous example of  Òideological interpellationÓ in the ISA essay features an individual 
walking down the road, a policeman hailing them and the individual turning around 
suspecting or knowing the hail is for them. ButlerÕs criticism of  Althusser is based upon his 
statement that Ôthese things happen without any successionÕ, thus vacating the account of  any 
temporal or causal process (Althusser 1971a: 174). ButlerÕs distinction allows her to criticise 
Althusser by pointing out that ÔAlthusser does not offer a clue as to why the individual turns 
aroundÕ (Butler 1997: 5). Butler then offers her own explanation: the subject turns because 
they already know that they are guilty, they self-attribute their own guilt and then turn to the 
policeman knowing that he must be hailing them. 
As Chambers highlights, Butler reads AlthusserÕs scene of  interpellation in order to 
show her ontology of  the subject as Ôan openness or vulnerability before the lawÕ (Butler 1997: 
108, Chambers 2014: 62). This openness is the guilt that, for Butler, leads to individuals 
desiring the law and explains our willingness to be subjectiÞed under it. It is difÞcult to see 
however how this claim is given philosophically, because as Chambers points out, ÔÒguilt has a 
very particular, and speciÞcally Judaeo-Christian, historyÕ and Butler Ôimplicitly 
conceptualises guilt as lying outside historyÕ (2014: 62). Presumably however, societies built on 
non-Judaeo-Christian thought might not feature guilt as a foundational aspect of  the subject 
and, so, ButlerÕs account of  interpellation is historically and socially inconsistent. More 
importantly, Butler misses the point of  the ISA essay, which is to establish Ôhow the material 
conditions of  production are themselves reproducedÕ (Chambers 2014: 63 original emphasis). 
Indeed, as Chambers clariÞes, ÔAlthusser seeks to show that we cannot understand any 
concept of  ÒideologyÓ without Þrst grasping it as fully material, as embedded within practices 
that are themselves embedded within the material structures of  a social formationÕ (2014: 63 original 
italics).  125
 Macherey conÞrms ButlerÕs debt to Freud and Lacan in her understanding of  how the ego recognises itself  125
within her account of  ideological interpellation (Macherey 2004: 13-16). For Macherey, ButlerÕs version of  the 
story in which the hailed individual turns around allows the now-subject to exclaim ÔÒI exist!ÓÕ, having 
performatively afÞrmed itself  in the act of  interpellation (2004: 13-14). According to MachereyÕs Butler then, an 
individual becomes a subject through the necessary act of  performing in the political, although the entrance to 
the political is contingent upon their participation Þrst within the social. As will be shown however, Althusser 
presumed no such topology. Instead, for Althusser, the individual is always/already a subject within the discourse 
of  ideology, and the interpelative act simply changes the subjectÕs relations. Fruitful research could be 
undertaken however based upon MachereyÕs distinction between AlthusserÕs and FoucaultÕs ideas of  
subjectiÞcation. Whilst Althusser conceptualised subjectiÞcation as the process of  placing within the 
reproduction of  ideology, Macherey states that Foucault Ôrelated it to a diffuse disciplinary power that was 
neither ideological nor dependent on central agencies of  decisionÕ (2004: 11). What is to be made of  the 
distinction between power in AlthusserÕs idea of  ideology and the non-ideological power of  Foucault?
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Before showing how Althusser illuminates the material conditions of  reproduction in 
Marx, it is worthwhile elaborating on ChambersÕs criticism of  ButlerÕs work in order to show 
what is at stake. This is because Chambers uses his criticism of  Butler to make a claim about 
both empiricism and idealism which is central to the argument of  this thesis. SpeciÞcally, 
Chambers shows that Butler starts her social analysis with an essentialised psychic subject, 
drawn heavily from the work of  Freud (Chambers 2014: 59). With this pre-given, empty 
subject, Chambers claims, Butler develops a theory of  the social using a Hegelian theory of  
Òdyadic recognitionÓ. As he puts it, she Ôevacuates the social-historical context [of  her social 
theory] so that she may construct a philosophical account of  recognition, and then she turns 
recognition itself  into the context for the emergence of  her new, thin, account of  the 
socialÕ (2014: 76-77). In other words, the liberal individualistic ontology that underpins her 
social thought is shrouded with a philosophical gloss that is her criticism of  Althusser. 
However, ButlerÕs concept of  the subject is not at the same level of  AlthusserÕs: whereas she 
relies on an idealised (thus empirical) ontology which is then populated with meaning through 
discourses (used problematically as a synonym for the social (2014: 77)), AlthusserÕs subject is 
conceived as part of  the social structure itself.  ButlerÕs fault lies in her formal separation 126
between the ontic and epistemic characteristics of  the subject, pre-supposing the former 
whilst offering only the latter up to critical thought. Chambers summarises that Ôfor Hegel, 
thought is the Real; for empiricism, the real is given and thought must Þnd a way to correspond 
to it, to map it, perhaps even to grasp it, but certainly not approach itÕ (2014: 105-106). Put 
more generally, both empiricism and idealism posit a radical differentiation between thought 
and matter, and occupy the same position that Badiou was in at the end of  chapter one: an 
inability to account for the veracity of  the translation between the ontological and 
epistemological. There is no way to account for the relation between ontology and 
 Lampert characterises the political issue at stake clearly. Demonstrating in the same vein as Chambers that 126
ButlerÕs ethics of  resistance is based upon the subjectÕs internal reßections, he goes on the state that Ôsuch an 
ethics seems ineffectual, and even nihilisticÕ (Lampert 2015: 137). By focussing on how a pre-given subject is only 
inßuenced by social structures, Butler cannot conceive of  subjectiÞcation other than as a process of  
subordination, or as all ideology in terms of  a dominant ideology. Yet, again, this places her in the same position 
as Badiou, for whom the militant could never escape the StateÕs authoritative counting against which the truth 
procedure was measured. For Butler, as Lampert argues, the subject would forever be entrapped by the 
dominant ideology, without which they would cease to be a subject. In comparison, AlthusserÕs ISA essay focuses 
on the reproduction of  the relations of  production which treats ideological interpellation as a contingent process. 
Lambert suggests that this allows him to advance a Ôpolitics of  resistanceÕ, and one might ask of  individuals: 
Ôwhat behaviour does a particular individual engage in, in order to be recognised as such-and-such kind of  
subjectÕ (2015: 137). While it is not clear why the individual could not ask themselves this same question, thus 
turning AlthusserÕs politics of  resistance into an ethics of  a different form than ButlerÕs, the two points can be 
taken from LampertÕs comparison. First, subjectiÞcation must not be conceptualised as synonymous with 
subordination and, secondly, in order not to do this, the individual and subjectiÞcation must be conceptualised 
immanently within the mode of  production.
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epistemology if  one is grounded by the other, as this split would necessarily have to be deÞned 
within the terms of  one or the other, and self-reßexive explanation is tautological. 
The hope of  speculative resistance 
ChambersÕ criticism of  both idealism and empiricism provides the means to show how 
MeillassouxÕs speculative approach is beguiling in its promises, but hides a misconceived 
relationship between the formal and the sensible. This will be highlighted below but, Þrst, 
having identiÞed the problem which Meillassoux addresses, what does his approach entail? 
MeillassouxÕs Þrst move is to establish what he calls an ÒanhypotheticalÓ principle which, Ôby 
working through the intra-systemic consequences of  his opponentsÕ logic and the relations 
between their positions, marks an acknowledgement that any and all philosophical hypothesis 
are already immersed in the conjunctural Þeld within which one establishes a positionÕ (Brown 
2009: 11). This method is the same as AlthusserÕs Òsymptomatic readingÓ, and the purpose of  
both is to identify denegated foundational claims in arguments which are then shown to be 
illegitimate.  Using this principle, Meillassoux demonstrates the obvious fact that knowledge 127
is historically and socially conditioned, but makes the more subtle claim that the weakness 
shared by all the positions he criticises is that they all unwittingly subscribe to the Òprinciple 
of  facticityÓ. According to Meillassoux, the principle of  facticity demonstrates that Ôwe can 
only describe the logical principles inherent in every thinkable proposition, but we cannot 
deduce their truthÕ. ÔConsequentlyÕ, he continues, Ôthere is no sense in claiming to know that 
contradiction is absolutely impossibleÕ (Meillassoux 2008: 39). The principle of  facticity 
clearly has signiÞcant implications for any attempts to understand the arch-fossil as, prior to 
human experience, there is nothing to say that the world was not entirely other than what it is 
now (i.e. contradictory). Secondly, it is a problem for the activist because they cannot 
guarantee that the world tomorrow will accord to the same rules that they have deduced for 
the world today. Why should anyone elseÐor activists themselves for that matterÐcommit to 
action in the knowledge that tomorrow everything could change for no reason whatsoever?  128
However, identifying the principle of  facticity simply shows that the logical propositions we 
 Althusser uses the term denegate to Ôdesignate an unconscious denial masked by a conscious acceptanceÕ. In 127
other words, a process is denegated when it is used to furnish a result, but when one does not appreciate that this 
product was a result of  said process. For further explanation, see its note in (Althusser and Balibar 1970: : 312).
 Meillassoux develops the implications of  the principle of  facticity particularly clearly with regard to HumeÕs 128
billiard ball problem in his second monograph, Science Fiction and Extro-Science Fiction (2013: 8-32).
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use to describe the worldÕs stability cannot account for why it is necessarily so; Meillassoux still 
has to give an explanation for what might provide such an account. 
The second move of  the speculative gesture therefore involves taking the principle of  
facticity at face value, i.e. accepting that factual claims about the world are necessarily 
contingent, and then inducing from this position a (non-sufÞcient) reason for why the world is 
nevertheless manifestly stable. Meillassoux rejects any claim that the constancy of  phenomena 
guarantees the stability of  an ultimately contingent world because both constancy and chance 
(i.e that which accounts for the fact that some things appear unconÞned by a scientiÞc 
understanding of  the world) form two sides of  the same coin that is Epicurean aleatory 
reasoning. Chance presupposes the existence of  other natural laws and, as such, is subject to 
the principle of  facticity to the same extent. However, Meillassoux is keen to maintain the 
difference between chance and contingency, making it clear that the latter is capable of  
Ôaffecting the very conditions that allow chance events to occur and existÕ (Meillassoux 2008: 
101). Thus, in order to account for the radically non-totalising condition of  contingency, 
whilst acknowledging the inadequacy of  sufÞcient reason to account for its own veridicality 
(i.e. the principle of  facticity), Meillassoux turns to (and references) the same ZFC set theory 
that Badiou calls the language of  being qua being. The speciÞc claim that Meillassoux makes 
is that Ôthere is a mathematical way of  rigorously distinguishing contingency from chance, and 
it is provided by the transÞniteÕ (2008: 104). 
For Meillassoux, CantorÕs work in showing that quantities are unable to be indexed by 
any Þnite number can be taken to make a further ontological claim. Because a set of  inÞnite 
numbers cannot contain the quantity of  the parts of  the set, it is demonstrably impossible to 
totalise any given set of  laws - including, for Meillassoux, natural laws.  Thus, mathematics 129
(at least in its speciÞc variant of  ZFC set theory read through BadiouÕs Being and Event), 
provides Meillassoux with an ontological answer to HumeÕs epistemic problem, Òin what sense 
of  truth can we think and talk of  ancestral statements?Ó. By positing that mathematical 
axiomatisation provides a way to think the untotalisable without totalising it, Meillassoux is 
comfortable concluding that one can Ôthink the stability of  laws without having to redouble 
them with an enigmatic physical necessityÕ (Meillassoux 2008: 107). In other words, the 
stability of  laws becomes indexed by the application of  an absolutised mathematics, where 
what is mathematically conceivable is absolutely possible, even if  it is not necessarily true or 
 See footnote 34 in chapter two, as well as Meillassoux (2008: 104, 105).129
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actual. Whilst Meillassoux accepts that he does not show how this conclusion demonstrates 
itself  how to answer ancestral questions, he is content to claim it shows that the in-itself  can 
be thought absolutely, through axiomatised mathematics. 
Yet, is MeillassouxÕs ontological gesture being grounded on the problem of  ancestral 
questions precisely the reason why it cannot answer them? For Hallward, no stranger to 
BadiouÕs mathematic ontology, this is just the case. He describes MeillassouxÕs project as 
ÔseductiveÕ, but concludes his criticism of  it by stating that the Ôcritique of  metaphysical 
necessity and an appeal to transÞnite mathematics will not provide, on their own, the basis 
upon which we might renew a transformative materialismÕ (Hallward 2011: 140-141). 
Hallward doubts that, if  the point of  philosophy is to conceptualise how one can change the 
way things are, the pure mathematics of  transÞnite set theory can function as an applied 
mathematics able to think both secondary qualities (such as colour and texture), but most 
primary qualities as well (length, mass and date) (2011: 140). How would one construct a 
concrete process of  social and political change, without being able to think the most basic 
qualities of  objects? It is precisely the fact that mathematics indexes the stability of  laws and 
does nothing else that leaves it mute to thinking either primary or secondary relations, let alone 
social relations. Thus, Hallward is right to Þrmly insist that ÔMeillassouxÕs acausal ontology 
[É] includes no account of  an actual process of  transformation or developmentÕ, and that his 
Ôinsistence that anything might happen can only amount to an insistence on the bare 
possibility of  radical changeÕ (Hallward 2011: 139). 
However, taking Hallward to task for extending MeillassouxÕs arguments past their 
original intent, Nathan Brown argues that the former misses the point in the speculative 
account of  qualities. For Brown, Meillassoux does not argue that Ôunits of  measurement or 
mathematical descriptions of  objects Òmight be independent of  the mindÓÕ, but that 
Meillassoux follows Descartes in arguing that Ômathematical descriptions of  physics or 
cosmology index primary qualitiesÕ (Brown 2011: 145 emphasis added). Relations of  
measurement (i.e. length, mass and date), according to Brown, are therefore relative to primary 
qualities which are properties of  the in-itself. Thus, science can talk of  the way things really 
are, even if  talk of  this is subject-speciÞc, because it builds on the formal prescriptions of  
mathematics. HallwardÕs attempt to dismiss MeillassouxÕs thought as a result of  its inability to 
think speciÞc historical events is thus, for Brown, to criticise him for not thinking something 
that Meillassoux never says he will think in the Þrst place. That is to say: speculative 
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materialism cannot account for, or explain, historical events, but Meillassoux never pretends 
to the contrary. Rather, Brown argues that Meillassoux simply shows that any account of  
Ôthose structural invariants which govern our worldÕ are necessarily open to contingent 
change, built as they are upon mathematical grounds (Meillassoux 2008: 38). As he 
summarises, Ôthe principle of  factiality requires that we think relation as a fact, rather than an 
absoluteÕ (Brown 2011: 149). For Brown then, no: the reason why Meillassoux accepts that he 
cannot answer ancestral questions is not because he cannot do so, but because he cannot do 
so and was never trying to do so in the Þrst place. Indeed, Meillassoux might argue that 
speculative materialism shines a light in front of  the activist by showing the possibility that 
dominant and seemingly-determining social structures are in fact, necessarily, open to being 
radically other. The political argument, which Meillassoux has so far not made in his 
published works, might be that the activist must work to transform social structures to their 
liking given the rallying call that they are contingent after all.  130
Nevertheless, Hallward is right to insist that MeillassouxÕs promise is beguiling. Despite 
BrownÕs caution against reading too much into MeillassouxÕs philosophy, there is a sense in 
which the activist must demand more than speculative materialism can offer. For, when 
Meillassoux concludes that all relations are necessarily contingent (rather than necessary in 
themselves) he gives the activist hope that s/he can change them. In other words, there is a 
formal prescription that results from his ontology that declares resistance to the given possible. 
And yet, this formal prescription says nothing of  the activistÕs ability to produce any 
signiÞcant change whatsoever. Hallward puts it well, reasoning that the Ôabstract logical 
possibility of  change (given the absence of  any ultimately sufÞcient reason) has little to do 
with any concrete process of  actual change (Hallward 2011: 139). Meillassoux tells the activist 
that resistance is necessarily possible, but not necessarily probable.  In doing so, he 131
demonstrates a radical disconnection between the formal and empirical. There are two 
upshots of  this disconnection.  
First, any hope derived from speculative materialism may well be only false hope. 
MeillassouxÕs philosophy (in its current form) can say nothing about the potentially 
insurmountable difÞculty which faces the activist. For, although his future work may bridge 
 Although Meillassoux has yet to publish anything explicitly political, Graham HarmanÕs book on Meillassoux 130
Philosophy in the Making contains an interview, passages of  which support this supposition (2011: 163, 173). 
 SpeciÞcally, building on CantorÕs diagonalisation, MeillassouxÕs principle of  factiality states that Ôwhat is 131
mathematically conceivable is absolutely possibleÕ (Meillassoux 2008: 126).
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the gap between the formal and the empirical, like Badiou, MeillassouxÕs current insistence in 
subtracting the empirical from his ontology ensures that he can say nothing about the actual 
nature of  social relations. It is all well and good pointing out to the slave, the sans-papier, or the 
subaltern that their condition is necessarily changeable but, unless this helps them 
conceptualise how to escape their conditions, it will be of  little use to them. This is not to say 
that the activist should necessarily demand a normative philosophy or political formulae from 
Meillassoux, but that speculative materialism is unable (and indeed unwilling) to provide any 
positive commentary on the empirical whatsoever (Hallward 2011: 139). Furthermore, it is 
hard to see that MeillassouxÕs conclusion (i.e. that factual relations are actually contingent) is 
any signiÞcant development upon what correlationist philosophy already concludes. The idea 
of  contingency is not new to post-Kantian philosophy and, whilst this criticism does not 
reduce the academic importance of  MeillassouxÕs work, it will be of  no surprise to the 
individual (activist or otherwise) that historical conditions change, or that they have little say 
in both why and how they do so. It seems rather that MeillassouxÕs argument provides little in 
the way of  conclusions that empirical investigation hasnÕt already demonstrated, i.e. that the 
world might change at any moment, for no reason, but that it hasnÕt. MeillassouxÕs rejoinder, 
that speculative materialism demonstrates how chance has nothing to do with why the world 
doesnÕt change, seems like an unsatisfactory trump card. 
The second upshot of  speculative materialismÕs absolutisation of  contingency is that, 
according to its conclusions, activists have no reason to suppose that their efforts wonÕt be in 
vain, regardless of  the difÞculty they Þnd themselves facing. BrownÕs defence of  Meillassoux 
must accept that, if  Meillassoux shows that the structural invariants that govern our world are 
contingent and open to change, he also shows the same for those of  the activist. Despite 
MeillassouxÕs argument that chance is as much at the mercy of  his critique of  sufÞcient 
reason as all other relational claims, it is precisely MeillassouxÕs insistence that anything at all 
might happen for no reason (although there is no reason that it would) that undermines the 
efforts of  the activist. Of  course, the activist will accept, even without Meillassoux, that 
politics is precarious and that political resistance is fraught with unforeseen challenges to be 
overcome. But MeillassouxÕs argument is more radical, pointing out that the laws governing 
the results of  their efforts might instantly change for no predictable reason. The fact that, for 
Meillassoux, chance is necessarily contingent does not necessarily mean that chance wonÕt 
occur. Furthermore, the reduction of  all other laws to the same status of  absolutely 
contingent does not immunise them from chance either. Resistance, according to speculative 
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materialism, would therefore be practiced in the constant fear that, on the one hand, the hope 
that change to come is not after all a false hope and, on the other, that it is not all for nothing, 
because the world has simply become other for no particular reason. Meillassoux has invented 
the InÞnite Improbability Drive, and how frustrating it must have been for the sperm whale, 
which was previously a nuclear missile, to fall headlong from the sky, for the second time 
(Adams 1979: 117). 
Thus, the disconnection between the formal and the empirical in speculative realism 
results in MeillassouxÕs ability to show how thought may formally think its own index of  
primary qualities. However speculative materialism is unable to think the empirical. Indeed 
Meillassoux understands this perfectly well when he states that Ô[p]hilosophyÕs task consists in 
re-absolutising the scope of  mathematicsÕ and, further, that Ôthe task of  the principle of  
factialityÕ is to derive Ôthe capacity, proper to every mathematical statement, through which 
the latter is capable of  formulate a possibility that can be absolutised, even if  only 
hypotheticallyÕ (2008: 126). Again, this is a reiteration of  his position that what is 
mathematically conceivable is absolutely possible, but only hypothetically so. In separating the 
formal from the empirical, Meillassoux thereby shows the same rationalist assertions that both 
underpinned and undermined BadiouÕs ontology. Meillassoux seems surprised that this would 
be an issue, stating that Ôit is astonishing to note how [É] philosophers, who are generally the 
partisans of  thought rather than of  the senses, have opted overwhelmingly to trust their 
habitual perceptions rather than the luminous clarity of  intellectionÕ (Meillassoux 2008: 91). 
And yet Meillassoux seems to have forgotten, and therefore not accounted for the fact, that, 
Þrst, he also trusts his habitual perceptions as well as his intellect and, secondly, he 
subordinates habitual perceptions to a lexically posterior position after the intellect. 
MeillassouxÕs subordination of  the perceptions to the intellect, and concomitant inability to 
think new perceptions, will be shown in order to contrast AlthusserÕs account of  the formation 
of  knowledge, which does take into account the conceptualisation of  new perceptions. 
Meillassoux claims that the Ôcondition of  possibility for physics is the repeatability of  
experiments, which is the fundamental guarantor of  the validity of  a theoryÕ (Meillassoux 
2008: 86). However, he then goes on to pose the situation that leads to HumeÕs problem in 
terms of  the ability of  experiments to achieve the same results after repetition. So, for 
Meillassoux, it is not just the ability for experiments to be reproduced which is necessary for 
science, but for them to come out with the same results when they are. The former criterionÐ
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the possibility of  reproductionÐis a formal criteria which has to do only with the hypothetical 
possibility of  the experiment being undertaken. It is only the latter criterionÐthe veracity of  
the experimentsÕ results to each otherÐwhich actually constitutes the validity of  science, 
according to Meillassoux. This distinction is important, not least because it describes the 
working differentiation between theoretical physics on the one hand (which has no need of  
empirical validity) and applied physics on the other (which does). The fact that Meillassoux 
does not account for the difference between the two sub-disciplines brings into question 
exactly what idea of  science he has in mind. Yet his unwillingness to take into account the 
formation of  the description of  scientiÞc resultsÐor, speciÞcally, the description of  the 
phenomena that result from scientiÞc experimentationÐmeans that Meillassoux cannot account 
for the veracity of  scientiÞc results from the perspective of  the phenomena. ScientiÞc practice, 
according to speculative materialism, can only go by a formal description of  what science 
looks for and must necessarily ignore new phenomena that it has not developed (necessarily 
contingent) laws to explain. In other words, Meillassoux assumes the stability of  the world 
because he has no way of  conceptualising new sensible criteria by which to establish its 
instability.  132
Meillassoux thereby falls to the same criticism at the hands of  Osborne as Badiou did in 
chapter one: he advocates Ôa full-blown idealism struggling with the limitations of  its grasp on 
actuality, which redeÞnes reality in terms of  the gap that structures the limitation (Osborne 
2013: 22 original emphasis). To be precise, when Meillassoux argues that Ôthe refutation of  
the frequential implication cannot consist in demonstrating that the stability of  the world 
conforms to the laws of  chance - rather, it should demonstrate that the contingency of  natural 
laws remains inaccessible to aleatory reasoningÕ (Meillassoux 2008: 100 original emphasis), he 
misses the point that the categories (such as aleatory reasoning) are part of  what he calls the 
stability of  the world. In other words, MeillassouxÕs subtraction of  everything except for the 
mathematical transÞnite from what he intends to explain allows him only then to index 
explanations against the mathematical. Yet it is not clear what beneÞts this might bring and, 
instead, it seems that a suitable investigation into the world must account for the constitution 
of  the terms it uses as part of  this investigation, as well as their stability. 
 Golumbia agrees, but puts it slightly differently when he claims that Ôunlike most proponents of  realism in 132
Anglo-American philosophy, Meillassoux refuses even to acknowledge the possibility that human perception 
might not provide perfect access to objective realityÕ (Golumbia 2016: 58).
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Ideas and the social formation 
In contrast to MeillassouxÕs account of  speculative materialism, and the previous 
discussions of  idealism, the rest of  this chapter will demonstrate how Althusser and Marx 
conceptualise thought as an immanent part of  what Chambers calls the Òsocial formationÓ. 
Secondly, it will show that DeleuzeÕs philosophy of  time can suture the aleatory void that 
renders AlthusserÕs philosophy idealist. Once sutured with DeleuzeÕs philosophy of  time, 
AlthusserÕs dialectical materialism avoids the charge of  idealism by accounting for the 
constitution of  the terms it uses in its analysis (unlike MeillassouxÕs speculative theory with 
regard to contingent laws). The key to this avoidance is that DeleuzeÕs syntheses account for 
the constitution of  the individual in time, as the individual synthesises these very 
conditions.  For Althusser then, the individual is populated (but not constituted) by their 133
relationship with the social formation, and does not exist outside of  those relations.  The 134
term population, rather than constitution, is used with regards to Althusser because of  the 
originary philosophical decision that his philosophy necessitates. For the same reason that 
Badiou criticises Kant, i.e. that there is an assumed originary unity that makes synthetic 
judgements possible, Althusser also assumes an originary void within philosophical practice. 
This void is posited as necessarily inconsistent and therefore requires population. When 
sutured to DeleuzeÕs concept of  individuation however, and by taking into account DeleuzeÕs 
three syntheses of  time, which overcome the idealism in AlthusserÕs work, a synthetic 
 DeLanda makes the useful observation that DeleuzeÕs use of  the term ÒindividualÓ is at least idiosyncratic. 133
According to him, for ÔDeleuze the term ÒindividualÓ refers to an entity in the process of  actualisation, that is, before 
it acquires its Þnal qualities and extensitiesÕ (DeLanda 2005 [2002]: 83-84). Whilst this deÞnition provides a 
useful reference to processes, thus distinguishing DeleuzeÕs concept of  the individual from those of, for example, 
the liberal tradition, Clisby provides an important rectiÞcation of  DeLandaÕs understand of  the virtual/
intensive/actual tripartite. For DeLanda, reality has three distinct Ôthree spheres of  reality, with virtual 
multiplicities constraining and guiding intensive processes which in turn would yield speciÞc actual 
entitiesÕ (DeLanda 2005: 86). The implication of  DeLandaÕs deÞnition of  individual then is that there are two 
kinds of  individual: a post-individual entity in the sphere of  the actual that is different in kind from non-actual 
entity that he calls ÒindividualÓ above. As Clisby clariÞes however, individuation and actualisation are in 
themselves different in kind, and there is a metaphysical priority of  individuation over actualisation (Clisby 2015: 
142). Clisby quotes Deleuze explicitly warning of  the dangers of  conßating the two: Ôany reduction of  
individuation to a limit or complication of  differenciation, compromises the whole philosophy of  difference. This 
would be an error, this time in the actual, analogous to that made in confusing the virtual with the 
possibleÕ (Clisby 2015: 145, Deleuze 2011 [1994]: 308-309). According to ClisbyÕs clariÞcation, DeLandaÕs 
deÞnition of  the individual is misleading. It would be more correct to say that, for Deleuze, the term 
ÒindividualÓ refers to an entity in the process of  individuation, where this process is Ôpart of  the actualÕ, but not 
reducible to it (Clisby 2015: 146).
 This chapter will work with the deÞnition of  the Òsocial formationÓ that is used by Chambers: Ôthe social 134
formation is itself  a political form, a politicised structure, whereas Òthe socialÓ may well be a sphere separate 
from Òthe politicalÓ domainÕ (Chambers 2014: 55). For Chambers, the social formation is distinct from Òthe 
socialÓ in the sense that the latter is only a particularly demarcated region of  the former. The social formation 
exceeds the social, taking into account the political and aesthetic, as well as the structures and practices that 
constitute their formation and reproduction.
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conception of  the individual can be thought as part of  the latterÕs social theory. Thus, the 
path will be paved to develop an ontological theory of  ethics that is latent in DeleuzeÕs work 
and is furnished by AlthusserÕs social theory.  
Lest it be thought (and indeed it has been shown that it was thought) that AlthusserÕs 
work was an attempt to de-politicise Marxism, it is important to remember at this stage that, 
by destabilising the ontologically primary subject (such as that found in Butler), to quote 
Lampert, ÔAlthusser is advancing a politics of  resistanceÕ (Lampert 2015: 137). This is not a 
resistance against the subject per se, and Williams is wrong to claim that it was Ôprecisely the 
phantasm of  the subject which Althusser strove to eliminate in Reading CapitalÕ (Williams 
2001: 58).  Rather, as Althusser develops in his essay on ISAs, the subject is the object of  
ideology, which is the theory of  social relations (Althusser 1971a: 170). Thus, Althusser 
cannot eliminate the subject, because it is a constituent function of  ideology: how else would 
he (for better or worse) think individualsÕ place in the world? Althusser destabilises dogmatic 
conceptions of  the subject (such as that found in Badiou), and subverts traditional, 
conservative social relations. Such a destabilisation impels the individual to take an active 
interest in their political and social situation, and it is this interest which constitutes the ethics 
to be developed in the next chapter.  Within AlthusserÕs thought, the concept of  the 135
individual must be thought separately to the concept of  the subject and, accordingly, 
Chambers does not talk of  the subject at all.  
To reiterate ChamberÕs Althusserian argument regarding philosophy: philosophy that 
posits a radical differentiation between the ontological and epistemological, and the 
grounding of  one upon the other, cannot account for this grounding in the terms of  either. As 
Deleuze asserted in his 1956-1957 seminar series What is Grounding?, demonstrating further 
similarity with AlthusserÕs project, in order to make a claim, one needs to assert oneÕs right (or 
authority) to do so and this involves positing a ground (Deleuze 2015 [1956-7]: 22). As the 
authority by which a claim makes sense is not to be found within the claim itself, nor is it 
inherent within the subject that makes the claim, Deleuze argues that it must be grounded in 
a ÒthirdÓ. This third cannot simply be either ontological or epistemological, empirical or 
 AlthusserÕs appropriation of  SpinozaÕs ontology means that his politics can be seen in the same light. 135
Referencing AlthusserÕs attempts to synthesise MarxÕs scientiÞc methodology and his initial humanism with 
Spinoza, he argues the the beneÞt of  this is that ÔSpinozaÕs immanentism can Þnally liberate us from all forms 
of dialectics, from all  teleology; that his materialism is not narrow, but aleatory and open to the virtualise of  
being; that through the avowed articulation between immanentism and materialism, knowledge will henceforth 
rely on resistance, and happiness on the rational passion of  the multitudeÕ (Negri 2013: 20). AlthusserÕs politics 
are therefore, alongside SpinozaÕs, not dialectic but subversive (2013: 5).
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formal, as this would make an empirical claim about the nature of  the ground and, thus, 
open the ground up to the problem of  circular justiÞcation. Therefore, for Deleuze, Ôground is 
the instance invoked by and in the demand of  the claimÕ (2015 [1956-7]: 24). The ground 
assumes no formal difference between ontology or epistemology in service of  the claim, but 
uses what it needs in the practice of  claiming. It is in this way that, for Deleuze, claims make 
sense and constitute, through the use of  the third, their own coherence.  Whilst the 136
invocation of  the third may account for how sense is made by a claim, it does not explain the 
relationship between thought and matter. For Chambers, this relationship is constituted by the 
practices that make up the social formation. 
Drawing on MarxÕs The German Ideology, Chambers argues that it is not thought that 
thinks, but human beings. Chambers does not however posit a crude rationalism himself, as 
Ôhuman beings can only think from within the context of  the social formation in which they 
Þnd themselvesÕ (Chambers 2014: 106). To this end, the material activities and structures in 
which individuals live condition them to think about these conditions or, put in the terms 
above, human beings are situated in material conditions that overdetermine their claims 
about the world.  Thus, as Chambers puts it, there is Ôno such thing as epistemology, a theory of  137
knowledge, that is not also and at the same time a theory of  the social formationÕ (2014: 106 original 
emphasis).  Unlike Meillassoux, who does not think it necessary to account for the 138
constitution of  concepts by which the empirical is thought, Chambers emphasises the 
production of  thought as part of  the process of  historical development. In doing so, 
Chambers complicates the assumption that Meillassoux uses throughout After Finitude, i.e. that 
we are able to think the in-itself  because, for Chambers, to assume this would be to miss the 
 Against HyppoliteÕs Hegelian criticism of  Deleuze, Nathan Widder develops DeleuzeÕs constructive ontology, 136
invoking what he calls the ÔEvent of  sense that brings together Ideas and bodiesÕ (2003: 452).
 In an article called ÔOrigin of  the StructureÕ in the journal Cahiers pour lÕAnalyse, Jean-Jacques Miller deÞned 137
overdetermination as Ôthe structuring determination which, by being exercised through the biases of  the 
imaginary, becomes indirect, unequal and eccentric in relation to its effectsÕ (Hallward and Peden 2013: ch. 2).
 Although a full discussion of  MillÕs thought will be left for the next chapter, it is worth noting that, in the 138
Considerations, he makes a similar claim: Ôthere can be no separate Science of  GovernmentÉ. All questions 
respecting the tendencies of  forms of  government must stand part of  the general science of  society, not of  any 
separate branch of  itÕ (Mill 1977c: 906).
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point that the in-itself  is itself a conceptual product of  social formation.  In other words, 139
what Meillassoux calls the in-itself  does not exist outside the practices and structures that 
constitute both the real present and the thought of  the present. It is this distinction between 
what Marx, Althusser and Chambers call the ÒrealÓ and the Òthought of  the realÓ that solves 
the problem of  grounding found in both BadiouÕs and MeillassouxÕs work; neither the real, 
nor thought of  the real, grounds the other, because they are both reciprocally produced and 
presupposed by the other. As such, Chambers does not have to undertake the circular task of  
accounting for grounds. 
MarxÕs distinction between the real and thought follows SpinozaÕs distinction between 
the attributes of  thought and extension. This is not the same as BadiouÕs distinction between 
ontology and epistemology, because it does not make sense to think of  the real coherently 
expressing itself  without thought. For Badiou, mathematics is ontology, i.e. the language of  
the ontic, irrespective of  the relationship between the ontic and the individual, and 
irrespective of  the latter thinking, writing or actualising mathematics. Indeed, this explains the 
title of  chapter three in HallwardÕs Badiou: a Subject to Truth, ÔInÞnite by PrescriptionÕ (2003: 
49-78); the subject, for Badiou, is because it must be (on the condition of  mathematics which, 
for Badiou, take ontological priority over philosophy). Only on condition of  the formalist 
subject can philosophy actualise mathematical prescriptions, and this priority leads to the 
problems regarding the conceptualisation of  phenomena (more explicitly) shown in 
MeillassouxÕs work above. Instead, for Marx and Althusser, as Chambers puts it, there is an 
ÔinterweavingÕ of  epistemology with the real, so that practices are always a major Ôconstituent 
part of  any social formationÕ (Chambers 2014: 108). In this conÞguration, epistemology and 
the real are both concrete: they both reciprocally determine one another through theoretical 
practices and material practices, and are conditioned by their differential relation with each 
other. Thus, as Chambers puts it succinctly, Ô[t]he social formation is made up of  practices, 
and it is made up of  thoughts of  practices. Above all, the conceptualisation of  practices itself  
organises, structures, and potentially directs those practicesÕ (Chambers 2014: 108). Whereas 
Badiou claims that ontology can express the ontic (or, the ÒrealÓ) in spite of  matter, Chambers 
 Chambers uses the idea of  the social formation, alternating with the Ômore generic termÕ Ôsocial orderÕ in 139
effort to avoid Ôlimiting [himself] to the Althusserian terminology or theoretical frameworkÕ (Chambers 2014: 21, 
ff. 18). The two conceptualisations used by Chambers are similar to the conceptualisation of  class struggle as the 
motor of  history found in AlthusserÕs Essays in Self-Criticism (Althusser 1976: 35-77), however Chambers is at 
pains not to build any form of  theory per se (Chambers 2014: 20). Chambers provides a less ambitious, but 
nonetheless equally compelling, account of  social formation from a composite of  different ÔperspectivesÕ, that 
emphasises the openness to revision and modiÞcation of  his work, Ômuch like the social formation itself Õ (2014: 
20)
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shows that matter is a prerequisite for the expression of  the real. Without material relations, 
there would be no way to organise, construct, direct or, ultimately, think the real. 
What is the precise nature of  the relation between theoretical practice and material 
practice? Chambers is keen to point out both that, for Marx, thought is not the thought ÔofÕ 
the real, and that Ôthought does not grasp the real directlyÕ (2014: 106). For both Chambers 
and Althusser, humans think objects, not as a real objects, but as theoretical objects. Were the 
real object to be thought, then the real would always be reduced to the given, rather than also 
what is possible. Instead, Chambers and Althusser are in line with Hume, Kant, Hegel and 
Deleuze in arguing that we must study a theoretical object in order to theorise what may 
happen to the real object, because to Ôknow is to go beyondÕ; [É] Ôit is to say more than what 
is givenÕ (Deleuze 2015 [1956-7]: 25). Althusser and Chambers thus show how the social 
formation conditions thought to go beyond what is givenÐthe realÐas thought thinks both 
itself  (i.e. thought) and the Ôrelationship between the real and thoughtÕ (Chambers 2014: 107). 
In opposing a strict determinism, both authors escape the determinism of  Hegelian Marxism 
(where being determines thought) and BadiouÕs and MeillassouxÕs rationalism (where thought 
presupposes what being then reciprocally determines). Rather, AlthusserÕs emphasis on 
practice, as opposed to locating a transcendental ground, accounts for how thought, thought 
of  the real and the real interact.  Similarly, AlthusserÕs conception of  philosophy as practice 140
in relation to real, material practices allows Althusser to theorise the practices and 
technologies that populate the social formation.  Furthermore, it is the practice of  philosophy 141
that accounts for the constitution of  the third in AlthusserÕs philosophy: it is the positing of  
the aleatory void at the front of  philosophy in order to clear the way for further thought. 
Chambers has therefore demonstrated how Althusser overcomes the problematic disjunction 
between thought and matter, as evinced in BadiouÕs onto-mathematics and MeillassouxÕs 
speculative materialism. An upshot of  this disjunction that can now be seen is that 
Meillassoux is mistaken in his assumption that there is, in fact, an in-itself  to think. Because 
the in-itself  only exists to the extent that it is produced by the differential, productive relation of  
the real and thought of  the real, any concept of  the in-itself  as such is a presentation of  this 
 Drawing out the inßuence of  Spinoza on both Althusser and Deleuze, Diefenbach argues that both Ôconverge 140
at the question of  how a structure differentiates through its distancesÕ (Diefenbach 2013: 169). As Massumi has 
argued, highlighting the Spinozist inßuence that underpins both authorsÕ philosophies, Ô[t]he relationship 
between the levels of  intensity and qualiÞcation is not one of  conformity or correspondence, but of  resonation 
or interference, ampliÞcation or dampeningÕ (Massumi 1995: 86).
 La Caze and Lloyd show that theoretical practice and material practice are both affective in the sense 141
inherited from SpinozaÕs conception of  thought and extension (La Caze and Lloyd 2011: 1).
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relation.  Were the language of  the in-itself  still necessaryÐand it is no longer clear that it isÐ
the question to be asked would therefore be: what is the function of  the in-itself  (understood 
as a particular conÞguration of  social practices) within the situation that requires thinking it?  
However, the concept of  the void in AlthusserÕs philosophy must nevertheless be 
remembered before concluding that he removes idealism from his philosophy. As the previous 
chapter showed, the concept of  the void undermines his philosophy as it prohibits an account 
of  the persistence of  thought within the event. Although Althusser accounts for differential 
times that are entirely separate from the standard understanding of  linear time, he 
nevertheless can only account for the population of  a pre-given event, and cannot account for 
the constitution of  the event itself. Therefore, in order to fully remove all traces of  idealism 
from his thought, this aleatory void must be constituted with an account of  persistence, i.e. 
that which was in the past. To bring AlthusserÕs account of  ontology and socially-productive 
epistemology into accord with both his anti-humanist philosophy and HumeÕs concept of  the 
relational individual, it is thus necessary to make a second suture. This suture is DeleuzeÕs 
three syntheses of  time which, although playing several functions within DeleuzeÕs philosophy, 
together account for the passage from the virtual to the actual, and the persistence of  the past 
into (and through) the present (Williams 2011: 15). Suturing DeleuzeÕs three syntheses of  time 
to AlthusserÕs social theory will allow for the persistence of  time in AlthusserÕs philosophy and, 
together, provide the context for an ethics of  resistance to be developed in the next chapter. 
Time and the syntheses of  Ideas 
 Deleuze conceptualises time, not in the sense of  a homogenous Þeld of  intuition as 
Kant argues, nor in the sense of  BadiouÕs contradictory time-lines that emerge from the 
event, but rather Ôa series of  heterogenous syntheses, some passive and some activeÕ (Williams 
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2013b: 98).  Although the active syntheses (representation, contiguity, causality, resemblance 142
and opposition) are important for the individual in order to Ôlive empiricallyÕ, these are a 
second level of  temporality for Deleuze (2011 [1994]: 92, 105). The ÒempiricalÓ syntheses are 
reminiscent of  the relations that constitute human nature for Hume, and are a reminder for 
the reader of  Deleuze who might wish to downplay the importance that Deleuze places on 
the ÒrealityÓ of  events.  The passive syntheses are important for Deleuze because they are 143
the metaphysical conditions of  the individual or, in DeleuzeÕs terms, a Ôpre-reßexive 
 DeleuzeÕs theory of  time is possibly the most difÞcult and nuanced component of  his philosophy, and spans 142
his texts on Kant (2008 [1963]), Bergson (1991 [1988]), Difference and Repetition (2011 [1994]), The Logic of  Sense 
(2004 [1969]), through to both volumes of  his work on Cinema (2005a, 2005b). Nevertheless, as Lundy explains 
in his review of  WilliamsÕ Gilles DeleuzeÕs Philosophy of  Time, ÔDeleuzeÕs books on Cinema, which clearly have much 
to do with time, add nothing to DeleuzeÕs philosophy of  time, and indeed detract from itÕ (Lundy 2014: 126). By 
taking cinema as the object of  their studies, the Cinema books use time functionally more than they develop a 
philosophy of  time itself, which is what is important for the argument in this chapter. As such, and following 
WilliamsÕ claim that DeleuzeÕs philosophy of  time is Ôexpounded in its Òmost consistent and extensive formÓ in 
Difference and Repetition, it is this form which is used for the purposes of  this chapter (Williams 2011: 161). There 
has been a large amount of  literature that appropriates DeleuzeÕs conceptualisation of  time: see Ansell-Pearson 
(1999), Crocker (2001), Al-Saji (2004), Deamer (2011), Pisters (2011, 2012), Somers-Hall (2011) and Smith 
(2013). As Williams acknowledges in his detailed study of  DeleuzeÕs theory however, whilst scholarship on 
DeleuzeÕs work often uses his theory of  time in order to underpin claims which are tangentially related to it, 
there are fewer texts that concentrate speciÞcally on time per se (Williams 2011: 2). WilliamsÕ Gilles DeleuzeÕs 
Philosophy of  Time was written with the clear explication of  DeleuzeÕs theory in mind and is indeed an excellent 
reference point for understanding the topic, whilst his critical introduction and guide for Difference and Repetition 
(Deleuze 2011 [1994]) develops his work on the three syntheses in relation to DeleuzeÕs book more generally 
(Williams 2013b). Two other book-length texts to note are Ansell-PearsonÕs Germinal Life (1999), which reads 
DeleuzeÕs philosophy of  time in contrast to, though having developed from, BergsonÕs concept of  duration, and 
BryantÕs Difference and Givenness (2008). Whilst not playing down the detail and accuracy of  WilliamsÕ and Ansell-
PearsonÕs work, BryantÕs Difference and Givenness will be used predominantly in what follows as it foregrounds the 
importance and contribution that DeleuzeÕs theory of  time gives to metaphysics. BryantÕs text emphasises, as 
indeed Deleuze does himself, the necessity to conceptualise time in-itself  (i.e. as a differential relation that pre-
supposes its elements) that accommodates the non-dogmatic persistence of  the past into the present. It is this 
persistence which is the key to removing the idealism latent within AlthusserÕs idea of  philosophical practice.
 One such critic of  Deleuze is Peter Hallward, who argues that DeleuzeÕs philosophy comes from Out of  This 143
World (2006). Although he appreciates the lack of  an actual God in DeleuzeÕs thought, Hallward argues that 
Deleuze falls in line with ÔtheophanicÕ conceptions of  the world, where every object, process, or idea is an 
expression of  a God (or its equivalent) (2006: 4). Hallward claims that DeleuzeÕs trademark ontological condition 
of  ÒbecomingÓ applies writ large across DeleuzeÕs entire philosophy so that Ôrather than reserved for that which 
exceeds creation or orients it towards its limit, an immanent conception of  creativity assign the task of  self-
transcendence to its every creature (2006: 6). In other words, HallwardÕs Deleuze makes everything sacredÐ
everything emerges from the one sovereign power of  becomingÐwhich, of  course, only serves to also make 
everything profane. However, Deleuze does in fact talk of  moving towards a limit in passages that Hallward 
either misses or ignores. For example, when discussing how the present passes to allow the empirical to be 
sensed, Deleuze argues that the Ôsign of  the present is a passage to the limitÕ (Deleuze 2011 [1994]: 105 original 
emphasis). Put (too) simply: for Deleuze, the present is presented to past by the past as a multiplicity of  signs that 
can be ÔchosenÕ, a process which Deleuze simply refers to as ÔlifeÕ (2011 [1994]: 105). The past is constituted by 
actualised phenomena, the ÒempiricalÓ in DeleuzeÕs transcendental empiricism. In other words, for Deleuze, 
every creature (and object, process and idea) is transcendent, but only having Þrst become empirical. Having 
become empirical, the creature presents the individual with an encounter, which is the proper condition for 
becoming (Bryant 2008: 88, 99-100). Thus, both the empirical and the transcendental are needed for DeleuzeÕs 
philosophy and, the term ÒrealityÓ used here is intended to highlight the importance of  both. DeleuzeÕs 
development of  the transcendental (virtual) conditions for the empirical (actual) is drawn from his work on 
Bergson and, in Bergsonism, he reminds the reader that Ôthe virtual is opposed [not to the real, but] to the 
actualÕ (1991 [1988]: 96). As such, Hallward is as mistaken in missing or ignoring the actual, as other readers 
would be in ignoring the virtual.
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impersonalÕ consciousness without the self-reßexive self  (Deleuze 2001: 25). There are three 
passive syntheses outlined in Difference and Repetition that constitute, Þrst, memory (that of  the 
Òpassing presentÓ); habit (that of  the past); and thirdly, the fractured self  (that of  the 
future).  None of  the syntheses are predominant in the sense that they ground the others as, 144
for example, were the Þrst synthesis primary, then the present would become a Ôdimension of  
the pastÕ (Williams 2011: 5). Rather, each synthesis is differentially related and necessarily 
presupposes the others. This differential relation forms what Williams terms the Ôideal 
synthesis of  differenceÕ, where pure difference is DeleuzeÕs (non-)foundational ontological 
condition (Williams 2013b: 30, 98, 151).  A detour via DeleuzeÕs development of  differential 145
calculus is required in order to account for the determining potential of  the second synthesis, 
which will therefore also be shown. 
Following the work of  Duns Scotus, and drawing upon BergsonÕs Matter and Memory 
(1991 [1908]), DeleuzeÕs philosophy of  time is an attempt to Ôexplain the relation of  instants 
in time, without having to rest on an answer claiming that instants either somehow imply one 
another or are somehow contained in a larger entity that they are a subset of Õ (Williams 2011: 
 The third synthesis is not developed as much as the previous two in order to maintain this chapterÕs focus on 144
ideas and matter, the relation of  which are best understood by focusing on the Þrst, second and active syntheses. 
For detailed studies of  the third synthesis, see Williams (2011) and Voss (2013b).
 DeleuzeÕs idea of  pure difference as his ontological condition is in stark contrast with BadiouÕs 145
conceptualisation, for whom Being (in)consists of  undifferentiated multiplicity (it is interesting to note that 
Badiou uses the past participle form of  indifference, implying that this has been the result of  a process of  
undifferentiation, although he does not develop on this anywhere in his work). Difference and Repetition begins with 
a brief  repudiation of  the primacy of  indifference. For Deleuze, it makes no sense to talk in terms of  indifference 
because, whether this indifference is one of  pure void-nothingness (i.e. BadiouÕs void), or  pure totality-
indifference, it is only with the concept of  difference that one can Ôspeak of  determination as suchÕ (2011 [1994]: 
36). This is not to say that one must talk of  the difference between the void and totality (or, for Badiou, the ÒOneÓ) 
as already given, becauseÐas with empiricismÐthis presupposes their differences in the Þrst place (for a 
development of  this argument, see also Morejn 2015: 1-3). Rather, difference for Deleuze is primary, and a 
priori of  both identity and representation. According to the principle of  difference then, the mathematical 
ontology of  Badiou is, in DeleuzeÕs terms, an exercise of  reason, Ôa harmonious organismÕ which relates 
Ôdetermination to other determinations within a formÕ and has four properties (identity, analogy, opposition, and 
resemblance) (2011 [1994]: 37). Importantly, as Williams points out, Deleuze Ôdoes not seek to deny scientiÞc 
evidence and theories, but instead seeks to complement them with an account of  the role of  differenceÕ (Williams 
2011: 42). Accordingly, Deleuze has no wish to reject reason per se, but to explain it as conditioned by difference 
and, in doing so, remove reason from its idealised place in the clouds. Due to its reliance on a priori reason then, 
mathematics (including the mathematics of  BadiouÕs Ògrand styleÓ) is not ÔpureÕ and cannot form an ontological 
position (2011 [1994]: 44). But this does not necessarily relegate the use of  mathematics more generally; Deleuze 
highlights the expression Ômake the differenceÕ, inviting the reader to use maths in conjunction with all the other 
modalities that are made to express Being (Bryant 2008: 98).
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24).  There is no reason, for Deleuze, a priori of  the individualÕs sense of  the world, why two 146
moments should be related to each other, and yet he acknowledges that individuals need the 
connection of  moments into series in order to live in a spatio-temporal world. As Bergson 
puts it in terms of  an individual drum beat in series, it is the Ôbest illuminated point of  a 
moving zone which comprises all that we feel or think or willÕ (Bergson 1911: 3). It is clear 
then that Deleuze is, however unwittingly, taking up the problem of  time that Althusser falls 
foul of  when he posits the aleatory void. In doing so, AlthusserÕs approach clears the decks of  
any erstwhile philosophical idealism but, on the one hand, idealises the event in its place and, 
on the other, actively prohibits individuals from connecting series. The position of  DeleuzeÕs 
syntheses with regard to aleatory theories is made clear when he claims that Ôperceptual 
syntheses refer back to organic syntheses which are like the sensibility of  the sense; they refer 
back to a primary sensibility that we areÕ (Deleuze 2011 [1994]: 93). Here, and contra to the 
purely disjunctive void, Deleuze argues that sensibility both conditions the individual as such 
(in answer to this question being left open by Hume), as well as the sense by which the 
individual goes about their life in the world. It is not enough for Deleuze, as it is for Kant, 
Badiou and Meillassoux to presume the Ôharmonious exercise of  the facultiesÕ (Bryant 2008: 
92). All three authors develop the idea of  a self-reßexive individual which recognises itself  in 
its thought of  the world (even if  this individual is purely formal, as is the case with BadiouÕs 
idea of  the subject). This individual, for Deleuze, is only an empirical subject and cannot 
properly be said to be a life, for it lacks the Ôsingularities and the events that constituteÕ it 
 DeleuzeÕs correction of  this philosophical atomism stems from his reading of  Scotus, and Widder argues that 146
an appreciation of  DeleuzeÕs reading of  Scotus is essential to avoid characterising DeleuzeÕs univocal ontology as 
a Ôcloset PlatonismÕ (Widder 2009: 27). Deleuze names Spinoza and Nietzsche as successors to ScotusÕ ontology 
even if, as Widder notes, they do not use the same terminology (2009: 27). According to Scotus then, ontology is 
not comprised of  (Epicurean) atoms in a void, neither is it Ôdivided into parts, into species and genera, but is 
difference itself Õ (Deleuze 2011 [1994]: 44, Diefenbach 2013: 169). Instances cannot be explained in terms of  
the difference between them because, as Deleuze argues, this is only an empirical explanation, and Ôthe 
corresponding determinations are only extrinsicÕ (Deleuze 2011 [1994]: 36). Deleuze has the same criticism of  
empiricist explanations as Althusser: by explaining the instances in terms of  the differences between them, 
instances are not thought by themselves, and instead are thought according to a separate principle which represents 
the instances in another light (see Althusser and Balibar 1970: 19-37). Drawing on NietzscheÕs On the Genealogy of  
Morality, Deleuze uses the example of  lighting to show that difference makes itself, and is nothing other than 
itself  (Deleuze 2011 [1994]: 36). It is absurd, as Nietzsche demonstrates, that lightning could do anything other 
than ßash because lightning is nothing other than the ßash. Lightning is not distinguished as the difference 
between two like instances, but against that which is not lightning (Deleuze 2011 [1994]: 36, Nietzsche 2014: 
236). The similarity between ßashes of  lightning is therefore not a property of  the ßashes themselves, i.e. it is 
determined neither by the three syntheses of  time nor the lightning ßashes themselves, but is a property of  the 
mindÕs representation of  the ßashes and is thought by the second level of  active syntheses. 
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(Deleuze 2001: 29).  The task Deleuze sets himself  is therefore to account for the conditions 147
and delimitations of  the individual, showing how the non-harmonious faculties construct the 
sense of  the world as it itself  is made up of  the world (2001: 29, 31). 
The individualÕs sense of  the world, or ÔhabitÕ is produced in the Þrst synthesis of  time, 
that of  ÒhabitusÓ (Bryant 2008: 93, Deleuze 2011 [1994]: 99). The importance of  the Þrst 
synthesis is to produce the ideas by which individuals might go about acting because, in 
DeleuzeÕs terms, Ô[a]ction is constituted, in the order of  generality and in the Þeld of  variables 
which correspond to it, only by the contraction of  elements of  repetitionÕ (2011 [1994]: 96). 
As Deleuze points out in what follows however, the contraction that constitutes the grounds 
for action cannot be constructed by action as its own presupposition. Rather, the contraction 
occurs in what Deleuze calls variously the Ôcontemplative self Õ, a life, or the individual of  the 
passive and active syntheses (2011 [1994]: 96). The habitus fulÞls the goal of  synthesising the 
sense of  the past that forms the conditions for further synthesis (Williams 2011: 26). 
Importantly then, there is nothing yet in the Þrst synthesis that could be called Being. Rather, 
as Deleuze puts it in Bergsonism, Ôthe present is not; rather, it is pure becomingÕ (Deleuze 1991 
[1988]: 55) and later in Difference and Repetition, describing the Þrst synthesis the Ôliving 
presentÕ (Deleuze 2011 [1994]: 97). It is not that the present is simply one instant in a series of  
instances that form a continuous series, for this would both fall foul of  the criticism of  
empirical time as outlined in the last chapterÕs discussion of  Althusser, and would pre-suppose 
differences between instances that are, in fact, the product of  reason. The Þrst synthesis instead 
inexists, and is the synthesis responsible for contracting the past that is presented to the 
present: Ôsynthesis constitutes time as a living present, and the past and the future as 
dimensions of  this presentÕ (2011 [1994]: 97). 
But what does the Þrst synthesis contract? This is the task of  the second synthesis and is 
best explained through DeleuzeÕs appropriation, and difference from, BergsonÕs theory of  
time. As Crocker puts it, memory is often thought to be the recollection of  events which are 
no longer present. This might be a series of  instances as measured against a clock, or in the 
sense of  AlthusserÕs plurality of  different temporalities, each speciÞc and in differential 
 The somewhat awkward use of  the terms individual and the subject here is purposeful. As demonstrated 147
above, the concept for Althusser is the individual as interpellated by social relations. The individual is not 
reducible to the subject, because the concept of  the subject is a knowledge effect of  the relation between the 
individual and social relations; there are always also scientiÞc, aesthetic and philosophical questions to be asked 
of  the individual. Deleuze is not as speciÞc about his use of  the term ÔsubjectÕ as Althusser is, and so the term is 
used here to highlight the regional limits that Deleuze argues constitute the empirical method vis a vis the idea of  
the subject.
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relation to the others. All recollections have in common a past that once was, but is ultimately 
no longer present. Crocker explains that this ÔrecollectionÕ of  the past Ôinvolves only 
differences of  degree between presentsÕ, and that Ôthe moment of  association is derived from 
what is associatedÕ (Crocker 2001: 54-55). Recollection, in other words, involves a judgement, 
rooted in the subject, of  what happened in the past. This judgement compares and contrasts 
past presents, but cannot account for how the past constituted the present or the individualÕs 
ability to recollect certain instances and not others. For Bergson on the other hand, memory is 
itself  creative; it does not contemplate past presents in the sense that these exist separately 
from each other, but instead Ôpast events participate in relations of  association and 
resemblance with a new, present perceptionÕ (Crocker 2001: 55, Deleuze 1991 [1988]: 51, 54). 
Memory is not a faculty for storing and it does not work only intermittently. The past is 
contracted by the mind as what Bergson calls the ÔPast in GeneralÕ, or Ôpure 
memoryÕ (Crocker 2001: 55, Mullarkey 2004: 473), and the cerebral mechanism drives back 
into the subconscious what is not useful (or what it cannot immediately Ôcast into lightÕ) 
(Bergson 1911: 5). Using the example of  a musical tune, Bergson highlights how each note 
seems to meld into one another. Ô[M]ight it not be saidÕ he questions, that Ôeven if  these notes 
succeed one another, yet we perceive them in one another, and that their totality may be 
compared to a living being whose parts, although distinct, permeate one another just because 
they are so closely connectedÕ (Bergson 1989 [1960]: 100)?  
As developed later by Deleuze, this is the ÒvirtualÓ structure of  the tune which becomes 
ÒactualisedÓ when played, for example, on a piano by a student. The student, whose memory 
has contracted the notes into a tune so far (and also the information necessary to Þnish off  the 
tune) has, as a result of  this synthesis, a certain bed of  knowledge from which to carry on 
playing. Of  course, the student may not wish to carry on playing, or even carry on with the 
tune that they know how to play - they may improvise. This is to say that there is nothing 
strictly determinate in BergsonÕs theory of  time, nor in DeleuzeÕs appropriation of  it. For the 
virtual structure to be determinate, there would have to be a Þxed relationship between its 
elements and their relations, and this relationship would have to be deÞned by a conditioning 
principal that exists outside of  the terms of  the relationship itself. Instead, for Bergson, both 
elements and relations are in a state of  mutual transformation and unable to achieve identity, 
for the repetition of  an element is deÞned only by its difference to the previous elements in a 
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series (Crocker 2001: 53, Mullarkey 2004: 473).  This is not to say that there arenÕt elements 148
and relations in the virtual structure, but that they only become sensible after they have 
become actual.  The constitution of  the virtual structure is the substantial issue over which 149
Deleuze parts from Bergson, and a difference from which DeleuzeÕs second synthesis becomes 
clear. 
Ansell-Pearson is clear about DeleuzeÕs break from Bergson: it is Ôover the question of  
the nature of  intensityÕ (Ansell-Pearson 1999: 74). According to BergsonÕs Time and Free Will, 
psychic states (i.e. the virtual structure of  an individualÕs mind) Ôare seen to be more or less 
intenseÕ (Bergson 1989 [1960]: 222). Intensity, for Bergson, is the measure of  qualitative states 
(such as ÒrednessÓ). He states clearly that Ô[i]ntensity is quality and not quantity or magnitudeÕ 
(1989 [1960]: 224). Because, for Bergson, space is a homogenous medium that life resists as it 
rises up through it, it makes no sense for there to be qualitative distinctions outside of  the 
mind (Bergson 1911: 10-17); how would matter determine its own quality and, even if  it 
could, wouldnÕt this also necessitate a subjective, qualitative judgement of  matterÕs judgement 
in order to accept it? In dyadic opposition to matter, the differentiation of  differences in kind 
is, for Bergson, a principle solely pertaining to life, and his idea of  duration is the method that 
the mind uses to think the contraction and relaxation of  qualitative states in relation to 
external matter. As Bergson puts it, only Ôin consciousness we Þnd states which succeed, 
without being distinguished from one another; and in space simultaneities which, without 
succeeding, are distinguished from one another, in the sense that one has ceased to exist when 
 Mullarkey takes issue with CrockerÕs description of  BergsonÕs conception of  the present vis. the Past in 148
General. Whereas Crocker thinks that the Past in General is the virtual ground of  which actual things are 
expressions in the present, Mullarkey argues that Bergson in fact does away with singular presents altogether. 
Rather, as Mullarkey explains, Ôpresent actuality, qua perspective, is a force, an affect, that virtualises other 
presents and actualitiesÕ (Mullarkey 2004: 477). The present for Mullarkey, has much more in common with 
what Massumi has termed the Ôautonomy of  affectÕ, or a non-sensible dimension that affects change in 
differential relation to elements within the virtual (Massumi 1995). BergsonÕs lack of  consistency in this regard 
between Time and Free Will and Matter and Memory is conceded by Mullarkey. However it is clear, contra to 
criticisms by Badiou and Hallward, that DeleuzeÕs concept of  the virtual/intensive/actual tripartite falls more in 
line with MullarkeyÕs depiction. See also Clisby (2015).
 This description does not do either concept justice, for the descriptionÐand perhaps more crucially the 149
priorityÐof  the virtual and actual are highly contested in the secondary literature on Deleuze and Bergson. To 
do justice to each of  the concepts alone would require a large number of  words and would take this chapter 
away from what it is intended to argue. Sauvagnargues, Ansell-Pearson, Williams, Buchanan and Connolly have 
all contributed to the debate, but two excellent contributions/reviews of  the discussion are Mullarkey (2004) and 
Clisby (2015)
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the other appearsÕ (Bergson 1989 [1960]: 226).  DeleuzeÕs criticism of  BergsonÕs concept of  150
intensity, as it appears in his 1956 essay ÔBergsonÕs conception of  differenceÕ (1956), Bergsonism 
(1991 [1988]) and Difference and Repetition (Deleuze 2011 [1994]: 299-301), concerns the fact 
that Bergson pre-supposes Ôready-made qualities and reconstituted extensitiesÕ (Ansell-Pearson 
1999: 74). For Deleuze, everything ÔBergson has to say about [duration] comes down to this: 
duration is what differs from itself. Matter, on the other hand, is what does not differ from itself; it 
is what repeats itself Õ (Deleuze 2004a: 37). However because, as shown by his example of  
lightning, difference carries its difference Ôwithin itself Õ for Deleuze (1999: 74), he is thereby 
concerned with the order of  difference that constitutes and informs both quality and quantity. 
In other words, Deleuze affords primacy, not to either quantity or quality (even at the risk of  
having to go to radical lengths to explain the constitution of  the individual having given up 
internal qualitative distinctions), but to the principle of  a difference of  intensity. As Ansell-
Pearson puts it, for Deleuze quite simply, Ôdifference is intensityÕ (Ansell-Pearson 1999: 74). 
The question of  what the second synthesis contracts then is complicated signiÞcantly by 
DeleuzeÕs insistence that it is not populated, as Bergson argues, by qualities. Were this the case 
then he would have to explain, as Bergson does, how the process by which life, already 
imbued with the capability to discern qualities, makes its way through matter. In one way 
then, Deleuze is saved from the need to explain the existence of  non-conditioned qualitative 
distinctions in the mind but, of  course, this means he must explain how both quantitative and 
qualitative distinctions are constituted according to the principle of  difference. As difference 
is, for Deleuze, a metaphysical principle (Ansell-Pearson 1999: 65), DeleuzeÕs criticism of  
BergsonÕs biological explanation, and his own account of  time, must be developed on 
metaphysical grounds (Mullarkey 2004: 475). Deleuze has to account not just for the 
constitution (and, as will be shown, determination) of  qualitative and quantitative distinctions, 
but also for the differentiation between the noetic and the ontic. His account is sourced from 
the work of  BergsonÐdespite the latent dualityÐspeciÞcally in BergsonÕs criticism of  Kant, and 
is developed predominantly in chapter four of  Difference and Repetition (Ansell-Pearson 1999: 
33). 
 This dualism between a creative Òlan vitalÓ and quantitative extension gives Bergson a source for developing 150
The Two Sources of  Morality and Religion (1935). For Bergson, the shared nature that humans have as open, 
aspirational beings with a shared creative nature gives them one source of  morality which binds them together. 
Their second source results from their joint obligations under a society which attempts to close lives off  from one 
another. For an interesting comparison of  BergsonÕs moral theory with another French naturalist Marie Guyau, 
see Ansell-Pearson (2014b).
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In Matter and Memory, Bergson explains that, when Kant argues that the mind can Ôhave 
no contact with matterÕ, he does so by claiming that there can be no Ôconceivable relation, no 
common measureÕ between the thing in-itself  and the sensuous manifold from which 
knowledge is constructed (Bergson 1991 [1908]: 230-231). Instead, Kant presupposes 
homogenous space as the barrier interrupting and obfuscating the intellect from things, thus 
making both matter and spirit unknowable, and orientating conscious perception to pure 
knowledge (Ansell-Pearson 1999: 33, Badiou 2004: 135, Bergson 1991 [1908]: 231). Bergson 
however insists that the idealisation of  this barrier amounts to a Ôtrue hallucinationÕ, whereby 
Kant would have to accept that either Ôour conception of  matter is false, or memory is 
radically distinct from perceptionÕ (Bergson 1991 [1908]: 239). In other words, by formally 
separating knowledge of  the thing from the thing in-itself  (the noetic from the ontic), Kant 
cannot account for the relationship between the two, expect as one of  extensive 
differentiation. He is thereby obliged to develop his categorical theory of  the faculty of  
understanding to account for how the subject might think synthetic concepts as the 
understanding of  the noetic and the sensible. This problem is of  course familiar, and is a 
variant of  the same issue both Badiou and Meillassoux run into: formally separating thought 
and matter into two separate realms prohibits an account of  how formal ideas think 
phenomena. So how does Deleuze negotiate the necessity to account for the difference 
between thought and matter, whilst accounting for their relation? 
The key to DeleuzeÕs reversal of  Kant is found in his characterisation of  differential 
calculus, itself  an expression of  his principle of  difference: Ôjust as difference immediately 
reunites and articulates that which it distinguishes, and the fracture retains what it fractures, 
so Ideas contain their dismembered momentsÕ (Deleuze 2011 [1994]: 216). Here, Deleuze 
argues that difference has the dual function of  both distinguishing and uniting things, and 
that are not differentiated by any principle prior to this distinction. Ideas then are a 
problematic unity of  difference, where a problem is deÞned as Ôthe constitution of  a unitary 
and systematic Þeld which orientates and subsumes the researches or investigation in such a 
manner that the answers, in turn, form precisely cases of  solutionÕ (Deleuze 2011 [1994]: 
215). In arguing this, Deleuze is not suggesting a vulgar rationalism, and indeed criticises 
Kant for maintaining that ideas (and thus problems as well) are only identiÞable by their 
extensive characteristics in determinate relation to the a priori Þelds of  experience and 
understanding (Bowden 2011: 103). Extensive characteristics would imply that Ideas are 
actual, i.e. are the product of  a process of  individuation. Rather, Deleuze clariÞes that ÔIdeas 
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[É] possess no actuality. They are pure virtualityÕ (Deleuze 2011 [1994]: 349). They are the 
open expression of  the difference that distinguishes and articulates elements which ÔplayÕ in 
differential relations (2011 [1994]: 349). The differential relation provokes the question Òwhat 
else can be related, and what would this relation be?Ó (Deleuze 2011 [1994]: 216-217). 
Williams summarises the openness of  ideas well when he writes that ÔIdeas must give 
determinacy to the chaos of  pure differences but without rendering it Þnally determined in 
any wayÕ (Williams 2013b: 150).  151
DeleuzeÕs prioritisation of  difference reverses his priority of  determination contra Kant. 
For Kant, the faculty of  understanding is obligated the task of  judgment, i.e. of  establishing 
which categories were universal and, thus, properties of  human intellect. The categories of  
the intellect are, for Kant, transcendental because, as he puts it in the Þrst Critique, having 
removed intuition as a way of  cognising, all that are left are concepts (Kant 1996 [1787]: p. 
121-122, A68, B93). Kant continues by distinguishing concepts and intuitions further: 
Ôconcepts are based on the spontaneity of  thought, whereas sensible intuitions are based on 
the receptivity for impressions. Now the only use that the understanding can make of  these 
concepts is to judge by means of  themÕ (1996 [1787]: p. 121-122, A68, B93). Nevertheless, as 
Bergson shows, this amounts to admitting that intellect is simply a hallucination conditioned 
by homogenous space, playing on the face that Kant only assumes that appearances ÔrelateÕ to 
objects (1996 [1787]: p. 121-122, A68, B93). Drawing on BergsonÕs argument, Deleuze 
explains that, for Kant, Ôproblematic Ideas are both objective and undeterminedÕ in the sense 
that Ideas are a necessary part of  intellect, determinable by intuition, but ultimately not 
determined by any form of  ontological ground (Deleuze 2011 [1994]: 215, 220).  DeleuzeÕs 152
transcendental problem asks however: how can we account for the rules and conditions of  a 
transcendental philosophy, given that these conditions seem based upon an empiricism in the 
Þrst place (Bryant 2008: 34)? For Deleuze, developing the contribution to calculus made by 
Salomon Maimon, both the terms of  differenceÐi.e. Ôthe determinable intuition and the 
determinant conceptÕ must Ôequally be thoughtÕ (Deleuze 2011 [1994]: 220). It is not enough 
 It is for this reason that whilst Paul PattonÕs translation of  the title of  chapter four in Difference and Repetition is 151
ÒIdeas and the Synthesis of  DifferenceÓ, others have translated this to ÒThe Ideal Synthesis of  
DifferenceÓ (Morejn 2015: 11). For Deleuze, syntheses are indeed idea(l)s, but remain open to actualisation 
within the virtual. Syntheses are not dogmatic ideas qua Badiou, formally determining the constitution of  
difference as a transcendental principle within the actual, but synthesise only in relation to other virtual ideas.
 Deleuze also notes how Kant attempted to hide what he calls this ÔpsychologismÕ, i.e. the derivation of  the 152
transcendental structures from the empirical psychological acts of  consciousness, by removing text from the 
second version of  the Þrst Critique (Deleuze 2011 [1994]: 171).
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to simply suppose the distinction between intuition (i.e. the sensible) and the concept as 
belonging to either different faculties of  the subject (Kant), or a mind/world dyad (Bergson), 
but rather both distinctions must be explained according to an account of  what Deleuze calls 
a Ôprinciple of  reciprocal determinationÕ (2011 [1994]: 220). Reciprocal determination for 
Deleuze is when ÔIdeas appear in the form of  a system of  ideal connectionsÐin other words, a 
system of  differential relations between reciprocally determined genetic elementsÕ (2011 
[1994]: 220). It is thus the differential relation that determines both quantity and quality, 
rather than the latter determining the former. The relation itself  is, for Deleuze, the Idea 
which, according to Williams, is a determinable problem (to the extent that the Idea is not a 
totalised unity, but open to further relations) (Williams 2013b: 152). In reversing the Kantian 
prioritisation of  difference then, ÔDeleuze develops his concept of  the problem in such a way 
that it accounts for the internal genesis of  both the sense and the truth of  propositions, along 
with the object which realises this truth, and without reference to anything transcending the 
problem and determining it from the outsideÕ (Bowden 2011: 97). Furthermore, the radical 
differentiations between thought and matter, as present in Kant, Badiou and Meillassoux, are 
shown to be conditioned by an originary relation. This originary relation undermines the idea 
of  dyads as completely determinate, as they must always be related to other differential 
relations and, thus, problems.  In order to show how Deleuze conceptualises the necessity of  153
both the passive and active syntheses of  time, and thus the constitution of  the individual in its 
social production, it is necessary to develop brießy his use of  differential calculus. 
It is important to note, before giving an impression that Deleuze commits himself  to the 
grand style of  mathematics alongside Badiou, that Deleuze subscribes in fact to the minor 
style (Evans 2006). Daniel Smith distinguishes between the grand and the minor style of  
mathematics (which he calls the studies of  theorematics and problematics respectively) as 
such: 
Ôif  in theorematics a deduction moves from axioms to theorems, in 
problematics a deduction moves from the problem to the ideal events that 
condition it and form the cases of  solution that resolve itÕ (Smith 2006: 148 
original emphasis). 
In other words, rather than assuming that mathematical Þgures exist as ideas in the 
Platonic sense (in terms of  essence and derived properties), mathematicians of  the minor style 
 Originary relationality is what is later deÞned by Deleuze and Guattari as the non-philosophical foundations 153
of  philosophy. See MacKenzie (1997: 10-11).
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deÞne Þgures dynamically by their Ôcapacity to be affectedÕ (2006: 149 original emphasis). In 
particular, for Deleuze, differential calculus is only an expression of  the function of  differentiation, 
and cannot be called scriptural materiality in the same way that Brassier describes BadiouÕs 
use of  mathematics.  Both group and set theory, for Deleuze, hide within them a teleology 154
that combines both the necessity for the mathematical expression of  problems with the 
manner by which problems are solved (Deleuze 2011 [1994]: 228). It should therefore not be 
a surprise, as Deleuze explains, that some problems cannot be solved algebraically, as calculus 
is Ôonly a mathematical instrument which, even in its own domain, does not necessarily 
represent the most complete form of  the expression of  problems and the constitution of  their 
solutions in relation to the order of  dialectical Ideas which it incarnatesÕ (Deleuze 2011 
[1994]: 228). The use of  calculus in solving problems amounts to a Ôcounter-actualisationÕ for 
Deleuze, or the identiÞcation of  the Ôtranscendental - yet immanent - conditions of  the actualÕ 
(in this case mathematical) in order to Ôthen proceed to a different way of  actualising 
themÕ (Egyed 2006: 82). In other words, mathematics is not an analytical framework qua Kant 
or Badiou, but the productive synthesis of  a particular multiple of  relations. Differential 
calculus identiÞes the manner in which problems, ideas, solutions and Þelds of  solution are 
composed but, when it comes to actually solving problems, there are, for Deleuze, many ways 
to skin a cat. 
Deleuze begins his explanation of  the differential relations of  ideas by stating that, the 
Ô symbol dx appear s as s imul taneous ly undeter mined, deter minable and 
determinationÕ (Deleuze 2011 [1994]: 217).  This is to say that the symbol presents the 155
difference that determines both d and x as distinct from each other. Without relation to 
 Deleuze uses the idea of  function in two contexts. The Þrst is within Difference and Repetition when he expands 154
his reading of  calculus, whilst the second is in What is Philosophy?, where he and Guattari argue that functions are 
object of  science (Deleuze and Guattari 1994 [1991]: 117). How then did Deleuze understand science at the 
time he wrote both Difference and Repetition, as well as his book on Leibniz and calculus (Deleuze 1993 [1988])? 
Given the emphasis placed on ontology in Difference and Repetition, but also the fact that discussions of  ideas, 
concepts and functions occur, the question is only complicated by DurieÕs claim that DeleuzeÕs idea of  
mathematics is the ÔÞeld which has enabled various ÒfunctionsÓ to displace a series of  traditional philosophical 
concepts, and, more importantly, the philosophical Þeld from which they emergedÕ (Durie 2006: 182). According 
to this reading, Deleuze conceptualises mathematical practice as a gradual replacement of  philosophical 
concepts. However, this reading goes against the grain of  DeleuzeÕs clariÞcation that mathematics is not a form 
of  the Platonic ideal (Deleuze 2011 [1994]: 226). Further research might be done in order to distinguish the 
relationship between DeleuzeÕs conceptualisations of  philosophy, science and mathematics, beyond the 
distinctions they are given in What is Philosophy?, with regard to the idea of  function in the calculus of  ideas. For 
the purposes of  this thesis, the idea of  function is understood as it is used in Difference and Repetition.
 Deleuze develops his understanding of  calculus in Difference and Repetition in reference to Salomon Maimon 155
(Deleuze 2011 [1994]: 220), however this builds upon his work on Leibniz in The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque 
(Deleuze and Strauss 1991: esp. ch. 2).
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anything however, x is simply an axis (the abscissa) populated by singularities. Singularities, 
also described by Deleuze as Òvanishing quantitiesÓ, are points on the abscissa where dx (the 
change in x) is zero (Deleuze 1981, Duffy 2006: 119).  Because the axis x is not yet in 156
relation to anything else, this means that there are an inÞnite number of  singular points along 
it. Yet, the relation dx is determinable in the sense that there are singularities along the line x 
with which another variable can be related.  A differential relation with another variable y, 157
(i.e. dx/dy) constitutes the reciprocal determination that allows Deleuze to account for the 
material production of  the quality and quantity of  Ideas. According to this relation, y changes 
in relation to x when subject to a function f, thus y = f(x), and the Idea denotes this variation. 
As Deleuze puts it, Ôthe Idea has the differential relation as its object: it then integrates 
variation, not as a variable determination of  a supposedly constant relation (ÒvariabilityÓ) but, 
on the contrary, as a degree of  variation of  the relation itself  (ÒvarietyÓ)Õ (Deleuze 2011 
[1994]: 219-220).  For example, it would make no sense to speak of  a variable Idea of  a 158
painting (dx), because y, having been reciprocally determined by the relation df, would 
intersect x at separate points along the line and thus determine a series of  different and 
distinct paintings. DeleuzeÕs use of  calculus thereby accounts for qualitative difference along 
the y axis and quantitative difference along the x axis and, following an exchange of  letters 
with Althusser who suggests the two terms, uses ÒdifferentiationÓ and ÒdifferenciationÓ 
respectively to distinguish between the two types of  difference (Bryant 2008: 75, Deleuze 
2011 [1994]: 312-313, Stolze 1998). 
This brief  overview having introduced the ideas and relations of  the second passive 
synthesis, it is important to note that, for Deleuze, variety necessitates the use of  the active 
syntheses (representation, contiguity, causality, resemblance and opposition). For example, 
having determined a series of  paintings according to one differential dx/dy, the comparison 
 Lawlor summarises the importance of  singularities for Deleuze, stating that Ôsingularities are that which is 156
expressed in an expression or that which is perceived in a perceptionÕ (Lawlor 1998: 19). Non-actualised, in the 
sense that they are the pre-conditions for relations, singularities are not sensible but rather constitute what 
Deleuze calls the Ôtranscendental ÞeldÕ of  sense in The Logic of  Sense where they are also known as Òideal eventsÓ 
and Òsurface effectsÓ (Deleuze 2004 [1969]: 22, 99, 2011 [1994]: 240).
 DeleuzeÕs concept of  potential thus involves the metaphysical claims that all relations partly consist of  the 157
conditions to be in relation to any other relation, but that this relation must be made. Deleuze and Guattari 
emphasise this when stating that Ôthe multiple must be madeÕ (Deleuze and Guattari 2004b: 7).
 In the chapter on ÒThe Image of  ThoughtÓ, Deleuze puts it differently, saying that the name Ideas are Ôfor 158
those instances which go from sensibility to thought and from thought to order, the limit- or transcendent-object 
of  each facultyÕ (Deleuze 2011 [1994]: 183). Here, Deleuze maintains the importance of  time in mentioning 
ÔinstancesÕ, whilst also emphasising the spatial nature of  Ideas. For a discussion of  the relation between the two, 
and the inÞnite speed of  Deleuze and GuattariÕs virtual as opposed to Kant, see Bell (2015: 28-32).
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between different paintings constitutes what Deleuze calls a ÔlinearÕ relation dz. This new 
relation is populated by the paintings identiÞed by what Deleuze refers to as their extensive 
coordinates, as opposed to the original relation dx (2011 [1994]: 223). Not a differential 
relation, Deleuze explains that this linear relation necessitates the use of  a sumÐan empirical 
counting of  these pre-determined singularitiesÐwhich themselves determine a second series 
that is Ôcompletely determinedÕ (2011 [1994]: 223). The complete determination of  the 
second series renders its Ideas ÔdistinctÕ, removed from the pure difference that constitutes 
differential relations. It is therefore clear why Deleuze argues that active syntheses are needed 
in order to think completely determined series (such as a collection of  similar paintings): the 
Þrst passive syntheses of  the passing present is immanent with the creation of  the paintings 
and is different at all times. Only in retrospect, after the initial series of  painting, does an 
active series reproduce and use the image of  the pure past, as presented by the past in the 
second passive synthesis.  
This explains why, despite passages both in DeleuzeÕs work with Guattari and the 
secondary literature which appear to the contrary, nowhere does Deleuze argue that the 
active syntheses are necessarily to be avoided, per se, and nor is there necessarily a priority of  
the second synthesis as directly determining the Þrst.  The introduction of  Deleuze and 159
GuattariÕs A Thousand Platteaus is one example, where they instruct the reader to Ômake a map, 
not a tracingÕ (Deleuze and Guattari 2004b: 13). The authors place emphasis on the 
experimental method of  drafting, rather than the reproductive method of  tracing, because of  
the possibility that the former is open; Ôit is detachable, reversible, susceptible to constant 
modiÞcationÕ (2004b: 13). In fact, however, whilst the active syntheses presuppose the passive 
syntheses (i.e the differential relations conditioned by the principle of  difference), they are a 
crucial part of  DeleuzeÕs modiÞcation of  KantÕs principle of  sufÞcient reason. As shown 
above, Deleuze recognises that individuals need to live in life and, in order to do so, they need 
a Ôdistinctness of  IdeasÕ (2011 [1994]: 223 original emphasis). There is no point, for Deleuze, in 
trying to explain away the existence of  objects, practices or ideas; rather, one must ask what is 
their function, and what purpose do they serve when placed in a certain structure or regime. 
The active syntheses are essential, therefore, in the determination and actualisation of  
singular practices - on the understanding that these practices are both metaphysically 
 Examples of  secondary literature that suggests there is a priority of  the virtual over the actual are (Badiou 159
2000, Hallward 2006, Reynolds 2008, Žižek 2012b). MullarkeyÕs article ÒForget the virtualÓ (Mullarkey 2004) 
contains a full discussion of  what is at stake in prioritisation of  either ÔvirtualismÕ or ÔactualismÕ.
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experimental, and also Ôdirected towards a clinical and critical afÞrmation of  our actual 
livesÕ (Williams 2008: 99). Put in terms of  DeleuzeÕs example, the individual drafting the map 
needs the active syntheses in order to differentiate towns from roads, trees from elevation, yet 
the drawing of  a map is a creative articulation of  this differentiation - a counter-actualisation. 
Put technically, the determination of  orders of  distinction (which constitute the active 
syntheses) alongside the order of  becoming (that is contracted by the passive syntheses) means 
that propositions express the sense of  a situation, whilst concomitantly being determined by 
an a priori problem (Bowden 2011: 97-98). 
Having taken a slight detour through DeleuzeÕs use of  differential calculus, it is now 
possible to show how, for Deleuze, the second synthesis of  the pure past, which is referred to 
under different conditions as the virtual, is the structure of  singularities and relations that 
form the potential conditions for the Þrst synthesis. For Bergson, difference is the difference of  
duration (the internal tendency for the contraction of  qualitative states) which, as Ansell-
Pearson characterises, Ôappears to be an indivisible global powerÕ (Ansell-Pearson 1999: 66). 
Deleuze however insists on the necessity to differentiate both qualitative and quantitative 
relations, and the second synthesis provides the grounds upon which to differentiate such 
relations in the present. For this reason, whereas Deleuze calls the Þrst synthesis that of  
ÒHabitÓ, the second is that of  ÒMemoryÓ. Memory (the virtual structure of  singularities and 
relations) is presented as a synthesis to Habit as its condition in the form of  what Deleuze calls 
variously surface effects, ideal events or signs (Deleuze 2008 [1964]). The Þrst synthesis is thus 
the differential relations themselves, whereby every relation constructs a new structure, 
constructing the second synthesis, via the principle of  reciprocal determination. Active 
syntheses play upon the relations in the second syntheses, selecting elements of  the virtual 
structure for processes of  individuation alongside the Þrst passive synthesis. Williams puts this 
concisely when he states that Ôthe past for passing presents is general and not particular, 
because it is a condition for any passing present which can then be aimed at and represented 
in active memoryÕ (Williams 2011: 59). 
An ontology proper to structuralism 
In contrast to AlthusserÕs aleatory void, it can now be seen how Deleuze accounts for the 
constitution of  the present. Althusser argues that the void must be instituted in order to avoid 
idealism, because only in doing so could you remove the possibility of  previous atomic 
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collisions determining future ideas. Deleuze addresses this conceptualisation directly, where he 
corrects the denigration of  the atomist clinamen: Ôthe clinamen is by no means a change of  
direction in the movement of  an atom, much less an indetermination testifying to the 
existence of  a physical freedom. It is the original determination of  the directions of  
movement, the synthesis of  movement and its direction which relates one atom to 
anotherÕ (Deleuze 2011 [1994]: 232). For Deleuze then, there is no need to take drastic 
measures to reconÞgure the clinamen because it is simply the virtual plane of  relations that 
afÞrm the place of  singularities. Indeed, the clinamen is, for Deleuze, reciprocal determination 
itself, the removal of  which (according to DeleuzeÕs philosophy) would require the exercise of  
the active synthesis for its selection and counter-actualisation. Although Deleuze argues that 
the Epicurean atom Ôstill retains too much independence, a shape and an actualityÕ (2011 
[1994]: 232), when conceptualised as a singularity that presents one relation to another, 
AlthusserÕs atomism looks much more like that which differentiates the four regional theories 
in AlthusserÕs Þrst Note. 
In accounting for the clinamen as the structure of  atomsÕ falling, and bearing in mind that 
Reading Capital is grounded in atomist philosophy (even if  this is not made speciÞc), it is clear 
to see how Deleuze can state that ÔAlthusser and his collaborators are, therefore, profoundly 
correct in showing the presence of  a genuine structure in CapitalÕ (2011 [1994]: 234). He goes 
so far as to argue that, for a society, Ôthere are only economic social problems, even though the 
solutions may be juridical, political or ideological, and the problems may be expressed in 
these Þelds of  resolvabilityÕ (2011 [1994]: 235). Notwithstanding DeleuzeÕs criticism of  
structuralism (i.e. that there is too much emphasis placed on the actuality of  the atom), there 
is a clear commensurability between the philosophies of  Althusser and Deleuze. In a 2007 
blog article, Bryant claims that ÔDifference and Repetition and The Logic of  Sense was, in part, an 
attempt to develop the ontology proper to structuralismÕ and DeleuzeÕs correction of  AlthusserÕs 
atomism should therefore be seen as a contribution to his theory, not a repudiation (Bryant 
2007).  In other words, the social theory of  the former can be supported by the philosophy 160
of  the latter; AlthusserÕs theory of  social formation, as characterised by Chambers, thus 
acquires an ontological foundation. For example, contra to ButlerÕs account, ideology does 
not need a psychic account of  recognition in order to function, because, according to 
 Patton has noted that, throughout his career, Deleuze aligned himself  with certain parts of  Epicurean 160
naturalism (Patton 2016: 349). Epicurus studied atomism with Nausiphanes who had been a student of  
Democritus, one of  the founders of  atomist thinking and whose thinking was later summarised and developed 
by Lucretius in On the Nature of  Things (Lucretius Carus and Johnson 1963).
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Deleuze, concepts are not epistemological but ontological (Bryant 2008: 68). Ideology 
functions as part of  the virtual, pre-personal Þeld as the discourse of  social relations. 
Although these relations are of  course open to change, this change would nevertheless remain 
part of  the discourse of  ideology and does not require any cognitive or psychic processes of  a 
totalising subject. Buchanan clariÞes this point by claiming that ÔDeleuze and Guattari insist 
that there is no such thing as ÒpsychicÓ reality, which would somehow be different from other 
kinds of  realityÕ (Buchanan 2015: 386, Deleuze and Guattari 2004a: 27). For Deleuze and 
Guattari, there is only one ÒrealityÓ which is constructed by the reciprocal determination of  
the three passive syntheses of  time. As per economics in Capital, ideology might be the 
discourse of  study in a particular text (such as AlthusserÕs ISAs essay), but this is on the 
understanding that it is only one Þeld in which questions about social problems can be posed 
and solved. 
Most importantly then is the question of  the extent to which DeleuzeÕs philosophy of  
time itself  remains idealist. BadiouÕs, MeillassouxÕs and AlthusserÕs philosophies have all been 
criticised so far for their idealism, to the extent that they all subordinate one aspect of  being 
to the thought of  another, from which being in its entirety can be known. DeleuzeÕs position 
then is different, for Deleuze does not argue that philosophy is subtractive, but constructive 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1994 [1991]: 2-3). Although he does not discuss the importance of  
time in DeleuzeÕs escape from idealism, MacKenzie argues that Deleuze (and GuattariÕs) 
constructivism is the key to the cell door (MacKenzie 1997). In particular, MacKenzie 
emphasises the separation of  the concept from what Deleuze and Guattari refer to as the 
Ôplane of  immanenceÕ (Deleuze and Guattari 1994 [1991]: 35, MacKenzie 1997: 8). The 
plane of  immanence is a Ôpreconceptual Þeld presupposed within the conceptÕ that gives 
authority to the concept as its third (Deleuze 2015 [1956-7]: 43, MacKenzie 1997: 8). 
Recalling then the problems of  idealism for Badiou, Meillassoux and Althusser, it was clear 
that they confused planes and concepts, thus making their theories transcendent to one or 
more concepts (mathematics, transÞnite logic or the void). In MacKenzieÕs terms, Ôthe 
privileged concept is considered coextensive with the plane of  immanence, rendering both the 
concept and the plane transcendentalÕ (1997: 9). Yet, for Deleuze, concepts construct their 
sense from a selection of  their virtual structure by the active syntheses. These concepts, now 
actualised, nevertheless constitute the new virtual conditions for counter actualisation. 
Deleuze therefore does not conßate the concept and its transcendental conditions by way of  
the passage from the virtual to the actual and then back to the virtual. In MacKenzieÕs terms, 
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Deleuze does not succumb to the Ôcharge of  attributing immanence ÒtoʼÕ somethingÕ (1997: 9), 
because the concept reciprocally determines its plane of  immanence and is immanent with it 
(1997: 10). The same is true for the Þrst and second syntheses of  time. Whilst the active 
syntheses select the speciÞc singularities from within the pure past, the past is itself  only 
determined as such by the passing present. Likewise, the past only contracts what has passed 
on the condition that it is not present, yet forms the presentÕs immanent grounds. The 
reciprocal determination of  the passive syntheses thus ensures that neither formally grounds 
the other, leaving both open to change via the active syntheses.  
Philosophy and idealism 
It has been argued that DeleuzeÕs ontology can form the structure for a non-idealist 
conceptualisation of  resistance. First, by accounting for the constitution of  novelty via the 
differential relation of  ideas, Deleuze ensures that no Idea or concept is rareÞed above 
another. Deleuze therefore avoids the trappings of  idealism. Whereby KantÕs transcendental 
idealism subordinates knowledge of  the world to the knowledge that we canÕt know the thing 
in-itself  in the Þrst place, and the dogmatic use of  logically deduced categories, Deleuze 
demonstrates how knowledge is produced both of  and by the individualÕs relation with the 
world. Secondly, all Ideas for Deleuze are ontologically determined according to the non-
totalising structure of  their differential relations (Voss 2013a: 29). As such, Deleuze accounts 
for the contingency of  knowledge necessary for philosophy since KantÕs Copernican 
revolution; Deleuze welcomes the possibility of  thought becoming other, and his philosophy 
does not have either a mandate, nor the authority, to determine what constitutes legitimate 
knowledge. As highlighted by AlthusserÕs work on regional theories, individuals in fact require 
other modes of  thought to  live in the world. In the next chapter, this argument will be 
developed in terms of  DeleuzeÕs idea of  mediators. DeleuzeÕs philosophy, contra to the 
arguments made by Meillassoux and Badiou, fulÞls a pragmatic, functional role; rather than 
delimiting the extent to which thought can think the world, Deleuze invites individuals to be 
free through posing and solving problems they Þnd interesting or useful (Deleuze 1991 
[1988]: 15, Deleuze and Guattari 1994 [1991]: 16, Porter 2009: 57).  
ChamberÕs work on AlthusserÕs social theory is particularly important with regards to 
DeleuzeÕs practical philosophy because it accentuates the differential nature of  ideas, practices 
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and discourses. Whilst DeleuzeÕs discussion of  differential calculus in Difference and Repetition 
focuses on the ontological scale of  inÞnitesimals, Chambers locates the same structural 
argument in AlthusserÕs social theory. Therefore, whilst Deleuze of  course does expand into 
more obviously socio-political themes in his work with Guattari, the conjunction of  Althusser, 
Chambers and Deleuze at this stage foregrounds the importance of  relationality at all scales - 
both micro, macro and those in between.  Important to the discussion regarding idealism 161
and scale is the understanding that, for Deleuze, Ideas are ordinal, meaning that they can be 
grouped and related. Yet counter to BadiouÕs account of  them, these ordinal groups (or sets), 
according to DeleuzeÕs ontology, are not Ideal. Ideas are grouped by differential, rather than 
formal, relations in what Althusser calls regional theories, or what Deleuze and Guattari call 
in A Thousand Plateaus assemblages, and thus allows the activist to understand the social in 
institutional terms, as well as through practices (Williams 2013b: 161-162).  Developed in 162
the next chapter, this is what Patton refers to as Òformal normativityÓ and it allows for 
individuals to pose and solve problems at all levels, the institutional and not just the personal. 
In particular, AlthusserÕs emphasis on political practice (i.e. the general theory), as 
opposed to simply knowledge or theory, is important in reminding the activist that it is not 
simply enough to know the ÒbestÓ way of  understanding the world if  the point is to change it. 
Practice, for Althusser, is that which uniÞes the regional theories and accounts for their 
constitution. Whilst BadiouÕs more overtly political works go to lengths to emphasise the 
importance of  practice, as has been discussed, his meta-political theory subordinates practice 
under his rationalist conceptualisation of  politics. As will be developed in the conclusion to 
the next chapter, this subordination prohibits BadiouÕs ability to explain how individualsÕ 
actions are ethical, even if  he provides a theory of  how they might be ethical in his Ethics 
(2001). Because both AlthusserÕs and DeleuzeÕs philosophies conceptualise Ideas and relations 
according to a univocal ontology, thus allowing them to explain the affective relationships 
between them, both can account for how practices are always-already co-constitutive with 
Ideas. If, as will be argued in the next chapter, ethics (or ethology) is the study of  what is good 
 ProteviÕs Political Affect uses inspiration from Deleuze and GuattariÕs philosophy in combination with 161
complexity theory and social physiology to develop a social theory that goes Ôabove, below and alongside the 
subjectÕ (Protevi 2009: 4). In doing so, he develops a conceptualisation of  a naturalised politics as the product of  
the Ôsense-making of  bodies politicÕ, rather than the traditional rational, cognitive subject (2009: 185).
 Buchanan (2015) provides a discussion of  Deleuze and GuattariÕs concept of  assemblage in its various 162
permutations across the secondary literature. It is unclear why Buchanan emphasises the importance of  
intentional beneÞcence in assemblages against DeLandaÕs assemblage theory, however what is at stake in the 
discussion is otherwise clearly explained.
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or bad for the individual, then processes of  individuation are always-already ethical. 
Therefore, the suture of  AlthusserÕs social theory to DeleuzeÕs philosophy provides the non-
idealist structure by which to think the ethics of  individuation in relation to different 
discourses and social structures. Removed of  any dogmatic conception of  politics, it is this 
theory constitutes the grounds of  a non-dogmatic theory of  resistance. 
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Chapter 4 - Ethology and the art 
of  practical resistance 
Deleuze, morality and ethics 
The suture of  DeleuzeÕs ontology of  structures to AlthusserÕs structural social theory in 
the previous chapter lays the groundwork for thinking a non-idealist and therefore non-
dogmatic practice of  resistance. In this chapter, the theory of  ethics latent within DeleuzeÕs 
ontology, as presented in Difference and Repetition, will, Þrst, be shown to resonate with the more 
fully developed ethical theory of  J. S. Mill. Whilst there are issues with MillÕs philosophy, such 
as the elitist tone of  his work, as well as the focus on the individual as opposed to practice 
(these issues are outlined in more detail below) reading it alongside DeleuzeÕs ontology and 
AlthusserÕs social theory provides an important contribution to a non-dogmatic practice of  
resistance. Secondly, and more controversially for Deleuze scholars, MillÕs idea of  genius will 
be dramatised alongside DeleuzeÕs idea of  ethology as the guiding concept of  practices of  
resistance. Whilst any turn towards MillÕs work will no doubt put off  some readers of  
Deleuze, the argument in this chapter does not embrace Mill wholeheartedly, and no claim is 
made regarding the compatibility of  DeleuzeÕs and MillÕs philosophies tout court. However, 
MillÕs work offers an important aid in thinking tangibly about social situations, something that 
is notoriously difÞcult to do with DeleuzeÕs philosophy. Furthermore, the development of  
AlthusserÕs theory of  differentially related social discourses is well supplement by the ethical 
components of  MillÕs work. The idea of  genius provides the ethical imperative for individuals 
navigating the social practices, such a psychoanalysis and ideological interpellation, as 
described by Althusser. To be clear then, this chapter develops MillÕs idea of  genius 
speciÞcally as the function of  individuation that best guides practices of  resistance, and does 
not draw upon his moral philosophy to any greater extent.  
 Continuing from the previous chapter, this chapter will continue the predominant focus 
upon DeleuzeÕs ontological work, as found in Difference and Repetition. Whilst the tone of  the 
dual volume Capitalism and Schizophrenia is more overtly political, and hence into which it is 
easier to read a theory of  ethics, a focus on Difference and Repetition is necessary for establishing 
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the solidly ontological nature of  this ethics.  Deleuze himself  understands Difference and 163
Repetition as an ontological project to develop ÒdifferenceÓ as his primary ideal postulate, and a 
number of  commentators have argued that it is the main source in his oeuvre for outlining his 
ontological stance (Bryant 2008: 113, Deleuze 2011 [1994]: 365, Hughes 2009: 52-53). 
Further work could be done to establish how the ethically ontological bedrock established in 
Difference and Repetition (as well as its development in The Logic of  Sense) is expanded upon in 
DeleuzeÕs later work with Guattari, however that is not the purpose of  this chapter. This is not 
to say that there is no continuity in DeleuzeÕs texts, nor that the contribution he makes to the 
collaborative work does not import the ideas developed in his solo work. Indeed the secondary 
literature (as outlined below) predominantly focuses and expands upon DeleuzeÕs work with 
Guattari, augmenting and branching out concepts found within it such as ÔbecomingÕ, Ôde/
reterritorialisingÕ, Ôwar machineÕ, and the ÔnomadÕ. To reiterate the introduction then, the 
contribution to the secondary literature that this thesis makes is a return to considering the 
ontological nature of  DeleuzeÕs ideas and, in particular, how a theory of  ethics can be 
developed from his ontological work. 
Even if  they are wary of  it, that there may be an ethical component to DeleuzeÕs work 
will be of  no surprise to many Deleuze scholars. Bogue, for example, in his book on DeleuzeÕs 
ethical theory, argues that although ÔDeleuze does not develop a formal ethics as a discrete 
component of  his philosophy, there is a sense in which the ethical permeates all his 
workÕ (Bogue 2007: 3). A collection of  essays suggesting various ethical programmes suitable 
to Deleuze (and GuattariÕs) philosophy has been published under Deleuze and Ethics (Jun and 
Smith 2011). Nathan Widder has written on Deleuze and GuattariÕs theory of  ethics as 
developed according to their concept of  the Ôbody without organsÕ (Deleuze and Guattari 
2004b: 165-185). Where Deleuze and Guattari deÞne the BwO as the ÔÞeld of  immanence of  
desireÕ (Deleuze and Guattari 2004b: 170 original emphasis), and thus the ground necessary 
for the constitution of  the individual (or Òdesiring machineÓ in the terminology of  A Thousand 
Plateaus), Widder concludes that Ôthe construction of  a BwO is a matter of  pragmatism and 
strategy in relation to the obstacles we encounter and the relays we establish, and so is 
dependent on context and contingenciesÕ (Widder 2012: 146). The manner in which, for 
 Deleuze himself  said that Anti-Oedipus was Ôfrom beginning to end a book of  political philosophyÕ (Deleuze 163
1995: 170). This is not to say that Difference and Repetition is not also explicitly political in parts, and that the 
received wisdom arguing that DeleuzeÕs pre-Guattari works were not political (see, for example Žižek (2012b: 
18)) is Ôpatently untrueÕ (Buchanan and Thoburn 2008: 1). See Deleuze (2011 [1994]: 64, 337, 382) for textual 
examples.
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Deleuze, ethics involves the setting of  problems by which the individual approaches the world 
is brought out by Widder who emphasises the necessity of  pragmatism and strategy in ethical 
thought. Craig Lundy has also argued that DeleuzeÕs philosophy advocates a certain 
strategical approach, going so far as to say that it also advocates a prudential, precautionary, 
even a conservative attitude to activism (Lundy 2013: 232, 246). 
Furthermore, the secondary literature argues that DeleuzeÕs philosophy does indeed 
contain an ethical theory, undeveloped in his writing though it may be, and it is accepted that 
this theory is ontological (Colebrook 2008: 127). Patton, for example, writes that Deleuze and 
GuattariÕs Ôontology of  assemblages is also an ethics or an ethologyÕ (Patton 2011: 118). Bogue 
writes that Ôfor Deleuze, as well as for Spinoza, ethics is ontology, and that for this reason his 
ethics is best conceived of  as an immanent ethicsÕ (Bogue 2007: 7). In line with the secondary 
literature, and the previous chapterÕs discussion of  the ontology of  social structures, this 
chapter assumes the position that DeleuzeÕs theory of  ethics is ontological (yet does not make 
the assumption that this necessitates Deleuze having an ontology per se).  However, despite 164
the general consensus on the existence of  an ontological theory of  ethics in DeleuzeÕs work, it 
is clear that he offers no standard Ônormative theory of  the basis of  [É] rights nor of  the 
kinds and degrees of  equality or regional autonomy that should prevailÕ either in his work or 
in his work with Guattari (Patton 2011: 117). Bergson for example, who, as was noted above, 
was a signiÞcant inßuence on DeleuzeÕs theory of  life, collaborated with Woodrow Wilson to 
establish the League of  Nations, chaired its International Committee on Intellectual 
Cooperation, and went on to profoundly inßuence John Humphrey (the principal drafter of  
the Universal Declaration of  Human Rights) (Lefebvre 2011: V, 2013). As such, Bergson was 
clearly comfortable working with norms, morality for him being a necessary result of  
individualsÕ immersion in society (see Ansell-Pearson 2014b, Bergson 1935). Deleuze however 
made no such foray into what he called ÒmacropoliticsÓ, i.e. the realm of  political institutions 
and social classes, preferring to emphasise the importance of  a ÒmicropoliticsÓ Ôthat involves 
subterranean movements of  sensibility, affect, and allegianceÕ (Patton 2011: 116). Rather than 
a normative political philosophy then, Patton classiÞes Deleuze and GuattariÕs political 
 Contra to claims made by authors within the current ontological turn in anthropology, for whom there are 164
many ontologies that are speciÞc to different regions and cultures, this thesis makes no such determining claims 
(see Descola 2013, Harris and Robb 2012, Swenson 2015). Instead, and in line with the argumentation 
regarding dyads throughout in chapter two, to posit an ontology would thus also posit that there is also that 
which ontology could not account for. Instead, it is more Þtting to refer to ethics as ontological, pertaining to one 
or more ontologies which are always/already being constructed or, in AlthusserÕs terms, ontological practice. It is 
often necessary to talk of  an authorÕs ontology for the sake of  argument, however and the term is used herein 
with this understanding.
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philosophy as Òformally normativeÓ (2011: 117). For Patton, political institutions are not 
conceptualised by Deleuze and Guattari individually, or as part of  a separate realm of  Òthe 
politicalÓ, but instead Ôtreated as continuous with the coordination and control of  ßows of  
matter and desire in non-state societies governed by the Territorial machine with its systems 
of  alliance and ÞliationÕ (2011: 117). It makes no sense, for Deleuze and Guattari, to 
conceptualise political institutions as metaphysically separate to the realm of  either 
individuals or practices, as that would rely upon the dogmatic use of  axioms to uphold the 
distinction. Instead, Deleuze and GuattariÕs use of  norms are, for Patton, formal, i.e. more 
akin to components in a structure that also contains ideas and relations of  individuals, 
practices and other institutions. Given the use of  the term formal within the context of  this 
thesis so far might imply a dangerous slide into the dualities characteristic of  BadiouÕs 
formalist system, it is better to call Deleuze and GuattariÕs theory a Òstructural 
normativityÓ.   165
Nevertheless, the point is clear: ontologically, Deleuze and Guattari conceptualise 
institutions in the same structuralist terms that they do individuals, classes and other social 
entities. There is no ideal treaty, social contract or political theology that might render an 
institution, set of  practices or individual sacred or hierarchical in their social ontology. 
Instead, for Deleuze and Guattari, politics concerns a differentially related multiplicity of  
elements within different regimes of  affect, coordination and control (Deleuze and Guattari 
2004a: 372, 2004b: 240-245, Patton 2011: 118). Having therefore demonstrated the non-ideal 
nature of  DeleuzeÕs philosophy in the preceding chapter, this chapter will develop a non-
dogmatic, structurally normative theory of  ethics using the social theory of  Althusser, 
DeleuzeÕs ontology, and the ethical work of  J. S. Mill. Yet why limit the remit of  argument to 
ethics, and not to morality more generally? Facing the challenges by those who think 
poststructuralism incapable of  advocating morality more generally, Todd May (1995) has 
developed just such an theory. Whilst his book (which follows on from his work on the political 
philosophy of  poststructuralist anarchism (May 1994)) is an important gesture in the face of  
 As is the case with BadiouÕs mathematical ontology, Deleuze deÞnes formal differences as those grounded Ôin 165
the objectÕ and able to be referred back to an originary principle or subject (Deleuze 2011 [1994]: 49). In 
accordance with the ontology developed in this thesis, the term Òstructural normativityÓ is preferred because it 
does not imply a originary ground or point of  reference. Structures are comprised by different modes of  
individuation that are themselves series of  singularities, and difference is prioritised over identity (2011 [1994]: 
49). The idea of  structure opens the path to disparate and divergent processes of  individuation, in differentially 
related modes, without presuming a determinant, totalising authority.
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those who claim poststructuralism is unable to think morality, understanding its overriding 
problem is important for appreciating why a theory of  ethics is, conversely, so important. 
In his introduction, May notes the criticism faced by poststructuralists (a term he uses to 
refer predominantly to Foucault, Lyotard and Deleuze) from Critical Theorists in particular. 
This criticism follows the recognition that, for poststructuralists, Ôpower is both creative and 
pervasiveÕ, such that it Ônot only represses pre-given objects but also creates objectsÕ (May 
1995: 6). Given this observation, May outlines two problems that are generally raised against 
poststructuralism. First, if  objects (as well as social practices and institutions) are all the 
products of  power relations, then Ôwhat is it about the social practice of  moral discourse that 
renders [poststructuralism] capable of  passing judgement on other practicesÕ (1995: 8). 
Secondly, Ôif  power is everywhere, then is the result of  all resistance not just another set of  
power relationsÕ (1995: 8)? This is a variation of  HegelÕs criticism of  Hlderlin and Schelling: 
if  differentiation and determination are only graspable via intuitionÐi.e. there is no 
differentiation in the world itselfÐthen the world is plunged into Ôa night in which, as the 
saying goes, all cows are blackÕ (Hegel 1998: 9).  Without recourse to some logic that 
determines the place of  things in the world, there is for Hegel, no ability to distinguish objects 
as actually differentiating from one another (Badiou 2013 [1982]: 1-11). According to the 
variation outlined by May, the critics of  poststructuralism claim that there must be some 
position by which critical gestures can be made. Crucially, this position must not itself  be 
susceptible to the power relations that would otherwise seek to incorporate and blunt their 
critical edge (see Habermas 2015: esp. 282-284). In his answer to this challenge, May is right 
to argue that the famous Deleuzian maximÐÔwe must experimentÕ (May 1995: 11)Ðis a 
necessary prerequisite for resistance, but left simply as that, is ultimately unsatisfactory. Whilst 
in-keeping with DeleuzeÕs emphasis on creativity and his rejection of  macropolitics, such a 
maxim is not capable of  distinguishing between what, following Spinoza, Deleuze calls life-
afÞrming and life-denying forces (May 1991: 29-30, 1995: 11, Ruddick 2010).  In the face 166
of  a restrictive, unhealthy or disempowering situation or set of  practices, a solution that points 
 See also Ansell-Pearson (2014a) for a discussion of  DeleuzeÕs reading of  Epicurean naturalism. According to 166
Ansell-Pearson, Deleuze was heavily inßuenced by Epicurus, who deÞned Ôphilosophy as a Òrule of  lifeÓÕ (Ansell-
Pearson 2014a: 122, Lucretius Carus and Johnson 1963: V: 10), demonstrating the latterÕs commitment to 
developing a therapeutic treatment of  life. Ansell-Pearson accounts for DeleuzeÕs ethics in terms of  individualsÕ 
decisions effect their own health and happiness. The theory of  ethics in this chapter is not intended to run 
counter to Ansell-PearsonÕs, but simply to develop connections with the ontological aspect of  DeleuzeÕs 
philosophy.
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simply at alterity might result in even worse conditions - more is needed to guide practices of  
resistance than simply the command to do otherwise.  
The validity of  MayÕs theory, a Ômultivalue consequentialismÕ (May 1995: 81), rests on 
his assertion that it Ôallows for guidance and evaluation of  acts, evaluation of  situations, and a 
relative weighing of  moral goodsÕ (May 1995: 93). May gives a convincing argument as to 
why multivalve consequentialism, a form of  moral theory that focuses on the judgement of  
the predictable consequences of  acts, is concomitant with the anti-representationalism of  
poststructural philosophies. What undermines his theory is his distinction between public 
morality and what he calls the aestheticism of  individuals. For May, articulating a position 
shared by the utilitarian Jeremy Bentham, morals should only be public, based around a 
shared use of  language, and not private (May 1995: 43, 94, 137-146). The individual is 
private, morally neutral, and subject only to an aesthetics of  living, i.e. the judgement of  
whether or not their life is beautiful (May 1995: 140-141). Yet the preference for a public 
morality opens moral claims up to the uncriticised inßuence of  the dogmatic claims so far 
discussed in this thesis. What is to stop dominant social orders and practices determining 
moral imperatives? It is for precisely this danger that poststructuralist thought has 
traditionally eschewed moral philosophy in favour of  ethics. 
The reason for preferring ethics is because moral theory concerns Ôlaws, principles, and 
norms which prescribe how human beings ought and ought not to actÕ, rather than ethical 
theory which is the study of  what is good in particular situations and contexts (Jun 2011: 91, 
Korsgaard and O'Neill 1996: 8-9). The pre-modern concern for the ethical good life was 
gradually replaced during the Christian Middle-Ages by the moral question Ôhow should one 
act?Õ, when the Ôclassical concept of  virtue [was] at Þrst eclipsed but ultimately fused by with 
the Hebraic concept of  lawÕ (Jun 2011: 91). Foregrounding a hierarchical Christian order 
subjugated man under a theocratic regime of  the sacred, where Òthe goodÓ was practiced by 
the individual but decreed by the church (Foucault 2014: 163-198). Whilst, as Jun shows, 
modern moral philosophers moved away from theological sources of  moral authority towards 
the secular, nevertheless this was only to constitute and codify moral precedence in the form 
of  law: Ôan exteriorised and transcendent concept, estranged from ordinary human lifeÕ (Jun 
2011: 92). Put simply, Christian scholars and the moral philosophers of  the modern period 
prioritised the right over the good. NietzscheÕs attack on Christian morality in On the Genealogy 
of  Morality and Beyond Good and Evil (Nietzsche 2014) however divested the idea of  God of  any 
rariÞed authority from which the good life could be determined and, in doing so, threw the 
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very notion of  transcendent normativity into question. With such a history attached to moral 
thought then, it is hard to see how poststructuralist philosophy (and Deleuzian thought in 
particular) could have anything to do with it.  
Certainly, bearing in mind the discussion of  the problematic nature of  ideas in the 
previous chapter, any moral postulate must, for Deleuze, be thought of  as located both in the 
virtual and the actual. Given that the virtual plane forms the transcendental conditions for 
individuation, and not just one singular idea within it, moral ideas that are subtracted from 
the virtual fall foul of  DeleuzeÕs criticism of  good sense. Good sense, outlined as one part of  
the dogmatic image of  thought in Difference and Repetition, is to attribute normative value to 
particular empirical objects which are then taken as transcendental conditions for thought 
(Deleuze 2011 [1994]: 169). In order to function within DeleuzeÕs philosophy however, and 
avoid the charge of  dogmatism, any normative concepts must be open to counter 
actualisation. In other words, they must only be actualised from their place in the virtual 
plane. In terms of  the calculus developed in the previous chapter, norms (i.e. normative ideas) 
are variables that lack a relation to anything else, that is to say that, norms are only singular. 
Such norms by themselves, in both senses of  the term, have no function. However, putting a 
norm into a series with another variable, the idea of  a political practice for example, adds a 
function to the variable. In this case, it determines a series that might guide activist practice. 
The point here, however, is that this series is potentially differential, contains an inÞnite 
number of  singularities, and each singularity is capable of  determining a series with another 
relation. Thus, norms are not Þxed a priori of  their articulation within situations, for each 
situation (or variable) will articulate the norm with a different function, thus determining a 
new, different series.  167
According to DeleuzeÕs philosophy of  ideas then, normative ideas are problematic and 
are not ontologically dogmatic. This is to say that ideas can only be used; Williams describes 
DeleuzeÕs concept of  life as Ôlike a structure of  identiÞable shapes and concepts, given 
signiÞcance by the sensations, intensities and Ideas that ßow through and determine 
individualsÕ (Williams 2005: 27). Therefore, whilst one criteria for a Deleuzian structural 
normativity is precisely that ideas must always be conceptualised as part of  the virtual 
structure, the second, Þtting with the esteem Deleuze held for SpinozaÕs work, is that concepts 
must be practical. Whilst his interest in BergsonÕs moral philosophy creeps into his reading of  
 See Smith (2008) for further discussion on how Deleuze uses calculus as a model for thought and, in 167
particular, detail on DeleuzeÕs use of  the terms ÒnewÓ and ÒpossibleÓ. 
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Deleuze, Ansell-Pearson puts this succinctly when he argues that, for Deleuze, Ôif  philosophy 
has a use it is to be found in the doctrine of  the Epicureans, as well as in later thinkers such as 
Spinoza and Nietzsche, namely, the creation of  the free human being and an empirical 
education in the art of  living wellÕ (Ansell-Pearson 2014a: 122). It is not clear that concepts 
such as ÒfreedomÓ, or any particular emphasis on the human being, are as compatible with 
DeleuzeÕs work as they might be with BergsonÕs. What is clear however, in an argument that is 
borne out in Proust and Signs (2008 [1964]), is that the very fact that there is both philosophy 
and life creates the imperative to think what might be good for life. Deleuze calls this 
Ôapprenticeship to signsÕ and, simply, ÔlearningÕ (Deleuze 2008 [1964]: 4), whilst Massumi 
describes it as an Ôethics of  engagementÕ (Massumi 2015: unpaginated). Philosophy, contra 
KantÕs system of  the categorical imperative, cannot rely upon set of  concepts designated a 
priori of  any given situation because each and every given situation (and its elements) is 
necessarily different to those before it. As MacKenzie puts it, ÔDeleuze and Guattari see 
philosophy as an activity co-extensive with activity in the world itself Õ (Mackenzie 2004: 68). 
Situations determine problems which impel individuals (whether collective or singular) to 
solve them. And yet, as series are counter-actualised to form new series, which contain the 
persistence of  prior series within them, it is clear that solutions to these prior problems will 
not be sufÞcient for problems to come. Therefore, each situation, comprised of  a multiplicity 
of  practices and different even from its repetition of  similar previous situations, forms new 
problems which must be overcome in a never-ending apprenticeship. The good is not deÞned 
by the right, a rule, or substance, neither of  which would be sufÞcient to determine what is 
good in new situations. Rather, the good is deÞned by the relation of  the individual to their 
situation in series - it is good in practice: Ôa practice of  concepts, and it must be judged in the 
light of  the other practices with which it interferesÕ (Deleuze 2005b: 268). 
Ethical mediation 
DeleuzeÕs mention of  judgement hints at his persistent interest in Kant and provides the 
key to showing the compatibility between DeleuzeÕs ontological theory of  ethics and 
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AlthusserÕs social theory.  As explained in chapter one, for Kant, judgement played a central 168
role in his transcendental idealism. According to him, judgement was performed by the 
faculty of  judgement, a primary component of  the rational mind, and was tasked with the 
production of  Ôobjective realityÕ (Kant 1996 [1787]: A242 n.). Kant gives four deÞnitions of  
judgement in the Critique of  Pure Reason (Kant 1996 [1787]: A68/B93; A69/B94; B141; A130Ð
132/B170Ð172) and for the purposes of  this discussion it can be deÞned as the synthesis of  
either transcendental or pure logic with intuition in order to provide a uniÞed understanding 
of  objects. DeleuzeÕs emphatic disagreement with KantÕs uniÞed subject has already been 
shown. Instead, Deleuze places emphasis on the process of  individuation and a vitalist 
conceptualisation of  life.  So how and why does Deleuze still use the language of  169
judgement? 
The most famous discussion of  the idea of  judgement in DeleuzeÕs work is his essay ÔTo 
Have Done with JudgementÕ (Deleuze 1997: 126-135). Here, Deleuze opposes judgement to 
combat and reiterates NietzscheÕs argument that the condition of  judgement is oneÕs debt to a 
judge (1997: 126, 132). For Deleuze, judgement presupposes a Ôcoherent moral 
orderÕ (Deleuze 1997: 127, Uhlmann 1996: 110), under which the individual is eternally 
subjected and to whom they owe their Þnitude. The result of  judgement, for Deleuze, is the 
subordination of  life to an abstract categorical authority that imposes limits over processes of  
individuation (Deleuze 1997: 129). Combat, then, is the opposition to judgement that does 
not itself  necessitate judgement; it is the practice of  Òbeing doneÓ with judgement and 
everything else at the same time (1997: 132). In being done with everything, combat creates 
resonances that amplify processes of  individuation: combat is Ôthe process through which a 
force enriches itself  by seizing hold of  other forces and joining itself  to them in a new 
ensemble: a becomingÕ (1997: 132). Given DeleuzeÕs criticism of  KantÕs doctrine of  the 
uniÞed faculties, it is perhaps easy to agree with his argument in the essay that the 
subordination of  the individual under authority is necessarily to be resisted. 
 MacKenzie argues that it is not that Deleuze (or Deleuze and GuattariÕs work) is speciÞcally Kantian, merely 168
that all three authors are situated within the same critical terrain. This is to say that all four authors (MacKenzie 
included) share the task of  solving the problem: how can we critique without this idea of  criticism being 
susceptible to itself  (Mackenzie 2004: XVIII). Hughes however, in his reader of  Difference and Repetition, places 
great emphasis on DeleuzeÕs fascination with Kant, going so far as to say that Difference and Repetition is formally 
modelled after the Þrst Critique (Hughes 2009: 3).
 In Negotiations, Deleuze states that Ô[e]verything IÕve written is vitalistic, at least I hope it isÉÕ (Deleuze 1995: 169
143).
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However, DeleuzeÕs opposition between practices of  judgement and combat hides the 
necessary presumption that, in order for judgement to operate, the individual must accept 
their place under an authority. In other words, the debtor must accept their place in the 
relationship with a judge. It is not clear however why an individual should conceptualise 
themselves as subservient to a uniÞed moral authority, and not, as has been argued, act in 
relation to a system of  structural norms. If  DeleuzeÕs development of  the conditions of  real 
experience (as opposed to possible experience) shows not that there arenÕt conditions but that 
these conditions cannot be presupposed (Deleuze 2011 [1994]: 81), it also follows that there is 
authority by which the individual is judged, but that it cannot be deÞned a priori. With no 
coherent moral order, the violence done to the individual by the encounter forces the 
individual to select which norms to prioritise in the knowledge that different norms hold 
judgement in different situations. Once selected (by the active syntheses) it is these norms 
which then impose limits upon the individual. In this light, practices of  resistance involve 
combat with ethically selected norms from the virtual structure of  ideas to guide processes of  
individuation. Therefore, if  DeleuzeÕs call to have done with judgement then is to be 
consistent with his ontology of  ideas, it must be seen as a socio-historical argument, rather 
than an ontological dogma. The relation of  his socio-historical claims to his ontology in this 
regard can be developed by drawing on DeleuzeÕs idea of  the mediator. 
In his 1985 interview Mediators, Deleuze gives three examples where mathematical, 
scientiÞc and literary concepts are in relation with each other. Riemannian spaces (a concept 
used in differential geometry to measure vectors in three dimensional space) are placed next 
to the bakerÕs transformation (a practice in physics that is used to model deterministic chaos), 
which is in turn placed next to ResnaisÕ Þlm Je tÕaime, je tÕaime. Deleuze points to the practical 
and temporal similarity of  the three examples, and claims both that all three are like Ôlayers 
that are constantly shifted aroundÕ and that Ôthere are remarkable similarities between 
scientiÞc creators of  functions and cinematic creators of  images. And the same goes for 
philosophical concepts, since there are also concepts of  these spacesÕ (Deleuze 1995: 
124-125). Whilst Deleuze is not arguing that each example is doing the same thing, per se, 
Deleuze is making the argument that Ôphilosophy, art, and science come into relations of  
mutual resonance and exchangeÕ (Deleuze 1995: 125, Williams 2005: 9). He is making a 
similar claim to that made by Althusser in the Þrst Note, where he argued that regional 
theories are in differential relation with each other. As was shown in chapter two, AlthusserÕs 
claim was that, whilst each relatively autonomous theory has its own set of  practices and 
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functionality that distinguishes itself  from the others, each theory produces a lieutenant that 
articulates the effect of  itself  in the others (Althusser and Matheron 2003: 49). It is in this 
manner that regional theories are uniÞed by political practice, as political practice for 
Althusser involves the movement of  an individual through various discourses, the effects 
engendered on these discourses and the change in the individual as a result of  their 
immersion in them. Deleuze and Althusser are therefore allied in their attempts to think not 
just the determination of  social structures, but the differentiation and relationship between 
their constitutive discourses.  170
However, as was argued in chapter two, AlthusserÕs philosophy relies on the logic of  
aleatory reasoning that, without DeleuzeÕs correction, presupposes the void at every moment 
of  philosophical practice to idealise away any persistence of  concepts with which an 
individual might articulate change. Furthermore, under AlthusserÕs articulation of  aleatory 
materialism (as opposed to DeleuzeÕs) the void removes any means to articulate any kind of  
agency whatsoever: creativity is subordinated to the void, which resets the clinamen, and 
abdicates control of  the new to the randomness of  the atomsÕ fall. As Deleuze puts it, any 
Ôdiscipline that set out to follow a creative movement coming from outside would itself  
relinquish any creative roleÕ (Deleuze 1995: 125). In order to account for a creative moment 
from within the differentially related layers, Deleuze advocates the idea of  the mediator.  171
According to him, 
ÔMediators are fundamental. CreationÕs all about mediators. Without them 
nothing happens. They can be peopleÐfor a philosopher, artists or scientists; 
for a scientist, philosophers or artistsÐbut things too, event plants or animals. 
[É] ItÕs a seriesÕ (Deleuze 1995: 125). 
Whilst Deleuze does not expand upon his idea of  the mediator much beyond this short 
explanation, further insight into what he means can be gained from the beginning from the 
beginning of  the interview. Here, Deleuze observes a tendency within philosophy to return to 
modernist abstractions (Ôorigins, all that sort of  thingÕ (Deleuze 1995: 121), despite the fact 
 A 2012 conference in London entitled ÔDeleuze, Philosophy, TransdisciplinarityÕ was organised, and a special 170
issue of  Deleuze Studies published, in order to discuss the ramiÞcations of  DeleuzeÕs claim on the blurb of  the 
French edition of  Difference and Repetition that Ô[p]hilosophy is not interdisciplinaryÕ (Collett, Kosugi et al. 2013: 
157). The organisers point to Deleuze and GuattariÕs What is Philosophy? (1994 [1991]) because it Ôputs forth a 
unique take on transdisciplinarity, [and] because it advocates a relation between disciplines that is more than a 
simple separationÕ (Collett, Kosugi et al. 2013: 160).
 Massumi translates the original French into ÒintercessorÓ (Massumi 2002: 255), but this deÞnition is not used 171
here on account of  the implication that an intercessor might intervene on someone elseÕs behalf. The English 
term ÒmediatorÓ does not necessarily imply working for another.
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that philosophy had already vested itself  of  such concepts. Thus, Deleuze Þnds it necessary to 
develop an idea that accounts from the movement between different practices, and the 
individualÕs position within them, without needing to identify when a given practice 
originated. The idea of  the mediator is therefore his idea of  how Ôto Òget into somethingÓ 
instead of  being the origin of  an effortÕ or, put differently, how to understand an individualÕs 
differential relation within a given set of  practices and structural norms. 
However, doesnÕt the term mediator imply precisely the sort of  person who takes a 
problem and creates solutions in line with given options? MacKenzie addresses just such a 
concern and, in developing what he terms the Òidea of  pure critiqueÓ, distinguishes between 
the ideas of  the critic as creator and the pure critic (Mackenzie 2004: 67). In line with he 
Deleuzian criticism of  transcendental logic, the idea of  critique can only be pure, for 
MacKenzie, if  it does not imply the use of  other ideas as its transcendental condition. The 
idea of  a critic as creator however implies the identity of  a creator as the one who criticises, 
thus generating Ôa safe-haven for indifference within the idea of  pure critique itself Õ (2004: 
67). In other words, there is a danger that the mediator, understood as a rational subject, 
creates change from their judgement of  a set of  actual, i.e. pre-given, solutions. Given the 
propensity for philosophical concepts to be associated with Ôdangerous fundamentalisms, be 
they philosophical, political economic, religious, cultural or whateverÕ (Mackenzie 2004: XI), 
it is clear that such a concept of  creation might simply be a tool for the reproduction of  the 
dominant mode of  production. It is not uncommon, for example, to hear the term Òwealth-
creatorÓ used not for workers, but for the share- and stake-holders of  companies who beneÞt 
from the proÞts generated by labour power. There seems to be a tension therefore between 
MacKenzieÕs Deleuzian argument, DeleuzeÕs implication here that there are in fact creative 
roles, and indeed his emphatic statement that ÔPhilosopherÕs ArenÕt Reßective, but 
CreativeÕ (Deleuze 1995: 122). 
MacKenzie is however well aware of  DeleuzeÕs use of  the idea of  creation, and is not 
saying that there is no such thing as novelty. Instead, he uses the term to avoid speciÞcally 
thinking of  mediators as those Ôforces that reconcile actual oppositionsÕ in order to Ôavoid 
presupposing that the actual is a pre-conceptual given beyond the reach of  pure 
critiqueÕ (Mackenzie 2004: 70). Putting this in terms of  the syntheses of  time explored in the 
previous chapter, the Þrst idea of  mediation would not take into account the Þrst passive 
synthesis of  the living present, where memory is contracted along with elements of  sense. 
Rather, it would imply that individuation could take place with the active syntheses selecting 
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from a formally transcendental memory and that there was nothing new to learn and think. 
MacKenzie thus suggests another deÞnition of  a mediator, that of  the Ôforces and processes 
whereby the virtual possibility of  always becoming-other is transformed into actually existing 
othernessÕ (2004: 70). This second deÞnition opens up the possibility for change to occur that 
is not pre-Þgured by any Þdelity to the actual. Here, the Þrst passive syntheses is taken 
seriously in accordance with active syntheses, highlighting the importance that Deleuze places 
on experimentation. If  one knows that s/he cannot simply choose from a range of  Þxed 
options, then the emphasis is placed on a revised understanding of  creativity.  This revised 172
understanding looks to the resonance and exchange that different discourses express when 
they are brought into encounter with one another. Individuals must, according to DeleuzeÕs 
idea of  the mediator, look for mediators as potential solutions for their problems, always in 
the knowledge that things might not turn out as they planned. By engaging with mediators, 
the forces and processes in different social forms and practices, individuals experiment 
creatively to Þnd the right tools to beneÞt their cause. This what Deleuze means when he 
writes in the Postscript on the Societies of  Control, Ô[i]tÕs not a question of  worrying or of  hoping 
for the best, but of  Þnding new weaponsÕ (Deleuze 1995: 175). 
It is here that DeleuzeÕs use of  the idea of  judgement can be seen in a new light from 
that of  KantÕs. Whereas, for Kant, the faculty of  judgement relied upon a priori logic to 
determine the conditions for possible knowledge, and thus determine what is morally right 
(see Kant 1997), DeleuzeÕs idea of  judgement is even more complicated. On the one hand, 
DeleuzeÕs metaphysical (rather than transcendental) account of  memory (i.e. the second 
passive synthesis) means that his Ôtranscendental empiricism is that philosophical position 
which determines the conditions of  real rather than possible experienceÕ (Bryant 2008: 3, 
Deleuze 1991 [1988]: 27). Because the conditions of  real experience (i.e. ideas and their 
relations) are virtually determined, and are not a set of  principles plucked from the actual, 
judgement must look elsewhere than the subject, or KantÕs transcendental idealism, for the 
norms by which to judge. On the other hand, Deleuze does not hide these norms away: they 
are to be found within the beguiling simplicity of  DeleuzeÕs virtual/intensive/actual tripartite 
system. The structural normativity of  DeleuzeÕs philosophy means that all the norms by 
 Deleuze does of  course warn against the assumption that mediators are only necessarily humans, and the 172
emphasis placed upon people here is made to bring discussion in line with the thesisÕ discussion of  political 
resistance more generally. This does not imply that plants, animals, buildings or institutions cannot also be 
mediators but, for the purposes of  this thesisÕ discussion of  resistance, it is necessary to foreground the socio-
political primacy of  individuals.
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which to judge are found, not within an actual set of  principles, but within the virtual realm 
of  ideas, or the second synthesis of  time. Because, for Deleuze, all practices, ideas and 
institutions exist as relations within the virtual structure, when the Þrst synthesis relates 
elements of  the second syntheses to actualise, it extends, modiÞes and changes existing series, 
as well as determines new ones. Of  course, these series may be either the reciprocally 
determined series that constitute differentially related social practices and discourses, or the 
directly determined series of  opposition, et cetera. Either way, the individualÕs place within 
the differential virtual structure means that the ideas of  the latter are those to be used in 
ethical practices: for the virtual determines the practices, discourses, and institutions which 
mediate processes of  individuation in the actual. Whilst it is important to note that the 
individual, for Deleuze, is only a singular expression belonging to an overdetermining process 
of  individuation, it is nevertheless possible (and necessary for a theory of  ethics) to frame a 
theory of  ethics according to it. According to DeleuzeÕs philosophy then, the individual is 
judged according to the difference that it makesÐfor better or for worseÐto whichever series is 
extended, modiÞed or determined. In other words, it is judged by the effect that it has on 
social relations, practices and institutions, and this judgement takes the form of  the reciprocal 
relationship that changes accordingly. This is what Deleuze and Guattari mean when, in What 
is Philosophy?, they emphasise the importance of  being Ôworthy of  the eventÕ (Deleuze and 
Guattari 1994 [1991]: 160, Kirkeby 2004: 308). 
The necessity of  ethics 
The rest of  this chapter will make one claim: when removed of  its Enlightenment 
baggage (i.e. the assumption of  a uniÞed subject), MillÕs idea of  ÔgeniusÕ is the idea necessary 
to furnish DeleuzeÕs metaphysical account of  individuation with an ethical imperative. This 
ethical imperative, when understood as part of  AlthusserÕs social theory, can inform a non-
dogmatic practice of  resistance and this will be outlined in the conclusion. The ethical 
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imperative to be attached to DeleuzeÕs philosophy is MillÕs concept of  genius.  Before 173
substantiating this claim however, a brief  synopsis of  the discussion so far is necessary to 
determine what is needed to make and support this claim. Chapters one and two discussed 
the dangers of, Þrst, formally distinguishing between the world and the way of  understanding 
it and, secondly, the necessity to understand thought in relation to the world. It was argued 
that such dyadic philosophies were unable to account for the relation between the formal and 
the empirical and thus could not construct adequately conceptualisations of  either politics or 
ethics. In answer to the previous chapters, chapter three demonstrated how DeleuzeÕs 
philosophy does account for the relation between the formal and the empirical or, in 
DeleuzeÕs terms, the transcendental and the empirical. The chapter then demonstrated that, 
for Deleuze, ideas were in differential relation to the relations that (mutually or directly) 
determined them. One beneÞt of  a relational account of  philosophy is that the constitution 
of  the ideas used within the philosophy itself  is accounted for; DeleuzeÕs metaphysics are not 
idealist for the fact that Deleuze can account for the constitution of  the ideas, including those 
that constitute his philosophy. Rather than simply assuming the adequacy of  one particular 
form of  expression (such as mathematics) to understand or articulate being, Deleuze shows 
that the ideas and concepts by which the world is known are constituted immanently with the 
world as it becomes new (Flaxman 2015: 67).  This also applies to the ideas that constitute 174
his philosophy, and there is nothing to say that philosophy might become other to what 
 The growing number of  texts now written on DeleuzeÕs conceptualisation of  ethics in relation to his work on 173
both Spinoza and Nietzsche begs the question: why develop his theory of  ethics in relation to Mill, as opposed to 
Spinoza or Nietzsche? There are (at least) three reasons for doing so. First, the argument in this chapter is not 
intended to run counter to the existing literature and, rather, it is hoped that it may resonate with existing work 
to create new lines of  ßight. Secondly, in line with DeleuzeÕs distaste for the dogmatic adherence to tradition 
within the history of  ideas, DeleuzeÕs philosophy welcomes the dramatisation of  diverse concepts in order to 
address problems. The dramatisation of  the idea of  genius outside the conÞnes of  its context in the 
Enlightenment is wholly in line with how Deleuze argued one should practice philosophy. Thirdly, more 
importantly, and as was argued in the introduction, an encounter with MillÕs philosophy supplements DeleuzeÕs 
ontology with a register with which to think social structures. Whilst the two volumes of  Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia are explicitly works of  political philosophy, their relations to ontology are not as explicit. The 
encounter with MillÕs idea of  genius therefore has the aim of  furnishing DeleuzeÕs ontological work within 
Difference and Repetition with an explicitly political register to inform practices of  resistance.
 The importance of  novelty in thought runs through all of  DeleuzeÕs texts, including those he co-authored 174
with Guattari. A clear example of  thus theme is in Deleuze and GuattariÕs portrayal of  discussion in What is 
Philosophy?, where they state that Ô[t]he best one can say about discussions is that they take things no farther, since 
the participants never talk about the same thing. Of  what concern is it to philosophy that someone has such a 
view, and thinks this or that, if  the problems at stake are not stated?Õ (1994 [1991]: 28). Here, Deleuze and 
Guattari highlight the importance of  addressing a well stated problem (i.e. not either type of  false 
problemÐÒnonexistentÓ or Òbadly statedÓ that Deleuze sees highlighted in Bergson (Deleuze 1991 [1988]: 17-21), 
rather than simply discussing an issue. Rather than simply setting Ôempty generalisations against one 
anotherÕ (Deleuze and Guattari 1994 [1991]: 29), they argue that concepts must be created in order to solve 
problems, always in the knowledge that each concept is inherently problematic and will determine new problems 
to be addressed. See also DeleuzeÕs discussion with Foucault Intellectuals and Power, where the two describe 
philosophy as a Ôrelay raceÕ with practice (Foucault and Deleuze 1980). 
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Deleuze writes. Rather than this contingency being a reason to avoid Deleuzian philosophy 
for one that professes more socio-historical permanence (such as MeillassouxÕs speculative 
realism) however, it is in fact the opposite. Given that Deleuzian philosophy is one of  
contingency (even if  not necessarily so), it must rely on being practically useful if  it is to be 
anything at all.  Thereby, Deleuze provides a philosophy which demonstrates the 175
contingency that is denegated within other philosophical approaches. At the same time, it 
accounts for its superiority by taking to heart its own contingency and facilitating processes of  
individuation because of  it. 
A second beneÞt is that the three syntheses of  time, alongside his reading of  Simondon, 
furnish DeleuzeÕs philosophy with a theory of  individuation necessary for an account of  ethics 
(see Deleuze 2011 [1994]: 307-309). Both DeleuzeÕs and BadiouÕs philosophies share a 
hesitance towards deÞning a programmatic set of  moral codes due to their emphasis on the 
event. However, DeleuzeÕs philosophy is more suited to articulating an ethical theory and the 
reasons for this are two-fold. First, DeleuzeÕs philosophy accounts for the relation between 
ideas and practices, whereas neither BadiouÕs nor MeillassouxÕs do.  Therefore, ethical acts, 176
according to DeleuzeÕs philosophy, are capable of  being judged according to their effects, 
rather than simply by virtue of  their principles. This puts Deleuze broadly in line with 
consequentialist and utilitarian ethicists, such as Bentham, James and John Stuart Mill, 
although there are important differences between DeleuzeÕs position and BenthamÕs. 
DeleuzeÕs philosophy is particularly sympathetic to J. S. MillÕs ethics because unlike Bentham, 
who rejected the consideration of  individualsÕ ideas in moral reasoning in favour of  
evaluating their practices, Mill argues that actions and character were indissolubly linked 
(Halliday 1976: 58). It is not simply by ÒpublicÓ standards that the individual is to be judged 
for Deleuze and Mill, but by a more complicated relationship between thought and practice 
 In emphasising the disruptive effect of  the sign upon thoughtÑtheir ÔviolenceÕ in DeleuzeÕs terms (Deleuze 175
2008 [1964]: 16)ÑDeleuze follows Dewey to show that one signiÞcant task of  philosophy is to account for a 
changing world in a Ôpragmatic approach to learningÕ (Williams 2015: 47). Although ontologies and categories 
(i.e. concepts) can be adequate for good, healthy individuation, new concepts must be created in order to 
accommodate new signs and metaphysically precarious situations. If  there is a theory of  truth in DeleuzeÕs 
philosophy then, it would not be one to designate something as true, in the manner of  traditional accounts of  
truth. Rather, it Ômight be thought of  as a functional component of  the sense that understands the world, which 
appropriates and creates different structures as necessaryÕ (Henry 2016: 12).
 Badiou introduces the concept of  ÒforcingÓ in Being and Event to account for the relation, and develops this 176
in Logics of  Worlds (2009). Nevertheless, as has already been established, Badiou only succeeds in naming the 
relation, and not accounting for how it determines either the empirical from the formal, or vice versa. Deleuze's 
philosophy is of  beneÞt over BadiouÕs because it can account for the determination of  both via. their relation.
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that takes ethics into account via what Mill called as Òself-regarding conductÓ.  Secondly, 177
and whilst Badiou does emphasise the speciÞcity of  considering different situations in ethical 
thought, his reliance on an ontological conception of  politics reduces this speciÞcity to a 
situational veneration of  a kind of  secular onto-theology. This is a translation of  the Kantian 
imperative into the ontological register: Badiou has replaced the categorical imperative with 
truth procedures, and judgement with forcing. Deleuze, on the other hand, conceptualises the 
individuals as differentially related with their situation, and their norms are determined by 
this intensive relation. Judgement then, according to Deleuze, is the effects that new or 
modiÞed relations have on processes of  individuation, that are themselves a result of  their 
participation in the situation. 
A further clariÞcation can be made to contrast the ethical positions of  Deleuze and 
Badiou: whilst Badiou explicitly emphasises the limited scope of  ethics as pertinent only to the 
consistent individual, the theory to be drawn out from DeleuzeÕs philosophy is not so limited. 
Contra the emphasis in this discussion so far placed upon the individual, Bryant, in The Ethics 
of  the Event, at Þrst seems to foreground the collective nature of  social groups as often 
discussed by Deleuze (Bryant 2011: 34). This reading of  Deleuze however, as Bryant goes on 
to recognise, would read Deleuze as if  he had in mind categorical determinations similar to 
those in Kant - groups with pre-Þxed dynamics would act according to categorical rules that 
governed the consistency, and hence behaviour, of  the groups. DeleuzeÕs philosophy however 
makes no such distinctions and, as Bryant puts it, is ÔindifferentÕ to them, and thus Ôable to 
move ßuidly among these determinations in drawing together acts or elements in a 
collectiveÕ (2011: 34). It is important to highlight this ÒtransversalÓ nature of  DeleuzeÕs 
philosophy here in order to prepare the way for discussion of  Mill.  MillÕs talk of  rational 178
individuals must be read in light of  the syntheses of  time discussed in the previous chapter as, 
for Deleuze, processes of  individuation apply just as much to people as they do social 
 Haddock is correct to doubt whether the distinction between self-regarding and other-regarding actions can 177
be maintained given Ôour complex involvement with other peopleÕ (Haddock 2008: 179). However the analytic 
distinction between the two seems beside the point for Mill who, as Haddock himself  recognises, thinks that Ôif  
we want to do the best we can for ourselves, then we have to retain an open mind. And we should extend the 
same thought to anyone we may encounter in our societyÕ (Haddock 2008: 180). In other words, MillÕs 
distinction between self- and other-regarding conduct can be read not as a dogmatic distinction, used to 
engender a programmatic moral theory. Instead, it can be read as an argumentative tool used to problematise 
government intervention that is justiÞed by a reductive measure of  public utility (2008: 179). MillÕs point is that 
neither self- or other-regarding conduct can be objectively measured, nor judged independently of  the other, 
and doing so delegitimises authorities who claim to do so. See also Ten (1980: 10-49) for a literature review and 
full discussion of  the idea of  self-regarding conduct. 
 For a full discussion on the transversal nature of  DeleuzeÕs thought, see Williams (2005: esp. ch. 2).178
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institutions. One extension of  this conclusion that foregrounds the importance of  the 
encounter is that, unlike Badiou, neither Deleuze nor Mill needs to account for why the 
ethical imperative should be adhered toÐor the reason to be ethical in the Þrst placeÐbecause 
the process of  individuation is always/already ethical. As processes of  individuation actualise 
their virtual conditions of  ideas and their relations, all individuals are necessarily determined 
in accordance with the selection of  ideas in the encounter by the Þrst passive and active 
syntheses. Therefore, Þrst, any practice of  resistance that is undertakenÐeven if  one 
undertakes to do nothingÐis necessarily ethical (OÕSullivan 2008: 91, 99).  Secondly, all 179
processes of  individuation, whether this be of  the individual or of  a social group/institution, 
are ethical. DeleuzeÕs position in relation to BadiouÕs theory of  ethics will be outlined further 
below. For now, to clarify the argument in this thesis against what might be assumed given the 
inheritance of  MillÕs On Liberty by the liberal tradition of  political philosophy: the actualisation 
of  ideas by processes of  individuation is not a process particular to individuals any more than 
it does institutions, or social groups. As an ethical concept, genius applies just as much to 
individuals, institutions and social groups, and there is no social form that is not implicated in 
the necessity to act ethically. But what is MillÕs idea of  genius? 
Genius and the art of  life 
Mill deÞnes the idea of  genius in his essay On Genius as Ôthe discovery of  new 
truthÕ (1977c: 330). Put like this, Mill could be mistaken for a simple Enlightenment moralist 
who advocates triumphs of  intellectual virtue as a primary social good above all else. 
However this was precisely the theory of  knowledge that Mill took issue with, in particularly 
with regards to the positivist Auguste ComteÕs Ôlaw of  three stagesÕ, despite the two authorsÕ 
friendship (Mill 1977c: 851, Rosen 2013: 83, 98-110). Comte argued that the Þnal stage in the 
evolution of  rationality was that of  empirical positivism, a stage in which natural laws could 
be discovered through the use of  reason and observation (Comte 2009 [1853]: 1-4). Contra 
Comte, Mill does not deÞne genius as a property of  a rariÞed class of  elite thinkers, 
historicised as the high point of  intellectual thinking. Rather, genius is for Mill something 
 This is not to say that all ethical practices necessitate practices of  resistance, and there is no argument in this 179
chapter that implies the moral superiority of  practices of  resistance over other practices. Whilst it might be 
unethical for one person not to resist, this does not imply that somebody else can be disparaged for not resisting. 
Indeed it might be the case that resistance is, in some situations, unethical itself. What is ethical for one 
individual is not necessarily the case for another, and no argument is being made to justify comparison between 
two peopleÕs moral standing.
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which anyone could acquire, in greater or lesser amounts (Mill 1977c: 332) and, in this sense, 
was more akin to a metaphysical property of  individuals.  Furthermore, it is an idea within 180
a particular branch of  science: MillÕs idea of  genius is the idea to which the science of  
ethology should aim at, where ethology is deÞned as Ôthe science which corresponds to the art 
of  education; in the widest sense of  the term, including the formation of  national or collective 
character as well as the individualÕ (Mill 1977c: 869).  
RosenÕs example of  ethologyÕs particular relationship with education is useful in 
understanding the idea of  genius in context (Rosen 2013: 75). Whereas education is, for Mill, 
an art, he nevertheless speciÞes that Ôthe grounds, then, of  every rule of  art, are to be found in 
the theorems of  scienceÕ (Mill 1977c: 947). Whilst this was reßective of  philosophers and 
scientists in various disciplines during the Enlightenment (Rosen 2013: 77), scientiÞc practiceÐ
i.e. the development of  knowledge by which to function in the worldÐshould not be confused 
with the dominant mode of  doing so: empiricism. Whilst the empirical methodology has been 
criticised throughout this thesis (where it has not been wedded to DeleuzeÕs concern for the 
transcendental), the role of  science as a methodology to facilitate living in the world should 
not be underemphasised.   Indeed both Althusser and Deleuze advocate the necessity for 181
scientiÞc practice, as has already been shown.  Mill is also critical, albeit not to the same 182
extent as Deleuze and Althusser, of  the empirical method and is more interested in processes 
that determine contingent empirical laws. As he puts it in the Logic, Ôthe really scientiÞc truths, 
then, are not these empirical laws, but the causal laws which explain themÕ (Mill 1977c: 862). 
Ethology, for Mill, was thus an extension of  the critique of  BenthamÕs limited psychology to 
social theory and Ôstood logically between psychology and social science, preventing 
empirically based psychological principles from forming the basis of  social scienceÕ (Rosen 
2013: 74). Disagreeing with the thesis that humans shared universal psychological principles 
 Mill was openly hostile to metaphysics, praising Bentham for his Ôsystematic opposition to the explanation of  180
phenomena by ridiculous metaphysical entitiesÕ, and liked instead to talk of  a deductive form of  psychology 
(Grover 1992: 102, 108-109, Mill 1977c: 489). Nevertheless, in order to make deductive arguments from 
psychology (the methodology of  which is predominantly inductive), Mill had to make some ontological claims 
about the properties of  individuals that were not subject to the empirical method. As Robson clariÞes, he 
Ôseldom ventures into the hazy land between ontology and physiology, but when he does, it is clear that he sees 
the desire for liberty as a basic element in the human constitutionÕ (Robson 1968: 128 ff. 32).
 HeideggerÕs term Ôbeing-in-the-worldÕ, or ÔDaseinÕ is an idea, inherited from Hegel, that describes the 181
condition by which an individuals can take up a ÔrelationshipÕ with the world (Heidegger 2010 [1953]: 12: 84). 
Deleuze, on the other hand, does not conceptualise such an duality between Being (Dasein) and its 
phenomenological presentation (es gibt), but emphasis the role of  vitalist processes of  individuation both in and 
with life. 
 See Stengers (2011) for a discussion of  the importance of  science in the history of  materialist philosophy.182
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(an argument that developed from Aristotelian logic and expressed at the time most 
prominently by LockeÕs Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1841)), MillÕs science of  ethology 
was to develop an (ever changing) set of  concepts with which to understand how individuals 
and societies might maximise their ability to better themselves. The crucial distinction 
between Mill and the assumption that in order to better oneself  one must be able to imagine 
their best self  is that, for Mill, the norms by which the individual lives according to are 
determined by the situation one is in, and not a teleological conception of  the self. This 
understanding resonates closely with DeleuzeÕs, who identiÞes ethology as the group of  
studies which deÞne Ôbodies, animals, or humans by the affects they are capable of Õ (Deleuze 
1988b: 125). Because Mill recognised that both individuals and their social circumstances 
were more mutable than predictably stable, MillÕs emphasis on science was that it provided 
the grounds by which individuals could discover how they could be the happiest. In the context 
of  its application to education, MillÕs Greatest Happiness Principle (GHP) can be shone in a 
light that emphasises the importance of  genius. 
MillÕs GHP, as presented in Utilitarianism, Ôholds that actions are right in proportion as 
they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of  happiness. By 
happiness is intended pleasure, and the absence of  pain; by unhappiness, pain, and the 
privation of  pleasureÕ (Mill 1977a: 210). This principle could be read as if  it advocated 
happiness as an end in itself, thus placing Mill in line with BenthamÕs utilitarianism which 
advocated moral judgement based upon an individualÕs public or social conduct (Halliday 
1976: 58).  However, Mill saw BenthamÕs version of  utilitarianism as needlessly 183
judgemental, being only suitable for a philosophical guide for legislation, or legal reform at 
best (1976: 61). MillÕs concept of  happiness, by contrast, is not an evaluative concept by which 
to judge the individual, and he did not subscribe to the Benthamite hedonic calculus 
(Quinton 1989: 63).  Instead, Mill was concerned more with Ômental and emotional culture, 184
on the ability to pursue virtue for its own sake and on the disinterested growth of  concern for 
othersÕ (1989: 63). It makes no sense, as Mill argues in On Genius, for individuals to be judged 
on outcomes of  oneÕs actions if  those same individuals have not been allowed to develop their 
 BenthamÕs priority is shown in his statement that Ô[t]he greatest happiness of  all those whose interest is in 183
question is the right and proper, and the only right and proper and universally desirable, end of  human 
actionÕ (Bentham 1948 [1823]: 125). For Bentham, law should be primarily concerned with the restriction of  
harmful acts and the development of  happiness is a private matter (Quinton 1989: 29).
 This was a sevenfold list of  dimensions that Bentham developed to allow the measurement and comparison 184
of  pleasures and pains. The dimensions are intensity, duration, certainty, propinquity, fecundity, purity and 
extent. See Quinton (1989: 33-34) for an overview of  the calculus and its place in BenthamÕs moral philosophy.
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ability to make ethical decisions for themselves - how can one be judged morally for dutifully 
following moral laws by the same people that instruct them to do so? As Haddock clariÞes, it 
was important for Mill Ôthat an active citizenry should emerge, rather than a passive but 
contented populaceÕ (Haddock 2008: 184). Happiness and pain then do not indicate 
individualsÕ universal telos for Mill, but rather two guiding principles by which individuals can 
judge the best course of  action in any one situation, as that situation pertains to them.  The 185
GHP should be seen, not as a judgement upon individualsÕ actions, but as a functional maxim 
for practical reason. Individuals, as Mill elaborates in Utilitarianism, have an ethical duty to 
cultivate themselves, not as an end in itself  qua BenthamÕs moralistic philosophy, but in order 
to be the best that they can be in any given situation according to what is best for them in that 
situation. Contra to the traditional view of  Mill as an overbearing moralist, the emphasis upon 
individual self-improvement in MillÕs utilitarianism leads Halliday to conclude that ÔMill was 
both a romantic and a utilitarian, and he remains so throughout his lifeÕ (Halliday 1976: 64). 
MillÕs romanticism lies in his belief  that individuals can better themselves, not according to 
transcendental moral categories (qua Kant or Bentham), but according to their ability to 
develop themselves beyond their immediate means, situation and (perhaps most importantly) 
ability to think the truth of  their current situation. 
In light of  MillÕs romantic utilitarianism, contrasted against BenthamÕs, genius, as the 
ability to discover a new truth, loses its moralistic undertones and takes on an important 
ethical pragmatism. First, not a social status symbol often considered belonging to ivory tower 
philosophers, by genius Mill means Ônothing but a mind with capacity to knowÕ (Mill 1977c: 
334). There is no sense that genius is, for Mill, a level which the individual can claim to have 
reached and thus compare themselves to others. Secondly, neither is there a discipline that 
might necessarily afford an individual a higher level of  genius than another. Thirdly, genius, for 
Mill, cannot arrive from the discovery of  truths already known passed on ÔvicariouslyÕ, 
 With perhaps too personal a list of  desires, Quinton clariÞes the nature of  pleasure in MillÕs philosophy as 185
primary to the objects which gratify it: ÔWhat is desired is always some speciÞc thing: a glass of  wine, a good-
looking woman, a peerage. The achievement of  these objects is no doubt attended with pleasure, but it is the 
objects and not the pleasure that is desiredÕ (Quinton 1989: 61). MillÕs concept of  desire therefore is directly in 
line with DeleuzeÕs conceptualisation, as Quinton conÞrms by summarising that Ô[p]leasure, one might say, is not 
a stuff  but a relationÕ (1989: 61). Mill remains an Enlightenment thinker of  the rational individual, yet identiÞes 
desire as a primary drive of  rationality. Deleuze and Guattari begin Anti-Oedipus by deÞning desire as the primary 
productive force of  social (and therefore also singular, if  not individual) ÔmachinesÕ (Deleuze and Guattari 2004a: 
1-57). Despite the different registers in which they argue, Mill and Deleuze are nevertheless similar in this respect 
given DeleuzeÕs insistence that individualsÕ drives Ônever exist in a free and unbound state, nor are they ever 
merely individual; they are always arranged and assembled by the social formation in which we Þnd 
ourselvesÕ (Smith 2007: 71). SmithÕs article ÔDeleuze and the Question of  DesireÕ (2007) has an excellent account 
of  the role that desire plays in an immanent theory of  ethics.
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through instruction or from mimicry (Mill 1977b: 331). Mill makes a point to single out 
mathematics as an axiom from which discoveries can be deduced but not discovered; 
mathematicians cannot, for Mill, be geniuses unless they develop a new function/concept 
aside from the dominant axiomatic. Mill does accept that genius can be involved in learning 
from man-made objects, stating that genius is involved in the comprehension, without which a 
great work can only be ÔfeltÕ (1977c: 333).  The point of  MillÕs idea of  genius however is that 186
it is a function, that all individuals can express, which facilitates individuals developing both 
themselves to the best of  their ability and an awareness sensitive to social challenges that 
might occur (Mill 1977c: 339, 2002 [1859]: 28, 47-49). If  individuals are to be the best that 
they can be within any given situation, it follows for Mill that they must expand their 
knowledge of  the available courses of  action to the maximum possible extent. For this reason, 
genius is not a regulative dogma by which to comparatively appraise an individualÕs course of  
action. Rather, genius is an impetus, a necessary corollary to ethical action that demands of  
individuals that their actions are oriented to actively develop themselves. Whilst judgement 
only manifests as the mutually reciprocal relation between processes of  individual and 
mediators, nevertheless it is essential for mediators to be chosen. Thus, genius is the ethical 
imperative responsible for ensuring that the individualÕs thought is not dulled or stultiÞed, as 
Mill and Deleuze are keen to guard against. 
Returning to the art of  education then, the foundation of  art upon science is not, for 
Mill, motivated by a necessity to revive a mechanical theory of  the passions, such as that 
found in Hobbes (see Hobbes 1996 [1651]: ch. 1). In order to guide individual (i.e. personsÕ or 
social institutionsÕ) progress, Mill does not attempt to secure an understanding of  the subject 
which could then function as a transcendental guarantor for correct moral practice; there is 
no idea of  the universal or generic human in MillÕs thought that would underpin a judgement 
of  the right over the good (such as can be found in the work of  Kant). De Beauvoir describes 
this form of  morality in The Ethics of  Ambiguity, stating that, 
Ô[w]e may call this attitude aesthetic because the one who adopts it claims to 
have no other relation with the world than that of  detached contemplation; 
outside of  time and far from men, he faces history, which he thinks he does 
not belong to, like a pure beholding; this impersonal version equalises all 
situations; it apprehends them only in the indifference of  their differences; it 
excludes any preferenceÕ (Beauvoir 2011: 68). 
  Mill makes an offhand remark which creates a strange and entirely undeveloped distinction suggesting 186
ÔconceptiveÕ genius is sometimes a Ôhigher faculty than creativeÕ (Mill 1977c: 333).
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For de Beauvoir, an aesthetic attitude constitutes a ÔwithdrawalÕ from the present and a 
Ôpure contemplationÕ (Beauvoir 2011: 69-70). Rather than considering the effects of  their 
action in relation to a deÞnite situation, individuals simply act on what they perceive is 
ÒcorrectÓ. Deleuze describes this phenomena either the Ôdogmatic, orthodox or moral imageÕ 
of  thought, characterising it as the philosophical position whereby Ôthought has an afÞnity 
with the true; it formally possesses the true and materially wants the trueÕ (Deleuze 2011 
[1994]: 167).  Mill maintained a differentiation in thought, recognising that science was the 187
classiÞcation of  causes, whereas art was the classiÞcation of  effects (Halliday 1976: 86). Whilst 
the rules of  art presuppose the truths of  science for Mill (1976: 77), nevertheless science 
cannot give the individual a rulebook for practice because it lacks the ability to think the 
effects of  action. It is only through artistic practice that individuals can develop themselves, 
not through passive aesthetic contemplation, but by the active engagement in situations. 
Whether this be the art of  education, or otherwise in the ÔArt of  LifeÕ as he developed in the 
Logic (1976: 60-61), ethology develops rules for action, that are based upon laws developed by 
science, and which are then applied to the social. As Mill wrote in the Logic: 
ÔThe art proposes to itself  an end to be attained, deÞnes the end, and hands it 
over to the science. The science receives it, considers it as a phenomenon or 
effect to be studied, and having investigated its causes and conditions, sends 
it back to art with a theorem of  the combinations of  circumstances by which 
it could be produced. Art then examines these combinations of  
circumstances, and according as any of  them are or are not in human power, 
pronounces the end attainable or not. The only one of  the premises, therefore, 
which Art supplies, is the original major premise, which asserts that the 
attainment of  the given end is desirable. Science then lends to Art the 
proposition (obtained by a series of  inductions or of  deductions) that the 
performance of  certain actions will attain the end. From these premises Art 
concludes that the performance of  these actions is desirable, and Þnding it 
also practicable, converts the theorem into a rule or preceptÕ (Mill 1977c: 
944-945). 
The repetition of  genius 
Deleuze, whilst not subordinating art under science, shares with Mill an understanding 
of  art that means artistic practice is needed to break through otherwise homogenising and 
 Mill draws on a similar point when he praised the German astronomer Herschel for doing the contrary, and 187
appreciating the necessity to understand the individualÕs practice within a given situation. For Mill, Herschel 
demonstrates Ôthe superiority of  science over empiricism under the name of  common senseÐthe advantage of  
systematic investigation, and higher general cultivation of  the intellectÕ (Mill 1831: 179).
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standardising social practices. Whilst Mill talks of  the Ôcollective mediocrityÕ of  men (meaning 
groups of  people without the ability to value things, such as their own development, who 
therefore conform to authority) (Mill 2002 [1859]: 55), Deleuze writes that the Ômore our 
daily life appears standardised, stereotyped and subject to an accelerated reproduction of  
objects of  consumption, the more art must be injected into it in order to extract from it that 
little difference which plays simultaneously between other levels of  repetitionÕ (Deleuze 2011 
[1994]: 365). Indeed, throughout DeleuzeÕs oeuvre, he is concerned that thought is subject to 
pressures that enforce its constancy and mute its affective potential (May 1991: 30). In Proust 
and Signs, Deleuze introduces the concept of  ÒprofundityÓ to signify the richness of  a 
practicesÕ signs and to understand the affectivity of  various practices on the individual. 
Deleuze lists Þve types of  signs that make up Ôdifferent worlds, worldly signs, empty signs, 
deceptive signs of  love, sensuous material signs, and lastly the  essential signs of  art (which 
transform others)Õ (Deleuze 2008 [1964]: 14).  Both Mill and Deleuze therefore are 188
concerned with exploring how practices of  individuation are related to other individuals and 
practices that can either intensify their own process of  individuation or abate them.   The 189
idea of  genius provides, as a response to technologies and practices that attempt to stiße 
creativityÐand thus the ability of  the individual to individuate themselves as profoundly as 
they otherwise mightÐthe imperative by which to guard against such efforts. 
This can be made clear by contrast with BadiouÕs theory of  ethics: the idea of  genius is 
the impetus necessary for overcoming BadiouÕs radical differentiation between thought and 
extension. As discussed in chapter one, Badiou appropriates SpinozaÕs concept of  
Òperseverance in BeingÓ, in order to claim that the individual claims Þdelity to the truth event 
to become a militant of  the truth procedure. However, Žižek shows the circularity of  BadiouÕs 
 In Difference and Repetition, the most profound signs of  Proust and Signs, those of  art, are known as intensity. See 188
(Massumi 1995) for a description of  how intensity, also known as affect, is tempered by its differential 
relationship with other signs or, as Massumi puts it, structure. As he puts it in one example, Ô[l]anguage, though 
head-strong, is not simply in opposition to intensity. It would seem to function differentially in relation to 
itÕ (1995: 86). Deleuze does not wish to set up any opposition of  one sign to another because Ôeach type of  sign 
has its particular line, it participates in the other lines as well, encroaches on them as it developsÕ (Deleuze 2008 
[1964]: 56). Instead, Deleuze is more interested in explaining their differential relations and asking which, in a 
given situation, is the most affective.
 Expressing DeleuzeÕs philosophy of  life, Braidotti puts it differently, claiming that Ôour fundamental drive 189
(conatus) is to express the potency of  life (potentia), by joining forces with other ßows of  becomingÕ (Braidotti 2006: 
153). In contrast, Boltanski and Chiapello in The New Spirit of  Capitalism (2005, 2007), analyse corporate 
management texts in order to demonstrate the change from Fordist corporate work structures towards more ßuid 
business practices, at the cost of  material and psychological security. Far from celebrating the emphasis on 
creativity and expression in poststructuralist texts, the authors criticise poststructuralism for, at the very least, not 
providing sufÞcient resistance to capitalism or, at worst, being actively complicit in its dominance. See also 
Raunig (2013), who encounters Deleuze and Guattari critically with the authors of  the Frankfurt School to 
create a philosophy of  Ôresistance and solidarity in the commonÕ (Majewska 2015).
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argument, in that it is only by virtue of  an already-subjectively engaged individual (i.e. some-
one who is already a militant) that an individual can pay Þdelity to a truth procedure. The 
radical disjunction between truth and doxa within BadiouÕs meta-ontology prohibits Badiou 
from explaining adequately how and why individuals pay Þdelity. This is to say that Badiou 
cannot explain why the individual would be impelled to become a militant in the Þrst place. 
MillÕs ethology however, and the idea of  genius, provide the key to understanding what 
motivates the individual to pay Þdelity to a particularly truth procedure, but only through 
making the idea of  the truth procedure profane. By investigating and synthesising the best 
available courses of  action in a presented situation, ethology provides a range of  possible 
options for the individual to individualise as their art of  life. Of  course, for Badiou, the ÒtrueÓ 
course of  action is not a rationally determined pathway per se, but is determined by a 
militantÕs Þdelity to a truth event that is forced through subsequent situations. This might 
seem to cause a problem for ethology because it requires ethology to conceptualise ethical 
practices that do not involve rational/subjective decision making. However ethology, or the 
science of  the causes of  individual practice, does not limit what determines the options that 
individuals have to choose from for their artistic practice; there is no reason as to why Þdelity 
to an event should not be a preferable course of  action, provided that there is no rareÞcation of  
this one event to a higher level, or expression, of  Being than any other event. 
In fact, it might just be that Þdelity to an event is precisely what is in the individualÕs best 
interestÐi.e. it is ethically good for the individualÐif  that Þdelity also affords the individual 
with the possibility of  knowing how to maximise their ability to individuate in the future to 
come. Furthermore, under the same conditions, it might be the case that it is appropriate to 
force the consequences of  an event through subsequent circumstances. And yet, given 
DeleuzeÕs repudiation of  dogmatic concepts and the image of  thought, neither Þdelity nor 
forcing can be thought of  as good in themselves, a priori of  the process of  individuation. 
Deleuze explicitly warns agains the dangers of  such ÔaristocraticÕ thought, stating that Ôit is 
not a question of  saying what few think and knowing what it means to thinkÕ (Deleuze 2011 
[1994]: 165). If  ethics is a necessary function within the process of  individuationÐi.e. the Þrst 
passive and active syntheses select ideas and relations from the second syntheses to 
individuate, and this implies choosing what is best in a given situationÐthen ideas must be 
selected ethically according to the principle of  genius. This is what Deleuze means when, 
from his criticism of  aristocratic thought, he calls for for ÔsomeoneÐif  only oneÐwith the 
necessary modesty not managing to know what everybody knows, and modestly denying what 
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everybody is supposed to recogniseÕ (2011 [1994]: 165). That said, it is possible, yet perhaps 
unlikely, that a particular set of  ideas to be forced fulÞls the imperative to experiment that 
Deleuze implores. Whilst neither the principle of  genius, nor DeleuzeÕs encouragement to 
experiment, necessarily implies that a certain position shouldnÕt be pursued through changing 
circumstances, the ramiÞcation that, for Deleuze, each new situation is a different variation 
does imply that the militant should reconsider the ethical course of  action. 
Mediated genius 
If  there is one thing necessary to shore up an account of  genius as the ethical imperative 
in DeleuzeÕs thought, it is to explain the relation between genius and mediation in terms of  
the ontology of  individuation as developed in the previous chapter. In particular, there is a 
danger in discussing MillÕs philosophy that one lapses back into subject-orientated concepts 
and the idealism of  rational choice theory. This would be to fall back into the problem that 
MacKenzie highlights, i.e. Ômediators becoming surreptitious creatorsÕ (Mackenzie 2004: 69). 
Secondly, there is a danger when discussing the importance of  genius that it leads the 
individual to develop knowledge for the sake of  knowledge, or to do things for the sake of  
being active. This second concern can be dealt with simply: there is indeed a danger for the 
knowledge developed by ethology to be useless, but only if  use is measured by what is 
practiced by the individual. To put this in terms of  the syntheses of  time discussed in the 
previous chapter: the second synthesis of  time constitutes memory as the pure past, and thus 
forms the transcendental conditions for individuation (Hughes 2009: 106-107). Given that, as 
has been argued, expanding the possibility to learn constitutes the Deleuzian ethical 
imperative, it might stand to reason that simply learning all that is possible about the world, 
or exploring all there is to explore, is good for the individual. However, this conclusion would 
ignore the fact that signs ÔforceÕ processes of  individuation, as well as the relations that 
processes of  individuation have with the virtual structure. In other words, because individuals 
are only judged according to DeleuzeÕs consequentialist logic (i.e. based on the effect they 
have upon themselves, other individuals, practices and institutions), knowledge and activity 
mean nothing by themselves. It is only when knowledge is used in order to ask and address 
interesting or useful questionsÐi.e. it makes a difference (Mackenzie 2004: 91)Ðthat it becomes 
good. Braidotti conÞrms this when she writes elaborately that Ôthe point of  fusion between the 
self  and his/her habitat, the cosmos as a whole [É] marks the point of  evanescence of  the 
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self  and its replacement by a living nexus of  multiple interconnections that empower not the 
self, but the collective; not identity, but afÞrmative subjectivity; not consciousness, but 
afÞrmative interconnectionsÕ (Braidotti 2006: 154). In short, ethology  necessitates a form of  
the multivalue consequentialism that May develops in The Moral Theory of  Poststructuralism 
(1995), but one that does not raise normative judgement to the moral level. Individuals 
undertake ethical practices based upon their affective embodiment in a situation and their 
prioritisation of  the multiple effects they may have upon themselves and their surroundings.  190
The Þrst concern requires a more elaborate response, and one that will prove 
unsatisfactory when looking for quick and easy practices of  resistance. MacKenzie warns of  
the danger that the idea of  mediators brings, i.e. the notion of  creativity whereby a mediator 
chooses the most preferable from an actually-existing set of  options. Of  course, this is not 
really creation at all, because it implies creation has already happened. As MacKenzie puts it, 
once a Ôdifference is made the logic of  pure difference is surpassed by a logic of  identity-in-
differenceÕ (Mackenzie 2004: 71). In other words, possibilities do not actually exist because in 
order for them to do so they would have to have been subject to a process of  individuation. 
The possibility would be actual, not possible, and would in fact be identiÞable as the course of  
action having already been taken. All this implies that there is a danger in presuming that the best 
course of  action is the one that is already available to the individual or, as MacKenzie puts it, 
if  Ôthe real is given as that which has occurred in the past, then the possible is that which 
merely conÞrms the real as a given totalityÕ (Mackenzie 2004: 75). 
Yet there is nothing in either MillÕs or DeleuzeÕs ideas of  ethology that would hint at an 
underlying presumption that all that could be done is set out in memory. Rather, MillÕs idea 
of  genius acknowledges that there is a constant necessity to learn new ways to understand and 
act in a world in which every new situation presents different challenges to pre-conceived 
knowledge. Hence MillÕs emphasis on originality: Ô[t]he man of  the greatest  philosophic 
genius does no more than this, evinces no higher faculty; whoever thinks at all, thinks to that 
extent,  originallyÕ (Mill 1977c: 332). Deleuze also refutes such a presumption in various 
 John Protevi has conceptualised the affective relations involved in processes of  individuation and cognitive 190
science (2010), as well as those that relate the subject to its social relations and the processes that constitute it 
(2009). The 4EA (embodied, embedded, enacted, extended, and affective) group is particularly interesting for its 
development of  a non-reductive and non-idealist form of  cognitive science. Chemero (2009) is excellent for its 
clear exposition of  the beneÞts that 4EA conceptualisation has over traditional theories of  mind. Research in the 
Þeld of  affective cognition has also been undertaken by Connolly (2002, 2013), Bennett (2004) and 
Kleinherenbrink (2014), who foregrounds the importance of  thinking gender dynamics in cognitive science.
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different ways across Difference and Repetition. MacKenzieÕs account of  a pure critique draws on 
DeleuzeÕs refutation of  the problem, and renders it as follows: 
ÔThe problem with this understanding of  creativity is that it is self-
contradictory. If  the real is given as that which has occurred in the past, then 
the possible is that which merely conÞrms the real as a given totality. In 
short, there would be no possibility of  true novelty or creativity, as these 
would be reduced to mere repetitions of  the same reality that is already 
assumed as historically given for all timeÕ (Mackenzie 2004: 75).  191
It is clear that, whilst the the past has to be taken as historyÐindeed this is the task of  the 
second synthesisÐnevertheless this history must be understood as the real, virtual conditions of  
individuation and not possibility. As Deleuze enigmatically puts it, Ô[t]he possible has no 
reality (although it may have an actuality); conversely, the virtual is not actual, but as such 
possesses a realityÕ (Deleuze 1991 [1988]: 96). In order to solve this problem, all that is necessary 
is to be reminded of  the differential calculus as discussed in the previous chapter. 
The virtual, for Deleuze, is the differential structure of  singular Ideas in a relation of  
potentiality to one another. Processes of  individuation are expressed following the reciprocal 
determination of  differential relations (dx/dy), where a series is individuated according to a 
functional variation in a relation, y = f(x). As explained in the previous chapter, the abscissa 
dx is populated by an inÞnite number of  singular points which are the as-yet undetermined, 
yet perfectly determinable, points for new series.  So, whilst some series will be determined 192
and individuated passively, forming what Deleuze calls in another register the second, passive 
synthesis of  time, there are also singular points within this synthesis which determine the 
further potential for individuation (Deleuze 2011 [1994]: 130). These points are what Deleuze 
calls the extensive differences of  identity (as opposed to intensive differences) and are deÞned 
as such by the active syntheses which use them to determine linear relations (Bell 2015: 32). 
This explains the reality of  the virtual: the inÞnite number of  singular points upon the 
 Clearly, MacKenzie uses the term ÒrealÓ in a different manner than Chambers, for whom imaginary ideology 191
is the set of  relations that afÞxes the social relations of  real individuals to other individuals and social institutions. 
MacKenzie elsewhere discusses the relationship between the real and ideology in Deleuze and RicÏur, pointing 
out Deleuze and GuattariÕs declaration in A Thousand Plateaus that Ôthere is no ideology and never has 
beenÕ (Deleuze and Guattari 2004b: 5, MacKenzie 2012). Deleuze and Guattari go on to state that, in fact, Ôall 
that consists is RealÕ (Deleuze and Guattari 2004b: 77). As MacKenzie suggests, more work must be done on 
DeleuzeÕs relationship with ideology (see also Porter (2006)), however it is safe to say that MacKenzie uses the 
term here only to refer to what, in Negotiations, Deleuze refers to as ÔhistoryÕ: Ôjust the set of  more or less negative 
preconditions that make it possible to experiment with something beyond historyÕ (Deleuze 1995: 170).
 Bell (2015) provides an excellent commentary on the concept of  inÞnity in DeleuzeÕs use of  calculus and 192
philosophy more generally.
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abscissaÐwhether it is differential or directly determinedÐare not actualised, but do 
nevertheless form the conditions of  determination.  Both directly determined and 193
differentially determined pointsÐanywhere along the axisÐare available for individuation, thus 
explaining the importance of  experimentation for Deleuze. Put simply, whilst Ideas can 
always be looked to in order to provide guidance for future action, Deleuze shows how Ideas 
are contingent upon relations that happened in a past present, a present that has itself  been 
synthesised in the past (Deleuze 1991 [1988]: 98). There are therefore three possibilities for 
resistance in the face of  a real situation: hold onto an idea and actualise it in the new situation 
(always in the understanding that no course of  action will repeat identically the next time); 
throw caution to the wind and create a new series by ignoring (to the best of  oneÕs ability) the 
lessons that the past can teach; or tactically experimenting with what one already knows. The 
principle of  genius impels the individual to expand the range of  Ideas that they may 
experiment with, on the understanding that this knowledge comes about from original, 
creative practice in the world (Mill 1977c: 336). This does not mean that, by reading enough 
books or doing enough things, an individual could simply know everything there is to know, 
because this presumes that nothing else in the world would change but them. However, 
ethology does teach the individual cautiously and pragmatically experiment in the face of  
different situations, tactically choosing options that supplement and liberate the individual 
from that which attempts to homogenise and conÞne them.  194
 When Deleuze argues that Ôthe possible is that which is realisedÕ (Deleuze 1991 [1988]: 96-97), he is referring 193
to the active synthesis of  resemblance having compared an actual development to its virtual idea and creating a 
series from this comparison.
 In arguing for ethical, as opposed to moral, practices of  resistance, individuation has been foregrounded in 194
favour of  the discussion of  collective practice. Both these focuses call for further work to be carried out with 
regards to the more explicitly normative thought of  authors inspired by Deleuze, such as Patton, as well as those 
who are not: Arendt, Butler and members of  the Frankfurt School. This work might investigate these thinkersÕ 
emphasis on space (as opposed to both space and time) from the perspective of  the ethically oriented ontology 
developed in this thesis. Further work could also expand the focus on individuation to that of  the collective and, 
with this in mind, developing the work of  Haraway and LloydÕs concept of  Ôinessential collectivesÕ (Lloyd 2005) 
could prove particularly important in the light of  contemporary politicsÕ ÒdividuatingÓ practices (see Deleuze 
(1992b)). A third strand of  research might investigate whether or not Deleuze departed from his interest in 
metaphysics when he started working with Guattari for Capitalism and Schizophrenia. What are the stakes at play in 
the change of  tenor from the ontology of  ideas in Difference and Repetition to the political philosophy of  machinic 
ideas such as the ÒrhizomeÓ, ÒplateausÓ, Òde/reterritorialisationÓ, and ÒsexualityÓ? What are the implications of  
any changes for practices of  resistance, given the discussion of  their ontological fundaments in this thesis?
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Conclusion  
No doubt resistance involves the drafting of  battle plans, tactics and goals. It involves 
negotiating the complex power relations, intertwining desires and vested interests that 
overdetermine the social formation at the same time as they are produced by it. The goal of  
practices of  resistance is a projection of  what Badiou terms a ÔhypothesisÕ (Badiou 2013c) that 
pushes into the future a synthesises of  what is known of  the real and the acknowledgement 
that this knowledge is insufÞcient. The activist knows that the outcome of  efforts to resist is 
unknowable, but that one nevertheless must, as Marx afÞrmed to a reporter on the Dover 
cliffs, struggle (Hamad 2015: 142). When faced with a situation that compels one to ask with 
Engels Ôwhat is to be done?Õ, how might the individual act well? In particular, how might one 
avoid EngelsÕ prediction that ÔÒ[d]ogmatism, doctrinairismÓ [is] the inevitable retribution that 
follows the violent strait-lacing of  thoughtÕ (Lenin 1961 [1902]: pt. 1D)? 
The problem is, as has been shown, not as simple as even the most careful reading of  
situations might present. BadiouÕs analysis shows that the apparent reality of  a situation often 
misleads the individual into political action that is against their true nature. The state of  the 
situation is such that, for Badiou, the individual can only reproduce the structures of  power in 
which they are immersed without a certain moment that breaks their pattern of  thought. 
Everything must be ignored to the beneÞt of  the enlightenment bestowed upon the individual 
by this event, for how can one act upon knowledge that he or she knows is misleading? In this, 
Badiou could not be a clearer advocate of  ideological interpolation, but on his own terms. 
Whilst Badiou accounts for the nature of  Being that emerges from the event as unknowable, 
Þdelity to it is the subjectÕs acknowledgement that events count for more than what individuals 
are otherwise; the subject becomes the militant, BadiouÕs account of  what it is to be Ôworthy 
of  the eventÕ (Deleuze 2004 [1969]: 149) and truthfully a participant of  politics (Boundas 
2006). A quasi-religious summons to bear out its consequences, the political event at once asks 
and answers EngelsÕ question, elevating belief  from the status of  doxa to truth. 
Much is at stake however when so much faith is placed in the event, and particularly if  
that eventÕs truth is afÞrmed by negation. How might one read a situation if  nothing is 
subtracted from it to reveal the clarity of  truth? Both Althusser and Deleuze, to differing 
conclusions, argue that it is necessary to make sense of  a situation, rather than Þnd truth 
hidden within it (Althusser and Balibar 1970: 52, Deleuze 2015 [1956-7]: 24). For Althusser, a 
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sense of  a situation depends on what type of  situation one is in, or at least what questions are 
being asked of  it. AlthusserÕs Reading Capital anticipates DeleuzeÕs argument in Difference and 
Repetition in which he claims that, Ô[t]he formulation of  a problem is merely the theoretical 
expression of  the conditions which allow a solution already produced outside the process of  
knowledgeÕ (Deleuze 2011 [1994]: 198, cf. Althusser and Balibar 1970: 52). The sense of  a 
situation when confronted by a policeman will, of  course, differ in kind from an encounter 
with a work of  art. The importance of  AlthusserÕs work to this thesis then is that he 
encourages the individual to ask questions of  their relations to different social practices. He 
forms the grounds of  an immanent political sociology in which the effects of  social practices 
of  the individual (and vice versa) are understood as separate, yet in affective, differential 
relation with each other. Further work might be done to draw out the importance of  his 
promissory Notes, the differential relation of  discourses and the relations between science, 
philosophy and art as developed in the works of  Deleuze, Brassier and Meillassoux. 
The importance of  the encounter with(in) a situation is also important for Deleuze, who 
argues that encounters do violence to the individualÕs understanding of  the world, a violence 
that challenges memory to account for the difference presented to it (Bryant 2008: 77, 
Deleuze 2008 [1964]: 16). Following an encounter with(in) a situation, individuals struggle to 
account for their relation with it, and what they should do next. The aim of  this struggle 
however, again, depends on the affective characteristics of  the situation: against BadiouÕs 
claim that commitment to the event determines the true course of  action regardless of  the 
situation (but only for the militant), both Althusser and Deleuze argue that all life matters, and 
that the goals that individuals set are not preÞgured by their status as one particular actor. As 
this thesis has argued, there is no rariÞed social position to ally oneself  with, and BadiouÕs 
militant practices are simply one amongst many practices of  resistance that are possible 
according to AlthusserÕs and DeleuzeÕs philosophies. 
However, if  AlthusserÕs work conceptualises the differential relations between typologies 
of  social practices then, in his haste to remove all forms of  idealism and Ôabsolute historicismÕ 
from his philosophy (Althusser and Balibar 1970: 119), Althusser re-introduces it with the idea 
of  the void. Breaking the persistence of  ideas through time in the social formation, AlthusserÕs 
structuralism becomes a series of  static ruptures, disconnected from each other. DeleuzeÕs 
structuralism however, inheriting the modiÞed ideas of  relations from Hume and time from 
Bergson, accounts for the passing of  time and both the determination and constitution of  
structures. By demonstrating both the passive and active relations of  ideas, both with 
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themselves and with time itself, Deleuze accounts for how ideas persist both through and in 
time. In developing this reading of  Deleuze and Althusser, this thesis provides an ontology 
proper to structuralism, and accounts for how processes of  individuation account for the 
persistence and variation of  structures in the social formation. What does this mean for what 
and how the individual might resist?  
In practices of  resistance, the individual takes stock of  their situation and what they 
know of  how they have come to be there. Having been forced to make sense of  a situation, as 
has been argued, ethics is an ontological property of  individuation, which is always-already 
ethical.  Whether they like it or not, individuals are already enmeshed in the social 195
dynamics and relations of  power, and the concept of  ethology in both MillÕs and DeleuzeÕs 
work testiÞes to the challenges that this immersion brings with it. It is not simply that the 
individual can refuse to make ethical decisions: as de Beauvoir argued, Ô[t]here is no way for a 
man to escape from this worldÕ, and solipsism belies the fact that an individualÕs choice to 
avoid decision making is an ethical decision itself  (Beauvoir 2011: 67-70). Likewise, a 
dogmatic appeal to idealist principles denegates the grounds upon which these principles are 
built in the presupposition that they are benevolent. In line with DeleuzeÕs criticism of  both 
good and common sense, there is nothing necessarily benevolent about the world and the way 
in which individuals exist in it. This thesis has argued that individuals should not assume that 
either ideas or ideals work for their beneÞt. Instead, the practice of  ethology and the idea of  
genius can guide the individual in understanding how to better him or herself  within different 
situations. 
The idea of  genius is, then, the function of  ethical individuation that impels individuals 
to distinguish themselves from within situations, which would otherwise dampen their 
potential. However, this is not to encourage solipsism under another name, and the individual 
is not conceptualised as counter to the other. Furthermore, individualsÕ practices of  resistance 
do not have to occur against the other, but can be understood as functioning with it, harnessing 
the potential contained within situations. As Nietzsche argued, there is no suggestion that 
NietzscheÕs bird of  prey is morally superior to the lamb, and indeed there is no comparison of  
one against the other (The Genealogy of  Morals in Nietzsche 2014: 1: ¤13). Rather, 
NietzscheÕs point, which is echoed by DeleuzeÕs ethics, is simply that the bird of  prey will be 
itself, as the lamb will be a lamb: Ô[t]o demand of  strength that it not express itself  as strength, 
 In a seminar he gave in 1980, Deleuze asked why Spinoza titled his book on ontology ÒEthicsÓ (Deleuze 195
1980), before explaining that ethics is an unfolding of  ontology itself. 
"180
that it not be a will to overwhelm, a will to topple, a will to become master, a thirst for 
enemies and obstacles and triumphs, is just as absurd as demanding of  weakness, that it 
express itself  as strengthÕ (2014: 1: ¤13). Practices of  resistance are conceptualised contra the 
other, taking the other into account and amplifying, multiplying and transforming its potential 
within a situation. The question that the activist will ask of  him or herself  then, when posing 
a question devoid of  dogma is, Ògiven the situation in which I am, with the potential futures I 
both know and donÕt know, what is to be done?Ó. The idea of  genius reminds the individual 
that there is always more to learn, more relations to create and enrich, and more problems to 
face. In this light, individuals learn to become the best they can be, in a cautious, yet 
pragmatic, struggle.  
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